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Abstract 
Writing his Habilitationsschrift as a young man in the late 1950’s, future 
Pontiff Joseph Ratzinger opined that, when St. Bonaventure composed his Collationes 
in Hexaëmeron in the spring of 1273, not since St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei 
contra Paganos had the world seen such a ground-breaking work on the logos of 
history. 
 Indeed, Ratzinger has much in common with his thirteenth-century predecessor: 
both led tumultuous lives intellectually and practically, lives which demanded 
prudence in the extreme. Such vicissitudes, in fact, impacted and shaped their 
respective theologies of history in riveting ways. Both, moreover, faced challenges 
coming from both science and novel eschatologies. 
 At issue in Bonaventure’s historical work is the widespread assumption, rooted in 
the newly “rediscovered” Aristotle, that history is unintelligible. For Bonaventure, 
deeply committed to historia salutis narrated in Scripture, this stance is however 
unacceptable. Here I show how mythos mediates the difference between science and 
history, yielding a non-positivistic approach to history. 
 But this history: is it static or progressive? Building on the dynamics of Plato’s 
Divided Line, I show that the days of creation, narrated by Bonaventure, structure 
both history and thought. Progressive though it be, on this journey the destination 
nevertheless returns back to its origin in a non-identical repetition ending on a higher 
plane. Yet the journey, crucially, must encompass the dimension of human affect, for 
both thinkers insist that, in order to reach our divine destination, our passions must be 
transfigured. 
 In the end these common features of mind and history must apply to the whole, on 
the largest possible scale. If history is a story, it has beginning and eschatological end. 
In the spirit of Bonaventure and Ratzinger, I insist that history and hence eschatology, 
finally, have a recognizable form. 
 What is the logos of history? It turns out that it is mythos. 
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Introduction 
I. There and back again: a word about method 
 At the end of Book VI of Plato’s Republic, Socrates provides the second of three 
images in an attempt to convey to his interlocutors something of the meaning of “the 
Good, the True, and the Beautiful.” As in the final figure he imagines (that of the 
Cave), in the image of the Divided Line, Socrates has in mind something of a process, 
a movement, a journey of the mind. It is as if he wants his interlocutors within the 
dialogue (just as Plato wants his readers) to begin at the bottom of the line, and then 
move up through the successive elements or segments of the line, up to the point of 
ultimate knowing, simultaneously the point of ultimate being. Now, the four stages or 
phases or segments on the line (from the bottom to the top) are as follows: eikasia, 
pistis, dianoia, and noêsis. I understand these, respectively, as 
1. the reception of images by means of visual sense perception, and the 
concomitant grasping of such images by the mind; 
2. the trust, or faith, that these images, now perceived in the mind, are actually 
real objects in the world;1 
3. reasoning, or the process of taking various elements received in the first two 
phases, and “putting them together” (and “taking them apart”) in various 
logical ways that, in the context of some kind of argumentation, fruitfully 
generate demonstrable conclusions; and 
4. ultimate recognition. Noêsis, from the Greek word for mind, nous, is distinct 
from reasoning (dianoia) in that it is not a process of synthesis and analysis. 
Rather, it is the result of the latter, and as such it is a simple beholding. It is a 
restful gaze, a comprehensive vision of some object of the mind, a beholding 
that is possible only because the intellectual labor of the previous stages has 
been completed. 
 Now, what is going on here, in this image of the Divided Line? What is Plato 
getting at? It is not so much that he is simply advocating a method of investigation or 
 
1Philosopher Corneulius Castoriadis calls this trust “ontological assuredness.” Cornelius Castoriadis, 
“The Discovery of Imagination,” in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, 
and the Imagination, tr. David Ames Curtis (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997), 218. Closely related is 
William Desmond’s “preobjective community of mindfulness and being.” See William Desmond, 
“Being, Determination, and Dialectic: on the Sources of Metaphysical Thinking,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 48, no. 4 (June 1995): 762. This phrase of Desmond’s also occurs in the reproduction of 
the above text in The William Desmond Reader, ed. Christopher Ben Simpson (Albany: State Univ. of 
New York Press, 2012), 3–4, at 3. 
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discovery. It’s not, that is, as if he is saying, “If you want to grow in your knowledge, 
then you should implement this method.” Rather, it’s more as if he is providing a 
description of how the human mind already works, how it actually functions, given 
(what seems to be) its structure, or the structure of knowing. Put philosophically, one 
can say that in this image of the Divided Line, Plato is giving a phenomenological 
description of how human knowing occurs. We don’t have to try to think this way, 
any more than we have to try to open up our mouths and speak (for example, when 
one needs someone’s help to accomplish some task), any more than we have to try to 
eat (or to chew food) when we are corporeally hungry. And yet, even though he is not, 
strictly speaking, advocating a philosophical method per se, still, attentiveness to the 
structure of this process can open up new vistas for improving one’s approach to 
philosophical investigation. There is great benefit in “laying bare” the structure of 
human thought, as Plato does here, for the journey of growing in (self-)awareness. 
 One can say, in other words, that the human mind has a natural inclination toward 
this process of mindful self-becoming. The human mind has this, and the human mind 
is this, the conatus essendi2 which, insofar as it is a development toward 
comprehensiveness is also a striving toward full universality. It is, indeed, 
peregrinatio from the particular to the universal.3 
 One of the most important structural features which the Divided Line lays bare— 
centuries of subsequent philosophical and theological tradition allow one 
retrospectively to see this—is that the final moment in the schema is a kind of return 
to the first—or, to the first two, taken together as a whole. One can, that is, take the 
first two moments of eikasia and pistis together such that, as a total unit, they 
constitute the actual “grasping” or apprehension of real objects in the world. One 
could regard this composite unity as “moment one.” “Moment two,” then, would be 
the process of dianoia, the time-laden process of moving serially through individual 
 
2 On the conatus essendi, see William Desmond, The Intimate Universal (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2016), 420.  
3 And yet, as Desmond points out, the mindful journey envisioned by Plato’s Line never eclipses the 
individual, for it is always the particular philosopher—a particular soul with a particular body—which 
is progressing toward the top. “… there is a side to the Platonic quest for the universal that returns us to 
the singularity of those seeking the universal. We see this most especially in the person of Socrates…. 
The Platonic quest shows itself mindful of the metaxu, the space between the intimacy of singular soul 
and the universality of the forms….” Desmond, Intimate Universal, 4. This qualification—intended 
clearly to eschew any kind of hardened dualism in my reading of Plato and Platonism—bears upon 
several subsequent moments in this essay, not least the “faithful comportment” of Bonaventure which I 
treat in chapter 4.  
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elements, taking them together and possibly (at a later stage) taking them apart. 
(Thomas Aquinas calls this activity componere et dividere.) Each of these earlier 
stages, however, is directed to the final moment, the third phase, of the entire process: 
noêsis, the simple (intellectual) beholding of some object of the mind. But the 
important point for our purposes here is to see how this final moment is a “return” to, 
a kind of recapitulation of, the first moment. The sense perception of sight, when 
coupled with pistis, is the visual grasping or recognition of an object: unlike a time-
laden process, it takes place in a sudden flash of insight, in “one fell swoop.”4 Such is 
the case as well for the final moment in the line. Noêsis, for Plato (and Platonists of 
all stripes who include themselves in the tradition he inaugurated), is a kind of 
intellectual grasping, a kind of beholding. It is not a movement through a series of 
elements, but rather, it is a restful gaze before  
some intellectual vision. In this regard, it is like that initial moment of visual 
perception, but more so. It is a kind of repetition of the initial moment, but on a higher 
plane. 
 In another of Plato’s dialogues, this one much shorter  than the Republic, we sense 
a similar resonance. In the Meno we find ourselves listening in on a conversation, a 
dialogue, among three characters (so, really, it is more of a “trialogue”). Meno, a 
friend of Socrates, is conversing, together with Socrates, with Meno’s unnamed slave 
boy. Socrates (the protagonist in virtually all of Plato’s dialogues, including this one) 
has set up this somewhat staged conversation between Meno and his slave in order to 
demonstrate a point, a point about memory. Socrates is attempting (once again) to 
“lay bare” a paradoxical feature of actual human knowing. As he and Meno converse 
with the slave boy, they are able to lead him down a path, by means of questions and 
answers, of “discovering” the mathematical truth of the Pythagorean theorem, 
although here discovery is actually a kind of remembering. Through a series of 
questions, they prompt their erstwhile student to realize the answers for himself, 
including the ultimate conclusion that, “given a square whose sides are two units long 
and so whose area is four square units, the square on the diagonal is necessarily twice 
 
4 In her book Repetition and Identity, Catherine Pickstock commences her entire argument with a 
discussion of recognition. “We negotiate the world through … recognition. This means that we must, at 
every turn, identify anew everything that we encounter.” Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. 
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as big.”5 Socrates and Meno never tell the slave boy the answer (or answers); they 
elicit the knowledge from him.6 
 Plato is wanting us to see that, at some level, the slave boy had already known or 
possessed the answer all along. He already “knew” it in his memory, Plato thinks, and 
this act of recollecting the truth is what Plato (together with the tradition which 
follows in his wake) calls anamnesis. Perhaps an example from the author’s personal 
experience is apt here: when I teach the Meno in undergraduate philosophy courses, I 
usually put the point like this: “In order to learn something new, to make a true 
discovery, one must neither already know the thing fully, nor be completely ignorant 
of the thing.” In other words, one must begin with a preliminary, inchoate glimpse of 
the final object. One subsequently achieves the final recognition through the process 
of anamnesis, in which knowledge is “drawn out” of the student by his dialoging 
interlocutors.7 But the real point, for our purposes, is that, here again, what we find at 
the final stage of the process is a kind of repetition of the initial element, but on a 
higher plane. After a process of recollection, which—as a kind of dianoia—is best 
done in dialogue with others, one arrives at a fuller version of what one already had, 
albeit in a preliminary, inchoate way, known at the beginning. 
 Insofar as these first two paradigms we have considered bear the structure A—
B— A’ (where the initial element is repeated at the end, but in a nonidentical 
manner), we can say that they are structurally identical to the Neoplatonic pattern of 
exitus et reditus—which Joseph Ratzinger, in his Habilitationsschrift on St. 
 
5 3 Robert Seely, “Plato’s Meno: the Geometry,” John Abbot College Math Department, accessed 
August 29, 2018, http://www.math.mcgill.ca/rags/JAC/124/meno.pdf. 
6 Plato, Meno, in Five Dialogues: Euthephro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, 2nd ed., tr. G.M.A. 
Grube 
(Indianapolis: Hackett: 2002). 
7 5 The etymology of the English word “education” is telling: the Latin educatio (originally exducatio, 
from the verb educo or exduco) is literally a “drawing out.” In his role of “drawing out” knowledge 
from his interlocutors, Socrates acts as a “midwife” (maia). See Seth Benardete, Plato’s Theaetetus: 
Part I of The Being of the Beautiful (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986), I.11–I.13 (lines 149–50). 
Hence philosophers sometimes refer to Socrates’ activity as maieutic. 
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Bonaventure, labels “egressus und regressus”8—the pattern of “exit and return” 
which characterizes much Neoplatonic thought.9 
This same structure is articulated in a postmodern context as well, in the work of 
Hans Georg Gadamer. Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutic circle also enshrines this 
movement from initial glimpse to final (though always provisional) intellectual—or 
hermeneutic—vision.10 
 As we will see later in our study, premodern divine illumination theory, often 
associated with the Augustinian tradition, also bears this same structure. Even in the 
realm of natural reason—quite distinct from the dynamics of religious faith—one can, 
according to this tradition, know things in the world only through some kind pre-
given insight, some kind of pre-given conceptuality. On the broad highway that is the 
tradition of Christian Neoplatonism—including the thought of St. Bonaventure—this 
insight is articulated in terms of light. And, here again, what we find at the beginning, 
light, is also the ultimate end point of the human pilgrimage of the mind: the luminous 
(and ineffable) beholding of the “essence” of God in the beatific vision. And yet this 
vision of ultimate reality cannot be achieved until after one has gone through an 
intellectual and spiritual process which prepares the spectator for this vision, which, 
for this tradition, is the ultimate telos of all human existence. 
 Allow me to attempt to apply this tripartite schema, distilled through the history of 
philosophy and theology, to this essay. In it the method I try to employ is consistent 
with all of the above scenarios (Plato’s Divided Line, Meno’s Paradox, Christian 
neoplatonist divine illumination theory, Gadamerian hermeneutics). Again, we find in 
them the basis for the following schematic: 
 
8 Joseph Ratzinger, “Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura” in Offenbarungsverständis 
und Geschichtstheologie Bonaventuras, Joseph Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften 2, ed. Gerhard 
Ludwig Müller, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2009), 619. This text is included in Band 2 of the 
Gesammelte Schriften and in 1959 was accepted as the final form of, and published as, the young 
Ratzinger’s Habilitationsarbeit: “Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura.” This portion of 
Band 2 (including the forewords of the various editions as well as various supplements at the end) is 
comprised by pages 419–659. 
9 On the prominence of the pattern of “exit and return” in ancient neoplatonism, see Andrew Louth, 
The 
Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007) 152–8. Cf. Peter 
Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, and Manuduction, or, Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006) 44–5. 
10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed., tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(New 
York: Crossroad, 1990), 265–71. 
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1. Some kind of primordial glimpse, or recognition, of an object, given in 
advance (“always already there”), often hazy and vague or in some sense 
incomplete. The name which I give to this activity/performance/power of the 
soul is “first intellectus.” 
2. A process of investigation involving multiple, intertwined dimensions of 
struggle and growth: on the intellectual level there is the work of dianoia 
which involves the analysis of relationships among various logical and 
discursive units; on the appetitive/moral/ethical/existential level there is the 
need for some kind of purification (for Aristotle, this is moral virtue; for 
Bonaventure and Ratzinger, this is a kind of sanctified, or “graced,” moral 
virtue which can be called “holiness”). Through this process, one is prepared 
for the third and final moment. 
3. On the “far side” of this process of growth, one finally arrives at a second, 
more full instance of recognition. For Plato it is noêsis. For Gadamer it is an 
interpretation (always provisional, but always closer to the truth than previous 
iterations) in which two cultural, historical horizons are merged. For 
Bonaventure and others (in certain streams of the Christian tradition, 
especially in the middle ages), it is called, in its ultimate form, the beatific 
vision, and it is accompanied not just by holiness but, for Bonaventure, also by 
full, mystical sapientia. I call this mode of existence, a kind of return to the 
first moment (since both are instances of recognition, or pure beholding), 
“final intellectus.” 
 One might wonder why I choose to combine Greek and Latin terms in the above 
rendition. I use the Latin term intellectus throughout this essay in an effort to connote 
the medieval notion of the intellectus fidei, with this this first of three moments can be 
equated. Counterintuitively, perhaps, given the centrality of this thirteenth-century 
Franciscan thinker to my project, I use the Greek dianoia throughout the essay, for 
two reasons: its provenance in Aristotle’s Poetics, in which it denotes the 
interpretation of a narrative plot, and also because the sense of the prefix “dia-” which 
suggests “through- ness,” that some kind of process or reality is taking place through 
time, diachronically. (Such etymological connotation is absent from the Latin 
equivalent ratio.) That I use Greek and Latin terminology so juxtaposed is a function 
of my aim in this essay to achieve more of a systematic analysis of the structure of 
 7 
Bonaventure’s hexaëmeral schema (through the lens of Ratzinger) than a historical 
treatment of him or any thinker. This dissertation, it is hoped, is a synchronic analysis 
of the diachronic process articulated by the Seraphic Doctor in his Collationes in 
Hexaëmeron. 
 In what I take to be a Gadamerian vein, I have applied the above method in this 
essay. At an early stage in my reading of Ratzinger’s Habilitationsschrift, I had a 
hazy glimpse, due to his emphasis on the story of the salvation of God’s people, that 
the notion of mythos or narrative might cast a powerful light on his reading of 
Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron. As I studied and meditated on the primary, baseline story 
which Bonaventure interprets in the work—the days (or “visions”) of creation as 
narrated in the first chapter of Genesis—I discerned there the same pattern as is 
embodied in Plato’s Divided Line.11 The first two days collapse into a single, initial 
moment; the middle moment (day three) constitutes a process of psychical growth, 
intellectual as well as (as we will see) appetitive; the final moment (day four) is a kind 
of recapitulation of the first, but on a higher plane. The discernment of this shared 
pattern then led me to investigate the structure of narrative itself, at the most 
fundamental level possible. While Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle—bearing the same 
tri-partite structure as is outlined above—is applicable to narrative analysis, Paul 
Ricœur’s narratology, together with Catherine Pickstock’s notion of nonidentical 
repetition, invites us to see history itself as a narrative, and so it, too, shares this same 
structure. Working backwards, then, my basic argument in this essay is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 As we will see below, Bonaventure never completed his (allegedly planned) treatment of the six days 
of creation, but dealt instead only with the first four. It is his treatment of these first four days, then, 
which I claim bears the same structure as the four segments in Plato’s Divided Line. 
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1. History is narratival: it is a special case of narrative. 
2. Narrative interpretation12 shares the pattern A—B—A’. 
3. In its interpretation of the days of creation, Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron 
 embodies this same pattern. 
4. Ratzinger rightly sees history (or the theology or logos of history) as 
fundamental to Bonaventure’s project, as contained in the Hexaëmeron. 
Conclusion: Narrative (or mythos, or story) provides a conceptually powerful tool 
for analyzing, in concert with Ratzinger’s work, Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron. 
This essay is an argument for, and an exploration of the implications of, this 
conclusion. In the mode of exploration thereof, I suggest a fundamental reason why 
philosophy is dependent upon theology, having to do with history, and therefore, with 
time. 
II. Preliminary outline 
 Let us turn, then, to an initial presentation of the overall shape of this essay. At the 
broadest level its structure (not including this present introduction) is as follows: 
• Chapter 1: the Sitz im Leben of each thinker (Bonaventure and Ratzinger). 
• Chapter 2: the Aristotelian positioning of narrative poiêsis in relation to two 
other modes of discourse: science and history. As a “discourse in between,” 
mythos metaxologically mediates the difference between epistêmê and 
historia. 
• Chapter 3: the structural position of intellectus in the work of Bonaventure 
and Ratzinger, and its connection to narrative or mythos. 
• Chapter 4: the role of desire, or affective disposition, in Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger, and its connection to narrative or mythos. 
• Chapter 5: the narratival interpenetration of mind or thought, on the one 
hand, and history on the other, at the broadest possible level, or history as 
whole, which necessarily includes eschatology, in Joachim of Fiori, 
Bonaventure, and Ratzinger. 
 
12 Following Jacques Derrida, I hold that there is no such thing as an uninterpreted narrative. As we 
will 
see below, Ratzinger’s notion of revelation manifests a similar instinct. 
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• Chapter 6: the same subject matter as chapter 5, this time, however, refracted 
through the hermeneutic and historical (that is, genealogical) projects of 
Ratzinger and John Milbank. 
• Conclusion: a review of the implications of each chapter, together with the 
cumulative argument of the overall essay (or the way in which the arguments 
of each chapter aggregate to form a larger argument). 
 In order for this “macro-outline” to be clear, however, I first must clarify several 
great themes which dominate the argument: mythos/story/narrative; the trans-epochal 
manifestation of “science” in Aristotle’s antiquity (epistême), in Bonaventure’s epoch 
of the thirteenth century (scholastic scientia), and in the modern period in which 
Ratzinger worked; the prominence of the pattern of “exit and return”; the 
philosophical importance of desire; and history (and time) as the lifeblood of 
theology. 
 To these respective themes, then, we now turn. 
III. Introduction of key themes 
A. Mythos/story/narrative 
 No theme is more crucial to this essay than that of mythos—a term which I will 
use synonymously with “narrative” and “story”—but in order to introduce this notion, 
instead of attempting some airtight definition, I will put forth four constitutive traits 
of this central notion, utilizing the work of four respective thinkers to that end: 
Aristotle, 
C.S. Lewis, Paul Ricœur, and Roger Fowler. 
 In his Poetics, a work attempting to elucidate the nature of ancient Greek tragedy, 
Aristotle lists several elements constitutive of ancient Greek tragedy that can fruitfully 
be applied to the phenomenon of narrative or story. These elements include plot 
(mythos), dianoia (thought), character (êthos), dialogue performed by the characters 
(lexis), recognition of the resolution of the plot (anagnorisis), and suffering (pathos) 
and katharsis on the part of an audience member, a character, and/or a chorus 
member.13 
 
13 I associate pathos and katharsis because, unique among these elements which Aristotle lists, their 
nature is to engage the human being at the emotional or affective level. These constitutive elements are 
listed and elaborated on in Book 6 of the Poetics. Aristotle, On Poetics, tr. Seth Benardete and Michael 
Davis (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), 1449b21–1450b21. 
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 As numerous commentators on the Poetics as well as theorists working in the field 
of narratology have noticed,14 Aristotle’s term mythos as it is used in that work 
frequently denotes the notion of plot, or “the putting together of events.”15 That is, it 
is one of several “narrative elements” (those listed above) which together constitute 
that cultural production, that mode of poiêsis, which Aristotle calls “tragedy” and 
which we may extend to include other verbal/written genres as well.16 Following 
Aristotle, I see plot as playing a more foregrounded role than any of the other 
elements. It enjoys a privileged position within tragedy and other narrative forms, 
precisely as the “putting together of events” (as distinguished from the dianoetic 
“thought” or interpretation or meaning of these events). And yet, even in the 
Poetics—though also true in other of his works—the Stagirite also uses mythos in a 
broader sense, generally to mean story or 
tale.17 
 An especially conspicuous instance of mythos as story occurs at line 1449b 5: 
The making of stories came on the one hand from the 
beginning from Sicily, but of those in Athens, Crates was 
the first to make speeches and stories of a general 
character once he discarded the form of the lampoon.18 
Here we encounter a usage of mythos in the context of a discussion of various 
subtypes, all within the same class of mythos, including comedy, tragedy, and 
lampoon. Hence it is clear that, for Aristotle, that cultural production called “tragedy” 
is an instance of the larger mode of poiêsis which is referred to by the term “mythos.” 
Tragedy, for Aristotle, is a subclass of mythos. 
 Additionally, as is indicated by his use of pathos as one of the constitutive 
elements of tragedy listed above, Aristotle sees a close connection between mythos 
and the realm of human emotion or—to employ a term traditionally associated with 
 
14 12 See for example Elizabeth Belfiore, “Narratological Plots and Aristotle’s Mythos,” Arethusa 33 
(2000), 
37–70. 
15Ibid., 1450a 5. Greek sunqhsin twn pragmatwn. See Aristotle, On Poetics, ed. R. Kassel, in 
Perseus Digital Library, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0055%3Asection%3D145
0 a (accessed November 20, 2018). See the use of this phrase by Benardete and Davis in Aristotle, On 
Poetics, 19–24, especially. footnote 55. 
16 We may extend the discussion beyond that of tragedy, since Aristotle himself extends the discussion, 
in the Poetics itself, to epic poetry in general and Homer in particular, applying various of these 
elements to those works as well. Numerous references to Homer are distributed throughout the work. 
17 15 For three such usages of mythos (in various grammatical declensions), occurring within 30 lines 
of each other, see Aristotle, Poetics, 1449a 20–1449b 10. 
18 Aristotle, On Poetics, tr. Benardete and Davis, 1449b 5–9. 
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the human register of emotion—passion. Aristotle is not alone in recognizing this 
additional trait; it is shared by the twentieth-century classical critic C. S. Lewis as 
well. The connection between narrative production and human affect is so important, 
so constitutive of the nature of story or mythos, that it merits expanded comment, 
even here at this introductory stage. 
 In his essay “Myth Become Fact,” Lewis contrasts the contents of myth—which 
he never defines but which he does exemplify by reference to “Orpheus and 
Eurydice”— with the contents of abstract concepts. “In the enjoyment of a great myth 
we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only 
as an abstraction.”19 Of import here is the ability of myth to provoke a concrete 
experience in the reader or audience member, a concrete experience which is the 
opposite of an abstract concept, such as the proper predicate of the middle premise of 
an Aristotelian syllogism or a mathematical theorem (such as the Pythagorean 
theorem of Plato’s Meno). For Lewis, then, myth is “concrete” not only in the sense 
that it utilizes images provoked in the imagination, but also as the stimulant of an 
(emotional) experience (such as pathos or katharsis) in the reader/hearer, an 
experience which may be regarded as a particular, embodied, material/physical event 
or object. 
 The third highlighted trait of mythos for the purpose of this essay, in addition to 
plot and provocation of affect, comes from the thought of twentieth-century Christian 
continental philosopher and literary theorist Paul Ricœur. In his essay “Time and 
Narrativity,” Ricoeur elaborates various ways in which narrative—both fictional and 
historical—participates in what the modern hermeneutic tradition—of which Ricœur 
is a participant—calls “the hermeneutic circle.”20 In its very essence, that is, 
narrative—or narrative interpretation—is characterized by the same structure alluded 
to above in this introduction: the threefold pattern of the initial grasp, the process of 
putting together elements and taking them apart in various ways, and the final vision 
of the whole story in its entirety, now at a fuller level of completion. 
 Fourth and finally, Roger Fowler, in his essay “Mythos and Logos,” takes us one 
step further down the road toward arriving at a preliminary grasp of mythos and its 
 
19 17 C. S. Lewis, “Myth Become Fact,” in God in the Dock, 4th ed (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 
63–67, at 66. 
20 Paul Ricœur, “The Human Experience of Time and Narrative,” in A Ricœur Reader: Reflection and 
Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdés (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991), 99–116. 
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importance for this essay, for he contrasts it historically with the notion of logos. 
Impressively, Fowler performs this contrast in the mode of a historical genealogy of 
the relationship between these two discourses, or the historical development he calls 
“demythologization.” Somewhere between the self-styled myth smashers of 
modernity (one thinks of the German-inspired historical-critical method of biblical 
interpretation, together with its associated names ranging from Reimarus and Wrede, 
through Weiss, to Schweizer and Bultmann) on the one hand, and the myth extollers 
of postmodern relativism, Fowler cautions against both extremes. Indeed, his position 
is close to that of Plato’s Socrates, who critically purges mythos of its irrational 
elements, while at the same time “mixing” it into the warp and woof of bona fide 
philosophy, recognizing all the while the latter’s dependence upon the former.21 For 
Fowler as for Plato, then, after the dust settles from the project of proper 
demythologization, we are still confronted by the enduring presence of mythos, and 
this is true even in spite of the falsity of the “progress myth” of secular modernity.22 
Mythos, then, needs logos, and vice versa; the two stand in a primordial, fecund, and 
symbiotic relationship of dialectic. 
 These four traits, then, “mark” my use of mythos in this essay: the centrality of 
plot (Aristotle); the connection with human affect (Lewis); the hermeneutic circularity 
(Ricœur); and the dialectical relationship with logos (Fowler). 
B. The historical manifestations of “science” 
 In the second place, it behooves us to consider in a preliminary way another form 
of discourse which historically functions alongside that of myth. Science is that body 
of knowledge which, for many, counts as the pinnacle of logos, alluded to above. This 
is true, first and foremost, for Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s early dialogue Euthephro 
his protagonist Socrates describes epistêmê, by appeal to the mythological sculptor 
demigod Daedalus, as knowledge which is “tied down”: unlike the roving figurines 
crafted by Daedalus (magically possessing the ability of self-motion), true knowledge 
for Socrates is secured by solid reasons and argumentation.23 Plato’s disciple 
 
21 For an insightful treatment of Plato’s stance with respect to myth, see Josef Pieper, Divine Madness: 
Plato’s Case Against Secular Humanism, tr. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995). 
22 Roger Fowler, “Mythos and Logos,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 131 (2011): 45–66. 
23 Plato, Euthyphro, in Five Dialogues, tr. G. M. A. Grube, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 11c–
11e (14–15). 
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Aristotle, “the first systematic philosopher of science in the West,”24 takes this initial 
description and imbues it which impressive rigor. For him epistêmê is a genuine grasp 
of causes, coupled with the conceptually airtight relations of entailment which hold in 
his full- fledged system of deduction (itself built on a foundation of inductive 
research), as theoretically articulated in the Posterior Analytics and as applied in, 
among other works, the Metaphysics. 
 By the time of Bonaventure’s thirteenth-century milieu at the University of Paris 
(shared with his confrere, more friendly to the Aristotelian vision of rigorous scientia, 
the Dominican friar Thomas Aquinas), of special note is the re-emergence of 
Aristotelian influence in the Latin-speaking West, after centuries of dominance by the 
tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, most influentially expounded by St. Augustine of 
Hippo. This Augustinian tradition, while rigorous in its own way, nevertheless lent 
itself to the kind of devotional “monastic theology” typified by, for example, Bernard 
of Clairveaux.25 By Bonaventure’s day, the re-emergence of Aristotle, including the 
so-called logica nova (far more expansive than the Categories, with On Interpretation 
the only extant Aristotelian logical work in the West until the mid- to late twelfth 
century) had won the minds (and captured the imaginations) of significant 
contingencies, notably the arts faculty of the University of Paris. Even theologians 
such as Thomas were enamored with this recent arrival of conceptually rigorous 
rationality, the stage of which had already been set by independent developments 
toward scientific discourse, including the new technologies of knowledge developed 
and deployed by the massively influential Book of Sentences of Peter Lombard.26 
Thanks in part to Lombard’s four- part tome, by the thirteenth century, biblical and 
theological thought was—at least in some quarters—thoroughly incorporated into 
scientific discourse (at least in the minds of many).27 
 
24 Paul Feyerabend, “History of the Philosophy of Science,” in The Oxford Guide to Philosophy, ed. 
Ted 
Honderich (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 849–52, at 850. 
25 On the distinction between “scholastic theology” and “monastic theology,” see Jean Leclercq, The 
Love of Learning and the Desire for God, tr. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 
1982). 
26 Philipp Rosemann, Peter Lombard (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 54–70; Philipp 
Rosemann, 
The Story of a Great Medieval Book (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2007). 
27 Philipp Rosemann shows how Bonaventure’s contemporary, Thomas Aquinas, develops the proto- 
systematic Book of Sentences, which still “sticks closely” to the narrative flow of Scripture in important 
ways, in a more scientific direction. Thomas takes himself, that is, to transform the material of the 
Sentences into the more appropriate (in his view) form of scientia divina. See Philipp Rosemann, 
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 While I firmly agree with Ratzinger’s claim that the specific motive of 
Bonaventure’s anti-Aristotelianism is not simply some anti-scientific bent on 
Bonaventure’s part, it is nevertheless clear from even a cursory reading of the 
Hexaëmeron that for the Seraphic Doctor, rigorous scientia is merely a means to a 
much greater end: the full-orbed sapientia which engages the holistic dimensionality 
of our humanity. Hence on the very first page of his Habilitationsschrift Ratzinger 
frames the entire work in terms of Bonaventure’s relation to science: after returning 
from his retreat on Mt. Alverna in 1259, Bonaventure returned to the university 
community “as an outsider to point out the limits of science from the perspective of 
faith.”28 Indeed, Bonaventure’s sustained and passionate emphasis on mystical 
wisdom stands in a relationship of entrenched tension with the thoroughgoing, 
science-based Aristotelianism of his day. For him rigorous science is neither the last 
word nor the highest discourse. 
 For all this contextualization of Bonaventure vis-à-vis the scientific culture of his 
day, however, he is not alone in staking out a contrapuntal relation to that one-
dimensional discourse. Joseph Ratzinger, some seven centuries later, charts a similar 
course, in a similar context, and for similar reasons. In the high tide of twentieth- 
century European modernity, however, the precise character of science has morphed 
yet again. In the hands of such Enlightenment thinkers as Kepler, Bacon, Newton, and 
Kant, the register of scientific inquiry had now shifted dramatically to the domain of 
the empirical, in contrast to the posture of Aristotle. Of particular importance in this 
shift is the new emphasis on experimental repeatability, or what Ratzinger calls “the 
faciendum.”29 
 In the wake of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, moreover, 
during which time the sound interpretation of sacred texts (and, by extension, political 
and legal texts) was becoming a pressing need in the lives of individual Christians, a 
new discipline, that of hermeneutics, began to emerge in Europe. Beginning with 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), this discipline, which emphasized meaning 
 
“Sacra Pagina or Scientia Divina? Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and the Nature of the Theological 
Project,” in Thomas Aquinas: Teacher and Scholar, the Aquinas Lectures at Maynooth, volume 
2:2002–2010, ed. James McEvoy, Michael W. Dunne, and Julia Hynes (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
2012), 56–61. 
28 Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, tr. Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1989), 3. 
29 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, tr. J. R. Forster and Michael J. Miller (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 64. 
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over “fact,” began to feel the need to define itself in contradistinction to modern 
natural science. Working in this same hermeneutic tradition, however, Edmund 
Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey nevertheless attempted to ground hermeneutics in a 
strict methodology every bit as rigorous as that of natural science: could 
Geisteswissenschaft—including its historical branch, Geschichtswissenschaft— 
establish itself securely on the basis of some unshakable ground, such as the 
transcendentally secured experiences of the phenomenological subject?30 In 
opposition to these efforts by the likes of Husserl and Dilthey, Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer set out not to repeat the methodical emphasis of, but rather to 
side-step, modern science and its hegemony, engaging instead in a critical retrieval of 
ancient thought, embodied by Aristotle and Plato, respectively. In their view, this 
approach lends itself much more effectively to the human need for existential therapy, 
a need wholly unmet by the “progress” of modern scientific thought. 
 It is within this twentieth-century milieu of evaluating the role and status of 
modern science that Joseph Ratzinger—at this time a young presbyter working as a 
fundamental theologian in Regensburg—confronts what he regards as the “boundary 
violations” of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation (HCM).31 As will 
be developed below, my contention regarding Ratzinger’s critical stance is twofold. 
First, any would-be scientific enterprise that refuses to heed the input of divine 
revelation must be respectfully considered but also chastened, re-positioned in a role 
of limited competence. Not only is such secular discourse wholly unable to treat 
issues of existential meaning and human longing, it is unable to secure and justify its 
own  
presumed autonomy. Second, Ratzinger’s construal of theology as a “spiritual 
science,” which respects and indeed incorporates the findings of the now more 
restricted practice of secular science (including HCM), insists on the true if surprising 
ultimate goal of such secular inquiry: a mystical wisdom that engages the whole 
 
30 We see this attempt in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, according to Gadamer: “Thus [Dilthey] set 
himself the task of constructing a new and more viable epistemological basis for between historical 
experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the meaning of his intention to 
complement Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with a critique of historical reason.” Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, 219. 
31 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Eschatology, 2nd ed., ed. Aidan Nichols, tr. Michael Waldstein 
(Washington, DC: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2007), 19–24. 
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person—body, heart, mind, will, and affections—all in the pursuit of holiness and 
union with God.32 
 C. The pattern of “exit and return” 
 Third, the recurring motif of exit and return is so prominent in Bonaventure that 
we are compelled to present this theme as well, here in the introduction. In his Origins 
of the Christian Mystical Tradition, Andrew Louth writes: 
Within the Platonic framework, the soul’s search for God 
is naturally conceived of as a return, an ascent to God; 
the soul properly belongs with God, and in its ascent it is 
but realizing its own true nature. Christianity, on the 
other hand, speaks of the Incarnation of God, of his 
descent into the world that he might give to man the 
possibility of a communion with God that is not open to 
him by nature. And yet man is made in the image of God, 
and so these movements of ascent and descent cross one 
another and remain—as a fact of experience—in 
unresolved tension.33 
 
 One dynamic that Louth nicely captures here is the way in which Christian 
theology aporetically crosses non-revealed philosophy. In this quotation above, the 
“exit and return” pattern heralded by the pagan tradition of Platonic philosophy—the 
journey of nous out from the divine, and then back to the divine—is at first thought to 
collide with the apparently biblical denial of the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul, a doctrine held for example by the scripturally rooted Jewish thinker Philo. (At 
this denial Louth gestures with his words “… a communion not open to [humanity] by 
nature.”) On this theological view, then, man cannot be said to have originated in 
God, and hence any reditus to the divine origin is undermined. And yet, upon further 
reflection, when the referent of “man” or “mankind” or anthropos is conceived 
Christocentrically—Christ being the “second man and the last Adam” (Col. 1:15)—
the original Platonic configuration is rescued and redeemed. If, that is, Jesus Christ is 
the true human(ity), then we can indeed hold that both his—that is, humanity’s—
origin and destiny are (in) God. Hence the original pagan picture (that the soul is 
immortal) is vindicated, even if transfigured. Christ’s divine origin (exitus) and divine 
 
32 D. Vincent Twomey, “Ratzinger on Theology as Spiritual Science,” in Entering the Mind of Christ: 
The True Nature of Theology, ed. James Keating (Omaha: Institute for Priestly Formation, 2014), 47–
70. 
33 Louth, Origins, 13. 
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destiny (reditus) are seen in the Incarnation and Ascension. The original Neoplatonic 
pattern is upheld, but now with a novel imaginative conception of “man” or “human” 
(as in “the soul of the human being”). 
 As Ratzinger emphasizes in his Habilitationsschrift, this Christocentric model of 
exit and return is indeed held by Bonaventure himself, and the deep logic of his 
Hexaëmeron—this much Ratzinger makes explicit—is that this itinerarium is 
accomplished not just ontologically but historically. Time and time again, as we will 
see below, the Seraphic Doctor stresses that “Christ is the center”—metaphysically, 
scripturally, but also historically. “The center of what?” one may well inquire. For the 
purposes of this study, the most relevant answer to this question is: the center of a 
journey, the journey from origin to destination. 
 For now I will limit my elaboration of this theme to a rather general level. In 
expounding Plato’s “phenomenological” description of human knowing as imaged in 
the Divided Line in Book VI of the Republic, I noted above that the middle term—
dianoia—refers to a time-laden process, which takes place between a first and last 
position and describes a kind of mental development. If, however, we broaden the 
perspective from the process of human knowing to the grand sweep of biblical history 
(or what Ratzinger calls the historia salutis), then we can say—very much in the spirit 
of Bonaventure—that this very time span of history is itself the “middle term,” which 
occupies a middle position between cosmic origin in God and cosmic destination in 
God. What lies at the very center of this structure? The time-laden logos become 
sarx—the middle term in the chiastic pattern of A–B–A’—which completes the 
movement from origin to omega point, or the journey of exit and return. 
 Before moving to the next theme, I offer one word of qualification, in the spirit of 
postmodern sensibility. As crucial as this recursive pattern of exit and return is (for 
Ratzinger, for Bonaventure, for myself), one must not admit, in too facile a manner, 
the notion of a perfect circle or circularity. If the A—B—A’ pattern is one of 
recursive, circular repetition, it indeed must be performed again and again. Yet, to 
invoke Walker Percy, this can sometimes involve turbulent “re-entry problems.”34 
When the thinker has attained some glimpse of the whole (in the manner of the 
 
34 Walker Percy, “The Orbiting Self: Reentry Problems of the Transcending Self, or Why it is that 
Artists and Writers, some Technologists, and indeed Most People Have So Much Trouble Living in the 
Ordinary World,” The Georgia Review 55/56 (2001/2002), 102–15. 
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trajectory of Plato’s Line), what then? She must still live her life. She must still carry 
on. Indeed, if she is to continue to be a thinker, then she must begin the cycle again 
(albeit at a higher level than before). Yet such a re-commencement, such a descent 
from the heights to the nitty gritty crags and situations of life on the ground, will 
involve difficulty and struggle. For us finite beings, there is no (seamless grasp of) the 
perfect circle, even if this says more about us than it does about the objectively real). 
D. The philosophical importance of desire, or the existential register of affect 
 To get our bearings on this fourth macro-theme of this essay, we can reflect upon 
two notions already dealt with above: dianoia and science. In the above list of 
elements which Aristotle counts as constituent parts of Greek tragedy, one notable 
item in the list is dianoia, or the “thought” which accompanies the tragedy’s plot 
(mythos) and which, the reader having sifted through the twists and turns of the plot’s 
action, comprises “the point” of the story in a relatively abstract way—for example, in 
the same way that Christ’s parables in the Gospels can be distilled in the form of an 
aphorism or proverb.35 One must realize, however, that dianoia accompanies not only 
the plot, but also those affective dimensions of the mythopoietic production, such as 
pathos and katharsis. Even for Aristotle, then, the plot cannot be fully and properly 
stated without some kind of emotional engagement. When Jesus narrates the parable 
of the prodigal son in Luke 15, any abstract statement of the point of this parable in 
the form of an aphorism, for example, would need to include the emotional weight of 
the father’s love for the son, a love illustrated in the parable by the father’s lavish acts 
of affection for the son, and the wildly extravagant abundance of his gifts for the son 
who was lost and now is found (see Lk. 15:11–32). 
 Turning to Bonaventure, when in this essay I investigate his performance of what 
I characterize as dianoia—that is to say, his interpretation of sacred scripture—what I 
find is that for him this process of reading, of synthesizing and separating various 
textual elements, is far more than merely intellectual or rational. When Bonaventure 
leads his audience by the hand in the journey of Scripture reading,36 he stresses that in 
so reading, our desires must be engaged and transformed. Otherwise, as we will see 
below, the purpose of Scripture is tragically thwarted. 
 
35 To illustrate this point, Paul Ricœur appeals to the work of New Testament scholar Joachim Jeremias 
on the parables of Jesus in the Gospels (Ricœur, “Human Experience,” 110). 
36 I borrow this phraseology from Candler, Theology and Manuduction, cited above. 
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 To state it differently, science—a discourse in relation to which both Bonaventure 
and Ratzinger, as we have stated above, position themselves contrapuntally—is 
radically deficient, when unaccompanied by alternate forms of discourse, for the 
attainment of the true goal at which both Bonaventure and Ratzinger aim. While 
useful in its own sphere, it cannot address the deeper meaning of the human or the 
divine, and when it attempts to do so the result is a boundary violation. What, then, is 
this true goal for both thinkers? Bonaventure explicitly articulates it at the beginning 
of the Hexaëmeron, second in sequence only to the consideration of audience in 
collatio I: he titles the second collation, “On the fullness of wisdom [sapientia] in 
which speech [sermo] must end.”37 Throughout the body of the work, furthermore, 
this emphasis on Christian wisdom—the achievement of which includes the proper 
formation of desire—is sustained. 
 Such is the case as well for Bonaventure’s twentieth-century German interpreter, 
as Fr. Vincent Twomey shows in his article “Ratzinger on Theology as Spiritual 
Science,” the title of which suggests a similar regard for science as salutary but, in its 
“unspiritual” forms, insufficient.38 If the goal is more than the conclusion to a sound 
argument (on the order of an Aristotelian syllogism)39 or the deduction of a geometric 
axiom, then something more than scientia—both Bonaventure and Ratzinger agree—
is needed. This “something more” is provided by the narrative of Scripture, the 
dianoia of which must needs avail itself of existential realities that touch upon the 
realm of human desire, realities which include the theological virtues of faith, hope, 
and love. For both Christian thinkers, then, any merely scientific maturity that lacks 
the incorporation of these passions falls short of that full sapientia which is finally 
realized in that ultimate moment of the intellect called the beatific vision, which is 
concomitant with full sapientia. If the final moment of the intellect is the grasp of the 
whole, then in the beatific vision our grasp of the whole requires in turn that “our 
whole”—the holistic dimensionality of the whole self—itself be grasped. My hope is 
that, in the details that follow below, I can show that for both thinkers the 
 
37 Bonaventure, Collations on the Six Days, The Works of Bonaventure, vol. 5, tr. José de Vinck 
(Paterson, New Jersey: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1970), 21. Hereafter, I will cite this source by the 
shortened title, “Six Days.” 
38 Twomey, “Spiritual Science,” 47–70. 
39 The conclusion of a sound argument (that is, one that is valid, with premises which are all true) will 
always be true. See Irving M. Copey and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 9th ed. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1994), 64. 
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achievement of this final goal requires not just science, but also—precisely because of 
the necessity of affect—story. 
 E. History (and time) as the lifeblood of theology. 
 We turn now to our fifth and final introductory theme. In The End of Time: A 
Meditation on the Philosophy of History, Joseph Pieper argues not only that all 
genuine philosophy stands in a contrapuntal relationship to theology, but also that this 
relationship holds true, more than anywhere else, in the philosophy of history. In the 
logos of history, that study in which, if possible, we grasp the meaning of history, 
here more than anywhere, according to Pieper, philosophy is utterly dependent upon 
theology. In short, Pieper thinks that, without theology, there can be no real 
philosophy of history. 
 This is the case, argues Pieper, for three reasons. First, unlike philosophy, 
theology claims to answer the cosmic questions of “whence” and “whither.” Second, 
theology alone addresses issues of disaster and salvation, issues or events which by 
their very nature are historical. Third and finally, the history of redemption for Pieper 
is “the exact center of theological pronouncement.”40 To a far greater extent than 
philosophy, then, theology assimilates at a basic level the objects of history, objects 
which, for Ratzinger as for Bonaventure, irreducibly take the narrative form of the 
historia salutis. 
 Thanks to Pieper, then, we can see that philosophy’s attempt to assimilate or even 
assess the phenomenon of history requires yet another “discourse in between”: 
theology. Theology’s particular importance, for the purpose of this essay, is that it 
“sticks closer” to the narrative of history than does philosophy. In this light one can 
appreciate the precise nature of the rebuke Ratzinger’s Bonaventure levels against 
Aristotelianism (be it that of the “historical Aristotle” or that of thirteenth-century 
Paris): by forsaking history, it forsakes theology, and by forsaking theology it 
forsakes the dianoia necessary for the end goal of human existence, “final intellect” in 
the fullest sense. By itself, philosophy is insufficient.41 
 
40 Josef Pieper, The End of Time, a Meditation on the Philosophy of History, tr. Michael Bullock (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1954), 19–24. 
41 Of course for the long period of intellectual history in the West preceding the rise of late medieval 
scholasticism, a philosophy “by itself”—sealed off and isolated from theology—was unthinkable. One 
sees this stance—that philosophy is not independent of theology—in Augustine, for example, who 
insists that “verus philosophus est amator Dei.” Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. 
and tr. R. 
W. Dyson (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), VIII.1 (312). 
 21 
 One implication with respect to time and history remains, however: if philosophy 
is insufficient, then so is chronos, philosophy’s time. Indeed, in Physics IV we 
encounter the Philosopher’s definition of chronos: an accident of motion which is 
measurable, neutral, and instrumental.42 I stand in negative agreement with Aristotle, 
then: if time is mere chronos, then history is mere tychê, opaque to reason.43 For 
Scripture, however, and hence for Bonaventure and Ratzinger, time is more than 
chronos: beyond das monotone Ticken,44 the tick-tock of the chronometer, God’s 
work, God’s “mighty deeds” in the historia salutis, are not assessed in the neutral 
measurements of the empty unit, but rather in the events of kairos, oversaturated 
phenomena, which are fraught with existential meaning. After developing this 
contrast between scientific chronos and existential kairos, I will show how this initial 
temporal difference points in the direction of others. Beyond chronos, kairos opens 
the door to other options as well, including the imaginative time of fictional narrative 
as well as the liturgical time of Christian mythopoietic ritual. 
 IV. Descriptive chapter outline 
 •   Chapter One: “The struggle for wise phronêsis: the Sitze im Leben of Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger” 
 My first major move in this essay is to set the stage of each respective thinker’s 
historical situation, in thirteenth-century Paris and twentieth-century Germany, 
respectively. More than a perfunctory attempt to situate each respective thinker in his 
temporality.”45 I will spell out this distinction below, but for now I should say that the 
abstract representation of time—what I call below the “timeline approach”—fails to 
do justice to or to “tell the truth” about the complex human experience of temporal 
life or lived temporality, an experience closely related to Martin Heidegger’s point, 
articulated in Division Two (“Dasein and Temporality”) of Being and Time, about 
Dasein’s Sorge (his glossed version of ancient phronêsis) in response to the 
experience of Geworfenheit.46 This existentialist insistence on temporal authenticity 
in the midst of one’s historical situation—an insistence shared by St. Augustine in his 
 
42 Aristotle, Physics, tr. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1995), 217b–224a. 
43 I establish that for Aristotle history is tyche, or chance, in chapter two of this essay. 
44 Florian Kolbinger, “Tempus, aevum, aeternitas: Einige Gedanken zu Bonaventuras Begriff von Zeit 
und Ewigkeit,” in Gegenwart und Offenbarung: Zu den Bonaventura Forschungen Joseph Ratzingers, 
ed. Franz-Xaver Heible and Marianne Schlosser (Regensburg: Pustet, 2011), 166. 
45 Ricœur, “Human Experience,” 108-9. 
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 
1962), 274–486. 
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Confessions—underlines the importance of this initial chapter for the overall message 
of my essay. If phronêsis—in its ancient or postmodern guise—involves the 
intersection of the rational and appetitive levels of the soul, then mythos—also 
oriented to these two psychic registers—is a fitting discourse. As we see in the very 
lived experience of Bonaventure and Ratzinger, that is, it is mythos which brings 
about prudence in the soul, a virtue needed precisely in the fraught historical situation 
of each thinker. Of note regarding the Sitze im Leben of Bonaventure and Ratzinger is 
the weight of the existential demands and decisions confronting them as a function of 
their respective cultural moments. In thirteenth-century Paris this took the form of 
carving a historical  path forward into the future, under the crushing and contradictory 
pressure not just of the newly fashionable Aristotelian science, but also the Joachimite 
eschatology of “spiritual Franciscanism.” In order to navigate these torrential flood 
waters of crisis, St. Bonaventure had no choice but to turn inward. Something similar 
holds for the twentieth-century Bavarian: the future pontiff finds himself at the 
crossroads of a secular culture in which modernism and its equal and opposite, naïve 
fideism, demand a response of an unprecedented kind. For inspiration, Ratzinger 
draws on the example of the Seraphic Doctor. 
 This chapter, then, will serve not only as a biographical introduction, but also as a 
suggestion that for each thinker, the unique crisis of his cultural moment makes 
history and time foundational to his thought. 
•   Chapter Two: “Coordinating mythos and history: Ratzinger’s Bonaventure versus 
Aristotle” 
 Here I build on my initial presentation of mythos (above) and develop my claim 
that it provides a fruitful approach by which one can the grasp the deep meaning of 
Bonaventure’s work in the Hexaëmeron. The force of this argument is that mythos or 
narrative provides an effective lens through which to view Bonaventure’s engagement 
with Aristotle, the primary task of the Hexaëmeron according to Ratzinger. To this 
end I argue that it is with Aristotle’s configuration of the relationship among the three 
discourses of science, story, and history that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure takes issue, 
even if this criticism is not explicitly stated in the work of either thinker in these 
precise terms. In contrast to Aristotle, it is the case for both Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger that, in relation to science and history, mythos is the “discourse in 
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between.” Just as Aristotle binds it to science, Pickstock (with others) binds it, 
through her articulation of nonidentical repetition, to (the brute givens of) history. 
 •   Chapter Three: “Bookending thought: the structural position of intellectus” 
 Having laid this groundwork, I then develop the first of the three major 
characteristics in the actual textual output of each respective thinker (Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger) that point to or suggest the relevance of story or mythos. For both thinkers, 
a God-given initial illumination (first intellectus) is given both in the recognition of 
the ordinary objects of natural reason (Creation Day 1/Vision 1), as well as in that of 
the objects of faith (Creation Day 2/Vision 2).47 Yet, this initial grasp, for both 
thinkers, gives rise to an arduous process of growth and development—a process that 
takes place both in the rational register of dianoia, or what I call “dianoia proper” 
(associated with Day 3/Vision 3), and in the moral and affective register of desire. 
Finally, on the far side of ratio and desire formation (taken jointly as the process of 
dianoia), we find in the thought of both thinkers a similar end goal (Creation Day 
4/Vision 4), which occupies the structural position of final intellect. While I hasten to 
identify this end goal quite explicitly as the beatific vision, part of my burden is to 
bring out the rich and complex texture of the presentation of the beatific vision on the 
part of both Bonaventure and Ratzinger. Ratzinger’s Bonaventure articulates this 
climactic moment in terms of a historical democratization of mystical wisdom: that 
which was formerly limited to an elite circle of disciples (1 Cor. 2:6) will one day be 
available to all (Eph. 3:10). Ratzinger, too, regards this ultimate destiny of the mind to 
be both holistic—encompassing every dimension of the individual human being—and 
“corporate” or cosmic in nature. He treats it extensively in his Eschatology. 
 Speaking of Ratzinger’s Eschatology, it is under this initial characteristic rubric of 
the structure of intellect that I will develop the importance of his response to the rise 
of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (HCM), a response articulated in this work dealing with “last 
things.” Although this issue will have implications for the relationship between 
history and reason (chapters 5 and 6, below) I primarily deal with it here under the 
rubric of the structure of the intellect because for both Bonaventure and his modern 
 
47 Recall that this combination of the first two “days” or “visions” into a singular, first moment of a 
larger, tripartite structure mirrors the same dynamic as I articulated vis-à-vis Plato’s Line (eikasia and 
pistis), above. 
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German interpreter, the core issue involved is the role of faith—and thus the 
intellectus fidei—in biblical studies or biblical interpretation, a discipline which, after 
Peter Lombard, must incorporate aspects of science. Since for Ratzinger (as indeed 
for Bonaventure), however, any academic treatment of the Christian Bible that, in its 
attempt to be rigorously scientific, excludes the role of faith—a role which 
Bonaventure elucidates in his exegesis of creation day two—can only ever be 
essentially and radially deficient, this twentieth-century debate sheds great light upon 
the question of the ultimate goal of the human intellect, for both thinkers. This is the 
case, not least, because both thinkers, properly understood, regard dianoia as essential 
to the achievement of the beatific vision, or the ultimate goal of the human intellect 
(“final intellect”). Far from denying the validity of HCM in and of itself—which, 
importantly for this context, takes as its starting point the supposed implausibility of 
the eschatologically immanent expectations of the earliest community of Jesus 
followers, as evidenced by the New Testament texts themselves—Ratzinger wants 
both to resist any reductionism in theology (be it in a “scientific” or a “sociological” 
direction)48 and to champion—importantly for my project, he does this in a way that 
channels of the spirit of Bonaventure—theology as a spiritual science. This latter 
emphasis, in turn, amounts to an insistence on a kind of holistic sapientia, by 
definition beyond the scope of any modern, secular domain, as the final goal of the 
human intellect. As I have suggested above, such sapientia is part-and-parcel with 
final intellectus for each respective thinker. 
 How does this structure of the intellect point to the notion of story or narrative? 
Invoking Paul Ricœur’s narrative analysis, I will identify the first intellectus with the 
pre-given glimpse of a story (for example, the genre), the process of dianoia with the 
process of reading, and the second intellectus with the final grasp of the whole, which 
then allows one to conduct the process of reading the story all over again, in new and 
fresh ways.49 When the reader reads a story, she enacts the hermeneutical circle (a 
notion shared by Ricœur and Gadamer), which is to say that she passes through every 
stage of the intellect: first intellectus, dianoia, and final intellectus. 
 
48 For Ratzinger, biblical studies is organically of one piece with theology, and cannot legitimately be 
severed from it. 
49 As we will see below, this hermeneutic circle is also described by Augustine, in his description of 
reading a psalm. Augustine, Confessions, tr. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991) 
xxviii (38)–xxxi (41) (243–5). 
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 •   Chapter 4: “Living without Scientia (but not dianoia): faith and the ‘man of 
desires’” 
 In addition to the shared presupposition of the above articulated structure of the 
intellect, both thinkers insist on the necessity of “dealing with desire” for true human 
fulfillment, which is concomitant with final intellectus. This emphasis—the crucial 
role of desire upon which both thinkers insist for human fulfillment—is the second of 
three major features of their textual works themselves that I develop in this essay. In 
the case of Bonaventure this requirement of desire formation is seen (among other 
ways) in his “monastic” (as opposed to “scholastic”) style of “writing,”50 but also in 
his own style of medieval compunction, similar to the faith/“way of being” of 
Kierkegaard’s Abraham. In the work of the then-future pontiff, the necessity of desire 
manifests itself in what I describe as his existential phenomenology of faith, involving 
a posture or comportment of the affect similar to that of Bonaventure. Such affective 
discourse cannot be reduced to the one-dimensional level embodied in HCM. For 
such a move would fail to involve the transformation and sanctification of the whole 
person, and no account of the Christian perigrinatio—be it individual, corporate, or 
cosmic—can neglect the role of story or mythos. Indeed, it is in and through the 
exposure to poetic elements such as plot, heroism, sacrifice, pathos, and katharsis that 
our desires are summoned, kindled, and transformed by God. Such, at any rate, is the 
view of the Seraphic Doctor as well as the Bavarian presbyter-theologian. 
 •   Chapters 5 and 6: “The eschatological whole” 
 Third and final among my exegetical “take-aways” based on the textual output 
itself of our two primary thinkers is the issue of eschatology. For it is here that one 
grapples with the nature not just of history, but of history as a whole. Both thinkers 
clearly hold both that the human mind is constituted by history (and time), and also 
that history is mindful, or rationally, ordered.51 
 
50 On this distinction, see Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God. The reason I 
put 
the word “writing” in quotation marks is that the Collationes in Hexaëmeron as we have them were 
originally given as something like a series of sermons, which were then written down and organized by 
a collator, as one can gather from the epilogue to the Quarrachi edition. Bonaventure, Collationes in 
Hexaëmeron, S. Bonaventurae opera omnia 5, ed. Fathers of the Collegium S. Bonaventurae 
(Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1891), 381–2. Hereafter, this text, the Latin version edited by 
the scholars of Quaracchi, is cited simply as “Hexaëmeron.” 
51 In other words, for both thinkers mind and history mutually interpenetrate each other. Bonaventure 
displays this conviction with the following moves: the step-wise development of the intellect in the six 
days of creation in Genesis 1; the logical progression inherent in the one-to-one correspondence of the 
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 In other words for both thinkers mind and history mutually interpenetrate each 
other. Bonaventure displays this conviction with the following moves: the step-wise 
development of the intellect in the six days of creation in Genesis 1; the logical 
progression inherent in the one-to-one correspondence of the Old Testament and the 
New; the development of the historical semen of creation day three; the 
historicization of the celestial hierarchies of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; and 
the historicization of the Dionysian sapientia nulliformis. 
 Ratzinger also has much to contribute to this idea that history and mind are 
inseparable. First, he draws out and develops in his Habilitationsschrift the problem 
of Joachim and Franciscan spiritualism, a crisis over the correct interpretation of 
history. Next, he situates Bonaventure’s eschatology within the larger medieval 
horizon of meaning that makes it possible (providing its “condition of possibility”) in 
the first place. This genealogical approach is, I claim, a kind of “meshing together” of 
history and reason, close to Bonaventure’s moves. He then treats Bonaventure’s 
invention of the multiformes theoriae so as to suggest a view of history that is 
explicitly dynamic and progressive, conditioned and shaped by intellectual 
developments, while also able to be recognized by the interpreter. Further, in the 
budding Bavarian theologian’s treatment of Bonaventure that was excised from the 
edition that was actually accepted by his Habilitation committee and actually 
published in 1959, Ratzinger offers an innovative interpretation of Bonaventure’s 
concept of revelatio, which for me is most valuable for its provision of the condition 
of possibility, on theological grounds, for conceiving of history in terms of genealogy, 
a view that regards history as thoroughly and irreducibly conditioned by human 
conceptuality. Finally, his most thought-provoking contribution in the 
Habilitationsarbeit is his pinpointing of the nature of time as the ultimate ground, the 
most basic objection, which Bonaventure levels against Aristotle and the 
Aristotelianism of his day. Ratzinger’s Bonaventure is unable to accept Aristotle’s 
relegation of history to the realm of the irrational. As a “discourse in between,” 
narrative allows Ratzinger’s Bonaventure to redeem the historical, recasting it as a 
story written not just by human beings, but also by a providential God. 
 
Old Testament and the New; the development of the historical semen of creation day three; the 
historicization of the celestial hierarchies of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; and the hicization of the 
Dionysian sapientia nulliformis. 
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 Beyond the Habilitationsschrift, Ratzinger offers a rendition, in his Introduction 
to Christianity, of the historical development of the (now) orthodox thinking about 
God— the semantic range and intellectual context surrounding the term “God”— 
which can be called genealogical and mythopoetic (though, as we will see, for him the 
proper use of demythologization is crucial). In his Eschatology, further, he performs a 
genealogy of the emergence and eventual dominance of HCM, which originates with 
Martin Luther as an “inaugurating rupture” within a wholly new intellectual tradition, 
thus demonstrating what this distinctively modern dispute really is: a case study that 
sheds light on the larger issue of tradition, an issue which is, as Ratzinger is at pains 
to stress, the true heart and motivation of his theological work. At this point in my 
essay, my hermeneutical posture, informed here by both Gadamer and Ricœur, again 
becomes relevant, since it is nothing other than tradition, I argue, which constitutes 
the condition of the possibility of the initial moment (first intellectus) of the reading 
of history—for example, the historia salutis as presented in the Christian Bible—as 
story. 
 Chapters five and six will address the mother lode of these historical issues above, 
raised by both of our two Christian thinkers, while also trying to “keep an eye” on the 
“big picture” of history as a whole. 
*    *   * 
 What I attempt to do in this essay, then, after situating each thinker in his 
historical context and introducing the role of mythos, is to examine the above three 
myth-related characteristics (the structural resonance of mythos with the intellect, ch. 
3; its unique ability to make contact with the human register of desire, ch. 4; its 
provision of the rationale of history, chs. 5–6) which emerge in the texts themselves 
of the two respective thinkers. I hope to utilize these three characteristics, together 
with the metaxological position of mythos (ch. 2), to show that philosophy is 
dependent upon theology in important ways, having to do with history and its 
presuppositions about mythos and temporality. 
 To the larger argument, then, let us now turn. 
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Chapter 1 
The struggle for wise phronêsis: the Sitze im Leben of Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger 
Introduction 
 Given the sustained and careful attention to history that both Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger exhibit, one must not imagine that their respective projects (treated by the 
current essay) occur in some kind of ahistorical vacuum. On the contrary, the 
historical situation of each thinker already begins to shed light not only upon his 
thought, but also on the ways in which it overlaps and resonates, one with the other. 
 While this initial chapter does aim to orient the reader to the historical context of 
both Bonaventure and Ratzinger in general, its particular burden is vividly to display 
the quality and texture of each thinker’s lived circumstance, constitutive for his 
respective thought. For each, his historical situation is neither arbitrary nor neutral; 
rather, it determines the specific character of both his pilgrimage as a lover of wisdom 
and his intellectual production. 
 In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle articulates a trenchant view of 
what, for him, is the most crucial of the intellectual virtues: phrônêsis (traditionally 
understood as “prudence”), which Martin Heidegger, some two and a half millennia 
later, would creatively reinterpret as the existential Sorge (“concern”) of Dasein.1 At 
crucial junctures in the life and career of each of our two leading characters, we 
observe them, at critical moments of decision, engaged in intense struggles in which 
much is at stake, for them personally as well as the communities and institutions 
depending on them. In each case, he must ask the prudential question, “What time is 
it?”—or, better, “What, right now, is it time for?” The answers to these questions, and 
the acts of decision they entail, shed immense light on these two thinkers, whose 
concerns (Sorgen) are, while intellectual, anything but abstract and merely theoretical. 
This chapter attempts to describe such crucial moments, connecting them to the 
theological and philosophical content treated in subsequent chapters of this essay. 
 After painting a curated picture of their respective historical backgrounds, for both 
Bonaventure and Ratzinger I first attend to a striking material feature of their textual 
output: the conspicuous fact that, in the most history-focused treatise of each—the 
 
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, 225–78. This material comprises section VI of Heidegger’s “analytic of 
Dasein,” entitled “Care as the Being of Dasein.” 
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two primary texts, respectively, that this dissertation seeks to interpret—what we find 
is a kind of violently imposed cutting short. For Bonaventure, his planned treatment 
of the six days of creation (as narrated in Genesis 1) had to be limited to only the first 
four; for Ratzinger, it turns out that two-thirds of his intended (and actually 
submitted) Habilitationsschrift were suddenly excised, due to objections of the 
relevant authorities. The dramatic truth is that each thinker is subject to the shifting 
winds of Geworfenheit—cultural storms against which no fortress of science could or 
can provide shelter.2 In each case, the final product of historiology is maimed—or at 
least marked—by the unwieldy vicissitudes of history. 
 In the second place, in both thinkers, we witness the development of a clash 
between theology and science that amounts to a public controversy to which each, as 
a recognized leader or representative of Christian thought in each respective cultural 
scene, must respond, and in the light of which each must point the way forward. For 
the Seraphic Doctor, this controversy involves the introduction of (a newly intensified 
embodiment of) Aristotelian philosophy into the formal curricula of study at the 
University of Paris in the thirteenth century; for the Bavarian presbyter it concerns 
modern science generally, and the dominance of the historical-critical method of 
biblical interpretation (HCM) in particular. 
 Finally, it is the emergence of two novel approaches to eschatology, respectively, 
that determine at a fundamental level the logos of history of both Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger. While medieval Joachimism poses a challenge to Bonaventure’s 
leadership, Ratzinger must both expose the pernicious effect of a narrow “HCM-
alone” method upon eschatological theory and unpack the eschatological weakness of 
liberation theology. These moves—in the thirteenth century as well as the twentieth—
are highly visible, and bring with them extremely high stakes for the communities 
involved. What, indeed, is the connection between history (oriented to the past) and 
eschatology (oriented to the future) for these two countercultural luminaries? This 
 
2 I am thinking here of Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lies,” near the end of the brief essay, where 
Nietzsche contrasts “scientific man” with “artistic man” (which he also identifies by the related 
opposition of “rational man” to “intuitive man”). Nietzsche’s bias is clearly in favor of the latter, and 
yet on his own account neither posture is guaranteed security or success. Friedrich Nietzsche, “On 
Truth and Lying in a Nonmoral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Ronald Speirs, 
tr. Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 141–55 at 150–3. 
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relationship, important to later moments of my essay, will be introduced and explored 
here, by way of these two historical precedents. 
I. General historical overview 
 A. Bonaventure’s historical context: some highlights 
  1. St. Francis of Assisi 
 Given the importance of St. Francis (1181/2–1226) for any attempt to understand 
Bonaventure, it seems appropriate to open up this historical introduction to 
Bonaventure with the Poverello in focus. While it is unlikely that as a child 
Bonaventure (born in 1217) actually met Francis personally, he was educated as a 
puer oblatus at the monastery at Bagnoregio, founded by the newly minted Franciscan 
order, beginning in 1225. Sixteen years prior, Pope Innocent III had granted the 
official approval of the order of the Friars Minor in 1209, just four years after Francis 
“heard the crucifix in the church of San Damiano speak to him and direct him on a 
path that was to lead to his founding a new religious order.”3 
 Throughout its course this study addresses several instances of Francis’ profound 
impact upon Bonaventure—the latter’s mystical experience during his retreat on Mt. 
Alverna; Francis’ exemplary voluntary poverty; the regula he imposed upon the order 
(together with its interpretation, or prohibition thereof); the striking stature to which 
Francis rises in Bonaventure’s narration of redemptive history. Yet there was one 
event in the young oblate’s life that marked him for life and set the stage for his 
subsequent sense of connection with the soon-to-be-canonized founder of the Friars 
Minor, of which he gives clear testimony in Legenda Maior: the apparently 
miraculous healing of a serious childhood illness through the intercessions of St. 
Francis himself.4 As Bonaventure relates the story, 
… when I was a boy, as I still vividly remember, I was 
snatched from the jaws of death by [Francis’] invocation 
and merits…. I recognize that God saved my life through 
him, and I realize that I have experienced his power in 
my very person.5 
 
3 Ewart Cousins, “Introduction,” in Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, the 
Life of St. Francis, 1–48 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1978), 3. 
4 Cousins, “Introduction,” 3–4. 
5 Bonaventure, The Life of St. Francis, in Bonaventure: The Soul’s Journey into God; The Tree of Life; 
The Life of St. Francis, tr. Ewart Cousins, 177–327 (Mahweh, NJ: Paulist Press, 1978), 182. Elsewhere, 
in the Legenda minor, Bonaventure credits his mother with a role in this healing: “God’s numberless 
favors granted through Francis do not cease to abound…. For as I lay seriously ill as a child, I was 
snatched from the very jaws of death and restored to perfect health owing to a vow made by my mother 
to the blessed Father Francis.” See Cousins, “Introduction,” 4. 
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Though one must strive to avoid any merely hagiographic bias in interpreting such 
matters and alleged occurrences in the premodern church, Ewart Cousins is surely 
right to conclude that “whatever the circumstances of the cure, it is clear that it made 
a lifelong impression on Bonaventure, establishing a close bond between him and 
Francis.”6 
2. The evangelical poverty movement 
 Our focus on the Poverello leads us in a straight line to consider a development 
from which the mendicant’s epithet originates: the widespread cultural movement that 
captured the imaginations of so many in the generation of St. Bonaventure, the 
voluntary embrace of a lifestyle of poverty, in would-be imitation of Jesus and his 
original apostles themselves. 
 As is the case with all movements of reform in the history of the church, the 
evangelical poverty movement had underlying roots in the social and political 
conditions of the day. By the twelfth century in Europe, a burgeoning economy had 
begun to spawn a revival of “urban life,” in which new classes and social groups such 
as “merchants, professionals, and skilled workers” began to emerge in significant 
numbers. The members of this newly arising bourgeois class, in turn, began to express 
greater expectations of the clergy than did their peasant predecessors. This grassroots 
phenomenon developed until it came to institutional recognition by the reform-
friendly Pope Innocent III at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Taking aim at the 
“entrenched patterns of corruption among clerics and religious,” the participants of 
the council redirected the duties of the clergy in favor of more responsible pastoral 
care of the members of the local parish. Newly legislated obligations included such 
tasks and practices as the prudent discernment of advice given to a penitent and the 
education of parish priests by appointed lectors. One can see in these moves a greater 
interest in and seriousness about the true cure of souls of the faithful.7 
 In the midst of this situation the community of St. Francis emerged. Unlike the 
Preaching Friars of St. Dominic, however, these “lesser brothers” embodied a 
movement that took shape from below, as it were. Consisting mainly of lay people, 
they 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Dominic Monti, O.F.M., introduction to St. Bonaventure’s Writings Concerning the Franciscan 
Order, Works of Saint Bonaventure, vol. 5, ed. George Marcil, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, New York: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1994), 11. 
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… [were] motivated by a desire to renounce “the 
world”—the web of avarice and status-seeking they 
perceived as the dominant forces in their society—to 
create a new type of community based on authentic 
Gospel values. They viewed their mission in the church 
as calling other Christians to true conversion of heart 
through their informal penitential preaching but, more 
importantly, through the witness of their own converted 
lives as they worked and moved, propertyless and 
powerless, among their neighbors.8 
 
 Such fervent and widespread desire to return to the simplicity of Jesus’ disciples 
was the environment in which the young Bonaventure developed. 
 Although two successive popes—Honorius III (1216–1277) and Gregory IX 
(1227–1241)—were also strongly supportive of the new mendicant movement, things 
begin to change with the ousting of Elias of Assisi as Franciscan minister general in a 
“great coup” in 1239. With the new leadership of Haymo of Faversham the order 
begins to take on a more clericalist cast, together with the adoption of a more 
sophisticated governmental system, in tension, surely, with the intended simplicity of 
the movement’s founder.9 
 This development toward greater clericalism bears upon one’s understanding of 
Bonaventure. Many contemporary scholars of the history of Franciscanism agree that 
the kind of establishment aura that characterized the order in the Paris of 
Bonaventure’s day comes into effect well before the emergence of the prodigy of 
Bagnoregio. Hence, while it may be the case that Bonaventure was willing to some 
extent to embrace the new prestige of the order, he cannot be regarded as the “second 
founder” of the order, if what is meant by this label is that he was responsible for the 
new status of prestige and social respectability. This view revises the stance of an 
older wave of Franciscan scholars, in the generation prior to Paul Sabbatier.10 Indeed, 
as his authentic works (including the Hexaëmeron) indicate, Bonaventure was, in 
reality, personally committed to a life of poverty, together with a kind of intellectual 
simplicity which it externally symbolized. 
 
8 Ibid., 11–12. 
9 Ibid., 17. 
10 Monti cites, as examples of the more recent revisionism, scholars such as F. C. Burkitt, John 
Moorman, and E. Randolph Daniel, all followers of Sabatier, who first began to turn the tide away 
from the traditional view in his 1894 Vie de S. François d’Assisi. See Monti, “Introduction,” 4 n. 7, 8; 
5. 
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 3. Inspiration by Alexander of Hales 
 Comfortable though he may have been with certain accoutrements of social 
respectability, based on Bonaventure’s writings we can say that his was a vision that 
advocated not a rejection of apostolic poverty, but a combination of it with the 
vocation of serious academic scholarship. In this predilection for the “both and,” he 
was preceded by Alexander of Hales, who, as Bougerol emphasizes, was a formative 
stamp upon the young Bonaventure.11 
 Although the story of the Friars Minor at the bourgeoning University of Paris—
the “intellectual capital of Christendom” at the time—does not begin with Alexander 
in the early thirteenth century, it is certainly “jump-started” by him. From its modest 
beginnings in borrowed facilities, donated by the abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Prés in 
1219, the community would take a quantum leap forward with the decision of 
Alexander to “request the habit of the Friars Minor, [thereby moving into the 
monastery] the chair of theology to which he had been appointed.”12 
 Alexander’s story provides remarkable context for the emergence of Bonaventure 
onto the scene, for this pioneer of sorts was an academic theologian first and a 
downwardly mobile mendicant only later. In fact, it was not until age 50 that the 
former dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London donned the habit. Would the allure of 
academic prominence prove detrimental to the original vocation of the followers of 
the Poverello? Whether the answer, judged from the vantage point of historical 
retrospective, is affirmative or negative, it would be under the steady hand of 
Bonaventure that it would achieve a unique blend of intellectual rigor and self-
imposed indigence. 
 Yet Alexander had more to offer the young Bonaventure than the example of an 
ascetic lifestyle. In him we find the foundation of the latter’s intellectual formation as 
well, seen in such distinctive characteristics as the combination of “the whole of the 
Christian tradition with that of pagan thought,” the preference for Augustine and 
Anselm over Aristotle, and the characterization of theology as a discipline conducted 
secundum pietatem. Building on this last theme, Bonaventure will come to his view 
that “the formal object of theology is [unified with] that of sacred scripture,” namely, 
 
11 Guy Bougerol, Introduction to the Works of St. Bonaventure, tr. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St. 
Anthony Guild Press, 1964), 14–18. 
12 Ibid., 14. 
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the God whom we come to know by way of holiness and wisdom (part and parcel 
with the reading of Scripture), and not by theoretical rationality alone.13 
 4. Overall career with the Franciscan order 
 Yet Bonaventure would rise to a height never attained by his mentor: in February 
of 1257, “three years after acceding to the chair of the general study house of the 
Friars Minor at the University of Paris, he was unanimously elected to head the 
30,000 member international fraternity as minister general.”14 Important highlights of 
his generalate, relevant for the context of the current study, include his decision to 
acquiesce to the condemnation of John of Parma (for apparently holding to the notion, 
following the party of the Joachim-inspired spiritual Franciscans, of a third age of the 
Holy Spirit),15 his response to the assimilation of Aristotle by the Arts Faculty,16 and 
his semi-rejection (which is also a semi-affirmation) of Joachim’s eschatology, 
backed by the spiritual Franciscan party of his order.17 
 In Ratzinger’s treatment of Bonaventure’s logos of history, all three of these 
“highlights” are treated and seen as related. More specifically, for Ratzinger there is a 
fundamental connection—a connection having to do with history—between 
Bonaventure’s anti-Aristotelianism on the one hand, and his anti-Joachimism on the 
other. In order to get a clearer sense of this connective role of history, let us first 
 
13 Ibid., 15–16. We see a similar posture, though perhaps slightly more radical, in Eudes Rigaud, who 
“does not consider theology to be a science.” He was “the first to note the importance of the habitus 
fidei, which is neither faith nor demonstrative science, but understanding perfecting the intellect with 
the sole intention of improving the affectus.” Bougerol, Introduction, 17–18. 
14 Monti, “Introduction,” 1. 
15 Philip McCosker, “Bonaventure,” in The Student’s Companion to the Theologians, ed. Ian Markham, 
162–8 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2013), 164. 
16 Bonaventure’s response is embodied in his two Lenten-season sermon series, in the years 1267 and 
1268, the Collationes de Decem Praeceptis and the Collationes de Septum Donis Spiritus Sancti, 
respectively. These two works comprise his negative verdict on the autonomous philosophy of 
Aristotle—autonomous in that it seeks to master the truth of reality independently of revelation coming 
from God to us in Scripture—which was at that time being embraced by faculty members such as Siger 
of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. See Ratzinger, Theology of History, 134ff. According to Ratzinger, 
Bonaventure identified key errors of Aristotelianism (treated below) in his Sentences commentary, but 
it was not until later (that is, during the period of these two sermon series) that he clearly grasped that 
the errors then identified were actually put forward in Aristotle’s authentic writings. 
17 As we will see below, Bonaventure’s qualified “yes” to Joachim consists in: 1) his willingness to 
accept some aspects of the novel periodization of Christian history put forth by the Calabrian Abbott 
(including the one-to-one correspondence between specific events of the Old Testament and those of 
the era of Christian history), and 2) his agreement that the spiritual movement launched by Francis did 
in fact rise to the level of unique, redemptive-historical momentousness, such that it provides clear 
proof of a new development of the Holy Spirit in the world. His negative assessment, however, is seen 
in his rejection of a third epoch of the Holy Spirit which would thus eclipse the redemptive-historical 
uniqueness of Jesus Christ, which Bonaventure regards (somewhat in tension with St. Augustine) as the 
center of history. 
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examine in a bit more detail the second of the above three “highlights” of 
Bonaventure’s career, that of his posture vis-à-vis the Arts Faculty. 
 5. Bonaventure’s relative position at the University of Paris 
 But not just the Arts Faculty, for it is not the case that there are only two positions 
(that of Bonaventure and that of the Arts Faculty), carved out in relation to Aristotle, 
which we can examine. Rather, there are four: two extremes, and two in the middle. 
On the one extreme, which one might regard as the “extreme left,” we have the 
uncritical imbibing of the newly “rediscovered” works of Aristotle, officially 
integrated into the Arts Faculty curriculum at the University of Paris in 1255.18 As 
representative of this perspective we have such secular clerics as Boethius of Dacia 
and Siger of Brabant. 
 Wishing to avoid any discussion of the debate concerning whether or not these 
figures held to a theory of “double truth,” for my purposes here I will regard these two 
together rather as a theoretical placeholder of sorts, assuming that they do hold to 
Aristotle’s natural and metaphysical doctrines, as a belief of ultimate allegiance. 
 On the other extreme—what might be called the “extreme right” since it sought to 
conserve faithfulness to the dogmatic tradition of the teachings of the Catholic 
church—let us take as our stock example Henry of Ghent, a regent master (in the 
theology faculty) of the University of Paris in the second half of the thirteenth 
century. Lacking the space here to give even a cursory overview of this figure who 
advised Bishop Stephen Tempier in the latter’s harsh condemnation of Aristotelian 
premises in 1277, I will do no more than cite one position of Henry’s in order to 
exemplify his thought: his position on the divisive issue of the number of substantial 
formae to be regarded as inhering in any sense within homo sapiens. Opposing 
Thomas’ unitive view that the rational soul is the lone counterpart, within the 
hylomorphic constitution of that organism called “rational animal,” of its material 
 
18 The complete corpus of Aristotle’s logical works—comprising the logica vetus (the Categories, De 
Interpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isagoge) and the newly rediscovered logica nova (the Sophistical 
Refutations, the Topics, and the Prior Analytics), both translated by Boethius but the latter group 
having been lost and rediscovered, and, together with the Posterior Analytics, translated by James of 
Venice in the middle of the twelfth century—was seen as unproblematic from a theological dogmatic 
point of view, and hence was sanctioned for use in the Arts Faculty in Paris as early as 1215. The 
natural and metaphysical works, such as the Physics, On the Soul, and the Metaphysics—regarded as 
much more controversial theologically—were not granted entrance, however, until 1255. Robert 
Pasnau, “The Latin Aristotle,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, ed. Christopher Shields (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 665–7. 
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composition, Henry was on this count a pluralist, positing at least two forms: “a 
bodily form for the matter (the forma corporeitatis) and then a rational soul to inform 
the body.”19 At the risk of painting with excessively broad strokes, the point here is 
that “pluralists” such as Henry of Ghent pledge allegiance to, cast a blind vote of 
confidence in favor of, the authoritative decree of the church. That is, they so 
privilege the church’s emphasis on the eternal existence of the soul that they allow it 
to force them into a far-fetched position that strains the limits of plausibility. All 
scholastics of every stripe, after all, adhere to basic Aristotlelian hylomorphism: why, 
then, would some of them feel the need to multiply forms? They do so—positing an 
eternal soul in addition to the more organic, Aristotelian one, on the basis of ecclesial 
fiat alone. 
 Thomas Aquinas embodies an alternative approach, occupying as he does (on our 
imagined continuum) a position of “moderate left.” Driven by a desire to synthesize 
the compelling rigor of Aristotle with the truths coming from revelation, he seeks a 
path of integration. “Why can’t we have both?” he asks: both the truth of revelation 
(an indestructible, everlasting, living soul) and Aristotle’s psyche which is the formal 
dimension, hylomorphically co-constituting together with the material, fleshly corpus, 
that concrete particular known as man. So it is that he regards the two descriptions— 
that which is co-extensive with the body and that which survives it, post mortem—as 
pertaining to one and the same form.20 
 If Thomas is moderate left, then my thesis, at this preliminary phase of 
introduction, is that Bonaventure is “moderate right.” Although Bonaventure’s 
thought is indeed thoroughly saturated with Aristotelian conceptual habits, and 
although on Ratzinger’s view the Franciscan doctor is anti-Aristotelian only in the 
narrow dimension of the logos of history, we can say that Bonaventure, situated at a 
point between Thomas and Henry, is more quick to part ways with Aristotle than is 
the former. 
 Why? Is his motive solely that of church authority? On the contrary, with its 
emphasis on story, desire, and mysticism (all inter-related one to another) this essay 
sees Bonaventure as deeply contemplative and more-than-scientific. Not directly 
opposing Thomas’ attempt to stretch himself to the demanding shape of the 
 
19 Pasnau, “Latin Aristotle,” 678–9. 
20 Ibid. 
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disciplinae of Aristotelian scientiae, Bonaventure insists that reality is bigger. As we 
will see below, history is our clue that opens up this vista of interpretation. 
 B. Ratzinger’s historical context: some highlights 
 1. Experience of World War II 
 Turning our attention to our twentieth- (and twenty-first-) century leading figure 
in this essay, we begin with his traumatic experience in the second world war in 
Bavaria.21 We had occasion above to mention the role which Bonaventure’s mother 
had in his spiritual formation (in relation to St. Francis). In the case of our modern 
Bavarian youngster, it is the early influence of his father which comes into play, for 
his father, a policeman by trade, consistently resisted the growing Nazi threat of the 
time. Given the fact, for example, that the young Joseph’s siblings were both enlisted 
in Nazi youth organizations, one can imagine the stress on the family and on the 
father in particular. At one point the pressure on Herr Ratzinger was so intense that he 
was forced to relocate his family from one Bavarian town to another.22 
 Ratzinger recounts a vivid story of how the Nazi influence settled down into the 
warp and woof of the local community, even if somewhat artificially and in the face 
of folk resistance. At his lower school in Aschau am Inn, a “gifted young teacher,” 
thirsty for “reform” and sympathetic to the Nazi cause, “attempted to make a breach 
in the solid structure of village life that bore the deep imprint of the church’s liturgical 
year.” So it was that he  
erected a Maypole with great pomp and circumstance 
and composed a kind of prayer to the Maypole as a 
symbol of life force perpetually renewing itself. The 
Maypole was supposed to bring back a portion of 
Germanic religion and thus help gradually to expel 
Christianity, which was now denounced as alienating 
Germans from their own great Germanic culture.23 
 
 
21 I note, however, that it is not with World War II that Ratzinger begins his own autobiographical 
account. There, rather, the story begins with the liturgy of the church, and his narration of his own 
baptism at the Easter Vigil in the church in Marktl am Inn, on Holy Saturday, April 16, 1927. See 
Joseph Ratzinger, Milestones, tr. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1998), 8. This 
same emphasis on the liturgy is seen, many decades later, in the decision of Pope Benedict XVI to 
commission as the first volume of his Gesammelte Schriften to be translated into English the volume on 
the liturgy. 
See Joseph Ratzinger, “On the Inaugural Volume of My Collected Works,” in Collected Works, vol. 
11: Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence, ed. Gerhard Ludwig 
Müller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2014), v. 
22 Ratzinger, Milestones, 13. 
23 Ibid., 16. 
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Socio-political ideologies and “pseudo-liturgies”24 such as the one exemplified in this 
story no doubt inoculated the young Ratzinger at an early age against any infatuation 
with modern utopianism. 
 Unfortunately, however, the Nazi menace persisted through higher levels of 
Ratinger’s course of education. After finishing up Gymnasium at Traunstein, where a 
requiem Mass was celebrated almost daily to mourn the fallen dead youth, he 
“increasingly recognized the names of … schoolmates who only a short while before 
had been [his] classmates, full of confidence and the joy of life.”25 
 Yet this mixture of the enthusiasm of education with the horrors of war would 
continue until the fateful day when he was recruited into the military, forced to 
“protect a branch of the Bavarian Motor Works that produced motors for airplanes.” 
After a few other miserable deployments, the dispositionally irenic student finally 
found relief: on June 19, 1945 he at last “held in [his] hand a certificate of release that 
made the end of the war a reality for [him]….”26 He would never forget the hellish 
experience of war.      2. Academic career, 
Vatican II, and departure from Tübingen 
 During the course of the following decades, Ratzinger would launch and develop 
his ministerial and academic careers, being ordained to the priesthood in 1951 and 
completing his doctoral thesis on Augustine’s ecclesiology at the University of 
Munich and then his Habilitation thesis on Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron (involving a 
dramatic experience, narrated below), in 1953 and 1957, respectively. In 1958 he was 
offered and accepted the chair of fundamental theology at Bonn, during a period of 
personal joy and intellectual thriving in his newly acquired position.27 
 During his tenure at Bonn, Ratzinger developed close personal relationships with 
several important figures within what one might call global Catholicism. For example, 
due his close relationship Cardinal Frings of the Archdiocese of Cologne, Ratzinger 
was eventually tapped to be a peritus (an official Council theologian) for the 
proceedings of the Second Vatican Council. A focused summary on Ratzinger’s 
theological involvement in the Council will prove to be highly instructive. While most 
people—wrongly, in Ratzinger’s view—have considered the work of liturgical reform 
 
24 Ibid., 33. 
25 Ibid., 29. 
26 Ibid., 39 
27 Ibid., 115–19. 
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the preeminent work of the ecumenical council, it is in the area of ecclesial 
authority— the interplay between Holy Scripture, Tradition, and revelation—where 
the Council’s most important work, according to Ratzinger, truly lies. Painting once 
again, necessarily, in rather broad strokes, we can say that the standard view of church 
authority—assumed to be that propounded at the Council of Trent—is that revelation 
arrives by way of two “sources”: Scripture and Tradition. This traditional view was 
reiterated by the party in favor of the “official schema” of the Council. 
 Over and against this traditional view, however, resulting from the work of one 
“dogma specialist” from Tübingen, J. R. Geiselmann, was a more innovative party, 
rooting its position in a revisionist reading of the Acts of the Council of Trent, which 
regarded Scripture as materially complete or sufficient. On this view, the material 
completion of Scripture—that is, the view that Scripture “contains the deposit of faith 
whole and entire”—means that “the church could not teach anything … not expressly 
contained in Scripture.” And yet, who is responsible for determining what is or is not 
so expressly contained? For this revisionist party, the answer was clear: 
Since the interpretation of Scripture was identified with 
the historical-critical method, this meant that nothing 
could be taught by the church which could not pass the 
scrutiny of the historical-critical method…. This new 
theory, in fact, meant that exegesis now had to become 
the highest authority in the church.28 
 
 So it is that we have, in the context of this controversy over ecclesial authority, 
two extreme positions: the party on the “right,” which holds to the allegedly 
traditional 
“two-source” theory of revelation, presumably stemming from Trent, and the faction 
on the “left,” which puts power in the hands of critical biblical scholars. The latter 
group, according to Ratzinger, were attempting adopt the model and attitudes of 
modern science: 
[For this group] … revelation is … a meteor fallen to the 
earth that now lies around somewhere as a rock mass 
from which rock samples can be taken and submitted to 
laboratory analysis…. [This] “rock analysis” … is … the 
historical-critical method.29 
 
 
28 Ibid., 124–5. 
29 Ibid., 127. 
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 It turns out, however, that the young peritus from Bavaria was not alone is his 
opposition not only to the historical-critical position, but also the traditionalist 
“schema”: his position of double-sided dissent was in fact shared by Karl Rahner, and 
so it is that the two, together, were recruited and commissioned to propose a third way 
forward for the Council. Yet this alliance would prove to be short lived, for very 
quickly Ratzinger realized that he and Rahner “lived on two different theological 
planets.”30 Forgoing an excursus into Rahner’s “liberal” theology, in this historical 
overview it will suffice to suggest that if Rahner’s position can be plotted as “center 
left” (in analogy with Thomas Aquinas), then that of Ratzinger—whose thought, after 
all, is profoundly shaped by the theology of the church fathers, can be regarded—in 
analogy with the subject of his Habilitationsschrift—as “center right,” once again 
channeling the spirit of his thirteenth-century predecessor. 
 What was Ratzinger’s position, then, on this pressing issue of revelation? Forged 
in the crucible of his Bonaventure research during his Munich years, he held, contra 
the “two-source” theory, which sees Scripture and Tradition as sources of revelation, 
that it is revelation which is itself the source of both Scripture and Tradition. As we 
will elaborate below, revelation for Ratzinger (and for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure) is an 
event that always already requires the perception and interpretation of what Ratzinger 
regards as a receiving subject. Scripture is (inscription of) that interpretation, and the 
church is the (communal, historical) subject that performs the interpretation of the 
interpretation (that is, the interpretation of Scripture).31 This view stands in opposition 
not only to that of Rahner, but also the revisionist faction and the traditionalist, (neo-) 
Scholastic party.32 In a striking historical vindication of Ratzinger, it was his view that 
eventually triumphed at the Second Vatican Council, finding official expression in the 
Constitution on Divine Revelation, hashed out in the final period of the council only 
after “very complex debates.”33 Sadly for Ratzinger, however, this understanding 
 
30 Ibid., 128. 
31 For the relevant texts of the Bonaventure research, conducted in the 1950’s but published only in 
2009, see Joseph Ratzinger, Offenbarungsverständis und Geschichtstheologie Bonaventuras, Joseph 
Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, ed. Gerhard Ludwig Müller (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 
2009), as follows. On revelation as manifestation, see subsections “Revelatio als Beseitigung des 
Sünden-velum” (pages 110–15) and “Manifestatio” (pages 119–31). On the objective and subjective 
distinction within Ratzinger’s Bonaventure’s notion of revelation, see “Der objective Aspekt des 
Problems” (pages 140–3) and “Die subjektive Ansicht” (pages 143–4). 
32 Ratzinger, Milestones, 127. 
33 “Ressourcement theologians played a vital role in the preparation of that final text, … [including] 
Ratzinger.” Gerald O’Collins, S.J., documents the vast extent of Ratzinger’s shaping of the 
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had—at least by the year 1997—trickled down only very little into the actual 
consciousness of the mind of the church.34  
 These events of Vatican II shed light on Ratzinger’s later, controversial decision 
to leave his post at Tübingen, where he had moved after a brief stint in Münster in 
order to be closer to his native, southern homeland of Bavaria. Working with a stellar 
cast of scholars, of whom some were and are household names, including his personal 
friend Hans Küng, Jürgen Möltmann, and Ernst Bloch, Ratzinger enjoyed an exalted 
position as dean of the faculty. Yet it was the rise of Marxist ideology—related to the 
trend of liberation theology, also at that time sweeping the Catholic church in the 
wake of the Council—as dominant across the humanities that began to disturb 
Ratzinger’s comfort. That it supplanted the existentialist posture previously dominant 
in the theology faculty—a stance to which Ratzinger seems sympathetic—added 
insult to injury.35 Lest anyone argue, however, that Ratzinger is here guilty of a 
reactionary “conservative turn”—of which he had been accused by some during the 
Council itself—one might attend to the commentary of Küng, offered in retrospect, 
decades later. 
There is in fact little difference [in terms  of ideological 
posture] between the Ratzinger of 1958 who committed 
himself to writing a dogmatics (which never 
materialized) and the 80-year-old Pontiff who presents a 
spiritual and meditative Christological volume, Jesus of 
Nazereth, in 2007.36 
 
 So it is that, in 1967, the still young fundamental theologian would make the final 
move of his formal academic career. It would be in Regensburg that he would take on 
several important tasks. He would serve, at the invitation of Pope John VI, on the 
newly formed International Papal Commission (for the purpose of providing the 
bishops in Council with theological guidance); he would play a foundational role, 
together with Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthassar, in the creation of 
Communio, an international journal of theology and culture; and he would publish a 
 
Constitution, including the formative role of his Bonaventure research on revelation. Gerald O’Collins, 
“Ressourcement and Vatican II,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewed Twentieth-Century 
Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 
372– 39, at 423. 
34 Ratzinger, Milestones, 129. 
35 Ibid., 135–39. 
36 Seán Corkery, A Liberation Ecclesiology? The Quest for Authentic Freedom in Joseph Ratzinger’s 
Theology of the Church (New York: Peter Lang, 2015), 44 n. 8. 
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penetrating volume on eschatology, a work which he regards as “[his] most thorough 
work, and the one over which [he] labored most strenuously.”37 
 Having examined Ratzinger’s pre-papal career as church leader and academic 
theologian, let us now turn our attention to two instances in which the older Ratzinger 
publicly and visibly called into question, now as Pope Benedict XVI, the rise of 
secularization in modern Europe (and western society). 
3. Public engagement with European secularism 
a. Habermas “Debate” (2004) 
 On January 19, 2004, at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria, the leader of the 
Catholic church and Europe’s most important Marxist philosopher at the time came 
together to hold a public dialogue about the relationship between secular culture and 
religion. First, what led to the organization and implementation of this historic and 
high-profile debate, the defining question of which, according to a summary provided 
by the German transcript, was, “Kann Religion der Vernunft Grenzen setzen—und 
umgekehrt?”38 The editor of the volume that documents the event, Florian Schuller, 
narrates a brief history of the background of the encounter, first alluding to a cultural 
discussion that gradually emerged in Italy in the late 1990s, centered on the status of 
European secularism, and within it, the role of religion in particular. The two parties 
involved were the credendi and the laici, “to use the customary abbreviations for 
these groups with their different worldviews.”39 The next development in the drama, 
according to Schuller, is the 2000 publication of the “left-wing intellectual and 
political”40 Italian periodical MicroMaga, in which “the following thesis is formulated 
in the forward: ‘Philosophy is concerned more and more with religion, rather than 
with knowledge, and seeks to enter a dialogue with religion.’”41 This claim, in turn, 
forms the subject matter of this particular issue of the publication, which is dealt with 
by “philosophical texts from a variety of schools, all of which display a high 
intellectual quality,” together with articles from three theologians, the most 
conspicuous of which is one Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who therein expresses his 
 
37 Ratzinger, Milestones, 140–51. 
38 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, Dialektik der Säkularisierung: über Vernuft und Religion, 
ed. Florian Schuller (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2005). 
39 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, Dialectics of Secularization, ed. Florian Schuller, tr. Brian 
McNiel, C.R.V. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 9. 
40 This phrase translates the German “linksintellektuellen, linkspolitischen.” Habermas and Ratzinger, 
Dialektik, 8. 
41 Habermas and Ratzinger, Dialectics, 9. 
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hope to “stimulate the debate on the truth of the Christian religion.”42 After 
suggesting that, in contrast with that of both Italy and France, the cultural situation in 
Germany tends to prevent a robust exchange of ideas between parties that lie on 
opposite sides of the political or ideological divide, Schuller documents a surprising 
statement of Habermas just three weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
in America: 
The philosopher [i.e., Habermas], who describes himself 
as a follower of Max Weber in the sense that he is “tone 
deaf in the religious sphere,” surprised many people by 
demanding that the secular society acquire a new 
understanding of religious convictions, which are 
something more and other than mere relics of a past with 
which we are finished. On the contrary, these convictions 
pose a “cognitive challenge” to philosophy. This speech 
was described by some as “opening a door for the 
churches.”43 
 
In light of these three elements—the general debate in Italy in the late 1990s, the 
publication of MicroMaga in 2000, and Habermas’ striking comments in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorists attacks—the organization of this critical dialogue does indeed make 
sense. 
 What is remarkable is the extent to which both interlocutors agree on the basic 
issues, both answering the above question about Religion and Vernunft in the 
affirmative. 
 For his part in the exchange, Habermas wants secular reason to engage in an effort 
of self-criticism in which it is limited by the claims of religion. And yet he 
distinguishes his version of this stance from the related position of legal scholar E. W. 
Böckenförde, according to which “a completely positivistic system requires religion, 
or some other ‘sustaining force,’ as the cognitive guarantee of the foundations of its 
validity.”44 Against this, Habermas holds that “systems of law can be legitimated only 
in a self-referential manner,” that is, on the basis of legal procedures born of 
democratic procedures, a view shared by Hans Kelsen and Niklas Luhmann.45 
Nuancing his stance further, however, Habermas suggests that, at the level of political 
 
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Ibid., 12. 
44 Ibid., 27. 
45 Ibid., 24–28. 
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practicality—that is, of human motivation—it is doubtful that any of this theoretical 
justification can actually work in the “real world” of politics. When it comes to issues 
such as the reform of the welfare state and the politics of immigration, questions such 
as, “How are we to understand ourselves as citizens of the Republic of Germany and 
as Europeans?” become inevitable. Such patriotism, Habermas clarifies, is not merely 
abstract but rather historical, such that patriotism requires the communal embrace of a 
national political history. This history, in turn, is irreducibly religious in nature, and 
becomes even more crucial in pluralistic societies in which the rank and file members 
of diverse ideological factions might not share the narrowly abstract philosophical 
viewpoints required to agree on any given political theory, narrowly defined.46 
 The fact that “when reason reflects on its deepest foundations, it discovers that it 
owes its origin to something else” only strengthens this point of Habermas, grounding 
his position in something more than the merely practical.47 Yet he also appreciates the 
empirical fact that even in Western society religious vitality seems to be a permanent 
feature of European nations and cities, giving rise to a new “post-secular” awareness: 
 
The expression “post-secular” does more than give 
public recognition to religious fellowships in view of the 
functional contribution they make to the reproduction of 
motivations and attitudes that are societally desirable. 
The public awareness of a post-secular society also 
reflects a normative insight that has consequences for the 
political dealings of unbelieving citizens with believing 
citizens.48 
 
On the empirical basis of experience, then, Habermas in these remarks argues that it 
makes sense for secular society to regard religious communities as a crucial 
component of its ongoing health. 
 Turning now to Ratzinger’s remarks in this historic exchange, the upshot of his 
comments—understandably, given the format of the interchange, painted in broad 
brushstrokes—is that the secular embrace of the discourse of human rights provides 
an entry point into a fruitful cross-pollination of reason and religion. Rejecting the 
 
46 Ibid., 35–39. What is this “something else,” which lies deeper than the level of reason? For 
Habermas, it is history. In agreement with this claim even while wanting to deepen it, later in this essay 
we will examine thinkers who hold that it is mythos, in addition to history, which lies beneath and 
grounds the humanly rational. 
47 Ibid., 40–2. 
48 Ibid., 46. 
 45 
kind of enlightenment formulation of natural law found, for example, in Grotius, he 
nevertheless argues that, even on the most secular version of human rights theory, one 
must assume “that [the human person’s] being bears within itself values and norms 
that must be discovered—but not invented.”49 It is on the basis, then, of a shared 
commitment to human rights that Ratzinger attempts to point forward to a path of 
common cause, shared between secular reason and the revelation-based Christian 
religion. 
 Having summarized this historic interchange as a first exhibit of Ratzinger’s 
prolific influence in the twenty-first century, a visibly public exchange between two 
towering public intellectuals of twenty-first-century Europe in which we find much 
more common ground than disagreement, let us now turn to a second: his 2006 
address to the “representatives of science” in the aula magna of the University of 
Regensburg. 
b. Regensburg address (2006) 
 Delivered within three years of his interaction with Habermas, the Regensburg 
address serves as a variation on the same theme as the former discussion of 
secularization, while situating it in a different context, one that is more rooted in the 
assessment of historical factors and developments. Further, it also sheds great light on 
several issues presented in this essay, introduced above and elaborated on below. 
Included in this list are: the historical understanding of scientia in the European 
university; the role of theology as integral to the western project of scientia (as a 
whole but also as determining the relationships between the various discipulinae); the 
relationship between faith and reason; the nature of revelation; the assimilation of the 
Greek philosophical legacy by Christian theology; the modern reduction of reason 
(excluding from its purview dimensions which in premodern epochs were crucial); the 
self-characterization of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation 
(together with other disciplines of Geisteswissenschaft) as scientific. 
 Ratzinger begins his address with a personal reflection of an autobiographical 
nature. 
He recalls his tenure at Bonn as an extended “lived experience” of the universitas 
scientiarum, in which “historians, philosophers, philologists, and … [members of 
 
49 Ibid., 71. 
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both] theological faculties” engaged in lively exchange, all on a basis of the shared 
sense of and commitment to reason, even if “not everyone could share the faith which 
theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole.”50 
This profound sense of coherence within the universe of 
reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported 
that a colleague had said that there was something odd 
about our university: it had two faculties devoted to 
something that did not exist: God.51 
 
 As many readers familiar with Ratzinger/Pope Benedict will know, the 
Regensburg Address, soon after it was delivered, became internationally 
controversial, due to its characterization of Islam, a historical portrayal to which 
Ratzinger quickly turns. 
Relying on the research of Theodore Khoury, the Münster scholar and Catholic priest 
of Lebanese origin,52 the scholarly Pontiff references a fourteenth-century transcript 
recording a conversation between Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus, and “an 
educated Persian,” occurring in 1394. In the exchange, in which the Christian ruler 
was offering a criticism of the attempt to produce religious converts by coercion, 
Emperor Manuel regards such efforts as irrational, and states that “not to act in 
accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature.” Ratzinger reports that Khoury 
further explains, 
For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek 
philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for 
Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His 
will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that 
of rationality.53 
 
 This purportedly Islamic view of reason serves, for the Pope’s purposes, as a foil 
against the historic Christian notion of rationality. For the Christian, Ratzinger argues, 
the conception of theos assimilates the notion of reason as “creative and capable of 
self-communication.” God is logos (John 1:1); God is reasonable. Acts 16:6–10 
(Paul’s vision of the Macedonians who call to him, “Come over to Macedonia and 
help us!”) can be read as “a ‘distillation’ of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement 
 
50 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Regensburg Lecture,” in Gained Horizons: Regensburg and the Enlargement 
of Reason, ed. Bainard Cowen (South Bend, Illinois: St. Augustine’s Press, 2011), 109–10. 
51 Ibid., 110. 
52 For this characterization of Khoury, I am indebted to Philipp Rosemann. 
53 Ibid., 112–13. 
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between Biblical faith and Greek inquiry.” Here, in support of this Christian 
dependence upon Greek ideas, Ratzinger summarizes the genealogy of the name of 
God which decades earlier he had developed in Part I of his Introduction to 
Christianity almost four decades earlier. Rivetingly, the Pope sees this 
demythologization beginning with the “I am” of Exodus 3, paralleling Socrates’ 
“efforts to vanquish and transcend myth.” It is in this context that the 
pontiff/fundamental theologian clarifies his view of the Septuagint (LXX) (important, 
too, for his genealogy in the Introduction), characterizing it as 
an independent textual witness and a distinct step in the 
history of revelation, one which brought about this 
encounter [between “faith and reason”] in a way that was 
decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity.54 
 
That Ratzinger regards a biblical translation—with all its cultural biases, with all the 
historically contingent decisions made by its translators—as a “step in the history of 
revelation” certainly meshes with the attitude toward revelation which we described 
above in connection with Vatican II. Closely related, too, to the understanding of 
revelatio gleaned from his Bonaventure research, we find here an example of human 
poiêsis—the translation of a religious/historical/literary/theological (set of) text(s) 
from a source language (Hebrew) to a target language (Greek)—which functions at 
the same time, for Ratzinger, as an event of revelation. As for Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure, then, so also for the Ratzinger not just of the 1950s (his 
Habilitationsschrift research) or the 1960’s (Vatican II), but also of 2006: there is no 
such thing as revelation without human engagement and receptive interpretation, 
principally because it is delivered conterminously with, part and parcel with, history 
and historical development. 
Yet, Ratzinger’s appeal to the Septuagint is apropos for an additional reason: it 
demonstrates that biblical (even Jewish) thought was already Hellenized by the third 
century BCE. Already, that is, in the work of the LXX we begin to discern that 
theology is properly done on the basis of Greek concepts and not on that of “brute 
revelation” alone (as if such a thing were possible). It is precisely this synthesis, 
according to Ratzinger, which begins to fall apart in the late Middle Ages in the 
 
54 Ibid., 115. 
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thought of Duns Scotus. In him “we find trends in theology which would sunder this 
synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit.”55 
 Yet if one can see the beginnings of an effort to de-Hellenize Christian thought in 
the work of the Subtle Doctor, this trend becomes fully unbridled after the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment. Among several examples, Ratzinger elaborates 
on the assumptions of practioners of HCM, in this context exemplified by Adolf 
Harnack. Above all, HCM regards itself, Ratzinger directly states, as scientific in the 
modern sense of the term: 
Historical-critical exegesis of the New Testament, as 
[Harnack] saw it, restored to theology its place within the 
university: theology, for Harnack, is something 
essentially historical and therefore strictly scientific.56 
 
 How should we, however, regard modern science in this context? Ratzinger 
provides a terse summary of large swaths of material developed (once again) in his 
1968 publication of his Einführung in das Christentum, putting forth several key 
features of the self-representation of modern science for a historical critic such as 
Harnack: 
 
• There is a connection between the technological exploitation of nature (for 
human benefit) and experimental repeatability. 
• Because only the interplay between Cartesian mathematical truth and the 
empirical (that is, the experimentally repeatable) can (purportedly) yield 
cognitive certainty for the human being, science comes to be reinterpreted as 
(and limited to) only those disciplines which can employ such methods to 
yield this epistemological result. 
• The human sciences, in the modern period especially after Descartes, cannot 
resist the temptation to redefine themselves in terms of this revised version of 
science. (As he intimated before, this also applies to biblical hermeneutics, in 
the hands of historical-critical scholars such as Harnack.) 
• As a correlate of the new status of science as limited to the mathematically 
and empirically certain, God is excluded from the realm of science.57 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 118. 
57 Ibid., 119–20. 
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 The conclusion of the matter, for Ratzinger, is that theology must resist the 
temptation to which Harnack and his fellow practictioners of HCM give in. If it is to 
claim the status of science, theology must not concede this reductive understanding of 
science.58 Connecting these thoughts to the same realm of discourse as that of his 
Habermas dialogue, Ratzinger ends his address by stressing that the secular world 
needs religion, in particular the Christian religion: 
“Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary 
to the nature of God,” said Manuel II, according to his 
Christian understanding of God, in response to his 
Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this 
breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the 
dialogues of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the 
great task of the university.59 
 
 With this general, yet intentionally curated, historical overview behind us, we now 
turn our attention to three distinct and more focused areas of historical biography in 
the lives of our two figures: the dramatic crises to which each was forced to react 
while crafting their own theologies of history; their respective responses to the 
historical emergence of a new kind of science; and a prudent word of direction, 
uttered by each, amid two bitter clashes over eschatology. 
II. Geworfenheit and the respective implementations of writing 
A. The strange character of the incompleteness of Bonaventure’s 
Hexaëmeron   
 At one level the incompleteness of the Hexaëmeron is not strange. It is well 
known that in the spring of 1273 Bonaventure, who was at the time right in the middle 
of his Hexaëmeron lectures, and who by this time had proven himself adept not only 
at scholarship and devotion, but also at institutional administration, is created 
Cardinal Archbishop of Albano and immediately tasked with the preparations for the 
Second Council of Lyon, thus being prevented from completing his work on the six 
days of creation.60 The collator of the Hexaëmeron writes, in the Additamentum found 
in the Quaracchi edition: 
 
58 As we will develop below, this stance of Ratzinger’s is consistent with that of Bonaventure: theology 
is not less than science, even if it is more. 
59 Ibid., 124. 
60 Ilia Delio, Simply Bonaventure: An Introduction to his Life, Thought, and Writing (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1978), Kindle e-book, “From Paris to Assisi.” 
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Sed heu, heu heu! Superveniente statu excelsiori et vitae 
excessu domini et magistri huius operis, prosecutionem 
prosecuturi non acceperunt.61 
 
Here we note that, as is the case with his twentieth-century counterpart, Bonaventure 
is not just more than a mere scholar, but also more than a mere mystic: he is also a 
gifted man of affairs who has the practical “know how” to steward and cultivate the 
health of an extensive cultural institution, working for the benefit of the members 
therein. Bonaventure’s competence in this area, indeed, turned out to be a welcome 
asset not just to his brotherhood of mendicants but also the Catholic church writ large. 
 And yet, at another level the incomplete status of the work bears the marks of 
enigma, for its purported premature ending (that is, the fourth vision which interprets 
the action of day four of creation) simultaneously seems like a development of 
ultimate importance. What, after all, could be more ultimate and important than that 
which, for Catholic dogma, is the end-goal of the entirety of human existence, the 
beatific vision? For it is this, notwithstanding the initial preview he gives in the third 
collation,62 to which Bonaventure seems to refer in his treatment of the fourth visio, 
which takes place on day four as it is narrated in Genesis 1. To see this, we must 
direct our attention to the final, twenty-third collatio of the entire Hexaëmeron. In the 
first section therein we read: 
… it was explained [in the previous collatio, XXII, 
dealing with the ecclesia militans and the ecstatic, 
hierarchicalized soul63] how the soul is hierarchicalized 
in … contemplation … so that the soul is in the light at 
all times, for it cannot remain [statically] in any one, and 
in the final one, there is repose, that is, the exemplary 
reason in the fatherland.64 
 
We see here that Bonaventure is discussing the soul “in … [the] repose … [of] 
exemplary reason in the fatherland.” Can there be any doubt that he has in mind here 
the full and final bliss of heavenly beatitude, experienced by the redeemed soul at the 
ultimate destination of its spiritual itinerarium? 
 
61 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, 450 note “Additamentum.” 
“But alas, alas, alas! As a higher state and an excess of life overcame the lord and master, they did not 
permit him to continue his work.” Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, 382. 
62 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, III.24–31 (347–8). 
63 The heading of the Collatio XXII contains the phrase anima hierarchizata. 
64 The Latin for fatherland is patria. Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XXIII.7 (366, n. ‡). 
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 And yet, we must also now acknowledge that the treatment of this topic in the 
context of the quarta visio does stand in tension with the preliminary outline he gives 
closer to the beginning of the work, in III.24–31. In this preliminary summary, the 
Doctor states his plan to treat the soul (or “vision of the intellect”—visio 
intelligentiae) “absorbed by rapture in God” (per raptum in Deum absorptae) not in 
his treatment of the fourth vision, but rather of the sixth65 (or seventh, since, as 
Ratzinger aptly points out, there is a deep ambiguity at certain junctures between the 
sixth element in a series and the seventh66). 
 A few sections later, in III.30, Bonaventure confirms that this topic of the 
“intellectus absorbed by rapture in God” is, indeed, to be treated within the sixth 
vision, a vision which, as we have seen, was never articulated due to the exigencies of 
history. 
 Strange, indeed, then, that the language of the actually treated fourth vision 
resonates so strongly with, and is saturated by the same vocabulary as, the planned-
for-day-six treatment of the beatific vision. There, in Collation XXIII, we see that the 
end goal of all this self-hierarchicalization on the part of the soul is that there be 
“repose … in the exemplary reason in the patria.” This is none other than a reference 
to the beatific vision, which consists in the reception of ultimate light.67 After the 
soul’s long journey in via up to this point, it can finally rest, having achieved a state 
of perfection. This complete vision, itself dependent upon an ultimate instance of 
divine illumination, is the end-goal of the intellect. Like the first intellect (proceeding 
on the basis of divine illumination for natural knowledge cum that of faith) this one, 
too, takes place in “one fell swoop,” and not in the manner of dianoia: “all things will 
be seen together at a single glance.”68 This is the ultimate vision of the whole. 
 
65 Ibid., III.24 (347). 
66 Here we see, as Ratzinger shows, the relevance of the Bonaventure-approved maxim septima aetas 
currit cum sexta, since, after all, when Christians modified “Jewish notions about the Sabbath,” there 
emerged “a new notion of the eighth day as distinct from the Sabbath.” Taking over the “late Judaic” 
notion that “a world week was to last 6000 years,” Christians, at certain times and junctures, “[inserted] 
Day 8” into the position of “final consummation” in place of the Jewish “Day 6.” Day 7, then, becomes 
symbolic of the heavenly rest of the departed, “between the Resurrection of Christ (with which the 
opening of the heavens is connected) and the final consummation of the general resurrection.” See 
Ratzinger, Theology of History, 15. 
67 See de Vinck’s confirmation of this view in the second footnote on this page, [double dagger]: 
Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, tr. de Vinck, 366, in the context of XXIII.1. 
68 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, trans de Vinck, XXIII.1 (365–6). 
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 How to account for this strangeness, this tension between vision four and vision 
six (or seven)? One is tempted to look for some kind of esoteric explanation. Could it 
be that the Master General caught wind of, or heard a rumor of, his impending 
promotion to the cardinalate, and “snuck in” his treatment the beatific vision, 
preliminarily, as he was composing vision four? As intriguing as such a reading 
would be, I have not been able to identify any evidence to that end. Perhaps a more 
sober explanation lies in the fact that, for medieval mystics such as the Seraphic 
Doctor, this-worldly contemplation is a kind of mystical anticipation of the beatific 
vision. This medieval assumption is articulated by Kevin Hughes (channeling the 
thought of Henri de Lubac, contained in the latter’s Medieval Exegesis) in terms of 
the “twofold anagogy” embraced by patristic and early medieval thinkers alike: 
Applied to the “twofold anagogy,” the “horizontal” and 
eschatological sense of anagogy names and indicates the 
fullness of time, the eschatological end of all creation, 
and the “vertical” and mystical sense identifies the ways 
in which the soul begins, in the here and now, to 
participate, partially and imperfectly, in the fullness of 
the Kingdom, “where God will be all in all.” 69 The 
relationship between the two anagogies is suggested well 
by the oft-quoted but difficult-to-pin-down saying of St. 
Catherine of Siena, “All the way to heaven is heaven, 
because Jesus said, ‘I am the Way.’” Or, in the words of 
Gregory the Great, “The joys of the eternal realm are the 
secret joys of the interior life.” The implicit claim is that 
“mysticism” and “eschatology” are intimately connected 
precisely by their relationship to the fullness of God’s 
presence, able to be realized partially and temporally in 
contemplation even as all creation awaits its full 
realization at the eschatological end. In this view, 
contemplation always has the nature of a foretaste, and 
so it contains within itself the hint of “waiting in joyful 
hope for the coming of the Lord.”70 
 
 
69 It is worth noting that the intelligibility of the twofold sense seems to rely on some form of a 
metaphysics of participation—in this case, Christian Neoplatonism. Through a metaphysics of 
participation, one can begin in the here and now, in time, to share in the fullness of time, the Reign of 
God, without that fullness being in any way changed or diminished. For a larger argument about the 
role of the metaphysics of participation, see Matthew Levering, Participatory Biblical Exegesis (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008). 
70 Kevin Hughes, “Ecclesia contemplativa: On the relationship between the mystical and the 
eschatological in Bonaventure’s Anagogia” (unpublished paper), 4–5, 
https://www.academia.edu/22696688/Ecclesia_contemplativa_On_the_relationship_between_the_myst
ic al_and_eschatological_in_St._Bonaventures_anagogia. 
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Viewed in this light, then, we can say that Bonaventure regards the beatific vision as a 
repetition of earthly human contemplation, consistent with medieval anagogia, à la 
Henri de Lubac. What happens on Day Four anticipates the beatitude of Day 
Six/Seven, and what happens in the later moment repeats the earlier. Strange, yes, but 
darkly intelligible nonetheless. 
 On this interpretation there is therefore no need to identify any kind of ex post 
facto redaction or effort to “clean up” the Hexaëmeron. Indeed, the apparent 
ambiguities between the previewed day six/seven, on the one hand, and the actually 
developed day four, on the other, are finally explicable in terms of the inner logic of 
anagogia: contemplation in this life is a mystical participation in the ultimate 
eschatological destiny of anthropos, the fully and finally consummate beatific vision 
of God. 
 B. The Drama of Ratzinger’s Habilitationsschrift 
 While Bonaventure’s most exhaustive treatment of the logos of history occurred at 
the end of his career, that of Ratzinger was undertaken near the beginning of his. That 
the latter’s intended Habilitationsschrift ironically almost ended his academic career 
is the suspenseful excitement this section aims to summarize. Ratzinger, as he 
narrates in his autobiographical memoirs, Milestones, originally published in Italian 
in 199771 under the title La mia vita: Ricordi (1927–1977), had originally structured 
his Habilitationsarbeit to contain three sections: a treatment of Bonaventure’s concept 
of revelation, the question of medieval understandings of Heilsgeschichte, and the 
theology of history of St. Bonaventure.72 Writing in his memoirs, Cardinal 
Ratzinger—at the time of writing, serving as the Prefect for the Congregation of Faith 
and Doctrine—plainly identifies Professor Michael Schmaus († 1993) as the key 
inhibitor of the success of his habilitation work. Ratzinger states that, at an academic 
gathering in Königstein, 
 
 
71 For this bit of knowledge (that the work was written first in German but published first in Italian 
translation), communicated to me by way of email correspondence, I am indebted to Franz-Xaver 
Heibl, the Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Papst Benedikt XVI Institut in Regensburg, Germany. 
72 An inspection of the 2009 published Band II of the Gesammelte Schriften reveals the contents of the 
third, middle section: the notion of salvation-history in Bonaventure’s thought. On the basis of the table 
of contents of this critical edition, then, we can say that the three sections in the originally composed 
version were: “der Begriff der Offenbarung”; “die Auffassung von der Heilsgeschichte”; “die 
Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura.” 
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Schmaus called me aside … and told me very directly 
and without emotion that he had to reject my habilitation 
thesis because it did not meet the pertinent scholarly 
standards.73 
 
 With this bombshell of a disappointment, Ratzinger’s world seemed to crumble 
before him. Not only would such a blow derail his academic career, it would also 
further uproot his ailing parents, who had just moved into his home on the Domberg 
in Freising (a domicile provided by the Hochschule as a part of the young professor’s 
compensation), relocating from their previous home in Hufschlag due to old age.74 
 Ratzinger gives a sober and respectful explanation of the most pertinent of 
Schmaus’ motives for his rejection: the latter’s concern that in the work the young 
wissenschaftlicher Forscher advocated (and projected onto Bonaventure) a 
“dangerous modernism that had to lead to the subjectivization of the concept of 
revelation.”75 This alleged “subjectivization,” Ratzinger surmises, must have 
stemmed, in Schmaus’ mind, from the subversion of the older, neoscholastic view of 
revelation as propositional, mere information deposited into the mind of the recipient. 
So prominent was this older view that, according to Ratzinger, it was at that time 
commonplace to refer even to sacred scripture in the vernacular simply and directly as 
“revelation.”76 Against this view, Ratzinger discerns in his research on Bonaventure a 
notion of revelation as God’s action in the history of redemption (Heilsgeschichte), 
always already grasped by a recipient and interpreted by the receiving subject of the 
church.77 
 Although Ratzinger narrates the story of this controversy in his Milestones, 
Michael Karger provides helpful commentary on the situation in an article that 
appeared in 2009 in the German Catholic periodical Die Tagespost.78 Karger helpfully 
situates the pertinent issues in light of the papal encyclical Humani Generis, 
promulgated by Pope Pius XII in 1950, a document which Gottlieb Söhngen, the 
 
73 Ratzinger, Milestones, 107. 
74 Ibid., 108. 
75 Ibid., 109. 
76 Ibid., 108. 
77 Ibid., 108–9. 
78 Michael Karger, “Ein Drama in vier Akten: Joseph Ratzingers Habilitation über den 
Franziskanertheologen Bonaventura war der Auftakt für sein Mitwirken in entscheidended Phasen der 
Theologiegeschichte,” Die Tagespost July 4, 2009. I obtained a PDF of this article from the Papst 
Benedikt XVI website, accessed on a page in which the full text of the article appears: 
http://www.institut-papst-benedikt.de/presseschau/presseschau-detail/article/ein-drama-in-vier- 
akten.html. 
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young Ratzinger’s Doktorvater, had “received with anger and despair.”79 Michael 
Schmaus, however, was not only supportive of the encyclical’s condemnation of the 
nouvelle théologie, at this time coming out of France, but had likely played a role in 
formulating the condemnation itself, given that he was “close to the Holy Office.” 
Such animosity between Schmaus and those promulgating the work of this 
ressourcement movement, as it was less pejoratively known, is confirmed, according 
to Karger, by a note from the journal that Henri de Lubac kept during Vatican II, 
referring to Schmaus as a “römischer Integrist.”80 
 In a dramatic turn of events, the deflated Ratzinger, upon inspection of the 
marked-up document which had been returned to him by his Habilitation committee, 
then discovered that Schmaus, while basically mutilating the first two sections of the 
work with his marginal criticisms, left the third part—which treated Bonaventure’s 
theology of history—completely unchallenged. Filled with a sudden, new found burst 
of hope, he then re-shaped this third part so that it could stand alone, and resubmitted 
it to his committee, who unanimously accepted and affirmed it. 
 In the subsequent decades of Ratzinger’s career, it was not just the “successful” 
content of his research on Bonaventure which played an important role in the work of 
the church, but also that part which was rejected. This material, so vividly important 
for the young scholar, was in fact destined to play a decisive role in the proceedings 
and aftermath of Vatican II, which Ratzinger would attend as a peritus at the side of 
Cardinal Frings. As explained above, one of the most divisive issues at stake at this 
church-wide gathering was in fact that of revelation. Was revelation, as the received, 
neoscholastic “wisdom” supposedly coming out of Trent had it, the effect of the two 
“sources” of Scripture and Tradition? It was largely on the basis of Ratzinger’s 
habilitation research, rejected by Schmaus, that the ultimate verdict of the Council 
was to affirm revelation as identical neither to Scripture nor Tradition, but rather as 
 
79 Karger writes: “Pius XII … in … Humani Generis die Nouvelle Theologie verturteilt, was Söhngen 
mit Wut und Verzweiflung aufgenommen hatte.” Karger, “Ein Drama.” 
80 “Er stand dem Heiligen Offizium nahe und wurde von Henri de Lubac SJ, dem sein Orden nach der 
Verurteilung von 1950 übel mitgespielt hatte, in seinem Konzilstagebuch ausdrücklich zu den 
„römischen Integristen“ gerechnet.” Karger, “Ein Drama.” An “integralist” in this context refers to one 
who, in the context of Vatican II, professed allegiance to neoscholasticism. See Aaron Riches, “Henri 
de Lubac and the Second Vatican Council,” in The T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. 
Jordan Hillbert (New York: T&T Clark, 2017), 121–56. 
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that which precedes them both, with Tradition then seen as the work of the church in 
interpreting Scripture.81 
 Only later, it turns out, was Ratzinger’s actually published Habilitationsschrift on 
Bonaventure’s theology of history applied to the lived work of the church. In his role 
as the Prefekt of the Congregation of Faith and Doctrine, Ratzinger would rely on this 
body of knowledge to distinguish the eschatological vision of the Bible from that 
specific form of this-worldly utopianism—attractive and compelling though it be— 
known as liberation theology. In his resistance to the latter, Ratzinger would endure 
the scorn of many.82 
 Having treated, then, the episodes around the writing of the two respective logoi 
of history—Bonaventure’s uncompleted treatment of the paradigmatic six days of 
creation and Ratzinger’s excised and reframed treatment of that treatment—we turn 
our attention now to two remaining loci of existential gravitas, beginning with each 
thinkers’ response to the emergence of a new kind of science (a thirteenth-century and 
a twentieth-century variety). 
III.   Respective responses to the emergence of a new kind of science 
 A. Bonaventure contra the re-emergence of Aristotelian science 
 Working on his Habilitationsschrift in Freising in 1955, the young Joseph 
Ratzinger summarizes a great swath of his research on the Seraphic Doctor with the 
following words: 
… Bonaventura [ist] der erste Theologe, bei dem sich 
eine begrifflich klare, unzweideutige Formulierung der 
Lehre von der “natürlichen” Sehnsucht nach dem 
“übernaturlichen” Heil findet.83 
 
It is in the context of this binary pair of opposed terms—which can be discussed 
under the headings of “nature” and “grace”—that the stage is set to appreciate (if only 
at a fairly broad level) the character of Bonaventure’s opposition to the emergence of 
a new kind of scientia in the thirteenth-century University of Paris. 
 As we mentioned above, it was in 1255 that the full body of Aristotle’s works—
the nova logica, the complete corpus of natural philosophy, as well as the 
 
81 O’Collins, “Ressourcement and Vatican II,” 378–85. 
82 Karger, “Ein Drama.” 
83 “… Bonaventure is the first theologian in whom a conceptually clear, unambiguous formulation of 
the doctrine of the natural desire for supernatural salvation is found.” My translation. Ratzinger, Band 
II, 291–2. 
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Metaphysics— was admitted into (and required by) the curriculum of the Arts Faculty 
at the University of Paris, in fact by that time serving as the foundation thereof. 
Within a decade after this shift in 1255, “some members … decided to stay as 
teachers in the Arts Faculty instead of moving on to the presumed higher disciplines 
[such as theology].”84 In 1266 Siger of Brabant began to claim the self-sufficiency of 
philosophy, and in 1270 “an outspoken Aristotelian in the Arts, Boethius of Dacia, 
started teaching in Paris.”85 Developments such as these unambiguously signal a 
growing conviction on the part of many that the philosophy of Aristotle—regarded as 
“natural” in the double sense that it sees no intellectual need for divine assistance in 
general, and that it rests on a foundation of reason alone, with no recourse to 
revelation (by means of faith) in particular—is an autonomous basis upon which to 
ground truth and life, with no need for the resources of revealed religion. 
 It is no wonder, then, that Bonaventure, from 1267 to 1273, composes three 
different sets of collationes for the express purpose of clarifying for his confreres (as 
opposed to any larger university audience) the precise nature of Christian wisdom, 
and what its relationship might be with the natural philosophy coming from Aristotle. 
The Minister General, then, is speaking in an intimate setting to a group of 
companions in whom he had not only a vested interest, but also for whom he had a 
genuine affection and concern. In this counter-scientific program, then, we see a 
continuation of his initial posture which, according to Ratzinger, began in 1259 
during his retreat to Mt. Alverna, for the sole purpose of being “drawn more deeply 
into the spiritual world of St. 
Francis in whose place he now stood.”86 In the years after 1259 the tension rooted in 
the Arts Faculty continued unabated, so much so that in 1267 in his first set of 
collations—the Collationes de decem praeceptis—Bonaventure “came back as an 
outsider to point out the limits of science from the perspective of faith.”87 This agenda 
continued in the sequel to this first set, the Collationes de septum donis Spiritus 
Sancti, and climaxed in the Collationes in Hexaëmeron in 1273. 
 
84 Stephen Brown, “Averroism,” in The A to Z of Medieval Philosophy and Theology (Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, 2010), 42. Cited in Jay Hammond, “Introduction,” in Collations on the Hexaëmeron 
(St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2018), Kindle e-book, location 450. 
See also Sten Ebbesen, “The Paris Arts Faculty: Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, Radulphus 
Brito,” in  Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marebon (New York: Routledge, 1998), 269–90. 
85 Hammond, “Introduction,” e-book locs. 416, 451. 
86 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 2. 
87 Ibid., 3. 
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 Why did Bonaventure feel the need to craft a triple set of sermon series for his 
fellow Franciscans which, irrespective of how pastoral and intimate, were 
undoubtedly and irreducibly polemical in character? As we will see below, he is not 
simply rejecting (as is clear from a cursory reading of any of his early, middle, or late 
works)88 either the discipline of Aristotelian epistêmê or the thirteenth-century 
Christian equivalent of the same. Rather, he is protesting the use of Aristotelian 
epistêmai in an autonomous manner. They are not ends in themselves. They lead 
inexorably to a higher kind of noetic activity, one which Aristotle could hardly 
envision, even if he pointed to it in a kind of inchoate way.89 This higher kind of 
activity, for Bonaventure, pertains not simply to nature—the nature, that is, of 
Aristotle’s works on ta physika—but rather to the realm of grace, of Geist, of the 
Übernatürliches. It is here, then, to this higher goal, that Bonaventure wants to lead 
his brothers minor; it is for this reason that he preaches the three sets of collationes. 
 B. Ratzinger’s counter-scientific resistance 
 We have already, in the context of the Regensburg address of 2004, commented 
upon Ratzinger’s assessment of modern science and its role in western culture. Now 
we examine two related areas in which Ratzinger’s view of scientific modes of 
thought comes into play. Neither of them is a merely theoretical issue, but rather both 
have to do with the work of the church in the context of the Second Vatican Council. 
On the one side, Ratzinger opposes the abstract approach to theology advocated by 
the neoscholastic advocates of a previous generation; on the other hand, he resists the 
abdication of theology, on the part of various liberal party proponents, to the 
gatekeepers of historical biblical criticism. 
 First, then, the neoscholastic approach to theology—an approach which was vying 
for attention in the debates of Vatican II—can be seen as a form of enamorment with 
science of a premodern variety. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza helpfully brings out this 
 
88 Examples of each would be the Sentences Commentary, the Itinerarium ad Mentis in Deum, and the 
Hexaëmeron itself. Even a cursory reading of each will easily demonstrate Bonaventure’s dependence 
upon all manner of Aristotelian habits of thought: vocabulary, deduction, even the ordering of the 
sciences itself. 
89 Where, in the Stagirite’s corpus, might we glimpse an example of “the natural desire for the 
supernatural?” Perhaps the most conspicuous example is in Ethics X.7, where he presents the “highest 
activity” of the philosopher in terms of theoriein, which he says amounts to “the complete happiness of 
a human being,” and is the result of “something divine [being] present in him.” Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, tr. Joe Sachs (Indianapolis: Focus Publishing, 2002), 1177b 20–30 (189–90). 
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dimension of early twentieth-century neoscholasticism by documenting that it rested 
on the foundation laid by Denys Pétau, who 
developed a conception of theology as a deductive 
science…. Pétau argued that theology achieves the status 
of a scientific discipline to the degree that it employs a 
deductive method. Theology advances in knowledge by 
deducing conclusions from premises of faith by means   
of ... reason.90 
 
According to Fiorenza the neoscholasticism with which Ratzinger and his 
ressourcement colleagues such as Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthassar91 
would have been all too familiar made habitual use of the newly invented theological 
manual, which sought to codify and standardize the deductive process, and “which 
became the major instrument of theological instruction.”92 Recalling the objections of 
Michael Schmaus to Ratzinger’s subversive treatment of revelation (outlined above), 
it is no wonder that he objected to Ratzinger’s characterization of revelation. 
Revelation as history, indeed, is less amenable to a deductive theological method than 
are revealed propositions. So it is that Ratzinger’s resistance to the neoscholastic 
pretension to syllogistic airtightness played a major role in his advocacy work at the 
Council for a revised (yet in some ways more traditional) notion of the nature of 
revelation. 
 This reworked notion of revelation finds expression in the Second Vatican 
Council's Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, promulgated by 
Pope John VI in 1965. In praise of this document Ratzinger said that “the fathers [of 
Vatican II] were concerned with overcoming neoscholastic intellectualism, for which 
revelation chiefly means a store of … supernatural teachings.”93 
 
90 Fiorenza clarifies that, unlike today (when we tend to regard Suarez or Bellarmine as the “leading 
theological figures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”), neo-scholastics of the twentieth 
century (typified by Carlo Passaglia and Clemens Schrader) regarded Pétau as the most important, due 
to his 
“use of historical sources” and “his understanding of the nature of theology.” Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza, “Systematic Theology: Task and Methods,” Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic 
Perspectives (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 22. 
91 “Is Joseph Ratzinger a ressourcement theologian? At a fundamental level, yes.” Lewis Ayres, 
Patricia 
Kelly, and Thomas Humphries, “Benedict XVI: A Ressourcement Theologian?” in Ressourcement: A 
Movement for Renewed Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 423. 
92 Fiorenza, “Task and Methods,” 22. 
93 Ayres, Kelly, and Humphries, “A Ressourcement Theologian?”, 433. 
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 Yet at the Council Ratzinger opposed the scientific aspirations on the left as much 
as those on the right. It was the party advocating the “material completeness” of 
Scripture, to be interpreted, in turn, by the historical-critical method of biblical 
interpretation, which turned out to be the equal and opposite position against which 
Ratzinger would also do battle. Proponents of that view conceded final authority for 
the interpretation of Scripture, and hence the direction of the church, to the research 
of the academicians of Wissenschaft.94 It was this latter position, equal to and opposite 
of that of neoscholatisicm, that Ratzinger more and more regarded as the real threat in 
the years following Vatican II. 
 It was not, in fact, until eleven years after the Council concluded that Ratzinger 
was able to articulate rigorously the substance of his opposition to HCM, which he 
does in his 1977 Eschatologie—Tod und ewiges Leben. There he takes historical-
critical biblical scholarship to task for committing a “boundary violation.” That is, the 
methodology and methodological assumptions of the natural sciences, upon which 
HCM bases itself, are wholly ill-equipped to interpret the meaning of 
theological/spiritual texts such as those of the New Testament, including the Gospels. 
The heart of the criticism is that the biblical content of the Gospels is not 
“measurable” in the same way that the physical world is (the intelligibility of the 
latter thus being susceptible to the methods of natural science). Rather, the content of 
the Gospels is more akin (in the manner of a “family resemblance”95) to the 
knowledge found in the philosophical tradition of the West: it participates in the 
tradition of “an enduring approach to the Ground of what is.”96 
 What, then, was Ratzinger’s position? How does Ratzinger configure the 
relationship between theology and science? As Father Vincent Twomey writes, for 
Ratzinger, theology, most properly, must be regarded as a spiritual science, helpfully 
connecting Ratzinger’s final definitive word on theological method—The Instruction 
on the Ecclesial Vocation of a Theologian, written in 2005—to the instincts which 
 
94 Ratzinger, Memoirs, 125. 
95 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 23. 
96 This quasi-philosophical quality of the content of the Gospels is also what prevents them from being 
studied objectively. Far more radically than the objects of modern science, this material (the preaching 
of Jesus in the Gospels) requires an interior openness in the heart and mind of the reader. Here, in the 
interpretation of the Gospel texts, there can be no interpretive neutrality, a neutrality more plausible in 
the field of the natural sciences. Sadly, for Ratzinger, however, “historical reason’s criticism of itself is 
still in its infancy,” and thus this method fails to see that “to employ in this domain the paradigm of 
natural science is fallacious.” Ratzinger, Eschatology, 19–24. 
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animated him in the days of his Habilitationsschrift and its implications for the 
Second Vatican Council. What both contexts have in common is an insistence on a 
concrete Christian anthropology. Why, for Ratzinger, is arid science insufficient for 
the proper work of the theologian? Perhaps the deepest reason is that such flattened 
out methods—whether on the abstract right or on the revisionist left—betray the 
nature of the human being (at least as it is affirmed in the Christian tradition) as 
guided by the heart. 
 Not only is the heart, for Ratzinger, “the organ for seeing God,”97 but it is also the 
heart which plays a vital role in “impressing upon theological study the right method 
for achieving a coherent interpretation.”98 Ratzinger writes: 
It seems to me that it was only after World War II and 
completely after Vatican Council II that we came to think 
that theology, like any exotic subject, can be studied 
purely from an academic perspective from which one 
acquires knowledge…. But just as we cannot learn to 
swim without water, so we cannot learn theology without 
the spiritual practice in which it lives.99 
 
What distinguishes theology, then, from science? Twomey provides a nice summary, 
which helps us to appreciate the motive underlying Ratzinger’s activity in this area: 
“Man’s reason is preceded by … a gift.”100 This gift is a word spoken by God, and as 
such, it is addressed not to reason alone, but to the whole person, including, above all, 
the heart. Exceeding a narrowly rationalistic scientific method directed by reason 
alone, God’s word also precedes and hence situates the entire method, thereby 
allowing the theologian (and the theologian’s heart) to order his scientific enquiry 
aright. In this sense, scientia—including the intellectual labor of philosophy—
requires theology, the faith of which alone can receive this gift. 
 
 
 
 
 
97 Tracey Rowland, “How Does Spirituality Supply Theological Study with the Correct Method?” in 
Entering the Mind of Christ: The True Nature of Theology, ed. James Keating (Omaha: Institute for 
Priestly Formation, 2014), 26. 
98 Twomey, “Spiritual Science,” 47. 
99 Ratzinger, The Principles of Catholic Theology, 422, quoted in Twomey, “Spiritual Science,” 58. 
100 Twomey, “Spiritual Science,” 65. 
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IV.    Crises of eschatology: two attempts to re-narrate history 
 A. Emergence of spiritual Franciscanism and Bonaventure’s response 
 Essential to the main argument of Ratzinger’s Habilationsschrift is his way of 
relating Bonaventure to the emergence of a subversive, grass-roots movement of his 
day stemming from the work of Joachim of Fiore (1135–1202). Joachim had 
developed a novel approach to eschatology—novel compared to the standard line of 
eschatological orthodoxy throughout the Middle Ages, that of Augustine—with 
several key planks, including: 
• a shift from Augustine’s seven-fold “week” of world history to a doubling of 
the same, such that a one-to-one correspondence is set up between the Old 
Covenant (the time of the Old Testament) and the New Covenant (the time of 
Christ and the church, enveloping as well the church militans, situated in our 
own time); 
• the extension of this two-fold, segmented periodization into a three-fold one, 
such that Joachim envisions a “third age of the Spirit”;101 
• an urgent, apocalyptic cry: Joachim begins to argue that this third age of the 
Spirit—one in which the “spiritual” prophecies of the Old Testament which 
envision universal peace, rest, justice, freedom, and bliss will become 
historically realized—will begin to dawn imminently; 
• in the decades during and after Joachim’s cry, generations of so-called 
“spiritual Franciscans” emerge who (in the case of the “radicals” at least) 
adopt something of a revolutionary attitude, seeing the institutional church 
(and her sacraments) as obsolete, and advocating in various ways for this 
recognition.102 
 
101 Joachim regards this tripartite history as Trinitarian: the first age is associated with the Father, the 
second with the Son, and the third with the Holy Spirit. 
 
102 For more depth on Joachim and his background than this preliminary introduction can afford, see 
the following: Barnard McGill, The Calabrian Abbot: Joachim of Fiore in the History of Western 
Thought (New York: MacMillan, 1985), especially Part II, “Main Themes of Joachim’s Thought”; Karl 
Löwith, Meaning in History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), especially Chapter VIII, 
“Joachim”; Cyril O’Regan, “A Theology of History,” in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac 
(New York: T&T Clark, 2017), 289–306; C. Christopher Colt Anderson, “St. Bonaventure's 
Collationes in Hexaëmeron and the Joachite Controversy” (PhD diss., Marquette Univ., 1998), 
ProQuest (A AI 9842426); Patrick X. Gardner, “Modern Pentecost: Henri de Lubac on Atheism and 
the Spiritual Posterity of Joachim of Fiori” (PhD diss., Notre Dame Univ., 2015), 
https://www.academia.edu/6769556/Modern_Pentecost_Henri_de_Lubac_on_Atheism_and_the_Spirit
ua l_Posterity_of_Joachim_of_Fiore. 
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Ratzinger’s assessment is that Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron gives Joachim a qualified 
salute. We have already seen how, in the three sets of Lenten sermon series, the 
Minister General responded to the “scientific revolution” coming from the Arts 
Faculty. Here we note that the third of these series, the Collationes in Hexaëmeron, 
was also a response to this eschatological controversy, stemming from the Calabrian 
Abbot. In it Bonaventure applauds Joachim for the first bullet point above, while he 
outright rejects the second, since it violates his bedrock commitment to Christ as 
center. As for the imminent anticipation of the eschaton predicted in the third point 
and acted on in the fourth, Bonaventure plays the prudential role of the steward of an 
institution, responsible for the oversight of goods both temporal and eternal. Is he 
comfortable with Joachim’s eschatology, which is both “realized” and progressive? In 
contrast to Thomas, who tends to dismiss the Calabrian Abbot simply as one given to 
speculation, one must answer in the affirmative. In terms of the fourth point above, 
the Minister General willing to support the efforts of the “spiritual Franciscans” who 
clamor for the overthrow of papacy-sanctioned, ecclesial institutions? No, he is not: 
even as he vividly imagines the radical democratization of spiritual sapientia (treated 
below), anticipating a new epoch of this-worldly history in which Joachim’s cry will 
find fulfillment,103 he is not confident that this day has presently arrived, or that it 
means the obsolescence, for example, of the great Couvent des Cordeliers in Paris 
(together with all its institutional trappings). So fervent was he in his opposition to the 
fanatical tendencies of the “spiritual” party, in fact, that he acquiesced to the 
imprisonment of his predecessor and friend, John of Parma, for his alleged role in 
fanning those flames. 
 And yet, when it comes to his final response to Joachim, surely Bonaventure’s sic 
is more important, for our purposes, than his non. Planting a qualified flag in favor of 
an eschatological “not yet” is less relevant than the overwhelmingly progressive and 
“this-worldly” flavor of the Hexaëmeron’s progressive eschatology, for, as we will 
elaborate below, it breathes with the confidence not only that history is an intelligible 
narrative, but also that it is in (the) process (of being fulfilled). 
 Yet, even in this process of fulfillment, it is far from over. So much so, in fact, 
that eight centuries later, subsequent waves of eschatological controversy continued to 
 
103 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XXII–XXIII (437–49). 
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ripple across western culture, spilling over into the time of Ratzinger. Not unrelated to 
the embroilment initiated by Joachim, the two areas we focus on here by way of 
historical context for Ratzinger’s thought are the connection with HCM and the 
eschatological presuppositions of liberation theology. 
 B. Ratzinger’s double clarification of twentieth-century eschatology 
 First we consider HCM once again, this time in its connection to the 
eschatological row current in Ratzinger’s cultural moment. A prime precipitating 
factor in the “crisis of eschatology”104 (and hence of theology) in Ratzinger’s day 
(that is, the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century105) was that of the 
imminent expectation of the end of the world which Jesus (and the apostles) 
purportedly held. For modern historical-critical biblical scholars such as Johannes 
Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, this view which they attributed to the historical Jesus 
was untenable. That is, to the modern mind, there is no way that one can agree with 
Jesus’ view, since (by the time of the twentieth century), plainly, the end of the world 
had, in fact, not occurred, and hence Jesus was plainly wrong.106 
 In the section above dealing with Ratzinger’s position on science, we examined 
his critique of HCM’s efforts to implement without remainder the methods of the 
modern natural sciences. In this context of eschatological dispute, Ratzinger 
reinterprets, over and against Weiss and Schweitzer, Jesus’ emphasis that “the 
Kingdom of God/Heaven is near.” That is, Ratzinger’s Jesus is not simply saying that 
a cataclysmic event within space and time is about to occur. When one appreciates 
Jesus’s call to repentance (e.g., Mk. 1:15), so thoroughly embedded in his preaching, 
it becomes plausible to understand Jesus’ “sense of urgency of the present moment” 
to be a matter of the heart, a matter of personal repentance and behavior. That is, 
when a sinner repents (in the same way and under the same conditions, according to 
Ratzinger, that the city of Nineveh repented in the book of Jonah), the Kingdom of 
God becomes present in the here and now. The apparent failure of the HCM (as 
represented by Weiss and Schweitzer) to appreciate this emphasis, according to 
Ratzinger, radically undermines the validity of its approach. 
 
104 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 30. 
105 The “Foreward to this Edition,” beginning on xvii, makes it clear that, when in 2006 Ratzinger re- 
assessed this work, originally published in 1977, his view was that the situation of this crisis had 
remained fundamentally unchanged. 
106 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 30. 
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 Ratzinger continues by insisting that in the sermon on the Mount, “grace appears 
as the lopsided order of this world.” How so? Only those who “now stand in 
opposition to the world” are able truly “to receive [God’s] riches.” My “takeaway” 
here is that, apart from grace, ethics aligns itself all too often with the hubris of the 
world, thinking that it can, on the basis of its own resources alone, “fix things,” and 
bring about holistic justice in the world and indeed within the human person/soul. But 
Jesus’ preaching reconfigures this picture: for him, a kind of death (i.e., “opposition to 
the world”) is absolutely required for true justice to come about. Hence the lopsided 
order of this world is transformed.107 
 In addition to mounting this argument, which bears a strong resonance with 
certain strains of twentieth-century philosophical hermeneutics, Ratzinger also enters 
more directly into the field of biblical criticism proper, attempting to undermine the 
chronological reasoning of these critical scholars. According to Ratzinger, Weiss and 
Schweitzer adopted the maxim that “the greater the stress on expectation of an 
imminent end, the earlier a text must be. The more mitigated such eschatological 
expectation appears, the later a text must be.”108 
 Examples of such retrojections of later moments of the early church’s own 
experiences of the delay of the Parousia into the sayings of Jesus include Matthew’s 
and Luke’s mention of the “delay of the arrival of the Lord, or the bridegroom,” and 2 
Peter’s response to “the urgent question, ‘Where is the promise of his return?’”109 
According to Bultmann, this qualification of Jesus’s affirmation of immanence 
reaches its high point in John, “where … temporal eschatology has been wholly 
eliminated in favor of its existential counterpart.”110 
 How does Ratzinger respond to this approach? Yes, he agrees with Bultmann, it 
accurately recognizes these expressions as the early Christian community’s struggle 
“to preserve the characteristic form of its own hope, and put into words an experience 
of disappointment which demanded an answer.”111 Interestingly, however, Ratzinger 
questions the validity of Weiss’ and Schweitzer’s project of chronological ordering. 
 
107 This point of Ratzinger’s nicely epitomizes a tendency in his thought: to maintain that theological 
truth is difficult to categorize. In this case, is it purely “a natural thing” (i.e., standard ethics, for 
example that of Aristotle), or is it a “grace thing” (i.e., a gift from God)? In the Sermon on the Mount, 
it is both. Hence it defies the categories to which we are accustomed. 
108 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 35. 
109 Ibid., 36. 
110 Ibid., 26. 
111 Ibid., 36. 
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This move is somewhat surprising, given that one of the tasks which Ratzinger 
regards as rightly belonging to the HCM is the determination of the “succession of 
events.”112 And yet, since Bultmann is committed to the view that “John understood 
Jesus better than Jesus understood himself,”113 Bultmann’s position—including even 
his de- temporalization (not mere dischronologization114) of the source material found 
in the Gospels—is undermined. For Ratzinger, pace Bultmann, is it at least possible 
that “an aboriginal understanding [can] probe more deeply into the ground of some 
given reality than a purely historical reconstruction” is able to do.115 
 But for Ratzinger an even stronger line of repudiation (based in part on Hans 
Conzelmann’s finding that there is “imminence-undermining material in Luke’s 
Gospel” itself) emerges: there is no solid evidence in the New Testament documents 
themselves for a “linear development” where “the expectation of an imminent end is 
concerned.”116 That is, as Conzelmann’s insight suggests, it may very well be the case 
that, at times, expectation of imminence occurs historically later than the alternative. 
This hypothesis of Ratzinger’s is strengthened by the possibility that such urgent 
expectations may have been the influence of a “re-Judaizing process”117 in the 
Christian community, especially since such insistence on the imminent end of the 
world was rampant within first- century Judaism, as Ratzinger correctly asserts. 
Hence the above maxim of Weiss and Schweizer is radically called into question. 
 Ratzinger’s point about Lk. 21:24118 is riveting, and deeply connected with the 
future pope’s mature eschatology, glimpsed in nascent form even in his 1957 
treatment of medieval doctrines of the last things. For him this verse shows that “Luke 
 
112 Ibid., 22. 
113 Here Bultmann is following Schleiermacher and others (including Dilthey) in the quest for a 
scientific “universal hermeneutics,” in which the modern historical critic can, indeed, understand the 
produced text 
of any given thinker better than the author of the given text. Gadamer, Truth in Method, 184–93. 
114 After all, Bultmann’s move to render the Gospel narrative(s) completely a-temporal (and merely 
“existential”) is more radically revisionist than that of mere dischronologization (the re-sequencing of 
events narrated within the Gospels), a move more characteristic of Weiss and Schweitzer than of 
Bultmann. 
115 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 36–7. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 37. 
118 “They will fall by the edge of the sword, and be led captive among all nations; and Jerusalem will 
be trodden down by the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled.” Revised Standard 
Version. 
kai« pesouvntai sto/mati macai÷rhß kai« ai˙cmalwtisqh/sontai ei˙ß ta» e¶qnh pa¿nta, kai« 
ΔIerousalh\m e¶stai patoume÷nh uJpo\ e˙qnw◊n, a‡cri ou∞ plhrwqw◊sin [kai« e¶sontai] kairoi« 
e˙qnw◊n. 
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is engaged in outlining a definite historical picture in which the coming of the time of 
the Gentiles marks the beginning of an open-ended future for the world.”119 This 
phrase “open-ended” nicely captures the spirit of Ratzinger’s attitude toward 
eschatology, and sits more comfortably within his scheme than it does either in 
Augustine’s (for whom history in a real sense is over) or Joachim’s (whose planned-
out future timeline occludes open-endedness). In this way it is quite resonant with that 
of Bonaventure. 
 It is these convictions that motivate Ratzinger to make so vehement a criticism of 
HCM, even as he insists on its limited role and necessary function within the 
“spiritual science” of theology. Yet, in closing this historical survey, we must attend 
to one final eschatological issue, again not unrelated to the thirteenth-century milieu, 
again growing out of the context of the Second Vatican Council: the utopian strivings 
of liberation theology. 
 Speaking as Prefect for the Congregation for Faith and Doctrine in 1984, Cardinal 
Ratzinger gave what may be viewed as his definitive word on the topic of liberation 
theology. First, however, I register the ironic beauty of the basis upon which 
Ratzinger argues against the false emancipation that liberation theology, in its quest 
for universal emancipation, offers: an alternative vision of the true nature of freedom. 
In his Values in a Time of Upheaval, he writes: 
Man, precisely as man, remains the same both in 
primitive and technologically developed situations. He 
does not stand on a higher level merely because he has 
learned to use more highly developed tools. Mankind 
begins anew in every single individual. This is why it is 
not possible for the new, ideal society to exist—the 
society built on progress, which not only was the hope of 
the great ideologies, but increasingly became the general 
object of human hope once hope in a life after death had 
been dismantled. A definitively ideal society 
presupposes the end of freedom. But since man remains 
free and begins anew in every generation, we have to 
struggle in each new generation to establish the right 
societal form.120 
 
 
119 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 40. 
120 Joseph Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, tr. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2006), 25-6. 
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Here we see the importance of freedom in Ratzinger’s theology and ecclesiology, 
with clear implications for his eschatology.121 Despite heated opposition to his 
resistance to liberation theology,120122 Ratzinger continues to insist that the danger of 
any “overstated” philosophy of secular history is that it annuls such human freedom; 
for Ratzinger it does this in the same way that merely immanent eschatologies—
whether Joachite or Marxist—do. “Rather than the creation of a unique person of 
possibility,” Ratzinger argues, in these approaches “each individual merely joins a 
process of securing progress.”123 
 So it is, that, connecting this line of thinking back to the milieu of Vatican II, 
Prefect Ratzinger, deliberating in 1984, quotes Pope Paul VI: 
We profess our faith that the Kingdom of God, begun 
here below in the church of Christ, is not of this world, 
whose form is passing away, and that its own growth 
cannot be confused with the progress of civilization, of 
science, and of human technology, but that it consists in 
knowing ever more deeply the unfathomable riches of 
Christ, to hope ever more strongly in things eternal, to 
respond ever more ardently to the love of God, to spread 
ever more widely grace and holiness among men. But it 
is this very same love which makes the church constantly 
concerned for the true temporal good of mankind as well. 
Never ceasing to recall to her children that they have no 
lasting dwelling here on earth, she urges them also to 
contribute, each according to his own vocation and 
means, to the welfare of their earthly city, to promote 
justice, peace and brotherhood among men, to lavish 
their assistance on their brothers, especially on the poor 
and the most dispirited. The intense concern of the 
church, the bride of Christ, for the needs of mankind, 
their joys and their hopes, their pains and their struggles, 
is nothing other than the great desire to be present to them 
in order to enlighten them with the light of Christ, and 
join them all to Him, their only Savior. It can never mean 
that the church is conforming to the things of this world, 
nor that she is lessening the earnestness with which she 
awaits her Lord and the eternal Kingdom."124 
 
 
121 I commend in this connection Seán Corkery’s balanced approach to the question of Ratzinger and 
liberation theology. See Corkery, Liberation Ecclesiology?, 147–50. 
122 A good example of such opposition (in a Latin American context) is seen here: 
https://nacla.org/news/popes-holy-war-against-liberation-theology. 
123 Corkery, Liberation Ecclesiology?, 76. 
124 See 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_the
ol ogy-liberation_en.html. 
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In sum, the form of this world is passing away. True human growth, the actual 
development of mankind, is not identical to the progress of politics, science, or 
technology, but rather—beyond all three of these domains—it takes root in that organ, 
at the center of the human person, which sees God: the heart which is receptive to 
love. Can such love—which is not simply opposed to politics, science, or even 
technology, but rather exceeds them—out-narrate secular eschatologies of whatever 
variety? We will turn our attention to this question below, mainly in chapter four (on 
the role of desire in each thinker) and chapters five and six (on the eschatological 
whole). 
Conclusion 
 At the end of this chapter of historical contextualization, then, we have addressed 
three main biographical themes: the temporal constitutedness of each thinker (in terms 
of Geworfenheit and the related need for phronetic care), public challenges resulting 
from scientific developments, and rival eschatologies (having real-time implications 
for concrete communities). We have not seen the last of these themes, as they are 
sprinkled throughout the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter 2 
Coordinating mythos and history: Ratzinger’s Bonaventure vs. Aristotle 
Introduction (opposition to Aristotle: Ratzinger’s claim) 
Within the first three pages of his set of memoirs, Milestones, Joseph 
Ratzinger gives us a rather unassuming but nevertheless poignant example of his ever 
present concern for the history and culture of the modern West. In a brief discussion 
of two European saints from the modern period, both of whom are conspicuously 
humble and simple, the then future Pontiff writes: 
I have often reflected … on this remarkable disposition 
of Providence: that, in this century of progress and faith 
in science, the church should have found herself 
represented most clearly in very simple people, in a 
Bernadette of Lourdes … or … in a Brother Konrad, who 
hardly seemed to be touched by the currents of the time. 
Is this a sign that the clear view of the essential, which is 
so often lacking in the “wise and prudent” (Mt 11:25), is 
given, in our days too, to little ones? I do think that 
precisely these “little saints” are a great sign to our time, 
a sign that moves me ever more deeply, the more I live 
with and in our time.1  
 
Nowhere is Ratzinger’s burden for discerning and diagnosing his cultural or historical 
moment more rigorously displayed than in his published Habilitationsschrift, Die 
Geschichtstheologie des Bonaventuras,2 translated into English as The Theology of 
History of St. Bonaventure. Not only is this study quite salutary for any exploration of 
the theological roots of philosophical historicism, however, but it also serves, so 
Ratzinger argues, to pinpoint a particular issue: the precise character of St. 
Bonaventure’s opposition to the Aristotelianism which he encountered at Paris in the 
thirteenth century. In particular, Ratzinger argues that the Seraphic Doctor opposes 
Aristotelianism not (pace Étienne Gilson) in order to defend and bolster some 
medieval Augustinianism, but rather because of the centrality for Bonaventure of 
Heilsgeschichte or eschatology, that is to say, of a certain logos of history.3 
 
1 Ratzinger, Milestones, 3.  
2 Joseph Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura (Munich: Schnell und Steiner, 
1959). This text is the published version of his Habiliationsschrift, later critically edited and 
incorporated into Band 2 of Ratzinger’s Gesammelte Schriften (see “Introduction,” note 6 above). 
3 This Bonaventurian concern, Ratzinger thinks, implies another: the danger of Aristotelian autonomy 
of reason over and against faith, including this autonomy as evinced by Thomas Aquinas, a connection 
discussed below. This claim concerning Aristotle and history holds true even if, as Kevin Hughes 
points out, the principal burden of the Collationes in Hexaemeron is not the logos of history as such. 
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Ratzinger’s fundamental argument in his Habilitationsschrift is that, for 
Bonaventure, Aristotle’s logos of history precludes any kind of intelligible 
development in human history. But Bonaventure’s progressive historicism, so I will 
argue, is not progressivism for progressivism’s sake; rather it is about what Christians 
have traditionally called revelation, which for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure necessarily 
includes the human interpretation of Scripture. For Ratzinger, Bonaventure is 
preeminently burdened to show how man’s appropriation of Scripture, and hence 
revelation itself, is not static. Over and above the spiritualis intelligentia (which 
“penetrates through the literal sense to the allegorical, tropological, [and] anagogical 
meaning[s]”)4 and the figurae sacramentalis (which “speak of Christ and of the Anti-
Christ in all [the books of Scripture]”),5 it is the multiformes theoriae from which vast 
new meanings of history are expected to emerge historically. This process of growth 
and deepening of scriptural interpretation—that is, of revelation—finally issues forth 
in a kind of revolution of wisdom. Based upon two crucial Pauline texts—I Cor 2:6–
106 and Eph 3:1–107—Bonaventure discerns the telos of this progressive 
understanding: a kind of democratization of perfection, in which it is no longer the 
spiritual elite alone who mystically grasp the things of God, but rather every member 
of the community.8 This culmination is a kind of historicization of (the teachings of) 
 
Ratzinger is not claiming that it is; rather he is claiming that the source of Bonaventure’s anti-
Aristotelianism, an anti-Aristotelianism which manifestly shows up in the Hexaëmeron (among other 
loci) is to be found in his historical commitments, that is, in the import he takes history to have for 
attaining to the truth of reality. For Bonaventure, if one wants to grasp what is most deeply true about 
humanity, God, and the world, one must seriously attend to history. Kevin Hughes, “St. Bonaventure’s 
Collationes in Hexaëmeron: Fractured Sermons and Protreptic Discuouse,” Franciscan Studies 63 
(2005): 108 n. 2. 
4 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 7. 
5 Ibid. 
6 “Yet among the mature we do speak wisdom, though it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of 
this age, who are doomed to perish. But we speak God’s wisdom, secret and hidden, which God 
decreed before the ages for our glory. None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, 
they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But as it is written,  
‘What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, 
nor the human heart conceived, 
what God has prepared for those who love him’— 
The things God has revealed to us through the Spirit; for this Spirit searches everything, even the 
depths of God.”  
7 Verses 9–10  of Ephesians 3 read: “… to make everyone see what is the plan of the mystery hidden 
for ages in the God who created all things; so that through the church the wisdom of God in all its rich 
variety might now be made known to the rulers and authorities in the heavenly places.”  All biblical 
quotations, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the New Revised Standard Version; italics mine. 
8 Ratzinger argues that in these two passages, Bonaventure sees a kind of historical progression 
envisioned by St. Paul, a movement from a kind of elitism to a kind of democratization, in which “the 
wisdom which had been limited to the circle of the perfecti will truly become public.” Ratzinger, 
Theology of History, 43–44. 
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Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, resulting in the sapientia nulliformis, that is, a 
particular understanding of the beatific vision involving the direct apprehension of 
God in a completely non-discursive way. All told, Ratzinger’s Bonaventure thinks 
that Aristotle’s logos of history will have none of this talk of growth, deepening, and 
development, regardless of the extent to which it is a function of revelation’s 
dynamism. We need to ask, however: is he correct? Hence the burden of this chapter. 
Now, Ratzinger thinks that he has identified two distinct “lines” of anti-
Aristotelianism in Bonaventure’s thought, both squarely focused on the possibility of 
the meaningfulness or intelligibility of human history. The first line, which in 
significant ways can be traced all the way back to the Sentences commentary, he calls 
an “objective-metaphysical opposition” based on Bonaventure’s rejection of the 
doctrine of the eternity of the world.9 The second line of polemic, beginning in 1267 
with the Collationes de decem praeceptis, Ratzinger labels “the prophetic-
eschatological” line of anti-Aristotelian thought.10   
Rather than delve into these distinct lines of argument, what I want to do in this 
chapter is to focus on Aristotle directly and to ask: what is it about Aristotle’s 
thought, if anything, which renders it inimical to a logos of history? Put another way, 
let us begin with the Stagirite himself, in isolation from Bonaventure and Ratzinger, 
and ask: is Ratzinger’s Bonaventure justified in his accusation that Aristotelian 
thought is inimical to any logos of history? Does Aristotle’s thought, in fact, reject the 
meaningfulness of history? If so, how so and why?  
The answer to these questions, in turn, depends upon a prior consideration: the 
possible relationship between mythos and history, a possible relationship with 
Aristotle himself raises, and then rejects.  
I. Aristotle on the relation of myth to history: no overlap 
Turning our attention to an interrogation of Aristotle on his own terms, it seems 
to me that the best place to start is the Organon, Aristotle’s set of primarily logical 
works which specify the criteria for knowledge that would be scientific. Once we 
grasp these criteria, we will then be in a position to consider two poignant passages in 
the Poetics in which the Stagirite explicitly comments on the work or the activity of 
the historian.  
 
9 Ibid., 148.  
10 Ibid., 148–158.  
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First, then, let us consider the Organon, where we are given two criteria which 
emerge as necessary conditions for knowledge that would be scientific: grasp of the 
cause and conceptual universality of terms.  
The first criterion concerns knowledge of the cause of a thing. In the Posterior 
Analytics I.2 Aristotle argues that scientific knowledge is unqualified, and stands over 
and against accidental knowing (the knowledge of the sophist). How so? Because 
bona fide scientific knowledge is founded on the rational grasp of the cause of a fact, 
when such cause cannot be otherwise than it is. Aristotle reiterates this point later on, 
in the penultimate chapter of Book I:  
What is understandable and understanding differ from 
what is opinable and opinion because understanding is 
universal and comes through necessities. What is 
necessary cannot be otherwise. But there are some items 
which are true and are the case but which can also be 
otherwise. It is clear that understanding cannot be 
concerned with these items; for then what can be 
otherwise could not be otherwise. But nor is 
comprehension concerned with them—by 
comprehension I mean a principle of understanding—nor 
is indemonstrable understanding (this is belief in an 
immediate proposition). Now it is comprehension and 
understanding and opinion and what is named from these 
which are true. Hence it remains that opinion is 
concerned with what is true or false but can also be 
otherwise. Opinion is belief in a proposition which is … 
not necessary.11 
 
In this passage Aristotle identifies three kinds of mental activity: understanding 
(including what he here calls “indemonstrable understanding”), comprehension, and 
opinion. All three ways of interacting with the world can be veridical, but only two of 
them—understanding and comprehension—can be scientific. Why? Because they 
alone are able to grasp the necessary cause of a fact, a cause which cannot be 
otherwise.  
We come now to consider a second relevant criterion for scientific knowledge as 
put forth by Aristotle in the Organon: conceptual universality of terms. The rigorous 
conceptualization of the kind of causation described above, Aristotle makes clear, 
proceeds only on the basis of the universality of terms. That is, the predicates of 
 
11 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, tr. Jonathan Barnes, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), 146 (88b30–89a4).  
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propositions are instances of genera or species, or what the Categories calls a 
“secondary substance”: 
A substance—that which is called a substance most 
strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is 
neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the 
individual man or the individual horse. The species in 
which the things primarily called substances are, are 
called secondary substances, as also are the genera of 
these species. For example, the individual man belongs 
in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; 
so these—man and animal—are called secondary 
substances.12 
 
These secondary substances are crucial, so Aristotle thinks, to each of the two kinds 
of theoretical scientific knowledge: induction and deduction. In the Posterior 
Analytics we learn that in the case of induction—that process from which emerge the 
first principles of deductive demonstration—one must move from the particular to the 
general or universal. In the case of deduction, on the other hand, one must utilize 
axioms, premises, and propositions of the logically correct structure: namely ones 
having a universal term—paradigmatically, a genus or a species—in the predicate 
position, a teaching we find not just in the Analytics but also in On Interpretation.  
Our question, then, is: given these criteria—rigorous grasp of cause and 
conceptual universality of terms—is history, that is, the logos or discourse of history, 
for Aristotle, a potentially scientific discipline/discourse? 
Let us first consider Aristotle’s answer to this question—a resounding “No!”—
which we find in Poetics chapter 23. Here, at line 1459a15, in the midst of a work 
dealing primarily with Greek tragedy, Aristotle teaches that “the arts of narration and 
imitation” [τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς]13 should not employ 
constructions in the same manner as “the histories,”14 in which  
there is a [need] to reveal not a single action but rather a 
single time, everything that happened in that time about 
one or several people, each part of which relates to one 
another in a haphazard way.15 
 
12 Aristotle, Categories, tr. J.L. Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, I, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), 4 (5a11–18). 
13 Aristotle, Poetics (Greek), Perseus Digital Library,  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0055 (accessed December 5, 
2015). 
14 Gk. iJstoriai.  
15 Aristotle, On Poetics, tr. Seth Benardete and Michael Davis (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 
2002), 57–58 (1459a 20–25). The Greek text reads: ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι 
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Reading this passage in light of Aristotle’s discussion of the criteria for scientific 
knowledge which he lays out in the Organon, we can see that he regards “the 
histories”—as we will see below we have reason to think that he has Herodotus in 
mind here—as incapable of identifying the causes of historical events. In particular, 
Aristotle makes two moves: 
1. He denies that the logos of history is meaningfully diachronic, that is, 
that the proper work of the historian is to describe or articulate single 
actions, actions which take place over or across an interval or duration 
of time and which operate on the basis of some kind of progression, for 
example that of the movement from potency to act. Instead, he seems 
to limit the proper work of the historian to the mere listing or 
cataloging of events and occurrences which happened synchronically: 
during a single cross-section of time.16 
2. He denies any meaningful connection—including that of cause and 
effect—among these synchronous events.  
As an intimation of what this stance of Aristotle’s might entail, consider this 
second denial, the denial of any meaningful connection among synchronous events. It 
implies, for example, that if the Assyrian Empire during the seventh century BCE was 
gaining more and more power and strength, while at the same time the people of 
Israel were engaging in more and more sinister actions and habits of idolatry and 
oppression, these two occurrences, for the Stagirite, are necessarily unrelated in any 
kind of intelligible way. They are “related in a haphazard way.” The same would 
hold, as a second example, if Herod King of the Jews in the first decade of the first 
 
δήλωσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς 
ἄλληλα. The Greek verb ἔτυχεν here is cognate with the noun τύχη, or “chance” or “fortune;” hence the 
prepositional phrase—“in a haphazard way”—in the translation above modifying the verb “relates.” 
Aristotle, Poetics (Greek), Perseus Digital Library, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0055 (accessed December 5, 
2015). 
16 For purposes that will emerge with more clarity later in this essay, let it here be noted that not only 
does this claim of Aristotle’s exclude the Bible’s eschatological project and Hegel’s project (both of 
which embody a progressive reading of history), it also excludes the validity of Nietzsche’s and 
Foucault’s genealogical method. In other words, even if, as in the case of the latter two thinkers, 
history is “decadent” in the sense that it is descending more and more into chaos, or indeed has only 
ever been a matter of chaos, Aristotle still considers it to be incoherent, for it still attempts to reason 
from cause (e.g., the will to power of various organisms) to effect (e.g., “inscriptions” on the bodies of 
members of subsequent generations of organisms).  
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century CE begins to fear a threat to his power, while at the same time Joseph, Mary, 
and the Baby Jesus were venturing toward Egypt as a means of escape.  
Is historical investigation capable of rising to the level of scientific rigor? 
Aristotle here answers resoundingly in the negative, for it fails to meet the first 
requirement previously established: the requisite kinds of cause of events.  
We come now to a second suggested answer, based on Poetics 9.  Here we 
find an even stronger articulation of Aristotle’s anti-historical posture, for the 
Stagirite here denies that history meets the second criterion for science, that it admits 
at all, in fact, of the universal applicability of terms.  
… the historian and the poet do not differ by speaking 
either in meters or without meters (since it would be 
possible for the writings of Herodotus to be put in meters, 
and they would be no less a history with meter than 
without meter). But they differ in this: the one speaks of 
what has come to be while the other speaks of what sort 
would come to be. Therefore poiêsis is more philosophic 
and of more stature than history. For poetry speaks rather 
of the general things while history speaks of the 
particular things. The general, that it falls to a certain sort 
of man to say or do certain sorts of thing [ἔστιν δὲ 
καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ 
πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,] according to the 
likely or the necessary, is what poetry aims at in attaching 
names. But the particular is what Alcibiades did or what 
he suffered.17 
 
Here Aristotle makes two moves, both of which bear upon our study. First, he 
clarifies the sense in which poetry is universal (that is, admitting of or characterized 
by terms which are universal or general). It is universal not in the same rigidly formal 
way in which strict scientific theoretical demonstration is. That is, poetry does not 
function on the basis of a syllogistically related system of genera and species, which 
are predicated of concrete particulars. No: the kind of universality of which poetry 
admits is of a less systematic kind than that. It deals not with genus and species but 
rather with “sorts of people,” what one might regard as “personality temperaments.” 
And an INFJ on the Myers-Briggs personality spectrum18 does not lend itself to 
 
17 Aristotle, On Poetics, tr. Benardete and Davis, 26–27 (1451b 1–11). For the Greek see 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0055%3Asection%3D145
1b (accessed on May 30, 2019). 
18 For more on personality types such as INFJ, consult the Myers and Briggs Foundation at 
www.myersbriggs.org. 
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scientific analysis nearly as completely as does an isosceles triangle, or indeed a 
molecular compound such as sulfur-hexafluoride. Hence we can say that, for the 
Stagirite, poetry or mythos19 stands in a middle position between pure science, on the 
one hand, and the bare particulars of historical occurrence (“this or that happened in 
this or that year;” “what Alcibiades did or suffered”).  
Additionally, though, the Stagirite comes clean on why he holds history in such 
low regard: it is a discourse which, unlike poetry, traffics merely and exclusively in 
the particular. Dealing not only no with genera or species, but not even with “sorts,”20 
it speaks merely of the individuals such as Alcibiades or Moses or Socrates or Callias, 
each of whom is an object denoted by a proper noun. As such, none of these objects, 
within the properly conceived work of the historian, admits of the kind of conceptual 
universality required by Aristotle in order to rise to the level, not just of theoretical 
scientific discourse, but even that of poetry. Poetry, then, for Aristotle, is quasi-
universal, but history is not.  
Based on these two moves, we can say the following about Aristotle’s posture 
with regard to any possible logos of history:  
1. For Aristotle poetry or mythos is a worthy discipline, for in it the poet creates 
a kind of rationality, a rationality which is quasi-universal, and, while falling 
short of the full rigor of epistêmê, is nevertheless not utterly devoid of value. 
2. There is, however, no such “medium-grade” rationality in history for Aristotle. 
3. Hence, poetry and history are different in such a way as to render the latter 
utterly nonrational. History, rooted exclusively in the bare particular, is utterly 
contingent, and so the attempt to find a rationality, or a chain of intelligibly or 
meaningfully connected elements, is, for the Stagirite, futile.  
For Aristotle, then, as illustrated below, there is no “overlap” between mythos and 
history, since, while the former involves universals as “sorts,” the latter traffics 
exclusively in the particular.  
 
19 On the basis of both Aristotle’s contextual use of the term mythos in the Poetics (see pages 8–9 
above) Robert Fowler’s article “Mythos and Logos” (see below) I hold that I am justified in treating 
Aristotle’s “poetry,” in this context referring to Greek tragedy, as mythos.  
20 As is indicated in the above quotation of the Poetics 1451b 1–11, it is Aristotle’s term (used twice: 
once in the dative singular and once in the accusative plural) poio/ß which is rendered by the English 
“sort” or “sorts.” See the entry for poio/ß in Liddell, Henry Georg and Robert Scott, An Intermediate 
Greek-English Lexicon, Founded upon the Seventh Edition (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1889), 
reprinted often by various publishers. Aristotle here uses the term, both times, as a substantival 
adjective.  
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With this realization we are in a better position to arrive at a working definition of 
mythos, and to appreciate the true character of Bonaventure’s anti-Aristotelianism. 
But before we make those moves, let us initially sample some of the ways 
Bonaventure makes use of story or narrative in the Hexaëmeron. 
II. Mythos in the Hexaëmeron 
Before sampling the following menu of representative tid-bits, however, it may 
be useful to cleanse the palate, especially for those unfamiliar with Ratzinger’s text or 
indeed with the Hexaëmeron itself. To this end I will offer the reader a brief preview 
of the next chapter in which I expand on the A–B–A’ pattern of the Hexaëmeron. This 
four-part schema (B–E of which, following the “preliminary considerations,” or 
section A immediately below, mirror the four segments of Plato’s Line), also serves to 
orient the reader to the highest level of organization of the Hexaëmeron.  
A. Preliminary considerations (Collations I–III)—audience (those willing to 
hear the Word), starting point (Christus Medium), end of the discourse 
(full and final sapientia): the first three examples of myth below are 
situated in this context. 
B. Vision/Day 1 (the intellectual light of nature, Collations III–VII): the 
fourth item for consideration takes place here.  
C. Vision/Day 2 (the intellectual light of faith, Collations VIII–XII). 
D. Vision/Day 3 (the intellectual light of Scripture, Collations XIII–XIX): 
the fifth and sixth examples to be considered occur here, in 
Bonaventure’s discussion of Scripture and its interpretation. 
E. Vision/Day 4 (the intellectual light of contemplation, Collations XX–
XXIII): the sixth and seventh specimens of mythos in Bonaventure’s 
work are situated here. 
mythos
historyscience
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To get a sense of the ways in which Bonaventure appeals to story or mythos 
within the details of this larger structure let us now consider these seven pericopes, 
the first of which is at the very beginning of the entire work: his portrayal of Christ as 
the center between Moses and John (the Evangelist). In the second section of the first 
collation, Bonaventure says that Christ is “the one from whom the two greatest wise 
men began”: Moses and John.21 Bonaventure is here invoking and connecting Gen 1:1 
and John 1:1, following Augustine in seeing these two passages as co-identifying God 
the Son as “that by which [the entire world] was made.”22 Here we find three persons 
who can be regarded as characters in a narrative: Moses, Jesus Christ, and John the 
Evangelist. Within this story which Bonaventure imagines, two of the characters 
(Moses and John), in turn, craft stories within the story: stories which center on and 
culminate in Jesus Christ.  
 Our second indication that Bonaventure’s mind tends to think in terms of story, 
or a particular kind of story, emerges from within the Hexaëmeron shortly after this 
first one. Beginning in section 11 we find yet another variation of the all-important 
Bonaventurian theme of “Christ the Center” (Christus Medium), again taking the form 
of a story.  What Bonaventure performs here is typical of the Hexaëmeron: a kind of 
coordination of a story and a scientific schema (beginning with metaphysics and 
passing through physics, mathematics, and logic). Rather than delve at this point into 
the inner significance of this move, I will simply register the presence of the story of 
Christ’s life by supplying the following chart (note in particular the final column) 
which summarizes this material: 
Hexaëmeron I.11 Coordination of Logos and Mythos of Christ 
Sense Order How wonder & praise are provoked How Christ is center: mythos 
Essence Metaphysical By eternal origin By his eternal generation 
Nature Physical Most strong through the diffusion of power By his Incarnation 
Distance Mathematical Most deep b/c of the centrality of position By his passion 
Doctrine Logical Most clear by rational proof By his resurrection 
Moderation Ethical Most important by choice of the moral good By his ascension 
Justice Political Outstanding b/c of the retribution of justice By the judgment to come 
Concord Juridical At peace through universal conciliation By the eternal retribution 
 
 
21 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, I.10 (5–6).  
22 As we will see in the next chapter, for Bonaventure the importance of Christ is not simply one of 
myth, but also one which we could call epistemological or “gnoseological”: as he says in §10 of this 
initial collation, “it is impossible to understand a creature except through that by which it was made.” 
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The context of this chart is what one could call Bonaventure’s starting point:  
… note that a beginning should be made from the center, 
(medium), that is, from Christ. For He Himself [holds] 
the central position in all things…. Hence it is necessary 
to start from him if a man wants to reach Christian 
wisdom.23  
 
Bonaventure continues that “Christ is the center in a seven-fold sense, in terms of 
essence, nature, distance, doctrine, moderation, justice, and concord.”24 Each of these 
seven senses, in turn, finds its context in a particular scientific order, which then 
provokes wonder for a particular reason and in a particular way. Bookended by 
eternity, the story of Christ (summarized in the last column of the chart) begins with 
incarnation, includes passion, resurrection, and ascension, and ends by stretching 
forward to that still future event (from both the perspective of the New Testament 
perspective and that of Bonaventure) of final judgment. In this context we find not 
only the mythos of Jesus Christ, but the coordination of that multi-phase, progressive 
mythos with several other discursive trajectories as well.  
Later in this same, initial collation we find Bonaventure appealing to yet another, 
third story, that of the apostle Thomas in John 20. In a similar vein as what the above 
schema represents, here we find a cross-pollination of story and deduction. Citing 
John 20, he sees the major proposition, the middle or minor proposition, and the 
conclusion25 in the details of the pericope contained in John 20: the fact that Christ is 
able apparently to traverse through closed doors shows his exalted divinity (this is the 
“major proposition”); his gesturing toward his scars evokes the “middle proposition” 
of his suffering and death on the cross; his eliciting of Thomas’ confession (“My Lord 
and my God!”) brings to mind the “conclusion” of a redeemed, deified humanity. In 
section 30 Bonaventure takes this story as intellectually normative and rationally 
binding: “This is our logic [logica], this is our reasoning [ratiocinatio] which must be 
used against the devil who constantly argues with us.”26 In this passage, we find yet 
another example of story-as-knowledge, or knowledge-as-story. 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. Lat. “Est autem septiforme medium, scilicet essentiae, naturae, distanciae, doctrinae, 
modestiae, justitiae, concordiae.” Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, I.10 (330–1). 
25 For these elements, see Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck I.28 (15). 
26 Ibid., I.30 (15–6). 
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 We move now to a fourth opportunity to detect the presence of mythos in the 
Hexaëmeron (B in the outline above), this time in sections 12 and 13 of Collation V, 
well into Bonaventure’s vision of the first day of creation. Here we see Bonaventure’s 
love for story in a different light, in a larger context. In this passage, in contrast to the 
preceding, he does not appeal to any particular story; rather, he speaks of the 
importance of ars, or Greek technê, which Aristotle in Book VI of the Ethics regards 
as one of the truth-revealing powers of the soul. (In this collatio one of Bonaventure’s 
major aims is to integrate the content of Aristotle’s ethics into the Christian journey to 
beatification, as one “stage along the way,” one element of what in this essay I am 
presenting as a kind of dianoia.) Now, the outline above, references the end or goal of 
Bonaventure’s discourse (“in qua sermo terminandus est,” from the title of collation 
II), a goal which he identifies as sapientia (part and parcel of beatification, the final 
end of the Christian life for Bonaventure). Here in Collation V he insists that such 
sapientia requires ars, that apart from this habitus cum ratione factivus,27 sapientia 
remains off-limits and unattainable.28  
 Now it is true that the category of ars is larger than that of mythos. And yet (as 
Aristotle’s use of poêsis to describe the “art of narration,” discussed above, suggests) 
mythos is surely an instance of technê (the Greek equivalent of ars). Strictly speaking, 
we admittedly cannot definitively conclude on the basis of this passage alone that 
Bonaventure regards myth is necessary for the achievement of sapienta. And yet, is 
there some other mode of artistic production which he might be envisioning? One is 
hard pressed to identify one. Given the way he saturates his writing with biblical 
narratives, it makes sense to suppose that such writing is the kind of thing he has in 
mind. 
 Although one is admittedly hard-pressed to find a thorough treatment of historia 
(the Latin equivalent of mythos) in Bonaventure—it is utterly absent, for example, in 
the Reduction29—there is good reason to believe that Bonaventure appreciated the 
imaginative, story-like quality of Scripture. Note the imaginative language in this 
passage from the Breviloquium: 
 
27Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, V.13 (356). 
28 Here we find a resonance with contemporary scholar Catherine Pickstock, who insists that, for 
Origen, “ethical self-discovery entails the risk of art….” Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 187. 
29 Bonaventure, On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology, Works of St. Bonaventure, vol. 1., tr. 
Zachary Hayes, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, New York; Franciscan Institute Publications, 1996). 
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… the whole course of this world is shown by Scripture 
to run in a most orderly fashion from beginning to end, 
like an artfully composed melody…. Just as no one can 
appreciate the loveliness of a song unless one’s 
perspective embraces it as whole, so none of us can see 
the beauty of the order and governance of the world 
without an integral view of its course. But since no 
mortal lives long enough to see all this with bodily eyes, 
nor can any individual foretell the future, the Holy Spirit 
has provided us with the book of sacred scripture, whose 
length corresponds to God’s governance of the 
universe.30 
 
Further, Ratzinger himself draws attention to the “symbolic mode of thought” which 
characterizes Bonaventure’s way of thinking in the Hexaëmeron: “In the Hexaëmeron 
the symbolic mode of thought is employed … emphatically…. The symbolic 
approach dominates the entire approach to history in the work.”31 Plus, since the 
crafting of narrative—what many scholars term “mythopoiêsis”—is a species of ars, 
we are on solid footing to make the claim in this form: since ars is required for 
wisdom or sapientia, and myth is a form (or subspecies) of ars, myth meets the 
requirement in question for the attainment of wisdom. On the basis of this passage, 
then, we can say that mythopoiêsis satisfies one of the necessary conditions—
necessary because it passes through “affective desire”32—for full sapientia.  
 Fifthly, in Collation XVII, well into the third day of creation (D in the outline 
above), we find Bonaventure returning to one of his favorite themes: the two trees 
which appear in the creation story: the tree of life, and the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil, which we are introduced to in the second chapter of Genesis, well after 
the narration itself of the six days of creation (together with the seventh day, the day 
of rest) has been completed: 
 
 
30 Bonaventure, Breviloquium, tr. Dominic V. Monti O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan 
Institute Publications, 2005), Prologue, §4 (10–11). Quoted in Boyd Taylor Coolman, “On the Creation 
of the World,” in Bonaventure Revisited: Companion to the Breviloquium, ed. Dominic Monti, OFM, 
and Katherine Wrisley-Shelby (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 2017), 119. 
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/nuim/detail.action?docID=5103751. 
31 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 77. “Stärker … macht sie im Hexaëmeron die symbolistiche 
Denkweise geltend. Sie beherrscht die Geschichtsvorstellung dieses Werkes.” Ratzinger, 
Offenbarungsverständis und Geschichtstheologie, 536. 
32 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, V.13 (356). Bonaventure here has affectione; elsewhere de Vinck 
translates this term (and related terms within the semantic range of affectus) as “the affective 
dispositions.”  
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And the LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the east; 
and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out 
of the ground the LORD God made to spring up every 
tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. The 
tree of life was in the midst of the garden, and the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil.33 
 
What is instructive for our purposes is the work to which Bonaventure puts these 
trees. For he insists that this work, performed by God himself, occurs on creation day 
3, and that these trees, in fact, are included in the phrase “trees bearing fruit in which 
is their seed,” which we find in Gen 1:11. We will treat these all-important semen in a 
later context below. For now, notice how and why Bonaventure attends to this story. 
The planting of these trees (on day 3 of creation) is a necessary condition for one 
dimension of human thought: the reading of the various “books” which Bonaventure 
puts forth in his variously formulated theories of knowledge: the book of Creation; the 
Book of Scripture; even the Book of the Soul.34 In order to read these books, neither 
the light of nature alone nor the light of faith alone is sufficient: the intellect must be 
sustained [reficiendibus] by Scripture.35 Here again, mythos is coordinated with 
knowledge, and we see yet another instance in which Bonaventure, for all intents and 
purposes, cannot seem to speculate without appealing to story. 
 I will mention only two additional uses of story by Bonaventure at this point. 
Consider penultimately the various renditions of the story of the Old Testament which 
occur throughout the Hexaëmeron. We will limit our discussion to the first extended 
example which one finds in the work: the occurrence in Collation XV of the one-to-
one correspondence between the Old Testament and the New Testament. Bonaventure 
speaks of the story beginning with Adam and concluding with Noah: “So it is that 
everything was done until the time when the Flood wiped out every animal except 
those of Noah.”36 Yet this biblical mini-narrative is just the first of eight which 
Bonaventure includes within the grand sweep of the entire Old Testament. Each of the 
eight corresponds to a “life-phase” of a typical human being, who grows from infancy 
(Adam—Noah), into childhood (Noah–Abraham), through adolescence (Abraham—
 
33 Gen 2:8–9.  
34 Bonaventure frequently refers to these three “books.” See, for example, Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron 
XII.14–17 (386–7). 
35 The title of this collation reads: “De tertia visione quinta, quae agit de theoriis Scripturae significatis 
per fructus, scilicet de considerationisbus reficientibus intellectum….” 
36 Ibid., XV.12 (400). 
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David), etc., until the end of one’s life, which Bonaventure mysteriously yet 
brilliantly coordinates with “the repose of the souls after Christ’s passion.”37 Here 
again, we see that Bonaventure deeply believes in the “logic” of mythos: so much so 
that he portrays it as matching and sharing the same structure as the growth of an 
organic rational animal.  
 Finally, we come to our seventh example of story in the work, what could be 
called “the life and times of the church militant”—the ecclesia which for Bonaventure 
is the vehicle of eschatological history. In both of the last two collations of the work 
(XXII and XXIII), Bonaventure rehearses the life and times of the church, and 
presents them as undergoing an intelligible process of development. Far from being a 
series of random accidents, related only haphazardly, the history of the church 
temporally reveals the order of heavenly realities first spelled out by Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite. These latter are ordered according to the logic of 
procession out of God (a logic which Denys borrowed and adapted from Neoplatonic 
sources such as Plotinus), and thus their coordination with the temporal events of 
church history articulates the significance of those events. One should appreciate how 
this content takes the form of yet another mythos or narrative. 
 In all seven of these examples, then, Bonaventure conceives in the manner of a 
mythos or story. One is tempted to conclude that, in radical contradistinction to 
Aristotle, he cannot think in any other way.  
III. Mythos and history: the alternative configuration of Catherine Pickstock 
 Based on Aristotle’s construal of the relationships between scientia, mythos, and 
history shown above (illustrated by the above Venn diagram, near the beginning of 
this chapter), in fact, it appears that we must (in his opinion) admit that these 
narratives upon which Bonaventure relies and which so thoroughly constitute his 
thought are anything but historical. Is it the case, then, that we have the world of story 
on the one hand, and the world of history on the other, and that never the twain shall 
meet? 
 In her book Repetition and Identity, Catherine Pickstock suggests an alternative 
approach, one which not only sees (contra Aristotle) mythos and history as 
compatible, but regards the former as constitutive of the latter.  Building on the 
 
37 Ibid., XV.17 (400). 
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thought of Søren Kierkegaard as expressed in his pseudonymous work Repetition,38 
Pickstock applies the notion of nonidentical repetition to things in the world (chapters 
1–3), to the field of signs (chapter 4), to human selves (chapter 5), and to the Christian 
biblical mythos (chapters 8 and 9). In this way she gestures toward an ontology of 
fiction which supplements39 Bonaventure and Ratzinger with profoundly fecundity.40 
 In marshaling Pickstock in support of this essay, I want to draw out and develop 
three points she makes in her book-length essay: first, her demonstration that 
imagined entities are required as the condition of possibility for the mere recognition 
of objects in the (spatial) world and events in time; second, her explication of reality 
as rhetorically troped; and third, her critical analysis of the Christian mythos as both 
historical and as rhetorically re-worked by the fathers of the church to assimilate the 
rhetorical or literary devices of anacephalaiosis (recapitulation) and apocatastasis 
(final restoration).  
 A. The imagined double as real 
 First, then, beginning with her chapter 4 in which she argues that any and every 
object or thing in the world is accompanied by a “shadowy sign” (a notion which, 
throughout the book, she alternatively expresses as “sense,” “meaning,” or 
“thought”), Pickstock clarifies that in order for the mind even to recognize these 
objects or things in the world, it must make use of abstract, immaterial entities. 
Examples include, at the most basic level, spatial points and temporal instances. Why 
is this the case? Because, as we learn beginning with presocratic thought (such as 
Heraclitus), all objects—indeed the cosmos itself as an object (a “meta-indexical 
whole”41)—are always in flux, always changing. Hence, the identity of any object in 
the world, and the world itself, shifts from instant to instant. Why, then, do we not 
simply conclude that each instant is correlated with a distinct thing, that no one thing 
perdures across the interval between instances? Perhaps it is because we—in line with 
Thomas Aquinas—hold (perhaps without explicitly realizing it) that, while the object 
has changed, it—or, more precisely, its aliquid—has also, in and through the process 
 
38 Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition, in Fear and Trembling; Repetition, ed. & tr. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983) 125–232.  
39 I invoke this notion of supplementation following Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology, tr. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 152–7. 
40 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity. See “Introduction,” n. 2 above.   
41 For Pickstock indexicality is the ability for an object literally to be pointed out, picked out among 
other objects and identified.   
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of change—remained the same.42 Which is to say that it—the object in question—has, 
precisely as event, nonidentically repeated itself.  
 However, points and instances are not the only abstract, imagined entities without 
which mere recognition of items in the world would be impossible, or which serve as 
the condition of possibility for the mere recognition of objects in the world.  “The res 
cannot be there in its primary actuality if it is not shadowed by [a] possibilitas,” an 
alternative state of existing.43 For this point she uses the example of Monet’s 
haystacks, as portrayed in his series of impressionist paintings commonly known as 
Haystacks, in which “a series of near-identical haystacks seems at once to present a 
sequence of real haystacks, according to an equally indefinite ideal variation.”44 What 
is going on here, Pickstock thinks, is that, instead of painting actual haystacks, the 
artist is rendering a series of imagined “shadow possibilities” of actual haystacks. 
Perhaps, after all, “it is one of the functions of the artist … to be the medium for 
manifestation of this concealment.”45  
 While it is true that this imagined possibilitas can be regarded as a “phantasmic 
abstraction,”46 there nevertheless is “no warrant” for limiting it to the non-real, or 
even the non-existent. It may even be the case that it arises “as a kind of emanation of 
the [thing] itself.”47 In maintaining this possibility Pickstock is being consistent with 
her earlier affirmation (in chapter one) that “immaterial phantasma” are, at the very 
least, no less real than material things in the world.48 
 If this is true, then real objects—such as an ordinary haystack on a rural farm—are 
always connected to, always shadowed by, alternative imaginings or images of 
themselves, alternative imaginings of the haystack: it could/can be different than it 
is.49  
 
42 Philipp Rosemann, Omne ens est aliquid: Introduction à la lecture du “système” philosophique du 
saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 1996), 14–47, cited on Pickstock, 73. 
43 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 73.  
44 Ibid., 74. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 73.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid., 7–11. 
49 Terse translation: every positive is a non-negative. Every instantiation is not some other instantiation. 
But this means that the “positive instantiation” is defined by, exists by virtue of, its “unreal other.” To 
be a cat is (in part, and by necessity) to be a non-dog. To be Garfield the cat is (in part, and by 
necessity) to be not-Chester-the-cat. But what is this Chester-the-cat, which Garfield is not? This is an 
imaginary (or remembered) cat. By the way, this exact same “dialectic with the non-actual” also 
obtains with (applies to) signs: A is not B, etc. This is Pickstock’s point when she says that Monet’s 
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 This, then, is the first plank in Pickstock’s ontology of fiction: fictional entities—
points, moments, alternative possible versions of any given object—are a requirement 
for the mere recognition of things in the world. As she summarizes this point:  
We have seen that … pure thinghood is devoid of … 
ontological content, and … that, without these null 
divisions [of point and moment], there would be no 
coherent entities and no coherent events. Similarly, they 
are devoid of meaning-content and signify nothing, being 
empty even of sound and fury. And yet, without them, 
there would be no meaningfully distinct entities and no 
significant or distinguishable events.50  
  
 B. Reality as rhetorically troped 
 Second, let us now turn to Pickstock’s exploration of reality itself as rhetorically 
troped.  It is not simply the case, she argues, that objects in the world are shadowed 
by their imagined sense or sensory images, their meanings, but, further, reality itself 
actually arrives in the mode of rhetoric. To grasp what Pickstock is getting at here, let 
us examine the three rhetorical tropes she develops, all three of which are so many 
versions of repetition.  
 The first rhetorical mode of repetition,51 which can be labeled retrieval, has to do 
with the undulated serpentine movement of certain processes. The idea here is that, in 
order for a process to move forward (that is, forward into the future), it must reach 
back into the past. It must (attempt to) recoup the origin, which is never simply or 
fully given, which is always already absent or deferred. Pickstock illustrates her point 
by recourse to three exhibits, the first of which is a novel by Kristy Gunn entitled The 
Big Music.52 In this story, which is in part about the technically sophisticated musical 
repetitions involved in “the grand, outdoor version of Scottish Highland bagpipe 
music,” the narrator states:  
Give it away, your past, and what do you have but only 
talk, only words, all the sentences…. Gone clear into the 
air. There’s no tune, for how can there be, from nothing? 
... For of all the certainties of the world, all the houses 
 
haystack “must indicate itself with at least minimal meaning, as if were already its own hieroglyph.” 
Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 74. 
50 Ibid., 76. 
51 According to Pickstock all three “aspects of repetition” are “rhetorical modes of turning back.” Ibid., 
171. 
52 Ibid., 153. 
 88 
and marriages and the children, without the past there’s 
only nothing, so never let it go.53 
 
With themes such as these Gunn’s novel illustrates the point that, in order to progress 
into the future at all, one—or one’s community or people or nation—must reach back 
into the origin of the past.   
 Pickstock asks us to consider, as a second example of retrieval, the phenomenon 
of photography, in order to shed light upon the strange character of the past or the 
origin which lies in it. Following Russian Orthodox film-maker Tarkovsky, Pickstock 
argues that the photograph is the “second happening of an event”—of the absent 
origin—which had yet-to-be captured by anyone’s recognition or gaze or attention or 
grasp.54 It is, in other words, the “first apprehension” of the origin, or the “first 
repetition,” or the “second happening” of the origin. The photograph is the “first 
repetition” that is at the same time the “second happening.” (“For an event to happen 
once, it must happen twice.”55) This yields a point about tradition (including traditions 
such as Scottish Highland bagpipe music): because of the always absent origin, the 
goal is not the exact capturing or identical representation of it,56 but rather the 
elaboration of it. This elaboration, which involves reaching back into the past, is 
central to the nature of tradition.   
 As a third illustration, consider the natural, annual recurrence of springtime, 
which further suggests the elusive character of the initial origin. Here, the immediate 
re-emergence of spring is like the immediacy, the “absurdity,” of the entire 
pattern/chain/sequence of successive springtimes itself. Spring is a good example of 
the sense in which Platonic methexis involves “imparticipable participation”: it is 
imparticipable insofar as it appears to have no cause or prior element; it is participable 
insofar as it is, in fact, related to the previous spring.  
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 158. 
55 Ibid., 73.  
56 One can see this kind of fetishizing of the origin—what David Bentley Hart calls “the genetic 
fallacy”—in the tendency of certain conservative biblical scholars who, working in the field of textual 
criticism, regard the ultimate goal of their craft to be the establishment of the “original autographa” of 
the biblical text. Admittedly, this is less pernicious in the case of say, Pauline studies, where Paul did 
actually write actual epistles, than in the case of the content of, for example, the book of Genesis, in 
which the material, surely, recedes far beyond any fixed version of the Masoretic text, back into the 
misty corridors of communal memory. On the genetic fallacy, see David Bentley Hart, The Experience 
of God: Being, Consciousness, and Bliss (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2013), 68. 
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 This first rhetorical device, then, may be thought of simply as retrieval, or a return 
to the always absent origin of the past as a way of moving into the future. As such, it 
is closely related to the notion of tradition.  
 The second rhetorical mode of repetition which Pickstock puts forth is the meta-
trope of recapitulation, which involves not just a retrieval of some individual element 
of the origin, but rather reaches back and summons the entirety of some larger 
complex.57 In this regard it differs from other rhetorical tropes such as anaphora, 
epistrophe, and hendiadys, which “pertain to a [single] emphasis or ornamentation of 
a point” within “a longer discourse” or narrative.58  
 How does repcapitulation repeat? It does so by “returning to the head of a 
discourse,” by “summing up an argument with reinforcement by a new means,” a 
means which is “a particular moment in a discourse [which] which tries to reinvoke 
the whole procedure….”59 
 Rather than further develop this notion of recapitulation at this time—it will be 
elaborated on below—let us turn to a third trope, which is, it turns out, a special case 
of recapitulation. 
 The distinctive feature of this third rhetorical mode of repetition, apocatastatsis, is 
that in it we find not just the invocation of, but the “reversal of the procedure that is 
invoked.”60  Pickstock is saying that apocatastasis is a “reversed reversal.” What is 
the reversal which apocatastasis reverses? The false (or at least pernicious) reversal—
or attempted reversal—of cause and effect.61 (If this original reversal is illusory, then 
this is consistent with Pickstock’s suggestion that the Fall is an illusion or at least like 
an illusion.)  
 
 
 
 
57 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 159. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid., 160. 
60 Ibid., 162. 
61 Pickstock illustrates this reversal of cause and effect—which she thinks describes the biblical Fall of 
humanity—by recourse to two thinkers who feature prominently in her overall essay: Lewis Carroll 
and Gilles Deleuze. See esp. ch. 8. It seems to me that this move of reversal involves two aspects: 1. 
saying that the cause logically derives from the effect; 2. suggesting that the effect precedes the cause 
in time. A possible example might be—since Pickstock in this context in thinking in ethical terms—
Donald Trump proclaiming all immigrants to the U.S. guilty before they have actually committed any 
crime.  
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… at least during the course of time, the application of 
the reversed reversal, or negation of negation, to echo 
Hegel (though with somewhat different implications), 
does not result in the literal restoration of a previous 
uncontaminated status quo, but rather in a new situation, 
full of resumed future possibility.62 
 
Pickstock illustrates this reversed reversal which at the same time subverts the order of 
cause and effect by appeal to Händel’s opera Rodelinda, in which the sacrificial 
willingness of the protagonist, the wrongfully deposed and imprisoned king Bertrando, 
to receive the punishment of the crime for which he is falsely accused ends up bringing 
about resolution to the plot.63 
 Thus far, as Pickstock has developed these three instances of rhetorical trope, she 
has limited herself to the realm of the literary or the (purely) fictional. So far, that is, 
in her rendition of retrieval, recapitulation, and apocatastasis, the space-time events of 
history have not been countenanced. In the next section, however, which consists of a 
treatment of two fathers of the church, all that will change.  
 C. Rhetorical trope as history 
 Thirdly and finally, Pickstock critically analyzes the Christian mythos, in light of 
patristic interpretation, to show how it is historicized and at the same time rhetorically 
troped such that it bears these same three rhetorical patterns, at the highest possible 
level, of repetition (both identical and nonidentical). Here Pickstock rehearses the 
moves performed by both Irenaeus and Origin, in which they—in different ways and 
with different idiosyncrasies—assimilate various aspects of Gnostic and Neoplatonist 
(both Plotinian and theurgic) soteriology into a new, creative Christian vision, 
forming and shaping it rhetorically, in particular by means of the rhetorical tropes 
developed in the previous section: return (or the retrieval of tradition), recapitulation, 
and apocatastasis or final restoration.  
 The three tropes of the previous section are no longer rhetorical in a strictly or 
merely literary/fictional sense. Rather, in them we now “discover a rhetorization of 
 
62 Ibid., 163. 
63 One might also think of two related biblical examples from the world of theology: the felix culpa, in 
which Adam’s sin is not only happy but also necessary, in order to bring about the salvation which God 
had always intended. A related way of articulating this same logic is that of prelapsarianism, a 
(distinctively Reformed) way of viewing the Fall, such that Adam’s Fall was decreed by God in order 
that God might bring about redemption. Here both the (normally assumed) temporal sequence and the 
(normally assumed) logical relation of cause and effect (fall and redemption) are reversed. 
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reology.”64 Specifically, Pickstock reads them in the context of Neoplatonist (both 
Plotinian and theurgic) and Gnostic soteriologies, which, in turn, involve particular 
versions of a cosmic fall from divine stature. For the purposes of clarity, I will simply 
list the salient features of these various movements of the ancient world, which the 
fathers of the church then retrieve and assimilate into their own vision(s) of reality.  
Ancient soteriologies: salient features of three ancient schools 
Plotinian 
Neoplatonism 
The fall (tolma) and hence salvation (both reversal and full restoration) 
are undramatic. True, there is an epic itinerary of the soul (modeled on 
the journey of Odysseus) which involves a return to the original point 
of departure, but what matters here is the ethical choices made by the 
individual soul within the cosmic “stage setting,” which simply “falls 
itself like a machinery from the skies.”65 There is the ethical struggle of 
the individual soul, but no cosmic dramatic plot involving a hoped-for 
cosmic salvific resolution of the fall. 
Theurgic 
Neoplatonism 
Any cosmic dramatic aspect is still missing. What matters here is that 
salvation, still construed at the level of the individual, involves more 
than merely an ethical choice on the part of the individual soul. Rather, 
“conveyance” of divine reality in the world is now more materially 
embodied through ritual action. 
Gnosticism The missing drama finally enters the picture with the advent of 
Gnosticism. This school assimilates the posture in St. Paul, seeing a true 
cosmic drama being played out: the divine pleroma has been lost, and 
can now be restored only by way of a divine descent into the material 
cosmos as such, a complex which Paul calls economia. (This remains 
true even if the Gnostics distort Paul’s thought through their insistence 
that a. the fall affects the divine realm itself, and b. the descent of the 
divine savior somehow did not truly involve his taking on a material 
nature.) Still, for the Gnostics, there is a disaster in heaven and a 
restoration of that disaster, two ruptures, with the latter reversing the 
first, even if—unlike the theurgic Neoplatonists—the only repetition of 
the this drama is a (supposed) indentical one (memorializing it mentally) 
and not a liturgical, non-identically repeated one (as for the theurgists).66  
  
 From here ancient catholic Christianity—for Pickstock exemplified by Ireneaus 
and Origen—borrows certain elements from each of the above movements. As for the 
Plotinian Neoplatonists, there is a fall which betokens disastrous consequences for the 
individual members of the human race. As in the theurgists, divine contact or 
 
64 Ibid., 172. This term denotes the logos or study of, or discourse about, things (Gk. res). Pickstock in 
this context points out how the prefix of the term “repetition” means both thing and again (as in “to ask 
[Lat. petere] again”).  
65 Ibid., 173.  
66 It is unclear how Pickstock can regard this memorialization or conceptual grasp an identical 
repetition, since in earlier in chapter three of her book she stresses that recollection is a kind of non-
identical repetition. Perhaps her real intent here is to say that this kind of Gnostic recollection or 
conceptual grasp is ahistorical or disembodied, or perhaps that it fails to be nonidentically repetitive in 
a historic or embodied way.  
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“conveyance” is achieved ritually and (hence) materially. As in the Gnostics, the 
cosmos as a whole is subject to a grand drama in which the restoration of a lost 
pleroma is accomplished.  
 In this newly constructed Christian vision “the action has been ‘rhetorized’ 
because salvation is no longer a matter purely of recovering the higher reason, as for 
Platonism, nor of mystically abandoning matter through a gesture of dramatic rupture 
with all drama, as for the Gnostics.”67 In other words, for orthodox, catholic 
Christianity, salvation requires something beyond merely a kind of intellectual grasp 
of concepts: what is needed involves a holistic transformation rooted in the “middle 
register” of the human soul including the will, the affect, and the heart. In order to 
prompt such a transformation, rhetoric—including the three rhetorical tropes 
developed in the previous chapter—is needed.   
 Pickstock next shows how ancient Christianity, having now incorporated the Fall 
from the Plotinian Neoplatonists, ritual action of conveyance from the theurgists, 
cosmic (or heavenly) drama from the Gnostics, goes on to perform two subsequent 
moves: the rhetorization of salvation, which then leads to a second move, the 
recognition—at the largest possible scale—of the pattern of repetition.  
 Before considering the three rhetorical devices themselves, an immediate 
clarification needs to be made. In none of the ancient schools treated above do we 
find an appreciation of salvation as a historical process. Even for the Gnostics, the 
fall takes place in timeless, transcendent realm and, while it is true that this fall does 
radically affect human beings, their salvation is enacted through a series of ethical 
decisions of rectitude which take place merely at the level of the individual. 
Pickstock’s burden includes the depiction of this intellectual development achieved 
by Origen and Irenaeus—the rhetorization of reality—as, at the same time, a 
historicization of it. With the addition of rhetoric, that is, the addition of history is 
included virtually as a byproduct. 
 Before concluding with the meta-pattern which Pickstock lays bare, let us first 
consider the rhetorization of salvation or salvation history as she describes it. Here we 
find three interminglings, sifted from the Christian mythos of sacred scripture, and 
 
67 Ibid., 178. 
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interpreted by church fathers, which exemplify the overlap or cross-pollination of 
history and mythos (or, in Pickstock’s idiom, of referent and sense). 
 First, based on a passage in Irenaeus’ Against the Heresies III, 22.1–2, Pickstock 
discusses the imagery of two trees: that of Adam and that of Christ.  
… the recapitulatory action reaches its climax when a 
human being, Jesus Christ, “impersonated” (or 
“hypostasized”) by the divine Logos, is obedient to God 
the Father in his weakness, dangling on the tree of 
death, thereby undoing through backwards traverse, 
Adam’s disobedience to God and the loss of the tree of 
life, when he was in a position of created strength.68  
 
The salient point for our purposes is that, for Irenaeus, Jesus of Nazareth—whom 
Irenaeus undoubtedly and rightly regards as a historical agent—repeats a 
mythological action. That is, he repeats a mythological action which is narrated in the 
story of the Old Testament, the Hebrew Scriptures. While this move on Irenaeus’ part 
is an instance of recapitulation, Pickstock’s point is also that this move—the stitching 
together of the mythological tree with the historical tree—also involves an 
“undulation”—a return to the past which takes the form of a retrieval. That is, 
Irenaeus’ Jesus performs a retrieval of the past, and then he nonidentically repeats it 
in an undulation in which the fictional past is recouped and refreshed by a historical 
actor in the (then) present, thus moving it forward into the future.   
 Again, since, for Irenaeus, Jesus is a historical agent, we see here a massive leap 
beyond the ahistorical assumptions of Neoplatonists (both kinds) and Gnostics alike 
in terms of salvation.  
The full, articulate reality of earthly paradise has been 
lost and the slow process of allowing the divine descent 
… must involve the effort to reweave together the real 
events of history with their prophetic and allegorical 
significance.69 
 
Here a historical agent embodies an allegorical interpretation of a text: with the 
performance involving the second tree, that of Calvary, we now see that the text 
involving the original tree in Genesis, as a-llegoria, literally “does not mean what it 
says.” It does not intend or speak (legei) literally: it “non-intends” or “counter-
intends” (allegei) a new and different sense: that of Christ, who is a historical agent.  
 
68 Ibid., 180. 
69 Ibid. 
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 Here history retrieves and repeats fiction, and fiction renders history intelligible. 
History retrieves allegory, a kind of fiction, and the resulting fictional history (or 
historical fiction) is regarded—by a historically verifiable thinker Irenaeus—as 
coherent by virtue of a historical event whose coherence is a function of its fictional 
constitution, its mythopoietic character.  
 Second, Pickstock brings out a subsequent intensification of the above rhetorically 
enacted intermingling, which occurs literally in the womb the Virgin Mary. 
This process reaches its consummation in Mary, because 
the Incarnation could only occur at the point when her 
perfect prophetic interpretation of the scriptures and the 
verbal utterance of this wisdom, instantly and 
“momentarily” passed over into an actual physical giving 
birth to the divine Word itself in the flesh. Here, sign and 
reality, imagination and embodiment, become one.70  
 
 In Christian theology it is commonplace to read the logos of St. John’s prologue 
as connected to, as the historical fulfillment of, the legacy of antique Greek 
philosophical thought, the “propaedeutic of the Gospel,” which centers so frequently 
and profoundly on the notion of logos. While not wanting to undermine this 
traditional stance, Pickstock here channels patristic thought in a slightly different 
though compatible direction so as to suggest that the logos stitched together in the 
womb of the Virgin is the fulfillment of not simply of the antique Greek legacy but 
also the Hebrew Scriptures, the mythos of the pre-Christian people of God.71 With the 
historical allegory of the two trees ringing in our ears, and in light of such passages as 
Luke 24:27,72 one can interpret the logos in question—the logos which emerged in the 
womb of the Virgin—as the seeds and sinews of the mythos of the Old Covenant.  
 Further (though Pickstock does not explicitly state this) it is clear that this move 
does count as a recapitulation, since it involves the whole or the entirety of the 
discourse or narrative. It is the entire story of the people of Israel which gets repeated 
in the Virgin’s womb. It is this old covenant, this old testament (Gk. diathêkê), which 
issues forth in the body of Mary, and which will later become the body of Christ, or 
 
70 Ibid.  
71 In anticipation of a point below about Hekataios of Miletos, we here glimpse the possibility of logos 
and mythos being so comingled or overlapping that they may be regarded as one and the same thing: 
logos as mythos, or mythos as logos.  
72 “And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, [Jesus] interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the 
things concerning himself.” Revised Standard Version.  
 95 
what the fathers regarded as the soma typicon.73 Once again, for certain fathers of the 
church at least, fiction and fact, allegory and event, are here merged into one.  
 This merging of the natural (the organic, biological body of Jesus) and the poietic 
(the narrative of the Old Testament) brings us to a third (and final) Gospel image, 
reaped and rendered with profound fecundity, this time by both Irenaeus and Origen: 
the figure of the serpent (“Just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so 
must the Son of Man be lifted up….”—John 3:14). 
… the allegorical association of Christ with the figura of 
the serpent, at once natural and artificial (taken up by 
many church Fathers), suggests that the devil’s imitation 
of the serpent was a false copying of the human and 
cosmic Urform, the form of the res as such, which has 
been philosophically situated as “serpentine” in 
character. Christ’s crucifixion inverts this inversion 
through recapitulation, and allows the true created 
serpentine progress to be resumed, removing even the 
curse from the ground (or from material reality) made by 
God after the Fall….74 
 
Of import here is not simply that the serpent image which Moses elevates—in this 
context the prototype which the “Son of Man” is destined to fulfill—is both natural 
and artistically constructed (i.e., an artificial rendering of a natural creature), thus 
implying that the “Son of Man” consists of both dimensions as well. Beyond this one 
should ponder that it is the church fathers—the actual historical agency of whom even 
the most skeptical modern academic historian admits—who were so arrested by this 
image, this Johannine portrayal of Jesus Christ as poetically produced.  
 Yet Pickstock’s interest concerns not just the dual composition of the object 
which arrested the attention of post-canonical historical actors, but also that it is a 
serpent. John’s move here—with all its patristic endorsement—is a “reversed 
reversal,” thus providing an insight into that rhetorical device of apocatastasis, itself a 
special case of recapitulation. According to John the Evangelist, Jesus of Nazareth 
takes a mythologically imagined event complex (taken to be situated in the past) and 
re-performs it in reverse. The cross reverses the first reversal: the (successful) 
temptation by the serpent (Genesis 3) and its subsequent status as idol (Numbers 21). 
 
73 Henri de Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Life of Man, tr. Lancelot C. Sheppard and Sr. 
Elizabeth Englund, O.C.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 93–101. 
74 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 183. 
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This reversed reversal, in turn, intimates the ultimate reversed reversal of full and 
final cosmic salvation, to which we now turn.  
 For Pickstock marshals these three rhetorical performances, enacted by the New 
Testament and elaborated on by the Fathers, in order to help us recognize a pattern of 
repetition at the highest possible level. Here eternity identically repeats eternity, but 
with a middle element which we can call creation or time or history.75 For Pickstock’s 
Origen and his affirmation of the apocatastasis of all things, it is within this middle 
element—the created order—that the ultimate reversal of the reversal is achieved. 
Ipso facto, then, for Origen, whom Pickstock regards first and foremost as a “rigorous 
metaphysician”76 (as opposed to, say, a rigorous biblical interpreter), the end of the 
world, or the final state of affairs of creation, is identical to—an identical repetition 
of—its beginning.77   
 And because the created world includes the Incarnation, Passion, and 
Resurrection—that is, it includes God himself—it is also, necessarily, identical to the 
End and to the Beginning, and this is involved in what Pickstock terms “the 
pleromatic paradox.”78  Creation or the created order is the nonidentical repetition of 
eternity, and is itself subsequently nonidentically repeated by a return of the same: 
eternity. Hence creation is involved both in a nonidentical repetition with eternity 
(twice), and (as the “in-between” element) within the identical repetition of eternity 
by itself. Here, in a formulation resonant with that of Nietzsche, we encounter an 
alternative version of the eternal return of the same.79 Pickstock’s pleromatic paradox, 
in short, is that, on the one hand we are led to say that the created order is not 
identical to eternity,80 and on the other hand we are led to say that it is identical to 
eternity.81  
 
75 Or, as I am attempting to argue in the larger context of this dissertation, dianoia.  
76 Ibid., 184. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 186. 
79 Yet, Pickstock’s eternal return of the same could not be more different from Nietzsche’s. While for 
Nietzsche the eternal return is something like the temporally unending, vicious flux of the warp and 
woof of the vortex that is the indefinite monad of the material world (the only world which for him 
exists) based on the dual “logic” of the will to power and the dice box of chance, for Pickstock (and 
Pickstock’s Origen) what is repeated is the divine res: the glory of God which had been infringed in the 
Fall. On the Fall as the infringement of God’s glory, see Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 177. 
80 Origen writes that “there is something greater than the ages […] the restitution of all things.” Ibid., 
184.  
81 “… our pre-existence, which is also our post-existence, unthinkably summons all that we have 
undergone and experienced in time.” Ibid., 185.  
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 Now that we have glimpsed the paradoxical pattern of cosmic repetition at the 
highest possible level, allow me to register one final point which Pickstock makes in 
this context, connecting a certain dynamic within God himself to an earlier point of 
hers about human self-repetition. For Pickstock’s Origen God’s eternal filiation—
seen here as the eternal artifaction of the divine logos—is akin to the process of the 
repetition of the individual human subject or self which she earlier rehearses in 
chapter 5: the ethical, self-constructive process of becoming one’s (telic) self through 
an “esthetic” process (in the Kierkegaardian sense) of embracing an imagined version 
of the self, an esthetic “character.”82 Here (in chapter 5) as elsewhere Pickstock 
regards this image or shadow sense as ontologically real, and it is this artifact which 
dimly hints at the divine logos as divine procession.83 (In contradistinction to process 
theology, God’s aseity is not compromised here, for it “is paradoxically assured 
through a work of recapitulatory repair, through which, by a further paradox, the work 
only existed in the first place as a divine and so perfect … artifaction.”84) In order, 
that is, for the human self to be itself at all, it must “be” (at least) twice, and as for the 
human, so also for the divine.  
IV.  A modest definition of mythos 
Now that I have pointed out several glimpses of mythos in the Hexaëmeron, and 
provided a Pickstockian account of things such that history requires myth (or a kind 
of ontology of fiction in which history requires myth), I will offer a tentative 
definition of the term “myth” or mythos, one that builds on the thought of Aristotle, C. 
S. Lewis, and a contemporary intellectual historian of philology, Robert Fowler.  
We have seen above that for Aristotle, mythos is quasi-universal, that, in its 
employment of “sorts,” it overlaps with epistêmê (with the latter’s use of conceptual 
abstraction or universality). My proposed definition for mythos, however, considers 
mythos, in direct opposition to Aristotle, to be quasi-particular. To get to the latter 
dimension of mythos, though, we must grasp two prior points: that story-produced 
affect is itself a particular, and that stories considered as concrete objects in 
themselves are rightly regarded as particular.  
 
82 Ibid., 187–88. 
83 Here Pickstock channels the spirit of Bonaventure, who refers to the second person of the Trinity as 
the “Art” of God the Father. Bonventure, Hexaëmeron, I.14. 
84 Ibid., 187. 
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Aristotle already admits, as we saw above in his list of elements which constitute 
Greek tragedy, that mythos includes katharsis, which Aristotle rightly associates with 
pathos or emotional experience.85 And yet in the above loci where he finds historia 
lacking in comparison to poiêsis, it is the universality of poiêsis which secures its 
superiority. Likewise history is seen as defective precisely on account of its mere 
particularity. And yet, it is Aristotle’s admission of pathos as an element of poiêsis, 
including its subclass of mythos, which ironically suggests its particularity. Aristotle 
fails to recognize that his own commitments suggest the particularity not just of 
historia but of mythos. And it is particularity which “saves” history by binding it to 
myth, in all of their shared particularity. Mythos is not just quasi-universal; it is also 
quasi-particular, and it is C. S. Lewis and Roger Fowler who, above and beyond the 
unrecognized assumptions of the Stagirite, help us to grasp this “other side” of the 
dual nature of mythos.   
 In his essay, “Myth Become Fact,” C. S. Lewis persuasively sheds light on the 
phenomenon of mythos—precisely as a phenomenon. In particular he shows that myth 
consists of the merging of two different registers of human psychical activity: the 
intellectual apprehension universal truth and the bodily experience of emotion. For 
example, the myth of Euridice and Orpheus conveys the truth—the universal truth—
of courage or justice in a way that a purely discursive discourse never could.86 It 
conveys it, that is, in such a way as to provoke an affective experience. Herein, for 
Lewis, lies the uniqueness of myth: it is the fusion of universal principle and affective 
experience.  
 This “affective experience” piece, however, is key for our purposes, for it implies 
that, in an important sense, a myth itself is a concrete particular. At one point in the 
essay Lewis writes that “what flows into us from myth is not truth but reality, or that 
about which truth is.”87 That is, it is the particular attributes of a given myth in all of 
their specificity which lend the myth its particular emotional impact in the reader or 
hearer. Many times these specific attributes appear in the form of narrative details: 
 
85 See Introduction above, 7–10. 
86 Lewis, “Myth Become Fact,” 65–6. This view thus entails the rejection of the view the origin of 
which Fowler locates with David Hume, who thought that it is with Thucydides that we finally arrive at 
the commencement of real history. For Hume “All preceding narrations are so intermixed with fable, 
that philosophers ought to abandon them, in a great measure, to the embellishment of poets and 
orators.” Fowler, “Mythos and Logos,” 48 n. 13. Lewis’ view also entails the rejection that mythos can 
be reduced to logos without remainder. It is, that is, irreducibly particular.  
87 Lewis, “Myth Become Fact,” 66.  
 99 
that Jesus was isolated in the desert among the wild beasts according to Mark’s 
Gospel (Mk 1:13); that he made eye contact with Peter after the latter’s betrayals, just 
as he was heading to the cross; that the Cyclops in Book X of the Odyssey lacks the 
custom (qemiß) of both hospitality and wine; that Demeter’s hair is as yellow as the 
ripe corn of which she is the mistress. Lewis’s point is that myth is irreducibly 
particular. Even, then, as it mediates some kind of universal truth, it always retains its 
distinct concrete particularity. Since this is the case, therefore, it cannot ever be 
successfully “demythologized” or distilled into some derivative abstract truth without 
remainder. For Lewis, if one wants the blessing of a myth, it is precisely the myth 
itself which must be taken in. One must experience it in a non-cognitive (or non-
reductively cognitive) way, in all its particularity. Otherwise—if it is distilled such 
that its brute facticity is eclipsed—it is no longer myth. It cannot be “interpreted 
away”; if it is to be interpreted, then the interpretation must stand side by side with the 
thing itself.88  
 One qualification should here be registered. It is not clear to me that Aristotle in 
the Poetics is dealing specifically with myths that are primordial in character—ones, 
that is, which tend to be shared across cultures, which identify some common human 
experience, and which are woven into the foundation of culture over time—as 
opposed to say, a narrative composed by “any old author” (for example, Paulo 
Coelho’s The Alchemist). Lewis, on the other hand, clearly has only the former in 
mind. For him a myth seems by definition to be a story which communicates some 
kind of shared human truth in a primordial way. I take on board this additional feature 
 
88 American Southern Catholic writer Flannery O’Connor makes this same point about the particularity 
of stories in her Mystery and Manners: “People talk about the theme of a story as if the theme were like 
the string that a sack of chicken feed is tied with. They think that if you can pick out the theme, the way 
you pick the right thread in the chicken-feed sack, you can rip the story open and feed the chickens. 
But this is not the way meaning works in fiction.” She continues: 
When you can state the theme of a story, when you can separate it 
from the story itself, then you can be sure the story is not a very good 
one. The meaning of a story has to be embodied in it, has to be made 
concrete in it. A story is a way to say something that can’t be said 
any other way, and it takes every word in the story to say what the 
meaning is. You tell a story because a statement would be 
inadequate. When anybody asks what a story is about, the only 
proper thing is to tell him to read the story. The meaning of fiction 
is not abstract meaning but experienced meaning, and the purpose of 
making statements about the meaning of a story is only to help you 
experience that meaning more fully.  
“Writing Short Stories,” in Mystery and Manners: Occasional Prose, ed. Sally and Robert Fitzgerald 
(New York: Farrer, Straus, and Giroux, 1961), 96. 
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supplied by Lewis—the primordial communication of truth—for the sense of mythos 
which I employ in this study.  
C. S. Lewis is not alone, however, in showing us how stories or mythoi participate 
in particularity. In his 2011 article “Mythos and Logos” Robert Fowler presents a 
compelling and nuanced view of Plato’s attitude toward myth. For Fowler Plato, 
reacting to the sophistic opposition of mythos and logos (an opposition which, Fowler 
alleges, the ancient sophists employ for their own self-aggrandizing purposes), does 
not simply repeat the position of the demythologizing Xenophanes. This is the case 
for Fowler despite the fact that Plato does follow Xenophanes in the latter’s skeptical 
principle of morality as a kind of litmus test for any given myth’s legitimacy. That is, 
if a myth presents a deity or deities as engaged in behavior that is demonstrably 
immoral, then the myth is false: on this Xenophanes and Plato agree, argues Fowler.89  
Yet Plato’s response to the nihilistic (and tragic) posture of the sophists is yet still 
more subtle than the position of Xenophanes. Yes, some myths ought to be 
demythologized: either “distilled” away so as to interpret some abstract truth, or 
rejected due to poor quality. But others, for Plato, are irreducibly true in a way that 
rivals the truth of logos. At the end of the day, Plato refuses to domesticate the power 
of myth; he refuses to “make myth safe.”90  
Fowler’s work on myth plays an additional key role in helping me to 
formulate my own view of mythos as particular (or “quasi-particular”). In a riveting 
passage he speaks of the use of myth which we find in “the opening of the Hekataios 
book.” This use of myth helps establish the status of myth (at this particular stage in 
history, the 6th century BCE) as the discourse of power. Here myth is “manly,” about 
doing, connected to power (krateros), performative, public, used to “back up the 
truth,” and linguistically “marked.”91  The said book opens up in this way: 
Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήτος ὣδε μυθεῖται τάδε γράφω, ὥς 
μοι δοεῖ ἀληθέα εἳναι οφλ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι 
πολλο τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ...ς ἐμοὶ φα νονται, εφισιν 
(Thus speaks Hekataios of Miletos: I write what follows 
as seems true to me; for the stories of the Greeks, as it 
seems to me, are many and foolish.)92 
 
89 Fowler, “Mythos and Logos,” 56, 65.  
90 Here Fowler’s view converges with that of Josef Pieper in his book about Plato, Divine Madness. 
See Introduction, n. 20, above.  
91 Fowler, “Mythos and Logos,” 53. 
92 Ibid. (Translation Fowler’s.) 
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Note that—contrary to normal expectations—the “stories” of the Greeks are 
expressed by the term logoi, and the mode of the leader’s speech in Greek is 
identified by the verb mutheitai. Hence we have an inversion of ordinary semantic 
assumptions, on the part of modern scholars, about the two terms! Mythos here 
communicates something like what we normally associate with rational statement; 
logoi are characterized as “many and foolish,” two traits often associated with myth.   
 What is even more telling about this historical exhibit, however, is an additional 
point Fowler makes. 
Had [Hekataios] called the Greeks’ stories mythoi, [that 
would have undermined his intended point]. The status 
of mythoi was not yet called into question at the end of 
the sixth century. Until it was, such a statement—that 
the mythoi of the Greeks are many and ridiculous—
would have to criticize not only (or even primarily) the 
multiplicity and foolishness of what people say, but the 
ways they say it and who says it: one could understand 
the “foolishness” part of such a statement (the speakers 
are fools), but the “multiplicity” part is obscure (of 
course they are many). Applied to logoi, however, 
which denotes the content not the context, multiplicity 
is a sensible criticism: truth cannot be multiplex.93  
 
Fowler’s spelling out of the assumptions in Hekataios’ statement is directly relevant 
to Aristotle’s doctrine, above, on the quasi-universality of poetry and its opposition to 
the particularity of history, except that here Fowler is highlighting not the way mythos 
is quasi-universal, but the way it is (as for C. S. Lewis) quasi-particular. What Fowler 
is pointing out, that is, is that it would make no sense for (the book of) Hekataios to 
fault “the Greeks” for their multiplicity of mythoi: of course they are many, as Fowler 
states. Why are they many, and why is this unproblematic in the current context? 
Precisely because they are—as opposed to logos, which, as universal, must be one—
particular. That logos must be one in order to be true is the accepted consensus even 
in the time of 6th-century Hekataios, despite all the other ways in which the semantic 
range of this term—together with that of mythos—shifts and morphs over the decades 
and centuries of the antique cultural world. Fowler’s citation of the book of 
Hekataios, then, points out and underlines the sense in which mythos is, to an 
important extent, particular.  
 
93 Ibid., 54.  
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 Aristotle, on the other hand, notes only that it is (quasi-)universal. Aristotle, then, 
apparently fails to see how mythos is quasi-particular, or at least he never articulates 
such an understanding.  
 This omission prompts a kind of epiphany about mythos. If one puts together the 
one-sidedness of Fowler’s point (together with Lewis’) with the one-sidedness of 
Aristotle’s understanding, one can see that mythos is a kind of discourse “in between,” 
in between the pure universal conceptuality which Aristotle calls epistêmê (translated 
into Latin as scientia), on the one hand, and what I call “bare particularity” or “brute 
fact”94 on the other. This bare particularity is referred to by Aristotle with the formula, 
“… what Alcibiades did or suffered,”95 and his point about it is that it is completely 
distinct from the craft of the poets. That is, we saw what he regards as the proper 
object of the historian: that which is completely opaque to rational scientia, which 
requires knowledge of the cause and the universality of terms and concepts.  
 As we will see below, this identification of bare particulars is the goal not just of 
Aristotelian history but also of the practitioners of the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century discipline of the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation (HCM). 
Contra Pickstock and Lewis, both Aristotle and the historical-critical method want to 
history to remain hermetically sealed off from myth. In harmony with Lewis and 
Pickstock, Joseph Ratzinger on the other hand takes aim at this approach to history in 
the thought of his post-Habilitation period, as we will see below. 
 What is mythos? I propose a modest definition: Mythos is a metaxological 
discourse between logos and the bare particularity of “what Alcibiades did.”96 Mythos 
as metaxu mediates the difference between scientia and bare historical particularity. 
As quasi-universal and quasi-particular, it inhabits the porous middle between scientia 
and the concrete particulars of time and space, as illustrated by the Venn diagram 
below. Myth pulls the two together, into the space where they kiss each other. By 
 
94 This term comes from the 20th century Dutch Calvinist thinker Cornelius Van Til. In his denial of the 
existence of brute facts, he agrees with Pickstock, who, following Charles Péguy, thinks that “for a 
thing to occur once, it must happen twice” (the second time being in the mind of the 
observer/interpreter). Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 73. On the nonexistence of “brute facts,” see 
Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Evidences, ed. K. Scott Oliphint (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978. 
95 See quotation from Aristotle’s Poetics, cited in n. 17 of ch. 1 above.  
96 For this notion of the “metaxological” I am indebted to William Desmond. See William Desmond, 
Being and the Between (Albany, New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 1995); Ethics and the 
Between (Albany, New York: State Univ. of New York Press, 2001); God and the Between (Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2008).   
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insisting on this overlap, I diametrically oppose Aristotle, for this is precisely what 
Aristotle (together with HCM) rejects.  
 
 
 The hope for this proposed definition of mythos, the aspiration for this 
metaxological discourse in the middle, is that it be seen as “a kind of rationality which 
is attuned to the nuance of singularities.”97 Indeed mythos is so attuned in many 
respects. As one illustration, recall once again the phenomenon of poetry, not just in 
its ancient manifestation as poiêsis (including Homer’s epics), but also modern and 
contemporary poetry, such as that of T. S. Eliot or Malcolm Guite. Perhaps the most 
vivid example of such metaxological commerce between the conceptual and the 
material is the physicality of words itself. At times such intimate experience with the 
verbal is striking indeed, as the following example shows. 
One evening, I sat in the audience at a poetry reading, 
waiting for it to start. Other people were talking quietly, 
but I wasn’t conversing or paying attention to individual 
words, only aware of the general hum. Then, from 
directly behind me a voice began to speak slowly in a 
hoarse whisper: 
Whan that Aprill with his shoures soote 
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote, 
And bathed every veyne in swich licour . . . 
The first three lines from the “Prologue” of Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales were being spoken in beautiful Middle 
English dialect. 
 
97 This phraseology is that of William Desmond, put forth during the viva voce proceedings for my 
dissertation defense, on June 2, 2020.  
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Immediately, my body began to shake beyond my control 
and my eyes filled with tears. I could hardly breathe. This 
was a very different reaction from the one I would soon 
be having when I listened to two poets read their 
contemporary lines.98  
V. History as mythos (and vice-versa) for Ratzinger 
 Now that we have focused on Aristotle’s opposition of myth to history and 
provided a provisional definition of mythos for use in this study which, in 
undermining Aristotle’s view, reconnects myth to history, let us now try to pinpoint, 
as precisely as possible, the true fundamental nature of the anti-Aristotelianism of 
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure. Simply put it is precisely the Stagirite’s rejection of the 
intelligibility of mythos, mythos which I am arguing shares with history a common 
affinity with particularity. It is this rejection, in turn, which conditions his rejection of 
the intelligibility of history (the rejection, on Bonaventure’s part, which constitutes 
the fundamental thesis of Ratzinger’s Habilitationsschrift).  
Earlier above, in section II, I provided a brief survey of several representative 
samples of Bonaventure’s gravitation toward mythos in the Hexaëmeron. Let us now 
do the same with Ratzinger and now consider a preliminary catalogue of actual 
specimens of history, of historical analysis, in the thought of our twentieth-century 
commentator, all of which in some fashion take the form of a story or mythos.  
o Heilsgeschichte, as exhibited in the Habilitationsschrift. As he states in the 
1969 foreword to the American edition, it was “the relation of salvation-
history to metaphysics”—a relationship long important to Protestant theology 
since Luther, but (in the 1950’s) only beginning to emerge in Catholic 
theological circles—which initially motivated his study.99 Beginning with 
Augustine, various iterations of historical models of salvation-history—the 
redemption of God’s people and God’s creation as narrated in the Christian 
scriptures—are grappled with and analyzed all throughout the work, 
especially in chapters I (“An attempt to find the structure of the 
Bonaventurian theology of history on the basis of the Collationes in 
 
98 Taken from the website of the American poet Anita Sullivan. https://weeklyhubris.com/the-
physicality-of-language-from-hand-to-mouth/. Accessed July 20, 2020.  
 
99 Ratzinger, Theology of History, xi–xii.  
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Hexaëmeron”), II (“The content of Bonaventure’s hope for salvation”), and 
III (“The historical setting of Bonaventure’s theology of history”).   
o The pilgrimage of the ecclesia militans, as contained in the 
Habilitationsschrift. This emphasis includes Ratzinger’s view of the church 
as the vehicle of history (also dealt with in his doctoral dissertation on 
Augustine’s ecclesiology), which he adopts from Bonaventure, who 
assimilates and then historicizes the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, resulting in a historical progression 
beginning with the patriarchs of the Old Covenant and ending, crucially, not 
with the mendicant orders of Bonaventure’s own day, but with a criptic ordo 
ultimus of the future.100  
o Various medieval eschatological theories/theologies, again exhibited in 
the Habilitationsschrift. Here Ratzinger presents a plotline of historical 
development to display Bonaventure’s dependence upon previous thinkers, or 
characters in a historical narrative—such as Rupert of Deutz, Honorius of 
Autun and Anselm of Havelberg—for his eschatological position.101 
 
 
 
o The narrative flow of the Apostles’ Creed, as narrated in Introduction to 
Christianity. In this work, originally published in 1968, Ratzinger excavates 
the content of this “profession of faith [which] took shape … in connection 
with the ceremony of baptism.”102 The salient point here is that, while 
Ratzinger does not explicitly refer to the Creed as a narrative or story, he 
does distance it from “dogma” as normally understood. It is not “a piece of 
doctrine standing in and for itself….”103 The Creed, he argues, calls men and 
women to commit their lives to it, to allow it to “shift their being” in the 
mode of a Heideggarian “about-turn.”104 In anticipation of developing this 
connection below, for now I will simply register that such traits—in a 
 
100 For the Dionysian influence upon Bonaventure see Ratzinger, Theology of History, 88–94. Cf. the 
important chart, ibid., 47.  
101 Ibid., 95–104.  
102 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 50.  
103 Ibid., 63.  
104 Ibid., 55.  
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different universe of discourse from scientia—lend themselves nicely to the 
dynamics of mythos.  
o The genealogy of the orthodox, catholic concept of God, as recounted in 
Introduction to Christianity. Here the still young theologian recounts, in 
genealogical mode, how what orthodox theologians today mean by “God” is 
a concept “with a history,” so to speak, even if this history is mediated by the 
revelatory sacred texts of the Christian church. Beginning with the burning 
bush story from Exodus 3, the aim of which is “clearly to establish the name 
‘Yahweh’ as the definitive name of God in Israel,”105 he continues with a 
defense of this proper name in opposition to the tendency of the translators 
the Septuagint to downplay, in a classically Greek way, the possibility that 
the one true God has a proper name—as if God were a character in a play.106 
His final of many steps in this genealogical narration is to show how the 
orthodox notion of God is purged of the twin Greek errors of imagining theos 
as “self-centered, thought simply concentrating on itself,” and as “pure 
thought,” thereby demonstrating that the orthodox concept of God performs 
both a demythologization of theos as well as a buttressing of mythical 
elements which are deemed indispensable and irreducibly real. Why this 
inalienable residue of myth? Surely because this genealogy, Ratzinger argues, 
privileges love over reason.107  
o The genealogical development of the loss of the traditional doctrine of 
the immortality of the soul, as presented in Eschatology. Here Ratzinger 
presents a narrative in which Martin Luther initiates a historical rupture, 
prompting a chain of events which, according to Ratzinger, ends up eroding 
the traditional notion of the immortality of the soul to the point of cultural 
irrelevance (including, it appears, within the church).108  
o The progress narrative of secular modernity, as discussed in his “debate” 
with Habermas.109 In the same vein as Karl Löwith,110 Eric Voegelin and 
 
105 Ibid., 78. 
106 Ibid., 119–23. 
107 Ibid., 93.  
108 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 247–60. 
109 See above, ch. 1, § I. B. 3. a., “Habermas Debate (2004).” 
110 In addition to Löwith’s Meaning in History (cited above), see Robert M. Wallace, “Progress, 
Secularization, and Modernity: the Löwith-Blumenberg Debate,” New German Critique 22 (Winter, 
1981) 63–69.  www.jstor.org/stable/487864.  
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others (including Roger Fowler, above), Ratzinger discerns within modern 
western culture a pernicious and false myth of progress.111 He narrates this 
account, his own secularization thesis of sorts, in the discussion with Jürgen 
Habermas in  but also in other works.112 Here we encounter not a narration as 
such but a modern, contemporary example of demythologization.  
o The liturgical (and ritual) enactment of the paschal mystery of Christ 
(admittedly my own contribution, yet building on Ratzinger’s work). In 
his A New Song for the Lord: Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today, Cardinal 
Ratzinger connects the “paschal mystery”—enacted and “anticipated” in the 
liturgy of the church—to the achievement of the goal of history.113 Distinct 
from each of the above examples of narrative-related engagements, I take this 
point to be an invitation to innovate a theory of mythos beyond written texts 
which begins to imagine yet an additional mode of tempus: liturgical time, 
different in key ways from kairos, chronos, and the imaginary time of 
Genesis 1.  
This consideration of various loci in Ratzinger’s corpus—but all, surely, 
dependent upon his Habilitation research in Munich—demonstrates that Bonaventure 
is not the only thinker under consideration who regards history as story. Indeed the 
young Ratzinger must have been indelibly marked by his 
Bonaventurasforshungsprojekt, for in his subsequent work he continues to share this 
same tendency with his medieval interlocutor.  
 In several cases above we locate the discourse in question within the “overlap” 
between history and mythos. Every such item is 100% mythos and 100% history, so to 
speak. In these cases, that is, mythos and history are superimposed. Further, in every 
case (save the last two), the kind of time involved is what I will now identify, and 
later develop, as “kairotic time.”  
For heuristic purposes, however, I highlight two items which fall outside of the 
“overlap,” and hence should be regarded as special cases. On the side of “pure 
 
111 This version of the modern myth of progress is closely related to what Charles Taylor calls 
“Secularism2.” See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknapp, 2007), 4.  
112 Joseph Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 25–26. 
113 “In its participation in the Paschal Mystery of Christ, liturgy transcends the boundaries of places and 
times in order to gather all into the hour of Christ that is anticipated in the liturgy and hence opens 
history to its final goal.”  Joseph Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord: Faith in Christ and Liturgy 
Today, tr. Martha M. Matesich (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1996), 135.  
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mythos” is the narrative of the creation of the world in six days in Genesis 1. Here we 
encounter a conspicuous phenomenon which is “pure myth, no history.” The 
temporality involved in this story is what I call “imaginary time.” Some of the 
historiologies in Ratzinger’s work—indeed, the Hexaëmeron itself—are patterned 
after this primordial myth.  
On the other extreme, the historical-critical method of the 19th and 20th centuries 
takes itself not at all to be constituted by mythos, but regards itself as “pure 
Wissenschaft” or science. In this regard, HCM regards itself as tantamount to 
Aristotle’s ideal for epistêmê. The temporality in view here is “chronotic time.” The 
purported output of this work is the establishment of bare particulars, or brute facts: 
“this or that happened; this or that existed.” For example, that Jesus of Nazareth 
actually lived (or did not actually live) during the reign of Ceasar Augustus or that 
Alcibiades performed (or did not perform) this or that action in this or that year or that 
Abraham begat (or did not beget) Isaac.114 The bare particulars are regarded as wholly 
non-kairotic, according to the methodological assumptions of HCM, and in this 
nonkairoticism they are at one with HCM’s method.  
The upshot for now is that many instances of mythos are also instances of history, 
and vice-versa. This is the deep implication of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure. History is 
meaningful because it is mythological or mythopoietic. This project, in turn, requires 
that Bonaventure take aim at Aristotle (or the Aristotelianism of his day), since 
Aristotle banishes history, excluding it not just from the domain of the rational, but 
even from the domain of the “quasi-rational,” or now we can say the “alternatively 
rational.” Put succinctly, what is the logic or ratio of history for Bonaventure (and 
Ratzinger)? Not the logic or ratio of scientia, but that of mythos.  
The bulk of my project is to show that various elements contained in the thought 
of both thinkers point toward this reality of mythos and its logic. To that end, in the 
remaining chapters I enlist and develop the following elements:  
o the structural position of the Intellect for Bonaventure and Ratzinger (ch. 3);  
o the necessity (in both thinkers) of desire for full sapientia (ch. 4);  
o the recognition or grasp of (mythopoietic) history as a whole (chs. 5 and 6).  
 
114 This latter example is cited by Bonaventure in Hexaëmeron X.4 (377–8). 
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For both Bonaventure and Ratzinger, mythos and history are related to each other 
and this relationship points to the necessity of mythos for true human fulfillment.115 
These three elements above form the remaining structure (and the content of the 
chapters) of this essay.  
VI. History as meaningful: implications for temporality (with special attention to 
Physics IV) 
Before turning our attention to these three elements, however, let us return once 
more to Aristotle, and the nature of the opposition to him which we see in Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure. For we have introduced the notion of chronotic time, even while 
maintaining that for the two Christian thinkers in question, this construct does not 
exhaust the possibilities of temporality. Let us, then, briefly consider what Aristotle 
says about chronos in his most focused treatment of it, Book IV of the Physics, 
together with one important historical appropriation of it.  
It turns out that Physics IV is important for our purposes only in an indirect way.  
For it says nothing about the kind of temporality upon which Ratzinger’s Bonaventure 
thinks that history depends. We could rehearse Aristotle’s account of chronos in 
Physics IV, but it would have little bearing upon our question. For example, we could 
note how  
o Aristotle argues that time is a measure of the motion of physical objects in 
the world. That is, just as for the Stagirite there can be no space without 
physical objects, so also there can be no time without their motion.  
o Aristotle’s conception of time, therefore, is derivative of his conception of the 
being of concrete particulars (that is, primary substances), since motion is a 
kind of change, or (most properly) a kind of progression from potency to act.  
o this measure is a function of natural number, that is, the “exact repetition of 
an increase by one,” and hence it is merely instrumental or neutral.  
o there is nothing in this conception of time which would prevent an infinite 
regress of past events.  
But none of that would show that for Aristotle history is opaque to reason. (For that 
goal, one needs the sort of analysis I provide above of the Posterior Analytics 
juxtaposed with the Poetics.) 
 
115 For Ratzinger and Bonaventure (and Ratzinger’s Bonaventure) true human fulfillment is a historical 
reality. That is, it takes place at, and indeed constitutes, the end of history.  
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The real import of the conception of time exhibited in Physics IV has not to do 
with the historical Aristotle, but rather with the contemporary Aristotelianism of 
Bonaventure’s day. According to Ratzinger, in Book II of his commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas affirms Aristotle’s conception of time 
as articulated in Physics IV, and it is upon this basis that Thomas embraces the 
rational possibility of an infinite regress of past events.116  
Here, indeed, is the rub for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure. It is not with any 
irrationality in Physics IV; it is not even with any irrationality strictly speaking in 
Thomas’ embrace of this theory of time. Rather, the critique is against Thomas’ 
application of this reductively chronotic conception of time to the domain of the 
history of the world, the world which God not only created out of nothing, but, in 
addition, into which he has entered, for the purpose of redemption. For if history were 
a matter of mere chronos, then an infinite regress of past events would indeed be 
possible.  
We can approach this issue by way of the Breviloquium passage above117 in 
which Bonaventure extols the “orderly fashion” of the universe, which he likens to a 
beautiful melody. As Pickstock reminds us, any structure at all within an object 
implies a bounded wholeness.118 Structure in any object by its very nature mitigates 
against an infinite series of elements. What, however, is the structure of history? As I 
have been arguing, it must be the ordered structure of mythos.  For a story to be a 
story, it cannot continue ad infinitum. An infinite series (or regress) of events, then, is 
not possible, as we know on the basis of the revealed historia contained in Scripture, 
and thus history must not be a matter of mere chronos. Far from being an accident of 
motion (a la Physics IV), then, history as structured is logically prior even to the 
perniciousness of infinite regress. 
This insight meshes nicely with Ratzinger’s claim that, for Bonaventure, it is the 
Stagirite’s rejection of the Platonic Ideas which lies at the root of his “hierarchy of 
errors,” which, at the most fundamental level, entails his embrace of the eternity of 
 
116 “For Aristotle and Thomas, time was the neutral measure of duration [maß der Dauer], ‘an accident 
of movement.’” Ratzinger, Theology of History, 141; Ratzinger, “Die Geschichtstheologie,” 619. In 
support of this claim, Ratzinger quotes Thomas’ Sentences commentary from Book II, Distinction I, 
Question 1, Article 5, argument 7: “ … quia tempus accidens motus.” Ratzinger, Theology of History, 
233 n. 22.  
117 See above, n. 30 of the current chapter.  
118 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 21–40. 
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the world.119 As we saw in Pickstock, there is an intimate connection between the 
logic of the Ideas or Forms on the one hand, and the fictional image of story, on the 
other. Both are “imagined doubles” or fictional images which are invoked in order to 
make sense of the givens of the material world. I am essentially making the same 
claim, then, as Ratzinger, expressing it however in terms of mythos and not simply the 
Forms or Ideas. 
Indeed, history as conceptually foundational is precisely what we find in 
Bonaventure. Yet paradoxically history itself is dependent, not on mere chronos, but 
rather on a different kind of time: the thick, complex, non-numerical description of 
egressus and regressus, out of God and back into God.120  
Hence, for Bonaventure we are faced with a clash not primarily between history 
and science, but rather between theology (relying as it does on revelation) and 
(Aristotle’s) philosophy, isolated from theology. Were it not for the revelation, for 
example, of the creation of the world from nothing (which for Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure includes theology’s interpretation of this divine given), Bonaventure 
might well  have no problem with the notion that the former pair (history and science) 
could run on parallel tracks, as it were, that is, that history might be utterly 
independent of science (Aristotle’s view in the Poetics). But regarding the latter pair 
(theology and philosophy), the same logic, for Bonaventure, is manifestly 
objectionable. That is, Bonaventure does not object to the scientific reasoning 
involved in Aristotle’s account of time in Physics IV. Rather, he thinks that this 
account is irrelevant for the truest kind of history, history which has been revealed by 
God (and hence interpreted by God’s people, first and foremost in Scripture). It is 
irrelevant, above all, for thinking about the biblical account of the historia salutis of 
mankind’s journey out of, and back into, God. 
Again, it is not simply Aristotle’s view of chronos against which Bonaventure 
reacts, just as Ratzinger applauds the methodology of HCM (when it refuses the 
temptation to overstep its boundaries). Instead Bonaventure’s objection is above all 
directed against the possibility of an infinite regress of past events—regardless of the 
presence of any other causal dynamic which might “save” the regress.121 For such a 
 
119 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 138–9. 
120 Ibid., 141–8. 
121 As Ratzinger points out, Bonaventure knows that Aristotle and Thomas both hold that the infinite 
movement of the heavenly bodies does not fall prey to the criticism of infinite regress. This is because 
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regress, in Bonaventure’s mind, directly and plainly, contradicts the truth of divine 
revelation: that creation processes out of God and will return to God. Secondly, it is 
against the use of Aristotelian chronos as a basis upon which to theorize about the 
past events of the cosmos. A use which the historical Aristotle might not be wrong to 
employ,122 but which Thomas Aquinas—along with, presumably, every other thinker 
in the Christian era, including those in the Arts Faculty in Paris, since they are the 
recipients of divine revelation—is, at least for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure.  
By examining Physics IV and Thomas’ sentences commentary, one can see that 
the real issue for Bonaventure is that neither Aristotle nor Thomas allows for any 
“overlap” between history and that quasi-universal discourse, mythos. This becomes 
more clear when one recognizes in Physics IV an assumed conception of time: time 
exclusively as chronos. The salient point is this: Thomas’ assumption—utterly 
consistent with our findings based on the Posterior Analytics and Poetics—proceeds 
on the basis of the admission of “chronotic time” alone. All parties—Aristotle, 
Thomas, Bonaventure—agree that if Physics IV provides an exhaustive account of 
time, then history cannot be susceptible of rational penetration. Bonaventure, alone, 
however, denies the protasis, proposing a new “if then” statement: “If other forms of 
time exist in addition to chronos, then we cannot definitively hold that history is 
rationally opaque.”  
Two of Thomas’ positions, both of which are stated in his sentences commentary, 
seem relevant here: first, his admission that the events of history—which, since this 
includes the biological generation of animals which would include the birth of Isaac 
from Abraham—are related in  a way that is merely accidentally (as opposed to 
essentially) causal and hence can nonperniciously be held to admit of an actual 
infinity,123 and, second, his refusal to see the measurement of time (which, again, is 
exclusively seen as an accident of motion)124 as related to the egressus and regressus 
 
the accusation of infinite regress is fatally pernicious only within the order of causation, and not in the 
order of serial items of like rank, such as the repetition of hammers used by a sculptor, as in Thomas’ 
example. Hence to avoid an infinite regress in the matter at hand, Aristotle and Thomas need a “first” 
only “in the order of causes on the vertical level running downward from above.” Ratzinger, Theology 
of History, 140. 
122 He didn’t employ it, but even had he done so, Bonaventure would have been willing to forgive him.  
123 Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book II, 
Distinction 1, Question 1, tr. Steven E. Baldner and William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1997), II.1.1.5 ad. s. c. 5, (104).  
124 Ibid., II.1.1.5 arg. 5, 104. It is here that Thomas states that tempus est accidens motus. Despite the 
fact that this statement occurs in the first round of arguments which Thomas will later critique and 
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of the creation. In the former case, Thomas follows Aristotle in relegating history to 
the nonrational, since it fails to meet the standards of scientia with its foundation in 
(essential) causality. Yet, given my submission of mythos as the “logic” of history, 
one could argue that historical events—such as the begetting of Isaac by Abraham—
are connected mythologically or mythopoietically. The latter refusal above is 
especially ironic given Thomas’s innovative move to structure his entire Summa 
Theologiae on the movement of creation out of God (exitus) and back into God 
(reditus).125 For Bonaventure these two motions—the catena of historical events and 
the itinerary of the world with respect to God—cannot be sequestered off from each 
other.  
Before closing this chapter, I want to register a structural similarity between 
Aristotle’s account of chronos and Bonaventure’s account of tempus, the tempus of 
the world’s journey out of, and back into, God. Aristotle states in Physics IV that 
“time is the measure of motion,” and so it involves quantity or number (that is, the 
integer or the whole number). Aristotle thinks that the only unit of measurement 
which can count motion is itself a kind of motion, or, better, the completion of a 
motion, in particular the kind of motion which is circular. What measures motion? A 
circle of motion: a day, a year (the earth’s revolution around the sun), the revolution 
of the second hand of an analogue clock around the circular face of the clock. (Note: 
since for Aristotle we count only by whole numbers or integers, circular motions 
work particularly well: they lend themselves to whole-ness.) So just as length 
involves the comparison of two bodies, so also time involves the comparison of two 
motions. “[Motion] is measured by circular motion.”126  
There is a riveting and suggestive connection between this talk of circles on 
Aristotle’s part, and that of Bonaventure, for whom the world’s itinerarium is a 
single, whole revolution from God, through Christ the Center, and back into God. 
Here Ratzinger points out that the pseudo-Hermetic book of the 24 Masters and the 
Regulae theologiae of Alan of Lille condition Bonaventure to think of God as 
 
argue against, this particular claim—that time is an accident of motion—is never undermined. 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp2001.html#3479  
125 Baldner, Steven E. and William E. Carroll, “In principio: An Introduction to Creation ex nihilo,” in 
Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book II, 
Distinction 1, Question 1, tr. Steven E. Baldner and William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1997), 33. 
126 Aristotle, Physics, tr. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 2011), 224a/130.  
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“sphaera intelligibis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam.”127 It is to 
humanity, however, that this divine circularity foremost applies for Bonaventure, and 
elsewhere the Seraphic Doctor confirms that the “history of the world” is a “great 
circular movement that proceeds from God and returns again to God.”128 
Is it a coincidence that, in his most focused discussion of time, Aristotle’s 
ultimate appeal rests on an appeal to circularity, and that Bonaventure, when 
discussing history at its most elevated level, does the same? Or, alternatively, could it 
be that, in a riff on Plato’s Timaeus, secular chronos is a moving image of cosmic 
kairos,129 which in turn is a moving image of eternity?   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to: 
o articulate Ratzinger’s claim about the character of Bonaventure’s anti-
Aristotelianism: it objects to the Stagirite’s anti-historicism (introduction); 
o confirm Aristotle’s anti-historicism by investigating the Organon and the 
Poetics, yielding the verified conclusion not only that history is opaque to 
reason, but also it stands in stark opposition to mythos or narrative (I); 
o offer a representative sample of the many and varied ways in which 
Bonaventure makes use of mythos or story in the Hexaëmeron (II); 
 
127 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 144.  
128 Ibid., 145.  
129 According to Gerhard Kittel, kairos as it appears in the New Testament is characterized by strong 
overtones of divine decision and the personal ordinances of God. It is often associated with the 
fulfillment of πληρώμα (John 7:6, 8). It can mean “the specific and decisive point, especially as regards 
its context. Hence one can see that, saturated with heightened meaning, it is the very opposite of the 
empty, neutral measurement of Aristotle’s chronological time. Likewise in ancient, extra-biblical 
literature it is often contrasted with τύχη, or that which for the Stagirite characterizes history. Gerhard 
Kittel, ed., Theological Dictionary of New Testament, vol. 3, tr. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1965), s.v. καιρός. Further, this notion of a time (or times) alternate to mere chronos 
resonates with Bonaventure’s theorization of temporality.  For him tempus—time or temporality, 
necessarily created—is divided into a four-fold schema, as follows. From lowest to highest 
Bonaventure lays out animal accidental time; animal existential time; simple substance accidental time; 
simple substance existential time. So for the animal there is accidental time (tantamount to Aristotle’s 
chronos in Physics IV) and existential time, and for the simple substance, i.e., the soul (human and 
angelic) there is also accidental time (modeled on Augustine’s distentio in Confessions XI) which 
accounts for the “before and after” of the “instantaneous, qualitative leaps” (Kolbinger’s “instantan 
vollziehenden, qualitativen Sprüngen”) experienced by men and presumably angels, as well as 
existential time (which in the case of material beings grounds their connection of matter and form, as 
well as the movement from potency to act). In both cases, accidental time accounts for change, and 
existential time the permanence or duration or presence of being. This last type of time—angelic 
existential time—corresponds to the aevum of the angels, which Bonaventure locates as closest to the 
divine aeternitas, situated between the three lower forms of time and God and his absolute 
timelessness. Kolbinger, “Tempus,” 169–85. 
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o put forth an alternative construal of the relationship between mythos and 
history, with the help of Catherine Pickstock, who sees the former as 
necessary for and constitutive of the latter (III); 
o offer a modest definition of mythos as metaxological discourse between 
science and brute particularity (IV); 
o adumbrate several of Ratzinger’s relevant interpenetrations of myth and 
history, and articulate why they matter (V); 
o In the context of Physics IV, tease out some implications for temporality 
which derive from the assessment of history as meaningful (VI).  
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure is, I maintain, correct to regard Aristotle’s thought as 
inimical to any logos of history. It really is the case that Aristotle’s commitments 
preclude the possibility of any logos of history that would be meaningful, including 
Bonaventure’s: rooted in Scripture, building on the logic of the historia salutis of the 
people of God. The particular commitments which obviate the possibility of 
meaningful history are: the banishment of history from the realm not just of science 
but of story, and the limitation of all temporality to that of chronos.  
In this chapter I have left much unsaid. I have defined some key terms and 
bolstered the more modest claim that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure is correct in his insight 
that Aristotelian historiology is fundamentally unintelligible. What more might it 
mean to say that history is rational or meaningful?  We have seen that mythos 
provides us with a clue. The remainder of this study is devoted, in large part, to the 
attempt, building on these insights about mythos, to address this question more fully, 
enlisting Ratzinger and Bonaventure to that end. 
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Chapter 3 
Bookending mind: the structural role of intellectus 
Introduction 
 In the first few pages of this essay above, I began my overall argument with an 
appeal to Plato’s Divided Line, showing how, when one takes the first two segments 
of the line as the combined first moment of the progression which Plato intends, it 
bears the chiastic structure of A–B–A’. Further, as also stated above, Bonaventure’s 
Hexaëmeron bears this same structure, thus implying a similar journey of the mind. 
This journey consists of an origin, an extended process of development, and finally a 
return to and repetition of that origin, now on a higher plane. The burden of this 
chapter is more deeply to analyze this structure which characterizes the mindful life of 
the individual and corporate human, attending to its connection with mythos.  
I. The character of the six days: intellectual light  
 Before we attempt, with the help of Ratzinger’s study, to analyze the structuring 
role of the intellect by delving into the body of the Hexaëmeron in a rigorous way, the 
reader is encouraged simply to attend to the titles of various collations. When one 
does this, one sees that Bonaventure organizes the twenty-three collations into a series 
of four “visions.” These four visions, correspond, in turn, to the first four days of 
creation.1 It is here—with the correspondence between intellectual vision and biblical 
day of creation—that we do well to pause and reflect.  
 To that end, consider the biblical text of Genesis 1:1–19 itself: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 As the compiler states at the very end of the Hexaëmeron, Bonaventure purportedly had originally 
intended to include all six (or seven—as we will see there is a deep though intentional ambiguity 
between the number six and the number seven) days of creation in his sermon series, but was unable to 
achieve this goal due to the exigencies of his role as a cardinal in the Catholic church. (See section II. 
A. of chapter one, above.) In fact, the Collationes in Hexaëmeron would be the final scholarly work of 
Bonaventure’s life.  
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1 In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. 
2 The earth was without form and void, and darkness 
covered the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God was 
moving over the face of the waters. 3 And God said, “Let 
there be light”; and there was light. 4 And God saw that 
the light was good; and God separated the light from the 
darkness. 5 God called the light Day, and the darkness he 
called Night. And there was evening, and there was 
morning, one day.  
6 And God said, “Let there be a firmament in the midst 
of the waters, and let it separate the waters from the 
waters.” 7 And God made the firmament and separated 
the waters which were under the firmament from the 
waters which were above the firmament. And it was so. 
8 And God called the firmament Heaven. And there was 
evening and there was morning, a second day.  
9 And God said, “Let the waters under the heavens be 
gathered together into one place, and let the dry land 
appear.” And it was so. 10 God called the dry land Earth, 
and the waters that were gathered together he called Seas. 
And God saw that it was good. 11 And God said, “Let the 
earth put forth vegetation, plants yielding seed, and fruit 
trees bearing fruit in which is their seed, each according 
to its kind, upon the earth.” And it was so. 12 The earth 
brought forth vegetation, plants yielding seed according 
to their own kinds, and trees bearing fruit in which is 
their seed, each according to its kind. And God saw that 
it was good. 13 And there was evening and there was 
morning, a third day.  
14 And God said, “Let there be lights in the firmament of 
the heavens to separate the day from the night; and let 
them be for signs and for seasons and for days and years, 
15 and let them be lights in the firmament of the heavens 
to give light upon the earth.” And it was so. 16 And God 
made the two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, 
and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the stars 
also. 17 And God set them in the firmament of the 
heavens to give light upon the earth, 18 to rule over the 
day and over the night, and to separate the light from the 
darkness.  And God saw that it was good. 19 And there 
was evening, and there was morning, a fourth day.2  
 
 
2 I opt for the Revised Standard Version in this case instead of the NRSV because I take issue with 
several translation decisions which the latter makes (e.g., “when God created the heavens and the 
earth,” “dome” instead of “firmament,” among other examples.)  
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What, we now must ask, is the relationship for Bonaventure between his six 
(planned) intellectual visions and the six days of creation? What is the relationship 
between interpretive vision and biblical day? As I grappled with Bonaventure’s text 
over a period of many months, I noticed at an early stage that Bonaventure indirectly 
addresses a specific issue which sometimes poses a challenge for modern Western 
readers of Genesis, including those of a more conservative or literalist bent: the fact 
that the sun is not created in the narrative until day four, even though several “events” 
happen within the narration on days one through three. “How,” the modern reader 
cannot seem to help but ask, “can there be light on the first day, when the sun—surely 
the ultimate source of all of our light on earth—is not created until the fourth day? Or, 
again, what about day three? Is not the sun required for the successful planting and 
growing of trees and gardens?” So it is that modern readers are driven into an 
uncomfortable dilemma between the Scilla of dismissing this text on the basis of its 
primitive “pre-modern worldview,” and the Charybdis of generating all manner of 
fanciful explanations to “save” the text in an attempt to render it amenable to a 
modern “worldview.”3  
Bonaventure, working within an established tradition of hexaëmeral literature 
stretching back before St. Augustine to Philo of Alexandria,4 has a better way, one 
which is not beholden to literalistic readings of the text which are supposedly 
scientifically credible. I mean the fact that, for the Seraphic Doctor, what is referred to 
in the narration of the six days in Genesis 1 is not actual sky, trees, fruits, or celestial 
bodies, but rather an imaginative account of human noetic activity, beginning with the 
creation of intellectual light.5 In the first section of collation V, which comprises the 
second tractate on the first vision/day, Bonaventure describes this intellectual light as 
“truth radiating over intelligence, either human or angelic.” Speaking of the 
 
3 Unlike Bonaventure, Augustine does explicitly address this issue (showing that it is a taxing one for 
premodern as well as modern readers) in his literal commentary on Genesis. “It usually troubles people 
how there could be bodily light before there was the heaven or the lights of heaven which are 
mentioned afterwards.” He goes onto to specify that “we … understand here … an incorporeal light.” 
Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, in St. Augustine on Genesis, 
The Fathers of the church 84, tr. Roland J. Teske, S.J., (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of 
America Press, 1991), 4.21 (158).  
4 Daniel Wade McClain, “An Hexaëmeral Reading of Bonaventure’s Breviloquium,” (PhD diss., 
Catholic Univ of America, 2016). 34–108. 
https://cuislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/cuislandora%3A60011/datastream/PDF/view 
5 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck I.16 (9).  
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intellectual light specific to day one: it “shines forth in a manner that cannot be 
stopped, for it cannot be thought of as not existing.”6 
The “Scylla or Charybdis” decision demanded by modernity, then, is a false 
dichotomy, for this text, according to Bonaventure, is purely an imaginary mythos. 
(Of course the presupposition of my entire project is that nothing could be more 
important than this purely imaginary myth.) In this way divine illumination theory—
the theory of the necessity of this intellectual light for knowing—resolves a false 
dichotomy of modern thought, whether secular or fundamentalist, precisely by 
rejecting the assumption held in common between the two opposing views: that 
Genesis 1 is intended to be a causal account of the material world.  
Having gained entrance into Bonaventure’s thought-world by beginning with this 
point about the sun, we are now in a position to notice that in the first four days of 
creation, Bonaventure finds a progression of four different kinds of intellectual light, 
each building upon the prior. To wit: 
I. Day/Vision 1. Light in general (the intellectual light of nature: the mind 
enlightened). 
II. Day/Vision 2. The firmament (the intellectual light of faith: the mind elevated 
by grace). 
III. Day/Vision 3. Trees, fruit, & seeds (the intellectual light of Scripture: the mind 
mythologized). 
IV. Day/Vision 4. Heavenly Bodies (the intellectual light of contemplation: the mind 
suspended). 
The immediate point here to notice is the progression involved in the imaginary days. 
For example, notice how day one naturally leads to day two: not only, as we have 
seen, do these two initial moments mirror the first two segments in Plato’s line, thus 
merging to form a larger, overarching, single moment, but also the notion of elevation 
in day two fuses it with day one. Hence day one leads “naturally”—seamlessly, 
organically—to day 2. In the same way, grace—the intellectual gift of revelation—is 
not received until the natural way of knowing is already in place. As an example of 
what this might look like, we could say that the doctrine of creation—a truth that is 
not discoverable by natural reason but rather is revealed as supernatural revelation 
 
6 Ibid., I.1 (73).  
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“on day two”—cannot be grasped until one has some kind of “handle” on various 
“natural” and mundane realities (realized “on day one”), for example, what it means 
to make something, or indeed what the “earth” (the sum total of all that there is, at 
least in the sub-lunar domain: rocks, trees, animals, etc.)—these being objects of the 
mind which are purely natural—might refer to in verses one and two of Genesis 1. Or 
consider as a second example: the revealed doctrine of the Incarnation. How can one 
understand the revealed truth that God became man unless one first knows what that 
natural creature man is—the latter truth being knowable without recourse to 
revelation?7 Or, again, consider the movement from vision two to vision three. How 
can one understand the scriptural story from Exodus 3, in which the LORD is 
mysteriously present within a burning bush, unless one first knows what a bush is, 
and also is first able somehow to recognize “the LORD” (a recognition bequeathed by 
divine revelation)?8 
II. The A—B—A’ pattern of the creation days according to Bonaventure 
This outline of the Hexaëmeron raises several issues to consider, many of which 
appear in the form of a paradox. First, the paradox of day one is, simply stated, that 
“before you know anything, you must know something,” something that could be 
thought of as an “unknown known,” some elusive object too deep for explicit, normal 
awareness (not unlike Freud’s subconscious). This is the lesson of Meno’s Paradox 
involving recollection (above). That Plato’s doctrine makes little or no use of the 
imagery of light (at least in the Meno itself)—instead relying on his doctrine of the 
transmigration of the soul as well as the Forms to ground his supposition of the 
 
7 This final caveat gives rise to an important distinction: for Christian Neoplatonists such as 
Bonaventure, revelation is not required for natural knowledge, but does this mean that the human 
being’s natural knowledge has no need for God, no dependence upon God? This tradition would 
answer in the negative: natural knowing proceeds upon the basis of that mode of divine assistance 
called the divine light of reason. While not conceived of as belonging to the register of grace per se, 
divine illumination is nevertheless still a gift from God, which he bestows upon his rational creatures 
as part and parcel of their very creation. Natural knowing, then, proceeds upon the basis not of 
revelation, but of divine illumination. (This classical, premodern position stands in contrast with that of 
some strands of modern Reformed theology, which see all human knowing as dependent upon “general 
revelation.” See Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, ed. William Edgar, 2nd 
ed. [Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2007.], chapters 7–10.) 
8 According to Boyd Taylor Coolman, Bonaventure thinks, following Hugh of St. Victor, that 
“Scripture treats of creation in order to facilitate a better understanding of salvation, since the notion of 
salvation obviously presumes the prior existence of something needing to be saved.” In other words, 
for Hugh, “the opus restaurationis, the work of restoration—Scripture’s overriding concern—is 
unintelligible without at least a minimal account of the opus creationis, the work of creation.” Boyd 
Taylor Coolman, “On the Creation of the World,” 103–4.  
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“unknown known” makes little difference for our purposes.9 Progressing to the 
second day of creation, we find the additional paradoxical truth that natural intellect—
that of day one—is not enough. To progress to the ultimate goal which is implied by 
the step-wise progression of the days, one must move beyond the merely natural. 
(This basic implication of the first two days confirms a presupposition of that 
twentieth-century school of theology, of which Ratzinger is a member, known as 
Ressourcement: that nature is always already oriented to grace, in need of the latter 
for its fulfillment.10) 
The most taxing enigma, however, arrives with day three. Something most 
unusual is going on here. The creation of trees, fruit, and seeds on day three is 
understood by Bonaventure as the scriptural enlightenment of the mind or the 
intellect, an enlightenment which occurs as we receive and interpret the narrative of 
Scripture.11 I claim that this is also “the mind mythologized,” not just because of the 
programmatic way in which the Scriptures come to us in the form of story, but also 
because of the centrality of (this particular) story to the structure of Bonaventure’s 
thought, a centrality we surveyed in chapter two, above. And yet, if this is the case, 
we are confronted with a striking paradox: the work of the Hexaëmeron is the actual 
performance of day three; it itself is the dianoetic work of biblical interpretation. In 
this sense, Bonaventure’s work profoundly depends upon Genesis 1 and in particular 
verses 9–13. At the same time, however, the whole content and meaning of day 
three—this pericope in the first chapter of Genesis—itself derives from Bonaventure’s 
work (or at least the output of the hexaëmeral tradition, of which Bonaventure is a 
member). So Bonaventure’s work assumes the content of Scripture, and the content of 
Scripture assumes Bonaventure’s interpretive work. Is this an instance of a logical 
fallacy in the form of a viciously circular argument? To quote the late philosopher 
Louis Mackey: “There is nothing wrong with a circular argument as long as the circle 
 
9 Note however, that the Greek terms Plato uses for “form” (or “idea”) is etymologically connected to 
the notion of vision. Walter Ong, S.J., for example, shows how the Greek ἰδέα “is, in fact, visually 
based, coming from the same Latin root as videre…. In the older Greek form a digamma had preceded 
the iota: Platonic form was form conceived by analogy precisely with visible form.” Walter Ong, 
“Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought,” in The Linguistics of Literacy, ed. Pamela A. 
Downing, Susan D. Lima, and Michael Noonan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992), 299. 
10 See Chapter 1 above, I.B.2. 
11 The title alone of Collatio XIII makes it plain that such is Bonaventure’s interpretation of day three: 
“De tertio visione, quae est intelligantiae per Scripturam eruditae, tractation prima, in qua agitur de 
Scripturae spiritualibus.” Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, 387.  
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includes everything.”12 Bonaventure’s famous “books”—the two of which are 
relevant here being the Book of Scripture and the Book of the Soul13—do, indeed, 
include “everything,” for they speak of God and God’s creation.  
Lingering with this paradox of day three for a moment, Emanuel Falque similarly 
reads Bonaventure’s thought as embodying a “virtuous circularity,” appealing to the 
hermeneutic circle of Heidegger and Ricœur. 
What we see between Scripture and theology is a 
relationship of complementarity, an irreducible 
chiasmus: theology takes from Scripture its unique mode 
of proceeding (description) … and Scripture takes from 
theology the keys to its own intelligibility…. This is a … 
virtuous circle…. It makes the modality which is proper 
to theology a second immediacy…. In this conception, 
even though we must believe in order to understand (the 
role of Scripture), we must understand in order to believe 
(the role of theology)….14 
 
With this striking paradox of day three in view, we find a vindication of Ratzinger’s 
view (at the time regarded as innovative) of revelation as always already constituted 
by human interpretation (discussed above).  
 The paradox of day four, quite simply, is that, for Bonaventure, like Pseudo-
Dionysius before him, the vision of this day is one that is experienced as blindness 
and darkness.15 Consistent with my argument that what we behold on day four is 
tantamount to the beatific vision (see ch. 1, II. A., above), what we see below is that 
this darkness is part and parcel with the reality that, in order to see God, the pilgrim 
herself must be totally and completely transformed. This vision of God so alters the 
parameters of what we normally mean by “seeing” that it is rightly imagined as 
darkness.  
Allow me to draw attention to two final points before moving to the body of 
Bonaventure’s text itself, both points relating to the pattern of A—B—A’. A 
moment’s reflection shows that, when one takes the first two elements together (just 
as we did above in the case of Plato’s Line), this progression of days/visions conforms 
 
12 Class lecture at the University of Texas, 1996. 
13 For Bonaventure’s articulation of the three books of nature, scripture, and the soul, see for example 
Bonaventure, Six Days, XII.14-17 (179–81). 
14 Emmanuel Falque, Saint Bonaventure and the Entrance of God into Theology, ed. William C. 
Hackett, tr. Brian Lapsa and Sarah Horton (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 
2018), 22–3.  
15 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XX.11-12 (306–7). 
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to this same A—B—A’ pattern.  Together, days one and two constitute the First 
Intellect, the initial capacity or ability of the human mind to recognize objects: the 
objects of day 1 are ordinary objects in the world which one grasps by means of 
visual eyesight (rocks, trees, giraffes, etc.), while those of day 2 are those objects 
delivered by revelation from God (the identity of God, including its crucial moment 
of development in the story of the burning bush; God’s work of creation; the 
Incarnation of God; the nature of God as love; etc.), grasped by faith, or the 
intellectus fidei.  Day three, then, centering as it does on the giving, receiving, and 
interpreting of Scripture—consisting of “natural objects” and “faith objects”—
amounts to a process of dianoia, in which the mind moves through a series of 
elements (settings, characters, situations, conflict, resolution, etc.), making 
connections and distinctions between them, together with the “pathetic” dimensions 
of this process, at which even Aristotle hints (in the Poetics, as discussed above) with 
his notions of katharsis and pathos. Not until this dianoetic process has occurred does 
one finally arrive at the third and final moment of the process: the paradoxical 
suspension of the mind in contemplation. This stage, concomitant for both 
Bonaventure and Ratzinger with the human sapientia of the whole person, consists in 
the reception of an intellectual light which (again) the Seraphic Doctor describes 
paradoxically as darkness. As we can see more clearly now that we are delving into 
the actual content of the Hexaëmeron, the structure of Bonaventure’s four visions, 
then, is identical to that of Plato’s Line, with its three moments of [eikasia + pistis], 
dianoia, and noesis.  
And yet, one can also discern the presence of the pattern A—B—A’ in different 
ways, superimposed onto the four days/visions in a different manner. Attention to the 
first vision, in isolation from the others, reveals that in it Bonaventure includes the 
ability intuitively to presuppose logical validity, for example, the law of 
noncontradiction.16 The law of noncontradiction, that is, together with other logical 
relationships and rules, is seen by the human mind in the light of natural reason. If 
this is so, then it must be the case that, even within the first “moment” of day one—
 
16 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, IV.1 (95–6). “Truth is the light of the soul. It never fails. 
Indeed, it shines so powerfully upon the soul that this soul cannot possibly believe it to be non-existing 
… without an inner contradiction. For if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist: and so 
something is true. And if something is true, it is true that truth exists. Hence if truth does not exist, truth 
exists!”   
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the day of natural vision—the process of dianoia is itself present, at least in some 
kind of incipient or inchoate way. In order, that is, for the mind to grasp the absurdity 
of contradiction, even at a subconscious level, it must in some sense move through, 
componendo et dividendo, a series of elements, for example the elements of the 
grammatical construction of the Latin language which Bonaventure explains in 
collation IV, speaking of different cases which correspond to different modalities of 
nouns: “the accusative, which indicates something toward which the action is 
directed, not a principle of action as would the nominative.”17  
Plainly, more is involved here than mere recognition (as important as that is). 
Because the natural illumination of day one includes not just the truth of things but 
the truth of signs,18 it involves not only multiple objects in isolation, not only multiple 
serial elements in a catena of reference, but obviously the relationships between those 
elements as well. With my claim that Vision 1 treats First Intellect as a mode of 
recognition (at least in its initial, natural component) am I, then, getting caught up not 
just in a logical circle (vicious or otherwise), but in a bona fide contradiction? 
Recourse to Pickstock’s notion of meta-indexible whole is helpful here (see chapter 2, 
III.A., above). If natural reason can sufficiently identify this or that thing in the world, 
then on this account it can also discern larger wholes which in turn consist of such 
smaller things or parts—for example a forest consisting of individual trees19 or a 
village consisting of individual houses.20 Extrapolated up to the highest level, we 
come to the notion of cosmos, a meta-indexible whole countenanced even by the 
Milesian Presocratics.21 When we say that it is the initial, natural power of recognition 
that Bonaventure treats under the rubric of vision one, we include in that claim the 
totality of all that is indexible, not just its composite parts. For Bonaventure this 
object, too, is capable of being recognized by natural reason (albeit, again, rendered 
possible by divine illumination) alone.  
And in fact, not only dianoia (“moment two”) but also Final Intellect (“moment 
three”) is present here within vision one, within the ambit of the first day of creation 
as imagined by Bonaventure. Granted, this final intellect which is limited to the 
 
17 Ibid., IV.19 (69–70). 
18 Ibid., IV.2 (60). 
19 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 34.  
20 Ibid., 24.  
21 Edward Hussey, The Presocratics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1995), 18.  
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natural sphere—that which is achievable by “the philosophers”—is a “low grade” 
kind of vision, accompanied nevertheless with a real (if deficient) form of sapientia. 
But Bonaventure is clear that this final moment is achievable apart from grace, prior 
to grace, attainable by Aristotle and the Aristotelians of his own day. It’s just that it is 
not the full and final degree of beatified vision/holistic sapientia enabled by the life of 
faith and Christian growth, as we can see in Bonaventure’s statement that “the 
philosophers … propose a false circle of beatitude” and his development of this 
theme.22 This statement suggests that the sapientia available to Aristotle—real enough 
in itself—is somehow different from the sapientia available to the life of faith. Both, 
to be sure, occur “on the far side of dianoia.” Both, to be sure, pass through the 
affective field of the human soul. And yet, the Seraphic Doctor “puts a stake in the 
ground” as it were and insists that natural beatitude falls short. 
 Just as the entire span of the mind’s journey, from intellect and back again, is 
embraced (in an alternative sense) within the natural sphere alone (day/vision one), so 
also, in V.12, Bonaventure treats all five of the “truth-revealing powers of the soul,” 
from Book VI of Aristotle’s Ethics—ars (technê), scientia (epistêmê), prudentia 
(phronêsis), sapientia (sofia), and intellectus (nous)—within the ambit of day one. Of 
particular note are prudentia (phronêsis), which, although an intellectual virtue, is for 
Aristotle connected to the “middle section” of the soul, the appetitive realm, in a 
fundamental way, and also sapientia (sofia), which includes not just the summit of 
abstract knowledge in theory delivered by the dianoetic activity of scientia, but also 
by the strengthening or disciplining of moral virtue. The presence of these two virtues 
signals that we are, here in day one no less, paradoxically at the “third moment” of the 
journey, having (in both cases) passed through the realm of the affective dispositions.  
 This is but one locus in the Hexaëmeron which indicates that, as is the case 
with dianoia, appetitive formation also occurs both after and before intellect. Intellect, 
that is, “bookends” appetitive formation just as it bookends dianoia. Appetitive 
formation and dianoia, in short, go hand-in-hand and occupy the same place—a 
shared space—in the structure of the soul’s journey to fulfillment. Hence, for 
Bonaventure, Aristotle could achieve sapientia (requiring, as it does, appetitive 
formation) in a limited but real way.  
 
22 Bonaventure, Six Days, VII.12 (116). Italics mine.  
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 Further, just as the entire pattern of A—B—A’ can be detected in the horizon of 
natural light provided on day one, so also is it contained in the subsequent days as 
well, now repeated nonidentically, on a higher plane.23 In this way, grace does not 
destroy nature, but fulfills it.  
 Now that we have recognized the pattern, let us turn to a more rigorous 
explication of recognition itself, rooted in the texts of Bonaventure and Ratzinger. 
This recognition, also called “intellect,” is both the precondition and the fulfillment of 
dianoia. Bonaventure is explicit about this double role of the intellect: Intellectualis 
est duplex.24   
III. First Intellect: intellectus as the precondition of dianoia 
As we now turn to an examination of Bonaventure’s account of the dynamics of 
the intellect, I want to invoke his twentieth-century interpreter in order to frame the 
issues. In his Introduction to Christianity—published nine years after the appearance 
of his Hablitiationsschrift—Ratzinger structures huge swaths of theological material 
according to our structure A—B—A’. An entire section of the book, in fact, is an 
extended explication of the Apostle’s Creed, of which Ratzinger is at pains to point 
out the “bookends”: the initial affirmation of faith in the initial word Credo (“I 
believe”) and in the non-identical repetition of that first element in the Creed’s final 
word, “Amen.”25  
Ratzinger bolsters this realization that it is the intellectus fidei which is both the 
origin and climax of the creed, and in fact of Christian faith itself:  “The tool with 
which man is equipped to deal with the truth of being is not knowledge but 
understanding [Verstehen].”26 Then, ensuring that sapientia is connected to the 
intellectus fidei, Ratzinger insists on the importance of the existential dimension, that 
 
23 Objects in Scripture are both natural and faith-delivered, and they must be recognized by the first 
intellect—both natural and faith-bequeathed. In terms of the latter, this would pertain to Ratzinger’s 
critique of HCM: if its practitioners opt not to proceed to higher forms of scientia, then they fail even 
to recognize revelatory objects grasped by faith. Hence Scripture is not properly read, dianoia cannot 
be said to have taken place, and Final Intellect cannot be achieved in the full, Christian way.  
24 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, V.24 (86–7). 
25 “In the harmony of ‘Credo’ and ‘Amen’ the meaning of the whole becomes visible, the intellectual 
movement that it is all about.” Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 75. The “section of the book” to 
which I refer is Section II of the Introduction, “The Ecclesiastical Form of the Faith,” comprised by 
pages 82–102.  
26 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 77. Due to its importance for my project, I quote this 
sentence in full from the German: “Die Form, wie der Mensch mit der Wahrheit des Seins zu tun 
erhält, ist nicht Wissen, sondern Verstehen: Vestehen des Sinnes, dem er sich anvertraut hat.” Joseph 
Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, Joseph Ratzinger Gesammelte Schriften, Band 4, ed. Rudolf 
Voderholzer et al. (Freiburg im Bresigau: Herder, 2014), 86.  
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one’s whole self (and not just knowledge or reason) is required for this recognition: 
“… the understanding of the meaning to which he has entrusted himself.” Such 
exalted understanding for Ratzinger is unattainable on the basis of natural reason 
alone, whether ancient or modern: “knowledge of the functional aspect of the world, 
as procured for us so splendidly by present-day technical and scientific thinking, 
brings with it no understanding of the world and of being.”27 For Ratzinger, Verstand 
is the recognition of ultimate meaning.28 (And yet, in a move we will return to later, 
Ratzinger insists that, in this life, there is no final grasp of God, because we, it turns 
out, are comprehended by him.29)  
 Both the thirteenth-century mendicant as well as his twentieth-century interpreter 
would agree with (my interpretation of the structure of) Plato’s Line, that, before 
dianoia can take place, the activation of First Intellect is required.  Let us begin with 
Bonaventure, for whom this truth can be seen at a very basic level: the mere fact that 
days one and two precede day three. Before any of the three of the biblical-
hermeneutical varieties of dianoia which Bonaventure lays out—the intelligentiae 
spirituales, the figurae sacramentales, and the theoriae multiformes—can be 
performed, one must first do the “work” of the natural intellect (day one) and the 
intellectus fidei (day two).  
 As we have begun to see, this work or activation of the natural intellect is 
achieved by divine illumination. Let us carefully consider how Bonaventure 
characterizes this intellectual light. At one point he states that  
God Himself, then, is intimate to every human soul and 
shines forth by means of His most clear species upon 
the obscure species of our understanding. And in this 
manner, these obscure species, mixed with the darkness 
of images, are lit up in such a way that the intellect 
understands.30 
 
Note that this statement of Bonaventure’s does not assume that faith is what is 
necessary for knowing, but rather that it is God and God’s illumination of every 
 
27 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 77. 
28 This dimension of the primacy of faith—since faith is a grasping of a deliverance from elsewhere; a 
recognition of something—meshes extremely well with the emphasis of certain continental thinkers 
such as Hegel and Heidegger on understanding as privileged to reason. It also adumbrates the “far 
side” of Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle. 
29 Ibid., 78.  
30 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XII.7 (175–6).  
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human soul / knower which is necessary for knowing. Of course, this statement itself 
is a statement of faith, or something like it. In other words, just as Bonaventure says 
in the following section, that God is the eternal exemplar is a “matter of faith.” To 
grasp the objects of the world, then, one needs divine illumination, but to grasp the 
theory of divine illumination itself, one needs faith (or something like it). 
 We can make sense of this “something like faith” on the basis of two sources: in 
the first place recall Plato’s Line in which pistis appears in a historical context wholly 
enclosed, from a Christian point of view (such as Bonaventure’s), within the domain 
of natural reason or the period of the propaedeutic of the Gospel (since Plato, the 
Christian tradition assumes, cannot be regarded as the recipient of revelation from 
God). Is this pistis identical to what Bonaventure regards as full-fledged faith in 
Christ, the exact same thing that Ratzinger has in mind in his discussion of the Credo 
and the Amen of the Creed? Surely not. And yet, one can say that, in the overall 
scheme of the “system” or structure of Plato’s Line, it plays a structurally similar role, 
and so can be regarded as something like Christian faith. Additionally, however, 
Bonaventure admits a second possible way to discern the reality of divine 
illumination: “indirect reasoning.”31 The light of divine illumination is “beyond reach 
and yet closest to the soul, even more than it is to itself.”32 It is as if it is too close to 
the mind even to be perceived.33 Hence the only two ways to know the truth of divine 
illumination are ecstatic vision (this seems to be correlated with the presence of faith, 
or “something like it”) and indirect reasoning. “This [intellectual light] can only be 
seen by … a man suspended beyond himself in a lofty vision.” It is impossible to see 
these things through simple intuition. Rather, we can only see via ecstatic vision, or 
by way of indirect reasoning.34  
 Unfortunately, neither of these two means—ecstatic vision or the kind of indirect 
reasoning Bonaventure has in mind—is easily achieved, so Bonaventure proposes 
something like a practical pedagogy for his students.  Through a combination of 
(indirect) reason and faith Bonaventure recommends that, in order more fully to grasp 
 
31 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr de Vinck, XIX.11 (289–90). 
32 Ibid. 
33 In this sense it is like Augustine’s interior intimo meo. Augustine, Confessions, III.6.xi (43). 
34 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XIX.11 (422). This indirect reasoning might be something like the 
transcendental deduction of Kant: in a kind of reduction ad absurdum, one can conclude that the 
condition of the possibility for any knowledge is divine illumination. It structures all knowledge. 
Without it, Bonaventure thinks, we cannot know anything, and nihilism is the case. Yet we do know 
things, and so one posits divine illumination. 
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the truth of divine illumination, one meditates on the following three “helps”: sensible 
creatures (elsewhere, “the Book of Creation”), spiritual creatures (“the Book of the 
Soul”), and sacramental scriptures (the “Book of Scripture”).35 Through these means, 
Bonaventure hopes, the student can grow in his confidence in the existence of this 
mysterious and elusive reality called divine illumination, that divinely granted 
condition for the possibility of recognizing (thus knowing) anything at all, including 
the objects of belief and the components of dianoia. 
IV. The character and necessity of dianoia 
But what is dianoia, in the context of this reading of Bonaventure? To answer this 
question, let us begin with a recollection of the previous chapter of this essay, in 
which I made recourse to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics to shed light on how the 
Stagirite regards the study of history. There we saw that Aristotle speaks of epistêmê, 
which proceeds on the basis of the logical analysis of various kinds of “givens” in 
order to generate not just truth (which after all might be mere belief), but actual 
knowledge. For the purposes of this paper, we can say that this discourse is called 
dianoia, and one finds its paradigmatic execution not just in the logical works of 
Aristotle’s Organon, but in those works of  “physical” (i.e., natural) philosophy such 
as On the Soul and the Physics, and metaphysical works (especially the Metaphysics) 
as well. It is precisely these works which were flooding into the Arts Faculty of the 
University of Paris of Bonaventure’s day, and so we can say that it is precisely these 
works which provoke the controversy or controversies in which Bonaventure was 
embroiled and which motivated his writing of (or, more accurately, his preaching of) 
the Collationes in Hexaëmeron itself.  
This interpretation of scientia as dianoia is shared by Ratzinger, who highlights 
the importance of a spiritual retreat Bonaventure made on Mt. Alverna. Early in his 
Habilitationsschrift he writes that, upon descending from Mt. Alverna in 1259 (a few 
years after the gradual injection of Aristotle into the Arts Faculty had begun to be felt) 
“Bonaventure returned [to the University] … as an outsider, to point out the limits of 
science from the perspective of faith.”36 Here Ratzinger suggests that the issue is the 
status and nature of dianoia as we have identified it in the paragraph above, and what 
the young Bavarian is suggesting is that Bonaventure at this time set out to undermine 
 
35 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XII.14 (179). 
36 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 3.  
 130 
the status and role of this powerful discourse which, in addition to scientia, can also 
be labeled not just dianoia, but also “philosophy.”37  
But does not Bonaventure do more than just undermine or limit it? At one point in 
the Hexaëmeron Bonaventure contrasts the “fruit of love” with the impressive status 
of philosophical knowledge.  
And so … a little old woman who owns a small garden, 
if she has nothing but charity, will bring forth a better 
fruit than the master who owns an enormous garden and 
knows the mysteries and the natures of things.38 
 
Or again consider the allegiance which Bonaventure has for St. Francis, who, while 
he did allow his confreres to pursue wisdom from the study of books, embraced not 
just the life of poverty but also the notion that knowledge in and of itself only puffs 
up. If neither the lady who owns the small garden nor St. Francis required the study of 
philosophy to achieve a holy status before God, then why should we think that it is 
required? 
 Yet the strongest exhibit in opposition to the necessity of dianoia as scientia 
which Bonaventure puts forth in the Hexaëmeron is his treatment of the father of 
Western monasticism (and the patron saint of Europe), St. Benedict.  
 
 
 
37 A brief discussion of the etymological evolution of the term philosophia is perhaps in order. The 
term is redefined with the rise of Aristotle’s absorption into the mainstream thought of the West in the 
12th and 13th centuries. For the older meaning, one can think of Augustine’s verus philosophus amator 
dei est. (See Introduction, n. 38 above.) In other words, philosophy here is simply the love of God, or 
the love of true Christian wisdom, a lexical assumption shared by Boethius. The injection of (the 
“new”) Aristotle into the tradition in the 12th and 13th centuries, however, repositions philosophy as 
something that is now other than, and possibly in tension with, this wisdom, which now begins to be 
thought of not as philosophia but rather as theologia. A key moment in this shift is the gradual 
systematization of scriptural teaching, which one can argue begins (or at least drastically leaps 
forward) with Peter Lombard’s innovations contained in his Book of Sentences. A good example of 
this emerging, more novel understanding of this “other” of philosophy or metaphysics is seen in St. 
Thomas’ commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate: 
Accordingly, there are two kinds of theology or divine science. 
There is one that treats of divine things, not as the subject of the 
science, but as the [first] principles of the subject. This is the kind of 
theology pursued by the philosophers and is also called metaphysics. 
There is another kind of theology, however, that investigates divine 
things for their own sakes as the subject of a science. 
Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his Commentary 
on the De Trinitate of Boethius, tr. Armand Mauer, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1986), V.4 (52). 
38 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XVIII.26 (279). 
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The soul of blessed Benedict was truly contemplative, for he saw 
the whole world in a single sunray…. And, as Gregory explains, 
the world was not narrowed but his soul was expanded, for he 
saw all things in the One in relation to whom all creatures are 
narrow and small and limited in extent.39  
 
What is instructive about this appeal to the scientifically untrained Benedict is the 
achievement with which Bonaventure (with the help of Gregory) credits him. “He saw 
the whole world” through the expansion of his own soul, now calibrated to the 
proportion of the world. True, it is not the beatific vision itself which is being referred 
to here (but merely a proleptic, anagogic anticipation of it40), and yet one cannot fail 
to be impressed with the mystical heights to which Benedict is said to have risen. In 
particular, it is his own transformation which allowed him successfully to grasp this 
totality. If this is not the picture of that sapientia which lies at the end of the Christian 
itinerarium, then what is it? 
 Is Bonaventure’s position, then, that dianoia is unnecessary for the attainment of 
that goal which I have identified as “Final Intellect”? On the contrary, my claim is not 
that it is unnecessary but that it is redefined. One can see this by inquiring more 
deeply into the nature of dianoia itself (now that we have seen at a more vivid level 
that it cannot be identified with Aristotelian scientia) and furthermore by utilizing the 
logic of the six days to that end. What is the content of that element which, in the 
structure of the four visions, stands between the first intellect of recognition (both 
natural and graced) and the final intellect of mystical sapientia? Not necessarily 
Aristotelian scientia—although, as we will soon confirm, that does count as a possible 
benefit for Bonaventure—but rather the reading of Holy Scripture. Hearing, marking, 
learning, and inwardly digesting41 Holy Writ must be regarded as a kind of dianoia 
for Bonaventure, and this kind of dianoia is necessary, in his view, for every 
individual who would complete the Christian journey to the Patria. Hence we can say 
that scientia as such is not necessary at the level of the individual believer, but 
dianoia—in the form, at the very least, of biblical assimilation—is.  
 Before identifying what the specific character and status of scientia is for 
Bonaventure, however, I want simply to register the fact that, for Aristotle, this 
 
39 Ibid., XX.7 (303). 
40 Recall the discussion above, appealing to Hughes’ notion of “horizontal anagogia,” above (ch. 1, II). 
41 This wording derives from the Collect of the Day for Proper 28 in the American Book of Common 
Prayer.  
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question about the necessity of dianoia that is merely scientific never arises; rather it 
is assumed. His unstated assumption of the necessity of epistêmê for what he regards 
as true human fulfillment42 is itself a worthy object of contemplation. Two possible 
explanations of this assumption, both of which highlight the contrast between 
Aristotle and Christianity, come to mind. First, standard in the thinking of Aristotle’s 
cultural context is the delimitation of what we can call the contemplative community 
to the narrow circle of a select elite. That Aristotle regards full eudaimonia, full 
human “perfection” (in Catholic terms) as off-limits to the vast majority of human 
beings makes it much easier for him to assume that rigorous scientia is, in fact, 
requisite for the achievement of the contemplative heights of the true philosopher.43 
Bonaventure addresses this pre-Christian elitism in dramatic fashion. Let us simply 
register the fact that it is Bonaventure’s concern with simple, nonphilosophical 
saints—the Poverello, St. Benedict, the “little old lady” with the garden—which 
makes the necessity of dianoia an issue for him in the first place. Here we glimpse an 
aspect of the incipient democratization inherent in the Franciscan’s thought. The full 
achievement of the human telos is attainable not just by the elite, but also by the 
simple.  
 Secondly, one wonders if the explanation of this assumption on the part of the 
Stagirite has something to do with the muted role which desire plays in his thought. 
True, the formation of moral virtue through habituation is crucial for the Stagirite.44 
True, too, Aristotle’s view of pleasure is notably positive, even if it is not as 
thoroughly ultimate as it is for the ancient Hedonists.  And yet, despite this emphasis 
on appetitive discipline and the inherent goodness of pleasure, one can detect a certain 
absence in Aristotle. While Bonaventure with his “monastic” writing style constantly 
fans the flames of love and dilectatio, the emotional formation proscribed by Aristotle 
is overwhelmingly disciplinarian. Both Bonaventure and Aristotle believe in 
 
42 The best picture we get of Aristotle’s idea of true human fulfillment, which for him is the 
culmination of eudaimonia, is his description of the quasi-divine contemplation of the philosopher in 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.7-8 (191–6). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. Joe Sachs, 2nd ed. (Santa 
Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 1999), XII.7, 9 (240–3; 247–9). Thanks are in order to Philipp Rosemann 
for the reminder of this latter reference.  
43 The intended audience for Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is the free male citizens of Athens, and 
hence it excludes slaves, women, and others. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press: 2007), chs. 11–12 (131–64). 
44 There are reasons to regard, in other words, even Aristotelian dianoia as in some sense engaging the 
passions, as the intellectual virtue of phronêsis shows, rooted as it is in both the higher faculty of 
reason and the lower (or middle) faculty of orexis.  
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disciplining our passions to be able to say “no” to excess and to temptation, but only 
Bonaventure, I think we can safely say, clearly believes in and strongly and explicitly 
affirms, and even celebrates, the appetitive “yes.”  
 What, then, is the status for Bonaventure, not simply of dianoia, but specifically 
of that scientia which is natural philosophy?45 His answer to this question is 
revealing, for it is situated within a detailed account of what one might call a 
“curriculum of learning” for his students, a curriculum which he calls an “order” for 
the attainment of knowledge and wisdom.  By “order” he means the logical and 
practical priority we should give the following genres of writing: Scripture, the 
writing of the saints, the writing of the masters, and the writing of the philosophers … 
if we should read the philosophers at all, an issue about which there is, indeed, some 
hesitation.46 The order Bonaventure gives, in which each element is put in service of 
the immediately previous one, is as follows: 
1. “Holy Scripture,”  
2. “original writings of the saints,”  
3. “the opinions of the masters,”  
4. “the worldly teachings, that is, the doctrines of the philosophers.” 
As an initial hint of his reticence to recommend the reading of philosophy, 
immediately after giving the above ranking Bonaventure registers that “… in the 
philosophers there is no knowledge leading to the remission of sins.”47 That 
knowledge, of course, is contained in Holy Scripture, and yet Bonaventure would 
never admit that we read the Bible directly, with no interpretive help, so to speak. 
Hence, before all else, it is with Scripture that we read Scripture: 
The whole of Scripture is like a single zither, and the 
lesser string does not produce harmony by itself, but only 
in combination with the others. Likewise, any single 
passage of Scripture depends upon some other, or rather, 
any single passage is related to a thousand others.48  
 
 
45 By “natural philosophy” here, I do not mean those Aristotelian works—the Physics and On the 
Soul—which, unlike the Organon and the Metaphysics, treat the domain of organic or “self-moving” 
phenomena. I mean, instead, philosophy conducted “in the mode of day one,” that is, philosophy done 
purely in the natural order, apart from divine revelation.  
46 This material comes from Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XIX.6–15 (286–92). 
47 Ibid., XIX.7 (286–8).  
48 Ibid.  
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Confirming our position, stated above, that scriptural interpretation alone 
(independently of scientia) is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of dianoia in the 
spiritual life, Bonaventure appeals to St. Bernard: “Blessed Bernard, for instance, 
knew little. But because he had studied Scripture intensely, was able to speak with 
elegance.”49 
 Scripture alone, indeed, is ultimately worthy to Bonaventure’s mind, a kind of 
ultimate end, in and of itself. And yet, he goes on to argue that in order to understand 
Scripture aright, one must make recourse to the saints (such as Augustine and Jerome, 
both of whom are expressly mentioned).50 But because the latter are difficult, one 
needs the “summas of the masters,” although even here one must be aware of “an 
overabundance of writings.” In each instance the subsequent element functions as an 
interpretive help, with which to view or to read the more ultimate textual source. 
 But then, when Bonaventure discusses the philosophers—verba philosophorum—
he says that it is necessary that a man know or suppose (supponat) them. Why? What 
is the motivation or the reason why a man should take into consideration the words of 
the philosophers?  Sed quia ista scripta adducunt philosophorum verba.51 
Bonaventure is saying is we—or, rather, his students—should study and come to 
know the philosophers because the summas of the masters quote them. 
 Something strange is going on here. Notice the first three elements in the series of 
four above. In each case, one enlists the subsequent item/text/author/type as a 
hermeneutical “lens” for interpreting the immediately previous kind of writing. Why 
do we read the writings of the saints? We do so in order to interpret properly the 
Scriptures. We read Scripture with the saints, through their eyes. The same 
relationship holds between the saints and the masters. But does it hold between the 
masters the “worldly teachings” of the philosophers? For Bonaventure, it decisively 
does not.  
 Instead, we read the philosophers because the masters quote them. Bonaventure 
would never be willing to admit that a philosopher—let’s take the top medieval 
commentator on the Philosopher, Averroes, as an example—could provide an 
authoritatively binding interpretation of Scripture or a saint or a master. And yet, if a 
 
49 Ibid., XIX.8 (287–8). 
50 Ibid., XIX.10 (289). 
51 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XIX.10 (421–2).  
 135 
master quotes Averroes, or Aristotle, then we should read that philosopher, expressly 
because the master did.  
 Further, from within the narrow confines of this qualification, one should read the 
philosophers, despite the fact that they are dangerous. While there is a danger in 
allowing the beautiful writings of the saints to eclipse the importance of Scripture—
this is formally equivalent to the failure of the early Jerome who was drawn away 
from the prophetical books by the writings of Cicero52—there is a different danger 
with respect to philosophy. Here the periculum in particular is one of dilution: 
compared to the wine of the Scriptures, philosophy is mere water. In fact, 
Bonaventure goes on to say, philosophy is dirty water. Unlike wine, no sane brother 
would drink in dirty water and assimilate it into his biological system. Just as one 
does not savor water (much less dirty water), so also, Bonaventure is implying, one 
does not ruminate on Aristotle. Why would one reverse the miracle of Christ at Cana, 
turning the wine of Scripture into the water of philosophy?53 
 Refusing to stop here, however, the Seraphic Doctor takes one last jab, this time 
not at Aristotle, but at his followers in the Arts Faculty. Alluding to the biblical story 
of Rachel and Leah, he writes:  
How much was Rachel enriched for having stolen her 
father’s household idols? The only thing she gained was 
to have lied and to have simulated weakness after having 
put them in the camel’s saddle and sat on them. The same 
thing happens when the notebooks [quaterni] of the 
philosophers are concealed.54 
 
 
 
52 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XIX.12 (290). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XIX.15 (291–92). This is a reference to the alleged habit of some at the 
thirteenth-century University of Paris to try to conceal their allegiance to Aristotle. Yet, when it comes 
to the posture of Arts Faculty members such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia in the face of 
the ecclesiastical censorship of Aristotelianism (the first round of Bishop Stephen Tempier’s 
condemnations appeared in 1270), contemporary scholarship has recognized that these thinkers 
publically taught the condemned views. What, then, are we to make of Bonventure’s accusation of 
concealment? John Wippel writes that Siger “usually qualifies his discussion of positions opposed to 
Christian belief by stating that he is presenting these not as his own view, but only according to … the 
philosophers” and that this “same stratagem is also found in writings by other … Aristotelians of this 
time.” John F. Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” in A Companion to 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2002), 67. It seems, then, that with this language of hiding the notebooks of the philosophers, 
Bonaventure is accusing such members of the Arts Faculty of concealing their true beliefs.  
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And yet Bonaventure is not open to the charge of fideism here, for he does 
recommend that his students read the philosophers, but only for the express reason 
stated above: they are a conceptual ingredient in the thought of the masters.55 If my 
reading here is correct, then Bonaventure is not saying that we should read the 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus because they help us accurately to 
interpret the masters. Rather, he is saying that we should read them (the philosophers) 
because the masters cite them. It is not, that is, that the philosophers are the 
interpretive key for the masters (as the masters are for the saints), but rather that we 
read them because the masters read them. If we retrace the steps of the masters, we 
can better understand the train of thought of any given master. What I want to point 
out here is that for Bonaventure the philosophers are necessary here in a genealogical 
way, for a genealogical reason. They are necessary only because the masters are 
necessary. They are necessary only because they are a conceptual ingredient in the 
thought of the masters. They are condition of the possibility, the historical apriori,56 
for the masters to think their thoughts, to make the breakthroughs they made. We see 
here something of an incipient historicism in Bonaventure: in order to grasp the 
masters’ thoughts, we must attend to certain historical developments without which 
they could not have been the masters which they were. Knowledge here, the 
knowledge of the masters, is temporally conditioned. In order to know the fathers, we 
must know what they knew, how they were able to know in the first place. 
 The relationship between elements four and three is different from that between 
three and two, and two and one. One can also see this in terms of history: the masters 
follow the fathers historically, and so also for the fathers and the Scriptures … but not 
so with the philosophers (such as Aristotle) and the masters. Further, as for the 
historical relationships, so also the conceptual ones. Elements one through tree can be 
viewed as nested continua, in which the previous element is wholly enclosed within 
the subsequent. But the fourth—the philosophers—does not enclose the third—the 
masters—in the same way. (This distinction between the two kinds of relationship 
surely has implications for how we conceptualize the phenomenon of tradition.) 
 
55 Ratzinger addresses the issue of fideism—in its medieval, Franciscan provenance, no less—in his 
2006 Regensburg Lecture. Ratzinger, “The Regensburg Lecture,” 109–25. 
56 On this term, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1972), 126–34. 
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 Philosophical scientia, therefore, is not a necessary ingredient in the dianoetic life 
of the Christian—for that, ingesting the Scriptures read and proclaimed will suffice—
and yet, for one who wants to grasp the Scriptures through the interpretive lens of the 
Fathers, more is needed: not just the fathers, but the masters. And if the master in 
question relies on a philosopher, then one is encouraged to do the same and to retrace 
those steps.  
 Before moving from the consideration of dianoia to that of Final Intellect, one 
more feature of this middle component is important to register (though we will 
address it more fully in chapter 5): the fact that for Bonaventure it is historicized. This 
is the case specifically for the third form of biblical interpretation which he covers 
within the ambit of “vision three”: the multiformes theoriae. Although we will treat 
these “historical seeds of interpretation” in more depth in chapter 5 below, it is 
appropriate at this juncture to point out that these “theories” are conceived by 
Bonaventure—unlike both the figurae sacramentales and the  spirituales 
intelligentiae of the allegorical sense, the tropological sense, and the anagogical 
sense—as historical in nature. “Who can know,” Bonaventure, quoting Augustine, 
asks, “the infinity of these seeds, when in a single one are contained forests of forests 
and thence seeds in infinite number?”57 The remainder of this paragraph is so 
astonishing I must quote it in full:  
Likewise, out of Scriptures may be drawn an infinite 
number of interpretations which none but God can 
comprehend. For as new seeds come forth from plants, 
so also from Scriptures come forth new interpretations 
and new meanings, and thereby are sacred scriptures 
distinct [from everything else]. Hence, in relation to the 
interpretations yet to be drawn, we may compare to a 
single drop from the sea all those that have been drawn 
so far.58 
 
 The implications of Bonaventure’s thusly imagined historical development are 
far-reaching for his view of the intellect and its structure. We have seen that dianoia 
is a stage in the progression of human mental growth, from initial recognition of 
objects in the world, through the intellectus fidei which grasps revealed content, 
through the long and involved, at times twisting and winding process of dianoia, both 
 
57 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XIII.2 (183–4). 
58 Ibid. Italics mine.  
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as grappling with Scripture and as the activity of deductive and inductive scientia, on 
(finally) to the end destination of Final Intellect. Yet, Bonaventure now imagines that 
this middle element which is a temporal unfolding, is also a historical process. It must 
be the case, hence, that it takes place at the metagenerational level, constituting a 
historical process which affects nations, cultures, civilizations. What this points to is 
some kind of culmination as Final Intellect which is equally historical, or, since we 
are speaking of (and Bonaventure is imagining) the future in this context, and not the 
past, surely a better term is eschatological. When Bonaventure historicizes dianoia by 
means of the multiformes theoriae, he at the same time suggests an eschatological 
culmination in the form of a historically fulfilled Final Intellect. About this 
eschatological culmination, more will be said below (in chapter 5).  
V. Final Intellect: the fulfillment of dianoia (together with appetitive 
formation). 
The most obvious point about the Final Intellect is that, like First Intellect, it is 
intellect. What then, is the difference between the first and the final? In section seven 
of Collation XX, Bonaventure assists us with this question. Remember that for the 
Seraphic Doctor the final culmination of the human pilgrimage includes moral 
perfection, the successful completion of the growth process of dianoia, and a vision of 
an immaterial, complete whole. And while the initial visual grasp of First Intellect 
does foreshadow or anticipate Final Intellect in important ways, that initial stage 
includes none of these particular constituents.  
First, moral purity is an absolute requirement of Final Intellect. While the goal of 
speculative dianoia (that is, scientia) is to lead to Final Intellect, it is not absolutely 
required for it (as the examples of the simple old lady, Francis, Benedict show). The 
sole condition—both necessary and sufficient—for mystical contemplation is moral 
purification (which is achieved in part through the assimilation of Scripture). As 
suggested above, this purification of the affective dispositions is not merely 
disciplinarian; it involves a holy enflaming of the passions:  
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And the whole reason of contemplation consists in this, 
for never does the splendid radiation come within the 
range of contemplation without at the same time setting 
afire. Hence, in the Canticle, Solomon speaks through the 
medium of love and of a hymn, for these dazzling lights 
cannot be attained except through love.59 
 
Not so for First Intellect: even the most polluted soul can grasp the essence of a 
giraffe or a chair, and while this grasping is the result of divine illumination, one need 
not acknowledge or realize this in order to perceive the object.  
Second, and related, Bonaventure insists on the mediation of a transformed soul. 
How is this vision of the whole achieved? Not, as the case of Benedict shows us, 
because the mind has achieved exhaustive knowledge of the sum total of the world’s 
contents, but rather because of something which happens with the soul. As we see in 
the example of Benedict, the bequest of the holistic vision depends not on the object 
of the beholding, but rather on the subject: “… the world was not narrowed into a 
single sunray, but [Benedict’s] soul was expanded.” It was expanded because of God: 
“for he saw all things in the One in relation to whom all creatures are narrow and 
small and limited in extent.”  
Thirdly, not only is the soul expanded or transformed, but its mode of knowing 
transitions from that of the animal to that of a purely spiritual being. Final Intellect, 
unlike the first, relies not at all on the bodily apparata of eye, brain, etc. Here, in the 
context of Final Intellect, we know as God knows, and see as God sees. And to know 
and see as God knows and sees, ipso facto, is to know and see God, who not only 
knows himself, but knows all things through knowing himself. He does not know 
things as embodied creatures know them. Gregory writes: “how is it that they do not 
see, who see the one who sees all?”60 And again, the quotation from Wisdom 11:22 
suggests that when we see God, we see as God sees. Or better: we see as God sees, 
when we see God. This is not the case with First Intellect. There, we know as human 
animals know: through sense perception, by a process of componendo et dividendo 
which requires the duration of time, etc. But here, in mystical contemplation, we 
know as God knows: directly, without any needed recourse to objects, signs, or 
logical relationships. Indeed, it is in the contemplative soul that all reality resides: “the 
 
59Ibid., XX.12 (306–7). 
60 Ibid., XX.7 (303). 
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sphere of the universe,” “the universe of spirits,” “marvelous light and beauty,” “the 
whole world.”61  
How, then, is Final Intellect different from the first? The answer we distill from 
Bonaventure is that it differs in three ways: moral purity, a transformed soul, and a 
new way of knowing/seeing.  
 As for Ratzinger, one can see his deep commitment to this same view of the 
Final Intellect in his extended struggle against what he regards as an inappropriate 
reductionism of theology to mere scientia which has been cut off from its true origin 
and goal: the historical-critical method of biblical studies (HCM). This approach to 
the Bible, which took root in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the work of 
Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweizer, began with the supposed implausibility of the 
imminent expectation on the part of the earliest Jesus followers in the first century. 
Since the continued delay of the Parousia required over time a response from this 
diverse, ancient community of believers, Weiss and Schweizer—as well as that 
twentieth-century interpreter Rudolf Bultmann, who, despite all his differences from 
them, nevertheless stands at a deeper level in continuity with them—date the 
statements of imminent expectation as earlier, and thus as more authentic.62 
Ratzinger, while granting much truth in this approach even while wielding Luke 
21:24 and its mention of “the time of the Gentiles”63 as a piece of counterevidence, 
has a deeper problem with this approach to Scripture: it is reductively “scientific.” 
That is, the future pontiff regards this this enterprise as conducted by these scholars, 
 
61 This list is contained in ibid., XX.8 (303–4).  
62 This characterization of Ratzinger’s of HCM is consistent with that of Milton Moreland, who writes 
that it “recognizes the long tradition history of textual interpretation and attempts to peel back the 
interpretive layers in order to reconstruct an original author, sources, audience, cultural context, social 
setting (Sitz im Leben), and provenance for each New Testament text.” Milton C. Moreland, “Historical 
Criticism: New Testament,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Biblical Interpretation, vol. 1, ed. Steven 
L. McKenzie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 401. Similarly, Ernst Troeltsch states that 
“the fundamental practice of historical criticism” is such that the critic inquires into the probability of 
“anything that has been handed down from the past.” In this way, any historical claim which is 
contained in the biblical text is assumed to be, at best, merely probable. Ernst Troeltsch, “On the 
Historical and Dogmatic Methods in Theology,” tr. Jack Forstman. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f87d/99239659227a6d47080df4c798947898ae60.pdf. Accessed July 
7, 2019.   
63 “They will fall by the edge of the sword, and be led captive among all nations; and Jerusalem will be 
trodden down by the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled.” Note the final two words in 
Greek (we will return to the issue of “kairotic time” below): kai« pesouvntai sto/mati macai÷rhß 
kai« ai̇cmalwtisqh/sontai ei̇ß ta» e¶qnh pa¿nta, kai« ∆Ierousalh\m e¶stai patoume÷nh uJpo\ 
ėqnw◊n, a‡cri ou∞ plhrwqw◊sin [kai« e¶sontai] kairoi« ėqnw◊n. 
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as wholly incapable of rising to the level of the “mind of Christ” to which we have 
access through theology that is truly spiritual.64  
To clarify, Ratzinger is not in the least opposed to the scientific rigor which 
these scholars employ. He admits that it accurately recognizes the early Christian 
community’s struggle “to preserve the characteristic form of its own hope, and to put 
into words an experience of disappointment which demanded an answer.”65  HCM, to 
his mind, has a legitimate role within the larger theological project. However, for it to 
be fruitful, it must—to employ the idiom I’ve been developing in this paper—rise to 
the level of Final Intellect. It must issue forth in holistic sapientia, a development 
which of necessity involves prior steps such as (the intellect of) faith and moral 
formation. It is precisely elements such as these, however, that the approach of Weiss 
and Schweizer rejects or, at the very least, brackets. Not only, then, does this 
approach fail because, on its own terms, it repudiates the goal of Final Intellect, but, 
what is more, it fails even to be authentic dianoia. Given its feigned neutrality, 
Ratzinger thinks, such an approach cannot be said to accurately interpret the 
Scriptures.   
For this reason Ratzinger accuses HCM of a “boundary violation.”  That is, the 
methodology (together with its methodological assumptions) of the natural sciences, 
upon which HCM bases itself (see above, chapter 2), is wholly ill-equipped to 
interpret the meaning of theological/spiritual texts such as those of the New 
Testament and the Gospels. The heart of this criticism of Ratzinger’s, elaborated in 
the section of Eschatology that is titled, “A Word on Method,” is that the biblical 
content of the Gospels is not “measurable” in the same way that the physical world is 
(the intelligibility of the latter thus being susceptible to the methods of natural 
science).66 Rather, the content of the Gospels is more akin (in the manner of a “family 
resemblance”67) to the knowledge found in the philosophical tradition of the West: it 
participates in the tradition of “an enduring approach to the Ground of what is.”68 
HCM is an attempt to provide ultimate explanation in the mode of “pure 
Wissenschaft,” and as such it is hopelessly doomed. 
 
64 Twomey, “Ratzinger on Theology as a Spiritual Science,” 47–70.  
65 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 36. 
66 Ibid., 19–24. 
67 Ibid., 23.  
68 Ibid., 24.  
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Ratzinger’s response to HCM, then, not only shows his fundamental agreement 
with Bonaventure, but also provides us with a fascinating case study for how and why 
the structure of the intellect matters in the first place.  
Having noted some differences between First Intellect and Final Intellect, and 
having observed a Ratzingerian application of the latter, let us now investigate how 
this tripartite structure points toward the importance of story or narrative. 
VI. How the structure of the intellect entails mythos or narrative.  
 How does this structure which characterizes Bonaventure’s view of Genesis 1 
point toward the notion of story? More pointedly, how is the conceptual tool of story 
or the intellectual lens of mythos essential to Bonaventure’s posture, to what he is 
performing in the Hexaëmeron? My claim is that he is presupposing the notion of 
story, even if he never says it, even if he is not explicitly aware of it. Story is a 
condition for the possibility of Bonaventure’s move in the Hexaëmeron. Ratzinger’s 
claim is that, for Bonaventure, there is no metaphysics without history; mine is that 
there is no history without mythos or story or narrative.  By making this claim I am 
being faithful to the spirit of Bonaventure and Ratzinger, since a) they both embrace a 
notion of tradition which allows for the kind of non-identically repetitive reading I am 
performing, and b) my reading can be regarded as one historically conditioned semen 
within the historical unfolding developments that are the theoriae multiformes. 
 In the opening collation of the work, Bonaventure makes a sweeping statement 
about the nature of metaphysics:  
Such is the metaphysical Center [medium] that leads us 
back [reducens], and this is the sum total of our 
metaphysics: concerned with emanation, exemplarity, 
and consummation: that is, illumination through spiritual 
radiations and return to the Supreme Being [summum]. 
And in this you will be a true metaphysician.69 
 
 With the above description of the chiastic A–B–A’ pattern still providing context, 
consider various aspects of this statement of the Seraphic Doctor. Notice that the 
language of “being led back” [reducens] implies not only some kind of movement, 
but also that the destination of this movement is in some sense the same as the origin; 
this explicit origin/destination, further, is God, “the Supreme Being” [summum]. Note, 
 
69 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, I.17 (10). 
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too, that the “Center” [medium] Bonaventure here refers to is Christ,70 an embodied, 
historical, time-bound entity—also called the Logos—which somehow fills the 
structural place of the journey.  
 In other words, we have here all three moments: A, B, and A’:  
o First Intellect: divine illumination: the origin (God) 
o Dianoia: scriptural interpretation: Christ 
o Final Intellect: divine beatification (of the transformed soul): 
the destination (God) 
In the simplest possible terms, we could summarize these three stages 
of development as: 
o Seeing a whole (or a serial sequence of wholes) 
o Stringing the individual wholes together while undergoing 
affective transformation 
o Seeing the whole 
Further, the terms “emanation,” “exemplarity,” and “consummation” can be 
coordinated with these three respective moments, again confirming the point.  
 Yet I have still said nothing about story. For this connection I appeal to Paul 
Ricœur, who in his article “The Human Experience of Time” invokes St. Augustine 
(Book XI of the Confessions) and Martin Heidegger (division II of Being and Time) 
to argue for three positions (forming the three subsections below) which, on my 
account, bind the structure above of the Hexaëmeron to the notion of narrative.  
 Before laying out the three arguments, allow me briefly to summarize Ricœur’s 
position. After classifying “history-writing” and “story-telling” as twin subspecies 
under the genus of narrative,71 and stating that “narrativity is the mode of discourse 
through which the mode of existence we call temporality, or temporal being, is 
brought into language,”72 Ricœur lays out his thought under three headings: “the 
Problematics of Time”; “the Narrative Kernel”;  and “the Temporal Structures of 
Plot.”  
 
70 Bonaventure immediately above these lines quotes John 16:28—“as the Son expresses it, ‘I came 
forth from the Father and have come into the world. Again I leave the world and go to the Father.” 
Ibid. 
71 This can be regarded as a stonger identification of mythos and history than I made above, for on this 
analysis, they are, qua narrative, identical: scientia oppositorum eadem est. I am indebted to Denys 
Turner for this insight. Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God (New York: Cambridge, 
2004), 159.  
72 Ricœur, “Time and Narrativity,” 99. 
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 In the first section, he associates Augustine and Heidegger insofar as they both 
lament the struggle involved in existence for the human being as a temporal creature. 
At issue here is the mismatch between the “specificity of the human experience of 
time” on the one hand and “the ordinary representation of time as a line linking 
together mathematical points” (or what I call “the timeline approach”). According to 
this representation, time is constituted merely by “relations of simultaneity and of 
succession between abstract ‘nows’ and by the distinction between extreme end points 
and the intervals between them.”73 We do not, that is, experience time, or lived 
reality, as a spatialized mathêsis (i.e., as a timeline), but rather as an event about 
which it can be said either that it flows through us, or that we flow through it.  
 Although their idioms are different, the similarities for Ricœur between Augustine 
and Heidegger are striking: while for Augustine, human time is subject to the dialectic 
between intentio and distentio (which latter term the twentieth-century, Christian 
literary critic identifies as a mix of extension and distraction), for Heidegger, it is in 
its incarnation of everyday life that inauthenticity (“which reminds us of 
distraction”74) enters into the analytic of Dasein as an existential issue. In his effort to 
“organize the phenomenology of time,” Heidegger employs three “levels of 
radicality”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 Ibid., 100. 
74 Ibid., 101.  
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o Temporality proper (most radical). This level is “characterized by the 
primacy of the future in the dialectic between the three intentionalities and, 
above all, by the finite structure of time arising from the recognition of the 
centrality of death, or, more exactly, of being-towards-death.”75 
o Historicity (less authentic). This is “our way of becoming between birth and 
death.” Whereas in temporality proper, what is in view is “the wholeness of 
life provided by its mortal termination,” here “the stretching-along of life is 
… more emphasized.” Yet this distention is “preserved from sheer dispersion 
thanks to Dasein’s capacity to recapitulate—the repeat, to retrieve—our 
inherited potentialities within the projective dimension of care. This 
Wiederholung76 is the counterpart of the stretching-along of life.”77  
o Within-timeness (least authentic). This is where what Heidegger regards as 
the pernicious present, when one falls prey to the objects of both the present-
at-hand and the ready-to-hand, comes to be privileged. This is average 
everydayness.78  
Human time is, for both Augustine and Heidegger, “the dialectic between intention 
and distraction, and we have no speculative means of overcoming it.”79 (As we will 
stress below, by intensio Augustine means seeing or grasping the whole—which on 
my terminology can refer either to “First Intellect” or “Final Intellect.”) 
In Ricœur’s second section dealing with “the narrative kernel,” he pivots away 
from a discussion of the human experience of time and toward a discussion of a 
crucial feature of narrative, that which makes it irreducibly temporal in nature. In this 
context, in fact, he makes an Aristotelian move: foregrounding plot, he argues that it 
is precisely this which unites history and story in their essential character as 
 
75 “The resoluteness with which we face our own being-towards-death, in the most intimate structure of 
care, provides the criterion of authenticity for all of our temporal experience.” Ibid., 101. Of course, a 
robustly traditional theist might question this statement of Heideggerian thought, since Heidegger (in 
postHegelian, historicist fashion) himself evacuates the eternal of any real importance. In light of this 
evacuation, the more traditional theist might want to inquire, whence comes this existential 
authenticity? The answer to this questions lies in the realization that, without the eternal, there can be 
no real contact with true mystery.  
76 “We shall show at the end of this paper the tremendous relevance of Wiederholung, which surfaces 
in any attempt to ground historical and fictional narratives in a common temporal structure.” Ibid., 102. 
77 This is similar to “re-inventing one’s identity.”  
78 Ibid., 102–04. 
79 Ibid., 101.  
 146 
necessarily temporal, identifying them as two equal subspecies of the genus 
narrative.80  
Now, in Ricœur’s view, the attempts to suppress this irreducible temporality at the 
heart of narrative (of both types) are, unfortunately, legion. From historians such as 
Braudel, who speaks of histoire non-événementielle,81 to certain structuralist critics 
such as Roland Barthes, there is an attempt to deal with the “overwhelming 
proliferation” of narrative forms (“… folk-tale, fable, epic, tragedy, drama, novel, 
movies, comics, … history, autobiography, analytical case-histories….”82) by 
reducing narrative to atemporal narrative forms. “Thus a more manageable deductive 
approach can be substituted for [a seemingly] impossible inductive approach … [with 
the result that] the narrative component as such is identified only with the surface 
grammar of the message.”83 Ricœur thinks that “most historians,” in fact, “consider 
history as an explanatory endeavor which has severed its ties with story-telling.”84 
Time, for these thinkers, has been eclipsed and banished from the theoretical 
treatment of history and narrative.  
In his third move, moreover, Ricœur shows how a theoretical approach to 
narrative which insists on the constitutive centrality of time, mediated by the 
irreducibly temporal character of plot, contributes to a solution to the burdensome 
aporiai which characterize human lived experience (outlined above). These salutary 
contributions are so important—not least for an application of narrative theory to 
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure—that I will now tease them out, and assign them to the three 
major sections below.  
Bonaventure’s claim above about “our metaphysics” makes it patently clear that, 
for him, reality is irreducibly temporal. Two components of his claim indicate as 
much. First, his bedrock schema of exit from God and return back to God necessarily 
involves motion; and if motion, then (some kind of) time. This is not to say that for 
Bonaventure God himself is characterized by time, but rather, as Ratzinger points out, 
 
80 While this construal of the relationships between story, narrative, and history differs from mine 
above—where I take story and narrative as virtual synonyms, which in turn serve as the “discourse in 
between” science and history—it nevertheless agrees with my analysis that there is an “overlap”—
some degree of coincidence—between history and narrative. For both myself and Ricœur, in short, 
there is no such thing as history without narrative.  
81 Ricœur, “Time and Narrative,” 104. 
82 Ibid., 103.  
83 Ibid., 104.  
84 Ibid.  
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that time—quia non tantum dicit mensuram durationis, sed etiam egressionis85—
along with the caelum empyreum, the angelica natura, and the materia—is one of the 
four most fundamental created realities, as Bonaventure teaches in Book II of his 
Sentences commentary.86 In addition to the motion inherent in the creation’s 
itinerarium in Deum, however, that Christ is at the center of the schema for 
Bonaventure also entails that any account of reality must include temporality at its 
very base. For Bonaventure as for Ratzinger, there is no Christ who is merely 
atemporal, and if Christ is (at) the Center, then the entire structure is historical and 
temporal.   
Ricœur’s theory, then, indicates how the best description of this inherently 
temporally structured world is narrative, to wit: 
A. Narrative practice provides therapy for the human experience of distensio 
or Geworfenheit.  
 Recalling Heidegger’s three levels of radically above, let us attend, with Ricœur’s 
guidance, to how narrative addresses and is correlated to each level, beginning first at 
the “bottom,” that least authentic plane, “within-timeness,” a state characterized by a 
sense of “thrownness” in which one is at the mercy of the vicissitudes and exigencies 
of a historical process—or at least a set of external situations—beyond one’s control. 
Inherent in this state is a life given to distraction and non-conscious manipulation in 
the play of both the ready-to-hand and the present-to-hand. It is as if one’s attention 
floats and bobs between this object, then that object, between, for example, this text 
message and that social media GIF,87 producing a disorientation which many over the 
last couple of centuries in the West have described as ennui. 
All the categories which, according to Heidegger, 
differentiate within-timeness from the other levels of 
temporality make sense at the ordinary level of story-
telling. The heroes of the narrative "reckon with” time. 
They “have” or “don’t have” time “to” (do this or that). 
Their time may be lost or won. Furthermore, narratives 
show men thrown into circumstances which, in turn, 
deliver them over to … change….”88  
 
 
85 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 141.   
86 Ibid.  
87 A “GIF” is a an extremely brief animated (moving) “image” which is popular on social media 
platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat.  
88 Ricœur, “Time and Narrative,” 108.  
 148 
In these ways, “… narrative activity tells the truth of within-timeness as a genuine 
dimension of human Care.”89 What Ricœur is referring to is the experience which the 
characters/actors/agents in a (his)story undergo: experiences such as passions, 
thrownness, and possibly virtues (such as prudence/phronêsis) and vices. These 
experiences, which count as existential, are also experienced in the imagination of the 
reader. 
B. The temporal development from parts to wholes embodied in story is 
constitutive of human thought itself. 
 In the terms of the knowing process which I have been describing throughout this 
essay, a process which characterizes Plato’s Line and Bonaventure’s days of creation, 
one moves from initial recognition of the objects of natural intellect and the objects of 
the intellectus fidei. At first, these objects are rightly regarded as wholes, which is one 
reason why we call the grasp of them “intellect.” Yet at another level and at a 
subsequent moment, these initial wholes—whole trees, whole visions or theophanies 
(narrated in the Old Testament)—themselves become parts of a larger whole. The 
transition between initial whole and final whole, the movement from wholes to parts 
to whole, is mediated by the process of dianoia. This evolution begins with what 
Ricœur regards as the second function of narrative, which “rescues” the reader from 
within-timeness and ushers her into the higher dimension of historicity.90  
 In this middle stage of the narrative process (situated between the two different 
senses of wholeness), we can discern along with Ricœur yet another transition—itself 
the nature of dianoia—from the episodic to the configurational. For Ricœur the 
episodic dimension grants the “grain of truth” within the bare timeline approach 
(which nevertheless, left to its own devices, perniciously tends to reduce time to a 
spatialized mathêsis), absorbed from the lower stage (within-timeness). The grain of 
truth is “the linear representation, … the ‘then’ and the ‘and then’ which provides an 
answer to the question, ‘What next?’ [and] suggests a relation of exteriority between 
the phases of action” of the plot.91  
 What is crucial to keep in mind here is the organic assimilation of this “episodic” 
quality into a more “configurational” mode in the process of reading, remembering, or 
 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., 109. 
91 Ibid.  
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narrating a story. Here “the configurational arrangement makes the succession of 
events into significant wholes which are the correlated of the [aesthetic] act of 
grouping together.” Although Ricœur does not say it here, one important aspect of 
this “configuration” is that, now, with this higher mode of intellection or reading, the 
smaller events or parts of the action of the story are no longer related in a merely 
external way; now, rather, the events interpenetrate one another into a larger, merged 
meaningful “meta-event.” Further (what Ricœur does say), it is in the midst of this 
process of componendo that the “thought” of the plot can and does emerge. This can 
take the form, for example, of the kind of distilled “lesson” which Joachim Jeremias 
draws out of a parable in the Gospel stories, or of the kind of “moral” that C. S. Lewis 
discusses in “Myth Become Fact.” And yet one must remember that, the validity of 
this “thought”—a “thought” which Aristotle acknowledges as an aspect of mythos in 
the Poetics92—notwithstanding, it is not, nevertheless, identical to the “whole of the 
story” which one finally grasps in the last stage of reading, or in the last of Ricœur’s 
“narrative functions.”  
 This last function, Ricœur argues, is nothing other than “repetition,” and this in at 
multiple senses: repetition of travel (Homer’s Odyssey is the paradigmatic example) 
which undoubtedly also marks Bonaventure’s metaphysical, cosmic peregrinatio, 
above, and repetition of fantasy, in which the heroine is brought “back into a 
primordial space and time which is more akin to the realm of dream than to the sphere 
of action.” Here “the linear chain of action is broken” and “the tale assumes an oneiric 
dimension….” This paranormal episode of challenge and resolution thus mirrors the 
same larger pattern at the overall scale of the tale, and in this way achieves a kind of 
repetition of the overall plot.93 
 And yet, rivetingly, Ricœur provides a third kind of repetition, which, even more 
than the above two, embodies the truth of Final Intellect and evokes a kind of 
horizontal anagogia (see ch. 2, above) of the beatific vision. Here, with Augustine’s 
Confessions serving as the paradigmatic case, “repetition is constitutive of the 
temporal form itself.” 
 
 
 
92 Ricœur also acknowledges this Aristotelian stance: Ibid., 109–10. 
93 Ibid., 112–13.  
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Here the form of travel is interiorized to such a degree 
that there is no longer any privileged place in space to 
return to. It’s a travel “from the exterior to the interior, 
from the interior to the superior” (Ab exterioribus ad 
interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora.)…. The quest has 
been absorbed into the movement by which the hero—if 
we may still call him by that name—becomes who he is. 
Memory, then, is no longer the narrative of external 
adventures, stretching along episodic time. It is itself the 
spiral movement which, through anecdotes and episodes, 
brings us back to the almost motionless constellation of 
potentialities which the narrative retrieves. The end of 
the story is what equates the present with the past, the 
actual with the potential. The hero is what he was. This 
highest form of narrative repetition is the equivalent of 
what Heidegger called Fate—individual fate—or 
destiny—communal destiny—i.e., the complete retrieval 
in resoluteness of the inherited possibilities in which 
Dasein is thrown by birth.94  
 
It is difficult to say if there is any room in Heidegger for such a self-realization as, 
indeed, is envisioned in Augustine. Perhaps one should say that he leaves that 
particular question open and undecidable. Yet, it is clear that Heidegger thinks that 
one necessary condition for such a self-actualization is “being toward death,” or a 
recognition of the limits of one’s life (in a kind of postmodern memento mori) without 
which one cannot even begin to grasp the meaning or even the shape of one’s life as a 
whole.95  
C. Since reality is irreducibly temporal, narrative is the discourse best suited 
to it. 
What the above points—the therapy which applied to “within-timeness” and the 
“dianoetic” transition, through the milieu of composition, to full and final 
wholeness—indicate is that narrative function corresponds to every dimension of 
Heidegger’s (and Augustine’s) temporality, culminating in the realization that 
 
94 Ibid., 
95 I find it interesting and somewhat strange that, in Ricœur’s treatment of this third and final narrative 
function, which can also be regarded as a moment in the reading process, he “skips over” and omits 
what is surely the most basic level of this final moment of wholeness, that complete grasp of an actual 
story, psalm, or other textual discourse that Augustine identifies in Confessions XI. “Suppose I am 
about to recite a psalm which I know…. As the action advances further and further … the psalm as a 
whole [eventually] occurs in its particular pieces and in its individual syllables.” Augustine, 
Confessions, tr. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), XI.xxviii[38] (243). Two 
notes of interest here: this complete grasp of the psalm is—like Ricœur’s three elements—clearly a 
kind of repetition; like Ricœur, Augustine does in this immediate context go on to develop other, 
“higher” forms of repetition (but it remains odd that Ricœur omits this most basic kind).  
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narrative as a discourse is supremely suited to describe or discern the truth about 
reality as temporal. And although this temporality here in view is a uniquely human 
one (for Augustine, Heidegger, and Ricœur)—a potential objection I will address in 
chapter 5 below—this suitability should not be surprising, since Bonaventure, as 
indicated in the quotation about “our metaphysics” above, regards reality as 
fundamentally and irreducibly temporal.  
Conclusion 
 Now that I have provided an account of the (chiastic) structure of the intellect, and 
shown how it entails or implies the necessity of narrative or mythos in an essential 
way, I will describe how Ratzinger’s Bonaventure historicizes this schema. But first, I 
must develop that concomitant byproduct of Bonaventurian dianoia: the 
transformation of what this thirteenth-century “man of desires” insists is the core 
dimension of the human person, namely, the affective dispositions.  
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Chapter 4 
Living without scientia (but not dianoia): faith and the “man of desires”  
Introduction 
 How should the theological thinker who would be authentically Christian think 
about desire? What role does it play in the Christian life, in the human journey toward 
the beatific vision, represented—even if in a proleptic way—by day four? In this 
chapter I address the way Bonaventure and Ratzinger approach this question, with 
specific emphasis on the issue of faith. For faith, according to both thinkers, is not 
simply that which occurs on day two, what I have discussed previously as the 
intellectus fidei: additionally, both thinkers treat it as an “affective disposition,” a 
component of our human constitution which is “located” for both Plato and 
Aristotle—who for all of their differences in this context are in agreement on this 
point—in the middle portion of the soul.1 Indeed, for both of our Christian thinkers 
(Bonaventure and his twentieth-century interpreter), transformation of the affect is 
utterly required for the successful arrival at the ultimate human destination, which we 
can, together with Bonaventure, name “the beatific vision,” “day four,” “the mind 
suspended in contemplation,”2 and what I have also termed, in the context of the 
exitus et reditus pattern of “A—B—A’,” “A’.” 
 
Bonaventure's 
Days 
Plato's 
Line 
Exit & 
Return 
Pattern 
Day 1 Eikasia   
Day 2 Pistis A 
Day 3 Dianoia B 
Day 4 Nous A' 
 
 Consider Plato’s line: at first blush it appears not to address the transformation of 
the affect. In fact if one were to interpret the line as a kind of “eidetic” schema which 
provides a phenomenological description of the workings of human knowing (see my 
 
1 While Aristotle regards the middle part of the soul as the region of orexis or epithumia (both terms 
can be rendered as “desire”), for Plato this “in between” region of the human psyche is specifically the 
home of thumos, or a desire not for bodily goods such as food, but rather for external goods such as 
affection or praise. 
2 This phrase is contained in the title of collations XX and XXI of Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, 
299, 319.  
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Introduction above), then one might argue that it rightly omits any such reference. 
(“What, after all, does emotion have to do with knowledge?” one might want to ask.)  
 And yet, recall what we have said about the third “segment” of the line, that which 
occurs on day three but which, given the combination of moments one and two, forms 
the middle stage of the A–B–A’ pattern. Dianoia—which unlike the events of days 
one and two occurs as a process over time—is redefined by Bonaventure to include 
not just the componere et dividere of an Aristotelian syllogism, but rather the reading 
of and meditating upon the biblical mythos. This is a componere et dividere of a 
different kind: involving the imagination, it engages the heart and emotions of the 
reader—as we learned from Paul Ricœur and C. S. Lewis—thus preparing her for the 
holistic transformation required for the attainment of beatitude.3 Hence we can say 
that the transformation of the affect occurs in this second stage, but as an 
epiphenomenon of sorts, which, while related to the line’s developmental process of 
knowing, “floats on top of it,” as it were. The transformation of the affect is an 
experiential byproduct of dianoia, of the reading of and meditating upon scripture.  
This chapter, then, is something of an excursus, intentionally deviating from the 
strict “schema” of the noetic moments of nous—dianoia—nous (A—B—A’), in order 
to do justice to the holistic dimensions of the human person, which, after all, is 
Bonaventure’s and Ratzinger’s concern.4 To this end I enlist Søren Kierkegaard, who 
offers a description of faith more vivid and penetrating than perhaps anyone else in 
the Christian intellectual tradition. For him faith consists of the movements of 
passion. I aim to draw out a certain parallel between his situation and response, on the 
one hand, and Bonaventure’s on the other (all the while remaining within the general 
hermeneutic lens of Ratzinger). Hence section I is dedicated to the attempt to describe 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of Abraham’s ordeal with Isaac, articulated in his Fear and 
Trembling, as a perspicuous and helpful example of the movements of faith, of “day 
 
3 See David Mosely, Being Deified: Poetry and Fantasy on the Path to God (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress, 2016). Note, also, that even Aristotle in the Poetics, as we saw above, includes dianoia as an 
element within the overall dynamic of the writing and reading of tragedy, thus admitting its connection 
with those more “affective” elements of his treatment, pathos and katharsis. Even the Stagirite, then, 
admits that dianoia plays a role in the engagement of human affect.   
4 For example, in a 1969 article on Gaudium et Spes, Ratzinger wrote that “the organ by which God 
can be seen … [is] the cor purum.” Joseph Ratzinger, “On the Dignity of the Human Person,” in 
Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II 5, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (London: Burns and Oats, 
1969), 155. Or again: “… just as we cannot learn to swim without water, so we cannot learn theology 
without the spiritual praxis in which it lives.” Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, tr. Sister 
Mary Francis McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 322.  
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three” faith. In Section II, I turn to Bonaventure, showing how, like Kierkegaard, he 
also articulates the movements of faith as a way of being, a certain comportment of 
the self which involves the affect.  Before concluding this chapter, I display an 
example from Ratzinger’s corpus in which we discern yet another example of the 
enduring effect of his Bonaventure research undertaken as a young man: what I call 
his “phenomenology of faith” articulated in the introductory portion of his 
Introduction to Christianity.  
I. Kierkegaard: faith as faithful comportment 
Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, the young Danish thinker Søren 
Kierkegaard serves as a “founding rupture”5 in the western tradition, insofar as he 
reacts against the attempt to develop a fully and finally comprehensive system of 
science—against such attempts in general, and against that attempt of Hegel in 
particular.6 In the stream of thought that he initiates, “existence” is now conceived in 
particular as human existence, which is held to require “new categories not found in 
the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be 
understood neither as substances … nor as subject interacting with a world of 
objects.”7 In this way existence as such becomes an issue for Kierkegaard, who 
develops an emphasis on “the single individual.”8 In Fear and Trembling this 
singularity “comes to light at the moment of conflict between ethics and religious 
faith.”9 Important to keep in mind here is that ethics on this view is a form of 
philosophy,10 which regards the individual human life—my life, as it were—as 
meaningful only when, and insofar as, I  
 
 
5 I am following Michel Foucault in this language, “rupture.” See Foucault, Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 4, where he equates ruptures with “interruptions”: 
Beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid, 
homogenous manifestations of a single mind or of a collective 
mentality, beneath the stubborn development of a science striving to 
exist and to reach completion at the very outset, beneath the 
persistence of a particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical 
activity, one [ought now to try] to detect the incidence of 
interruptions. 
6 See Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard and Hegel,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (New 
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), 101–24. 
7 Steven Crowell, “Existentialism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017), Edward 
T. Zalta (ed.), 5, htpps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism. 
8 Ibid., 6. 
9 Ibid., 7. 
10 For philosophy, that is, human action and lived practice are explained in terms of ethics.  
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“raise myself to the universal” by bringing my immediate 
(natural) desires and inclinations under the moral law, 
which represents my “telos” or what I ought to be. In so 
doing I lose my individuality (since the law holds for all) 
but my actions become meaningful in the sense of 
understandable, governed by a norm.11 
 
 Kierkegaard’s famous case study in which he demonstrates that ethics—with 
its conceptual and objective universality—is insufficient for true faith is that of 
Abraham and Isaac, taken from the biblical story contained in Genesis 22. Here ethics 
patently and simply fails to justify or underwrite Abraham’s action of intending (by 
all indications) to sacrifice his son in obedience to God’s command.12 Is Abraham’s 
deed, then, simply and finally unintelligible? What can we say about it that might 
justly commend its legitimacy? Kierkegaard’s answer, developed in his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript,13 is presented in terms of a notion of truth as subjectivity, 
which is another way of identifying “the passion of faith,” discussed and developed in 
Fear and Trembling.14 Many commentators on Kierkegaard emphasize the ways in 
which this posture of faith which he espouses is anti-rational.15 At one level, this is 
understandable, given the nature of Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian polemic.      
 And yet, before articulating Kierkegaardian faith as a kind of comportment, I 
would like to point out two senses in which such a characterization is overly 
simplistic and misses important dimensions of Kierkegaardian faith. First, in terms of 
the schema of the intellect which structurally mirrors the days of creation as 
articulated above, one can just as legitimately stress the intelligibility of faith—
including the faith of Kierkegaard’s Abraham—in terms of Bonaventure’s day two, 
that is, in terms of the intellectus fidei. In this sense, there is a kind of continuity to be 
appreciated between faith (day two) and ratio or dianoia (day three): one organically, 
 
11 Ibid., 7. A good example of this view of morality involving conceptual universalism is Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotle’s “virtue ethic,” which for him involves what he calls “man as a 
functional concept.” MacIntyre, After Virtue, 57–9.  
12 In the same way, it is his inability to cut ties completely with ethics which prevents the 
pseudonymous author, Johannes de Silentio, as we will see, from performing the second movement of 
faith, as is seen in his commitment to duty. 
13 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. & tr. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992).   
14 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, in Fear and Trembling; Repetition, ed. & tr. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), 51. 
15 For example, “… Kierkegaard prioritizes faith to the point that it becomes positively irrational.” 
James Swindal, “Faith and Reason,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sept. 5, 2019,  
https://www.iep.utm.edu/home/about/. 
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as it were, leads to the other. We can regard Kierkegaard’s Abraham as open to reality 
in a way that enables him to recognize God’s voice or God’s will. This is included in 
what it means for him to have faith. This move takes place at a pre-dianoietic stage. 
Hence, admittedly, no rational justification of this posture of faith on the part of the 
one who possesses it is possible. Nor, importantly, is a rational refutation possible, in 
the manner of Kant’s repudiation of Abraham’s deed in his Religion within the Limits 
of Reason Alone.16 Within the Bonaventurian, “phenomenological” framework within 
which mind and world become intelligible, then, Kierkegaard’s distinction between 
faith and reason (here seen as dianoia) makes sense. This is not a rational defense of 
the irrationality of faith; it is an acknowledgement of a formal coherence with 
Bonaventure’s hexaëmeral schema. Kierkegaardian faith assumes the faculty of the 
intellectus fidei; hence it is not, insofar as this is the case, necessarily repugnant to 
rationality.  
 The second sense in which Kierkegaard’s presentation of Abrahamic faith 
might be regarded as not necessarily anti-rational has to do with the particular 
dynamics of Bonaventurian “day three,” as the moment of dianoia (including the 
reading of Scripture) necessarily coupled with its concomitant byproduct, the 
movement and provocation of the affect. In view here is faith precisely as a passion 
(and not merely as the kind of recognition we witness on day two). In other words, the 
faith of Kierkegaard’s Abraham as a passion takes place within the register of day 
three, even as it also presupposes the intellectus fidei of day two. The faith of day two 
is a kind of recognition, then, which is required for the faith of day three, construed as 
a passion of the soul, or more properly, of the heart.17 Its rootedness in, its 
inextricable connection with, “day two” faith, the intellectus fidei, indicates that this 
passion of day three—the engagement of the affect—is not simply antirational. While 
an eidetic reduction alone is not sufficient, not enough to account for the experience 
of being human, what is also true is that the eidetic structure is needed in order to 
ground the passion of faith (“day three” faith) in something objective and determinate. 
 What is needed, in addition to a reductive schematic (no matter how helpful) 
is attentiveness to the human way of being, and not just a way (or process) of knowing 
 
16 Crowell, “Existentialism,” 8. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. & 
tr. Allen Wood and tr. George di Giovanni (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018), 211.  
17 An important section of Fear and Trembling is the “Preliminary Expectoration.” This latter term 
connotes the human chest or the human heart. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 343, n. 2.  
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alone. And for the human being, this “way” will include an appreciation of subjective 
inwardness. Borrowing a relatively minor term from Martin Heidegger, I would like 
to call this subjective inwardness, this Kierkegaardian way of being, “faithful 
comportment,”18 the latter term of which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
means “personal bearing, carriage, demeanor, … behavior.” 
  The first move which Johannes de Silencio—the pseudonym under which 
Kierkegaard wrote Fear and Trembling—makes in order to underline for the reader 
the importance of the believer’s way of being is immediately to inveigh against a 
widespread assumption which held sway in the cultural Zeitgeist of Kierkegaard’s 
Denmark. Notice, that is, that Kierkegaard, not unlike his thirteenth-century 
Franciscan predecessor, is reacting to his cultural situation: it is as if he is surrounded 
by a dry rationalism which suffocates the human spirit. Traceable in Kierkegaard’s 
mind to the kind of hubristic rationalism one finds in Hegel, the widespread belief 
here is that faith is little more than a prelude to systematic rationality, little more than 
a moment which takes place prior to (the “real action” of) rationalistic 
systematization. 
In our age, everyone is unwilling to stop with faith but 
goes further. It perhaps would be rash to ask where they 
are going, whereas it is a sign of urbanity and culture 
for me to assume that everyone has faith, since 
otherwise it certainly would be odd to speak of going 
further. It was different in ancient days. Faith was then 
a task for a whole lifetime, because it was assumed that 
proficiency in believing is not acquired in days or in 
weeks.19  
 
This popular posture, taken for granted by his peers, stands, Kierkegaard thinks, in 
diametric opposition to that of Abraham, the “father of the faith,” about whom it is 
said that he “never got beyond faith.”20 Kierkegaardian faith, that is, is a task or a 
 
18 Comportment (Verhaltung) for Heidegger is a kind of relation or relatedness or way of being related 
to various things in the world. Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. Albert 
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), 64, 346–7. For Heidegger the most fundamental 
objects of Dasein’s comportment consist in the “ready-to-hand,” but in a religious context like 
Kierkegaard’s one could also speak of one’s inward comportment to God, or inward comportment in 
the presence of God. Borrowing this term from Heidegger, one can interpret Kierkegaard’s description 
of Abraham’s example as a meditation on the comportment that is religious faith. 
19 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 7. 
20 Ibid., 23.  
 158 
project beyond which one never progresses. It is not properly regarded as a “prior 
moment” at all. 
 In making this point, however, have I not proved too much? After all, in the 
paragraphs above we saw that, according to Bonaventure’s eidetic schema, faith in its 
two different senses can be located on day two (as the intellectus fidei) or day three 
(as comportment). And yet, surely Bonaventure envisions the faithful believer, the 
mature human being, the Franciscan brother to whom his collationes are addressed, as 
progressing beyond days two and three, on to day four, imagined here as the moment 
of mystical contemplation which finds its ultimate expression in the beatific vision? 
Two responses are in order to vindicate my claim of correlation between Kierkegaard 
and Bonaventure.  
 First, one must appreciate Kierkegaard’s sustained emphasis that it is in the 
earthly life of the human being that there is no progressing beyond faith. This 
negative limit applies only in the “here and now.”21 After all, the Dane stresses this 
qualification in his literary objections against the same “system” of Hegel: 
Existence itself is a system—for God, but it cannot be a 
system for any existing spirit. System and conclusiveness 
correspond to each other, but existence is the very 
opposite…. Existence must be annulled in the eternal 
before the system concludes itself.22  
 
That the limit of faith, beyond which the person (or knight) of faith never moves, 
applies to this life is consistent with Kierkegaard’s description of Abraham’s faith, 
that it was not a faith in some “afterlife” or some “eternal beyond.” Rather for him 
faith is “for this life—faith that he would grow old in this country, be honored among 
his people, blessed by posterity, and unforgotten in Isaac….”23  
 We see this same refrain in Johannes’ adulation of “the princess,” the object of the 
knight’s love and affection: 
 
 
21 Kierkegaard makes it clear that the knight of faith lives not for some post-mortem “heaven,” but for 
the here and now. Now that Christ has come, the “Abrahams” of our time are “happy men” able to “get 
the world back” by virtue of faith. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 50. (This is a clear example of 
how Kierkegaard is rightly regarded as a Christian historicist: thanks to the developments of 
redemptive history, Christians today are in a fundamentally different situation than the “strangers and 
aliens”—including Abraham himself—of Hebrews 11.) 
22 Kierkegaard, Postcript, 118, 122 (quoted on Westphal, 102). 
23 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 20.  
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And yet, I repeatedly say, it must be wonderful to get the 
princess [back again]. The knight of resignation who 
does not say this is a deceiver; he has not had one single 
desire, and he has not kept his desire young in his pain.24 
 
Again, we see the importance of this point in Abraham’s conviction that he would 
have Isaac again, that Isaac would remain his son, in this lifetime.25 In this lifetime, 
and in this world, as the metaphor of the ballet dancer alighting back down to the 
ground after a great leap also indicates: 
… to be able to come down in such a way that 
instantaneously one seems to stand and walk, to chance 
the leap into the life of walking, absolutely to express the 
sublime in the pedestrian—only that knight can do it, and 
this is the one and only marvel.26  
 
 Both the princess and the ballet dancer are here examples of such temporal 
finitude, and here we gain an insight into why Bonaventure, determined to affirm 
history and this-worldly redemption, gives qualified approval to Joachim of Fiore, 
who insists on an eschatological redemption wholly realized in the history of this 
world (as we will observe in the next chapter). The biblical example of Abraham, as 
Kierkegaard poetically indicates, does indeed teach that faith concerns the things of 
this world: a posterity continued for generations in the form of a chosen people (Gen. 
15), the promised land, Isaac the son of promise. This is not the intellect of faith, but 
rather the comportment of faith, which never denies an intensely radical care and 
concern (Sorge) for this world and the things of this world. 
 Secondly, Kierkegaard’s articulation of the comportment of faith, like 
Bonaventure’s appetitive formation which occurs concomitantly with the dianoia of 
day three, finally gives way to a higher performance of holistic singularity (parallel to 
day four, or nous on Plato’s line). The knight must, in order to perform his movement, 
“concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning of actuality into one 
single desire.”27 (Insisting on and embracing this “all or nothing” quality of life, he 
 
24 Ibid., 50. Kierkegaard is here relying on a theological phenomenon which is related to a kind of 
historicism, that of progressive revelation: as an agent in a particular phase of redemptive history, 
Abraham did not know about the new heavens and the new earth, because this doctrine had not yet 
been revealed. 
25 Ibid., 36.  
26 Ibid., 41.  
27 Ibid., 43. 
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does not “diversify his risk” as the “shrewd financiers”28 do, since to do so would be 
to give in to the kinds of distractions which characterize the inauthentic life.) 
 Moreover, this culminating moment of singularity, Kierkegaard emphasizes, is 
distinctively noetic (even if it remains a “desire”). Johannes argues that the knight 
must “have the power to concentrate the conclusion of all his thinking into one act of 
consciousness,”29 a Kierkegaardian articulation of the “simplicity on the far side of 
complexity” that I have been calling “final intellect.” Taking place after the work of 
dianoia, it consists in one single, conclusive act of the mind.  
 Despite his invectives against arid reason of the Hegelian variety, Kirkegaard 
argues that this “moment of singular consciousness” takes place on the far side of 
both some kind of formation of desire and rational thought30—that is, on the far side 
of both of these time-laden processes of day three. Without both of these elements, 
Johannes argues, the knight’s soul is “dissipated in multiplicity from the beginning.”31 
This language resonates not only with Augustinian themes (“land of dissimilarity;” 
distentio of the soul) but also with the Heideggerian ones we noticed in chapter three 
above: surely this mode of being is one of inauthenticity, akin to Heideggerian 
“within-timeness” or average everydayness.32 Such is the resonance of Kierkegaard’s 
description: 
He will continually be running errands in life and never 
enter into eternity, for the very moment he approaches 
it, he will suddenly discover he has forgotten something 
and therefore must go back.33 
 
Such is the life, Johannes thinks, of the “croaking … frogs of the swamp.”34 
 In making his signature move of infinite resignation, this knight, embodied in the 
person of Johannes de Silencio himself, comports himself in nonidentical repetition. 
He will act in a manner unlike these reptilian “lower natures,” which forget 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Note the language of rationality (not just emotional comportment): “… the knight will have the 
power to concentrate the conclusion of all his thinking into one act of consciousness.” Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 We considered this notion of “within-timeness” above, in section VI of chapter 3. Ricœur, “Time and 
Narrative,” 108. 
33 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 43. 
34 Ibid., 41–42.  
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themselves and become something completely new,35 thus failing to perform any 
genuine repetition at all. To take a related example, 
The butterfly, for example, completely forgets that it 
was a caterpillar, and may in turn so completely forget 
that it was a butterfly that it may become a fish.36  
 
The knight of faith, on the contrary, will nonidentically repeat by recollecting:  
The knight, then, will recollect everything, but this 
recollection is precisely the pain, and yet in infinite 
resignation he is reconciled with existence.37  
 
 Such is this task of a lifetime, beyond which the Christian never gets, that is 
Kierkegaardian faith, this “way of being” which I characterize as faithful 
comportment. Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, however, displays one final 
specific facet of spiritual comportment, instructive in approaching Bonaventure’s 
treatment of desire in the Hexaëmeron: its connection with the reading of Scripture, 
the benefit of which is distributed in a radically democratic way, without regard for 
privilege, status, or learning. The office of the knight of faith, that is, is available to 
anyone and everyone, regardless of whether she has mastered Hegel’s system. It is no 
respecter of persons.  
 It is through scripture reading that one learns the movements of faith. Such is the 
point of the four Exordia,38 designed to provoke within the reader various experiences 
in response to alternative scenarios imagined on the basis of Genesis 22. Each of these 
fragments either playfully refashions the gist of the pericope, or radically “reads 
between the lines” of the Hebrew narrative, bringing out dimensions of the story 
which go undescribed in the sparse, or paratactic, character of Hebrew narrative.39 On 
the basis of the “primal, lyrical validity”40 of the original story and into these crevices 
the imagination is free to roam, inventing various scenarios which prick and prod the 
emotions of the reader.  
 
35 Ibid., 43. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 9–14.  
39 Parataxis, a quality of Hebrew narrative, is the syntactic resistance to clausal subordination. The vast 
majority of clauses in Hebrew narrative are “conjunctive”: linked together by such conjunctions as 
“and,” “or,” or “but.” (The Hebrew waw [ו] does most of this grammatical work, and can be translated 
as either “but” or “and.”)  On the parataxis of Hebrew narrative, see Meir Sternberg, The Poetics of 
Biblical Narrative (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
40 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 34.  
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 In fact, despite the fact that Johannes de Silentio can make only the first of the two 
Abrahamic movements, that of infinite resignation, he nevertheless models how this 
transformative process works. Inspired by Abraham’s example, Johannes himself 
performs an exercise of comportment (whether or not he is able to make the second 
move of faith—infinite resignation itself may be regarded as a profound act of 
existential comportment) as he performs dianoia, that is, as he reads the mythos of 
Scripture, precisely in the story of Genesis 22. Recall that for Bonaventure’s project 
in the Hexaëmeron, the reading of Scripture—which even the simplest worker in a 
garden can do, even if only by means of the parish preacher’s sermon—is the kind of 
“work”—over and against mere academic scientia—which is required for progress to 
the ultimate destination of beatitude. By reading the story of Scripture, Johannes de 
Silentio, together with the reader of Fear and Trembling himself, is making precisely 
this progress, or at least is being enabled to do so. When one recalls that the title of 
the work itself is lifted from the text of Scripture, this point is underlined.41  
 Further, any consideration of these movements of comportment in Fear and 
Trembling, however, should emphasize that, for Kierkegaard, this comportment is 
work. It involves and requires a kind of struggle. Here, in “the world of the spirit,” 
Kierkegaard argues, things are different than in “the external and visible world” in 
which (ironically, and despite the old “adage,” likely bandied about by those in 
power) it is not the case that “only the one who works gets the bread.”42 
 In protest against this Kierkegaardian law, however, “there is a knowledge that 
presumptuously wants to introduce into the world of spirit” the alternative “law”—
identical to that which holds in the external world—that one need not work, but that it 
is enough to know: this position “believes that it is enough to know what is great—no 
other work is needed.”  Indeed the Danish poet-philosopher continues: “There were 
countless generations who knew the story of Abraham by heart, word for word, but 
how many did it render sleepless?”43  
 
 
 
 
41 On the biblical provenance of the phrase “fear and trembling,” see Phil 2:12. 
42 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 27. 
43 Ibid., 28.  
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I do not attribute per se any more worth to the difficulty 
that brought the shrewd person [to the point of being 
able to make the movement of faith] than to the point at 
which the simplest and most unsophisticated person 
arrives more easily.44 
 
Again, we see the same indifference to the worldly wise versus the simple a few 
pages later:  
Fortunate is the person who can make these movements! 
He does the marvelous, and I shall never be weary of 
admiring him; it makes no difference to me whether he is 
… a professor of philosophy or a poor servant girl….45  
 
To summarize, then, what we find in Fear and Trembling is a presentation of an 
inward “way of being” which is not necessarily in opposition to reason (considered as 
dianoia), and yet which, when taken seriously, reveals the poverty of any approach to 
wisdom (or even knowledge) which reduces the human person to the merely rational 
(as if the dianoia of day three were the “be all and end all”), or even to the narrowly 
noetic (as if the eidetic schema itself were the thing that really mattered above all 
else). This way of being, as we have seen, consists in such movements as renunciation 
of the world, re-embracing of the world (on the basis of God’s promises), repetition 
through recollection, and formation through reading or engagement with mythos, each 
element of which concerns the emotional dimension of human affect. The advocacy 
of this stance, moreover, occurs in both cases within a specific situation of polemic. 
What is most striking of all, finally, is how Kierkegaard’s picture stands in 
conspicuous confirmation of Bonaventure’s schema. In both cases, the affective work 
of comportment takes place after the intellectus fidei, concomitantly with dianoia, and 
before—and as a prerequisite for—a climactic moment of intellectual, yet also 
holistic, achievement.  
II. Comportment as Bonaventurian compunction 
As we turn our attention now to the Seraphic Doctor, we witness a similar 
emphasis on comportment, yet one with the distinct character of compunction, a term 
that recurs in the Seraphic Doctor’s works, as we will see below. Writing in the 
 
44 Ibid., 32. 
45 Ibid., 38. 
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context of Bonaventure’s “flowing tears, narrative transitions, and spiritual stages,”46 
Ann W. Astell offers an insightful presentation of Bonaventurian spiritual 
comportment, largely through the lens of the spiritual senses, a notion which connects 
inward work of spiritual comportment with the outward life of the body, giving 
expression to the former (the inner) in terms of the latter (the outer). This same outer 
expression of an inward reality, Astell shows us, is for Bonaventure also manifested 
by the bodily function of tears. Indeed, in his Legenda Maior on the life of St. 
Francis, Bonaventure inserts a paragraph which describes “Francis’ freely flowing 
tears” and which emphasizes the unity of body and soul in the spiritual life of 
compunction:  
Francis’ “purity of heart and body” [is] preserved by a 
“continuous flood of [physical] tears,” by which Francis 
“cleanse[s] the eyes of his soul,” through which he can 
“see God.”47 
 
Astell associates this pivotal passage in the Legenda Maior with a similar one from 
the Reduction of the Arts, where the mystical friar observes that, just as the body is 
joined to the soul through “the medium of moisture, air, and warmth,” so too the soul 
is joined to God only when it has been rendered “moist with tears of compunction and 
spiritual love, made spiritual by contempt of earthly possessions, and enkindled with 
the desire of … its own Beloved.”48 
 One towering twentieth-century Catholic thinker who shares a similar stance with 
Astell is none other than Hans Urs von Balthasar. Astell brings the Swiss theologian 
into her discussion of Bonaventurian compunction as it continues to be mediated by 
the example of the Poverello. On the united activity of body and soul in this ascetic 
compunction of Bonaventure’s, this spiritual comportment, Ratzinger’s fellow 
ressourcement theologian writes,  
 
 
 
46 These terms form the title of the fourth of five sections in the article. Ann W. Astell, “A Discerning 
Smell: Olfaction among the Senses in St. Bonaventure’s Long Life of St. Francis,” Franciscan Studies 
67 (2009): 121–6. 
47 Bonaventure, The Major Legend of St. Francis, tr. Ewart Cousins, in Francis of Assisi: Early 
Documents, 3 vols., ed. Regis J. Armstrong, J.A., Wayne Hellman, and William J. Short (New York: 
New City Press, 2000), 2:560–61. Quoted in Astell, “Olfaction,” 121–22. 
48 Bonaventure, Reduction of the Arts, tr. Hayes, O.F.M., 23, 24 (locs. 1030, 1048 of 1174); Astell, 
“Olfaction,” 122.  
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One cannot suppose that the outer and inner senses are 
two faculties separate from one another: rather, they 
have their common root in the single intellectual-
material nature of man, in which the general character 
of seeing, hearing, tasting, and so forth is based.49 
 
In this same context Balthasar issues yet another warning to any would-be interpreter 
of Bonaventure against the temptation to read him in an overly-“spiritualized” (or 
overly disembodied) way:  
 
For Bonaventure, man is essentially the midpoint and 
summary of the world; this point must be made against 
anyone who would interpret his doctrine as one-sidedly 
spiritual, as flight from the world, as ecstatic.50 
 
Balthasar’s emphasis here on the this-worldly posture of Bonaventure certainly 
coheres not only with the this-worldly emphasis we saw in Kierkegaard, but also with 
the Franciscan friar’s historiographical insistence that God’s redemption of his 
creation is unfolding in and through human temporal development, an insistence into 
which we will delve more deeply in the next chapter. 
 One final Balthasar quotation nicely leads us into our consideration of 
Bonaventure’s text of the Hexaëmeron itself, suggesting in advance that this work of 
spiritual (while embodied) compunction, reminiscent of Kierkegaard, can be viewed 
as the formation which transforms one into a “man of desires”: 
[The inwardly cultivated spiritual senses] develop in … 
the whole middle area of sapiential contemplation, 
which has as its object the total form of the … Logos. It 
is here that the “eyes of faith” and all the other spiritual 
senses … are brought into action. But it is also here that 
they have their asceticism, for their finality is not within 
themselves, and they are not to be cultivated for the 
sake of their own pleasures but are measured against 
their object, which essentially is the Crucified, who is 
put to death in all the senses.51 
 
 
49 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. II—Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles, 
ed. & tr. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, and Brian McNiel, C.R.V. (London: T&T Clark, 1984), 
319. Cited in Astell, “Olfaction,” 124.  
50 Balthasar, Theological Style, 319.  
51 Balthasar, Theological Style, 325, in Astell, “Olfaction,” 125.   
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The life of spiritual compunction, which takes place in the moment of “day three” and 
occurs in and through the reading of the mythos of Scripture, is here seen in its 
context of the “middle portion” of the soul. Between higher reason and the lower 
regions of our brutish nature, Bonaventurian transformation is here confirmed to be a 
matter of the affective dispositions of thumos.  
Gesturing toward a resonance which once again reminds us of Johannes’ knight of 
resignation, Astell writes that “ … Francis first renounced the world [and] took up the 
cross through an austere life.”52 And yet what’s also true is that later, at the end of his 
life, “he burned with a great desire to return to the humility he practiced at the 
beginning.”53 These words remind us both that the work of appetitive formation is the 
work of a lifetime (an emphasis we saw in Kierkegaard) and that it is no stranger to 
the kind of pain—never far from the physiological—of compunctio.54  
With the hermeneutic insights of Kierkegaard resonating in our minds, 
supplemented by the emphasis on compunction from Astell and Balthasar, we are 
now in a position, as we turn to the Hexaëmeron itself, to appreciate the Seraphic 
Doctor’s mystical vocabulary of desire, which saturates the work from beginning to 
end, now regarding this language as a mode of medieval compunction.  
Since we have already emphasized that, for Bonaventure, scientia without desire 
is insufficient for the attainment of full sapientia or contemplative vision, we will not 
redo the bidding on that point here. Instead, I would like to draw our attention to the 
way Bonaventure in this, his last piece of textual output, continues the themes of 
comportment and compunction we have seen above. He launches this project at the 
beginning of the work, in the prologue to the days of creation. There, very much 
writing in a “monastic mode” similar to St. Bernard, and not so much in a “scholastic 
mode” à la Peter Lombard, Bonaventure enlists the apostle James55 to remind us that 
the sapiential light “coming down from the Father of Lights” makes “the affective 
power [affectivum] delightful [amoenam].”56 Still in the earliest stages of his work, 
Bonaventure is intent to begin with his sapiential end in mind: Porta sapientiae est 
 
52 Astell, “Olfaction,” 126.  
53 Ibid. 
54 As Jean Leclercq points out, the provenance of this medieval term is the practice of medicine, and its 
sense was never totally removed from its physiological origins. Leclercq, The Love of Learning, 29.   
55 See James 1:17.  
56 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, II.1 (336).  
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concupiscentia eius et vehemens desiderium. This door—which Bonaventure 
identifies as Christ—is “a yearning for [wisdom] and a powerful desire.”57 
Moving beyond the prologue into the actual sequence of creation days or visions, 
Bonaventure saturates each of the four with the language of spiritual sense, similar to 
that above. His sensation of choice? Not vision (as for Gregory), not olfaction (as for 
Astell); it is taste. Time and again, Bonaventure sensually celebrates the delights of 
mystical ecstasy, describing it as sapidus, or “tasty.”   
Before elaborating on this language of gustation, however, two elements in 
confirmation of previous points should be noticed, both occurring under the auspices 
of day one. First, Bonaventure argues that the affective dispositions must be 
“straightened out” (oportet affectus ordinatos rectificare) by the classical virtues. This 
confirms a point made above, that even before the advent in history of faith and 
Scripture (the two subsequent moments of days two and three), here in day one we 
can witness something like a low-grade formation of desire, in the manner of 
Aristotle’s virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and prudence. The import here is 
the glimpse into Bonaventure’s historicism: as we will develop in the next chapter, he 
envisions day one not only as a moment in the mind’s structural phenomenology of 
eidos, but also as an epoch of Heilsgeschichte (historia salutis), in the spirit that 
Ratzinger brings out and which motivated his Habilitationsschrift in the first place. 
The six days are not simply, that is, intellectual or eidetic at the level of individual 
gnoseology; they are also historical at the level of the human race and human culture, 
indeed of the created order as a whole.  
Secondly, however, even here at the register of natural reason (vision one), 
Bonaventure intuits and discerns that nature is already graced. Indeed, to attain the 
goal of human self-realization, which follows on the heels of appetitive sanctification 
or formation, one must ask. One must petition for an additional donum to be granted. 
“Woe to you,” Bonaventure admonishes, as if rebuking his Parisian colleagues who 
are enamored with natural philosophy alone and on its own terms, “who do not ask.”58 
Why should they ask, after all, if nature and its non-revealed truth horizon are both 
autonomous and ultimate? Here we see Bonaventure’s acknowledgement that full 
sapiential beatitude is inherently a gift, the result, at the end of the day, not of human 
 
57 Ibid., II.2 (336).  
58 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XII.17 (180). 
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striving or achievement or discovery, but of gratuitous grace (albeit always mediated, 
for Bonaventure, by creation or nature).  
With this initial material behind us, let us turn to Bonaventure’s language in praise 
of the palate. Now in day two, the Seraphic Doctor plays with the sense of the Latin 
sapere, which can mean either “to know” or “to taste.” In this context he focuses on 
the scriptural image of the divine word as a tongue: 
… the … Scripture is a tongue, hence: Sweetmeats and 
milk are under your tongue—how sweet to my palate are 
your promises, sweeter than honey to my mouth!59 This 
tongue enjoys the taste of food, wherefore these same 
Scriptures are compared to loaves of bread that are 
pleasant to the taste.60 
 
Item, est lingua, unde mel et lac sub lingua eius. Quam 
dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel ori meo! 
Haec lingua eibos saporat; unde haec Scriptura 
comparatur panibus, qui habent saporem et reficiunt.61 
 
 Again in vision/day three—dealing with not just trees and seeds, but with tasty 
fruit—Bonaventure, in no less than four distinct contexts, rhapsodizes effusively with 
the language of taste. In the first section of collation XVIII, he considers the all-
important multiformes theoriae not here as seeds, but as fruit which not only feed the 
soul, but, when enjoyed by the affective dispositions, are “tasty” (sapidus). In section 
3 of the same collation he reiterates that these theoriae “delight both the sight and the 
taste.” They “sustain the intellect by their beauty, and the affective dispositions by 
their sweetness.” Bonaventure emphasizes the dual sensory character—both vision 
and taste—of these fruits (thereby confirming the twin processes which get performed 
on day three: progress in the work of ratio which pushes forward to conclusiveness, 
and the concomitant formation of the affections by the wooing and satisfaction of 
desire). Finally, Bonaventure associates this delicious fruit with that of the tree of life 
(from Genesis two), again referring to the interpretive theoriae of Scripture as they 
proliferate historically, and as they pertain to the affections.62 Indeed, “the better 
 
59 Ct. 4:11; Ps. 118:103. 
60 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XII.17 (181).  
61 Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XII.17 (387).  
62 Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, XVIII.25 (279). 
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Scripture is understood, the more faith is increased, and hence it is the one food of the 
affective dispositions.”63   
 Finally, on the climactic day four we get Bonaventure’s two most dramatic 
statements regarding the transformation of affect. In the context of this proleptic 
instantiation of the beatific vision, which is the “intelligence suspended through 
contemplation” (intelligentiae per contemplationem suspensae),64 Bonaventure 
reiterates that the prerequisite for such mystical contemplation, that activity of final 
intellect, is intense desire: only “the man of desires” (vir desideriorum) may have it. 
Why, Bonaventure rhetorically asks, would one desire it in the first place? Because, 
he waxes, it is so tasty (sapidus).65  
 At the end of the entire work, Bonaventure returns to that lachrymose theme 
adumbrated by Astell above: the tears of desire. In this case, however, it appears that 
they are the joyful tears of God, into whom his people will on that eschatological day 
be absorbed or at least incorporated:  
… the incomprehensible consolation, when you 
consider that God will glorify both body and soul, in 
order that they be absorbed and inebriated by the 
heavenly dew.66  
 
In short, affective desire is so important for Bonaventure that he deals with it on 
each of the four days or visions of Genesis one contained in the Hexaëmeron. Yet, in 
terms of the schema itself, its interpenetration with the story of Scripture aligns 
affective transformation most properly with day three, characterized as it is by the 
mythos of Scripture.   
III. Ratzinger’s analytic of Christian Glaube 
 I now enlist Ratzinger in confirmation of this necessary attention to existential 
comportment, his own articulation of the Christian “way of being” that for him 
comprises Glaube.  In what follows we will see that he agrees with Kierkegaard and 
Bonaventure: faith is not just the intellectus fidei—crucial though that be—but also 
that manner of comportment which involves the life of the affect.  
 
 
63 Ibid., XVIII.14. (274). 
64 See the title to collatio XX. Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, 299; Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, 
424. 
65 Ibid.; Bonaventure, Six Days, tr. de Vinck, 299 (XX.1). 
66 Ibid., 371 (XXIII.10). 
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A. Ratzinger’s phenomenology of faith 
 In the lengthy introductory portion (“I believe—Amen”) to his Introduction to 
Christianity Ratzinger initially frames the issues with a discussion of doubt (Zweifel) 
and belief (Glaube). What is interesting here is that he defines both terms negatively: 
doubt is a nagging, existential gadfly of which the believer cannot seem ever to rid 
himself. So also for the nonbeliever or the atheist, who cannot ever seem to insulate 
himself from the recurring possibility that the realm of the supernatural exists (and 
that we have been shown this truth by means of revelation). In other words, Ratzinger 
is using these terms—“doubt” and “belief”—in a non-Cartesian way: doubt here is 
not systematic and belief is not “unjustified but possibly true opinion.” Instead, they 
are both threats which undermine the safety of a (purportedly) settled position which 
would allow the thinker/human to rest, as it were, in unencumbered comfort. For 
Ratzinger, then, doubt and belief operate at the level of the existential.67 
 Of special note in this section of the book is Ratzinger’s counterpositioning of 
faith or belief as that which stands over against nihilism. One sees this in the 
experience of Thérèse of Lisieux: 
… in what is apparently a flawless interlocking world 
someone here suddenly catches a glimpse of the abyss 
lurking—even for St. Thérèse—under the firm structure 
of supporting conventions. In a situation like this, what 
is in question is not … dogma. Wherever one looks, only 
the bottomless pit of nothingness can be seen.68 
 
This terrifying, lurking abyss is also glimpsed in a play from Paul Claudel, in which 
the sailor protagonist (also a Jesuit missionary) finds himself, after having 
experienced the demolition of his ship at the hands of pirates, “drifting on [a] piece of 
wood through the raging waters of the ocean.”69 It turns out that this piece of wood 
symbolizes the cross of Christ, and this protagonist finds himself “fastened to the 
 
67 In illustration of these existential threats, which dialectically challenge the safety of both the believer 
and the secular nonbeliever, Ratzinger offers four examples: the dramatic and humorous story from 
Kierkegaard (also taken up by Harvey Cox) of the clown announcing danger in the midst of a burning 
village, the persistent doubts of St. Thérèse of Lisieux, Paul Claudel’s Soulier de Satin, and a vignette 
of Martin Buber in which a secular skeptic is arrested by the simple “But perhaps it is true after all” of 
a wise Rabbi in contemplation. Such illustrations—together with Ratzinger’s emphasis that for both 
stances the dialectical “perhaps” of the opposite position is “oppressive”—indicate that these 
considerations are far more than merely theoretical.  
68 Ratzinger, Introduction, 43.  
69 Ibid.  
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cross—with the cross fastened to nothing, drifting over the abyss.”70 For Ratzinger, 
“the situation of the contemporary believer could hardly be more accurately and 
impressively described.”71 For the Bavarian theologian, then, contemporary faith 
which would be authentic can truly be described as “a hair’s breadth from nihilism,” 
and for him as for Thérese and the Jesuit missionary in the story, our situation is one 
that is not abstract, but fraught with existential drama. 
 As Ratzinger turns, in section two of his introduction to the work, to an exposition 
of the Apostles’ Creed, which has as its provenance both a concrete, historical 
situation as well as a specific ritual context (that of baptism72), he stresses the first 
word of the Creed, the credo, which points for Ratzinger to the ultimate kernel of 
Christianity, “that it is a belief,” that “the Christian should describe [his] attitude 
toward reality as being that of ‘belief’” or, as the German term Glaube can also be 
rendered, faith.73 The goal of the Creed—as difficult as this is in the modern world—
is for the “schema” of the Creed to be filled with “the flesh and blood of the personal 
‘I.’”74 Nothing could be further from the truth, for Ratzinger, than Christian faith as 
bare assent to propositional truth, as reduced to the life of reason or even the intellect 
alone.  
 When it comes to a definition (Wesensbestimmung75) of faith, however, the first 
plank Ratzinger lays down is its nature as essentially unseen. What this amounts to is 
a decision on the part of man, which, in a manner unique among all natural creatures, 
involves a “turning back,” or a “con-version.”76 Away from what does one need to 
turn? Away from our natural inclination to “the visible, to what [one] can take in his 
hand and hold as his own.”77 This is so true that it leads Ratzinger to formulate his 
first definition of faith: “Indeed belief is the conversion in which man discovers that 
he is following an illusion if he devotes himself only to the tangible.”78  
 
70 Ibid., 43–4.  
71 Ibid., 44.  
72 Indeed, “baptism” is the second of three terms in the German subtitle to the work, apparently omitted 
in English: “Bekenntnis—Taufe—Nachfolge” (“Commitment—Baptism—Discipleship”). 
73 Ibid., 48–49. 
74 Ibid., 49. 
75 The title of this section includes the phrase “provisional attempt at a definition of belief” 
(“Wessensbestimmung des Glaubens”). Ratzinger, Introduction, 47; Ratzinger, Einführung, 61. 
76 Ratzinger, Introduction, 51.  
77 Ibid, 51.  
78 Ibid., 51. 
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 Yet precisely because faith stands in opposition to our natural inclinations, it for 
this very reason requires the utmost effort of man in terms of the comportment of 
compunction.    
It has always been a decision calling on the depths of 
existence, a decision that in every age demanded a 
turnabout by man that can only be achieved by an effort 
of the will.79 
 
 In the next section, Ratzinger shows how, in the modern period after the 
Enlightenment, the situation for believing man is even more difficult. Not only must 
he “fight against the grain” of his natural inclinations of vision and mental grasping, 
but, with the demise of tradition (and its transmutation into “progress”80), he must 
struggle against the feeling or assumption in modern culture that the Christian faith is 
outdated or obsolete.   
 The modern world has seen many attempts on the part of Christian thinkers to try 
to ameliorate this tension, to attempt to “update” the faith in various ways that would 
make it more amenable to modern progress.81 Yet Ratzinger thinks that these attempts 
fail to admit the fundamental commitment to the past, to what (in Foucauldian 
language) might be considered the founding rupture of the Christian tradition, which 
is the historical appearance of the person and work of Christ. Even though Ratzinger 
does not use the precise term in this present context, one could say that his view 
supports a repetition of the founding rupture.  
What I mean is this: Christian belief is not merely 
concerned, as one might first suspect from all the talk of 
belief or faith, with the eternal, which as the “entirely 
other” would remain completely outside the human 
world and time; on the contrary, it is much more 
concerned with God in history, with God in man.82  
 
With this emphasis on history and Incarnation, Ratzinger redirects our attention from 
a timeless God (valid though that focus be) to an event which happened in the past, 
and which thus calls for the ongoing re-performance of both its original primordial 
occurrence as well as its historical repetitions.  
 
79 Ibid., 52. Italics mine.  
80 Ibid., 53.  
81 Razinger speaks of an interpretation of Christianity, that, “by all kinds of twists and turns … no 
longer offends anybody.” Ibid., 56. 
82 Ibid., 54.  
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 This emphasis on what Ratzinger calls “the ineradicable positivity of Christianity” 
confirms and reiterates the basic contours of the Habilitation research: that 
Bonaventure’s commitment to the historia salutis or Heilsgeschichte takes precedence 
over the deductive and timeless airtightness of scientia, Aristotelian or otherwise.83 
Even though he here does not invoke the notion of mythos or story, we can see that 
when history is viewed in the sense we laid out in chapter three, that is, when we 
regard it as constituted by an imaginative narrative, a coherent picture emerges: it is 
history in this sense which is able to be repeated, à la thinkers such as Pickstock and 
Péguy. Since what is repeated, then, is a mythos, it summons the affective dispositions 
in the same ways we have described above. 
 In sum, we see in Ratzinger’s treatment of Glaube that he does justice both to the 
eidetic dimension—the intellectus fidei which is identifiable on the schema of 
days/visions—and to the existential dimension: an existential way of being which 
stands in vivid contrast to the merely theoretical. As Ratzinger turns now to one 
specific issue in the Creed, he articulates both sides of die Glaube even more 
effectively. 
B. “Amen” (both Hebraic and creedal) as existential ground of knowledge 
 Ratzinger’s next move is to rehearse a brief but penetrating historical genealogy 
of our modern western intellectual climate, which moves from verum est ens (for 
premodern thinkers, both Christian and pagan) through verum est factum (beginning 
with Vico), the notion that we can grasp the cause—so important for Aristotelian 
epistêmê—only of what we as humans make or construct, to the contemporary view 
that verum est faciendum. This last stance manifests itself in twin versions of 
“makeability”: both Marx’s “so far philosophers have merely interpreted the world in 
various ways; it is necessary to change it”84 and the method of the natural sciences, 
which insists that epistemic certainty comes only through the repeatably 
experimental.85 
 Yet Ratzinger’s sole motivation for this genealogical rendition is to identify a 
contrasting foil against which to view authentic Christian faith. It is not that these 
positions of truth as factum and faciendum are simply wrong (nor, also, is the 
 
83 Bernard McGinn names this distinction as the ordo historiae versus the ordo scientiae. McGinn, 
Calabrian Abbot, 213. 
84 Ibid., 63.  
85 Ibid., 64.  
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historical consciousness which emerged in the west immediately prior to this view). 
Rather, Ratzinger’s agenda here is grander: it is to show that the dialectic of “know-
make” as a whole is inferior to Christian (though, in some sense, originally Hebrew) 
binary of “stand-understand.” This latter binary, in turn, confirms yet again that for 
Ratzinger a kind of self-comportment is essential to authentic faith.  
 Ratzinger finds his grounding for this alternative binary in both the Hebrew and 
Greek—that is, the Septuagint—versions of Isa. 7:9b: “If you will not believe // surely 
you shall not be established.” Ratzinger’s translation reads: “Wenn ihr nicht glaubt 
(wenn ihr euch nicht an Jahwe festhaltet), dann werdet ihr keinen Halt haben.” As he 
notes, both clauses translate the same verb, נמא  (amen), which occurs twice in the 
original text: 
The root word ‘mn (amen)86 embraces a variety of 
meanings whose interplay and differentiation go to make 
up the subtle grandeur of this sentence. It includes the 
meanings truth (Wahrheit), firmness (Festigkeit), firm 
ground (fester Grund), ground (Boden), and furthermore 
the meanings loyalty (Treue), to trust (trauen), entrust 
oneself (sich anvertrauen), take one’s stand on 
something (sich auf etwas stellen), believe in something 
(an etwas glauben); thus faith in God appears as a 
holding on to God (sich anhalten bei Gott) through which 
man gains a firm foothold (festen Halt) for his life. 
 
Of note in here is that Ratzinger’s understanding of this Hebrew term includes both 
eidetic dimensions and existential dimensions, and with it Ratzinger explicitly 
embraces both sides of this reality, both the import of the eidetic schema on the one 
hand, and the attitude of existentialist comportment and Bonaventurian compunction 
on the other. The first set of terms above constitutes what we can, in the context of the 
present essay, regard as the “eidetic” resonances of ןמא , of the kind we find on day 
two. The second set, moreover, constitutes what we can regard as the “third day”—
that is, the “existential” or “comportmental”—resonances of ןמא . As the verse itself 
makes clear in both the English and German translations above, the eidetic dimension 
is grounded in the existential. “If you do not trust,” one might say, “you will not find 
graspable truth or intellectual foundations.”87  
 
86 In Hebrew script, this verb would be ןמא . 
87 This interpretation is confirmed by William L. Holliday, A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of 
the Old Testament (Leiden: Brill, 1988), s.v. “ ןמא ”. Here the hiphil stem—in which the first occurrence 
of the verb is in Isa. 7:9—includes meanings such as “believe in,” “put trust in,” “have faith in.” The 
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 What, then, is faith, specifically of the “day three” variety? It is an existential 
attitude, a faithful comportment. It involves a concrete “way of being” which requires 
that one garner one’s soul in an openness and trusting embrace of God. 
 This interpretation of things is confirmed by the Greek of the LXX, which 
connects this Hebrew “amen” to the conceptual dimension of mind by rendering the 
second instance of the verb as συνίημι, “to understand.”88 
The … Septuagint … transferred [Isa. 7:9] onto Greek 
soil not only linguistically but also conceptually by 
formulating it as “if you do not believe, then you do not 
understand, either.”89 
 
In other words, faith is both eidetic and existential. In order to grasp reality 
intellectually, one must “stand” in a certain way. One must maintain a certain posture 
(toward reality, toward God) and engage in a certain way of being. 
This confirmation provided by the LXX, however, leads Ratzinger to make the 
connection even more explicit by reference to both Heidegger and Bonaventure.  
Heidegger, thinks Ratzinger, rightly values both “calculating” thought (the 
modern version of dianoia, for Ratzinger, connected to making) and “reflective” 
thought (intellectus), and recognizes that, because “both modes of thought are 
legitimate and necessary … neither can be absorbed into the other.”90 Further, since 
“reflective thought” or intellectus is concerned with meaning, it can by no means be 
insulated from the existential register of the human, and so it is that Ratzinger in this 
context appeals not just to Heidegger but alludes back to the object of his Habilitation 
research. 
Thus in the thirteenth century the great Franciscan 
Bonaventure felt obliged to reproach his colleagues of 
the philosophical faculty at Paris with having learned to 
measure the world but having forgotten to measure 
themselves.91 
 
 
niphal stem of the verb, meanwhile—in which the second occurrence of the verb is in the verse—lists 
“remain,” “have stability,” and “prove oneself.” While the Hebrew language does, that is, semantically 
distinguish concretely between two different forms of the verb, the real import for Ratzinger is that it is 
the same verb or word which delivers both meanings: both the “existential” or “comportmental” 
meaning, and the eidetic one. Hence he is able to deconstruct the difference between the two. One 
cannot have one without the other.  
88 Liddell and Scott has “to hear,” “to perceive,” and “to understand” as possible renderings of this 
verb.  
89 Ratzinger, Introduction, 69. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. “συνίημι.” 
90 Ibid., 71. 
91 Ibid., 71. 
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Not only, then, does dianoia need intellectus, but the whole dynamic of human 
thought in its entirety—dianoia and intellectus together as a whole—must holistically 
take into account the existential dimension, must take into consideration, as it were, 
the accurate measure of the self.  
Indeed, Ratzinger goes on to argue, without this human self-measurement, there 
is no enduring measurement of the world. What is required, in other words, is faith 
according to his second definition:  
… a human way of taking up a stand in the totality of 
reality, a way that cannot be reduced to knowledge and 
is incommensurate with knowledge; it is the bestowal of 
meaning without which the totality of man would remain 
homeless, on which man’s calculations and actions are 
based, and without which in the last resort he could not 
calculate and act, because he can do this only in the 
context of a meaning that bears him up.92 
 
 Furthermore, this meaning can never be constructed by man (one is tempted to 
say, “by Dasein”) but can only be received, as the very ground upon which his 
existence depends. Now Ratzinger is ready to put forth his third and final definition of 
faith:  
… entrusting oneself to the meaning that upholds me and 
the world; taking it as a firm ground on which I can stand 
fearlessly…. Understanding our existence as a response 
to the word, the logos, that upholds and maintains all 
things…. Affirming that the meaning we do not make but 
can only receive is already given to us, so that we have 
only to take it and entrust ourselves to it.93 
 
 Further confirmation that Ratzinger regards faith as a kind of existential 
comportment is seen in his description of it in this context with terms such as 
“composure” and “responsibility.” Faith enables us to “face the visible” with “calm 
composure” and to “know that we are responsible before the invisible as the true 
ground of all things.”94  
 What is fascinating is that, as Ratzinger brings to bear, Isa. 7:9 is not the only text 
in which the notion of faith is emphasized by way of repetition. Indeed, the narrative 
 
92 Ibid., 72. Ratzinger soon afterward, in the context of the Apostles’ Creed, reiterates the importance, 
for him, of faith’s opacity to calculation: “In the harmony of Credo and Amen the meaning of the 
whole becomes visible, the intellectual movement that it is all about” (ibid., 75).  
93 Ibid., 73. 
94 Ibid., 74. 
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of the person and work of Christ, as liturgically performed in the Apostles’ Creed, is 
also bookended by faith, by the initial credo and the conclusive amen. For the future 
pontiff, then, the “rationality of faith”—die Vernunft des Glaubens95—is literally 
bounded on both sides by belief. Immediately this resonates with the notion of 
understanding as recognition: the bookends of faith act as a kind of boundary marker 
or horismos, delimiting the edges or limits of something in order that it might become 
recognizable as a unit or whole. Indeed, “[i]n the harmony of ‘Credo’ and ‘Amen’ the 
meaning of the whole becomes visible, the intellectual movement that it is all 
about.”96 And what is it all about? It is all about something received, something 
arriving from outside of my control or my resources or my reason or my power(s) of 
discovery. It is an object of faith.  
The tool with which man is equipped to deal with the 
truth of being is not knowledge but understanding: the 
understanding of the meaning to which he has entrusted 
himself.97 
 
This sentence is hugely important for me, and for my project. For Ratzinger, der 
Verstand is the recognition of ultimate meaning, and it pertains no more to “day 
three” reason or to “day one” natural intellect than it does to faith (“day two”). This 
dimension of the primacy of faith—since faith is a grasping of a deliverance from 
elsewhere, a recognition of something which includes the existential dimension not 
just of human reality but of my particular human reality—meshes extremely well 
with the emphasis of certain continental thinkers98 who regard understanding 
(Verstand, intellectus) as privileged to reason (Vernunft, ratio). It also adumbrates the 
“far side” of Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle.99  
For Ratzinger, then, it is faith which bookends the Creed, or the content of 
Christian truth or doctrine. The recognition of an external deliverance both begins and 
ends the Creed, bracketing the whole of the content with the bookends of intellectus. 
Translating this into Bonaventure’s hexaëmeral schema—now completed with the 
 
95 This is the title of section six of the introduction of the work.  
96 Ibid., 75.  
97 Ibid., 77. 
98 For example, Hegel and Gadamer.  
99 Also, even though I would be reluctant to identify Aristotle with “the present-day scientific 
thinking,” I nevertheless think that Aristotle fails, in comparison with Plato, to appreciate the priority 
of understanding as the recognition of existential meaning. This instinct finds confirmation in Joseph 
Pieper, Leisure as the Basis of Culture, tr. Alexander Dru (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1963), 27.  
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existential comportment which occurs concomitantly with day three (dianoia)—we 
can say that, combined with day one (natural reason), day two’s intellectus fidei finds 
expression in “moment one” or “first intellect.” After the process of struggle and 
growth which takes place in and through the existentially formative reading of the 
story of Scripture, the entire progression culminates in the vision of the whole, or 
final intellectus. Here, at this climactic moment, we find the resounding “Amen,” 
which now includes the incorporation of the transformed self within the totality of the 
whole. Like St. Gregory’s Benedict, whose soul was expanded such that the whole 
became visible,100 she who confesses the Creed experiences a holistic transformation 
which, in the final analysis, is both intellectual and existential. 
Thus we can say that this final moment of recognition is not fully and finally 
correlated, without remainder, with Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle; such are the 
ultimate implications of the rationality of faith according to Ratzinger. Whereas the 
typical pattern is nousàdianoiaànous, in the considerations of our present context 
there is no final grasp of God. Why not? Because we are comprehended by him. We 
do, in fact, apprehend the truth of God, the reality of God.101 But then, in a moment 
which flies in the face of our ordinary way of knowing—in other words, in a moment 
characterized by our non-natural, counter-intuitive operation of faith—we fail to 
comprehend this “object,” because it is no ordinary object. We ourselves end up being 
grasped by this “object”; we are comprehended by God, and this is what Ratzinger 
means when he says that “[God] is not apprehended a second time.”102 
Conclusion: the role of story in the formation of comportment 
 In this chapter we have begun more explicitly to discern the difference that faith 
makes. Beyond the intellectus fidei, it is an existential—and thus affective—
requirement for final human fullness. For the Christian thinkers treated here—from 
the apostles who crafted the creedal formula, through Bonaventure and Kierkegaard, 
and finally to Ratzinger—it is story which serves as the medium of comportment, the 
means by which one achieves a comportment, a compunction, that is mature, 
existentially responsible, and faithful. As for Johannes de Silentio and the fraught 
experiences of identifying with Abraham in his reading of the biblical narrative, so 
 
100 Bonaventure, Six Days, XX.7 (303).  
101 Ratzinger is using the terms “apprehension” and “comprehension” in distinct ways: the former is the 
first moment of the hermeneutical circle; the latter is the final moment of the hermeneutical circle.  
102 Ratzinger, Introduction, 78.  
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also for any of us as we read and meditate on the story of Christ, including its 
embodiment in the Creed.  
 In this chapter, moreover, I have tried to show that, for Bonaventure and 
Ratzinger, the life of the mind, even viewed as a whole, does not alone comprise the 
entire reality of the human journey to that which each thinker regards as the end of 
human development. In addition to First Intellect, dianoia, and Final Intellect, an 
additional dimension, which we can say is quasi-transcendent to the schema as a 
whole, must be considered. A matter of the heart and a way of being, this existential 
comportment is contextualized within and conditioned by a larger narrative.  
 It turns out, however, as we will see in our pair of final chapters, that this 
narrative, together with the holistic human maturity it engenders, is larger than any 
single human individual. A concrete universal, it embraces the whole of humanity and 
the history in which it is formed. This mythos, in other words, is, above all else, 
decidedly eschatological.  
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Chapter 5 
The eschatological whole (I): Joachim and (Ratzinger’s) Bonaventure 
Introduction 
 In the last chapter we considered a substantial section of Ratzinger’s Introduction 
to Christianity dealing with the spiritual formation of that affective disposition that is 
faith. In that same work the Bavarian theologian comments upon Paul’s vision of the 
man from Macedonia, as narrated in the Acts of the Apostles: 
They went through the region of Phrygia and Galatia, 
having been forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the 
word in Asia. When they had come opposite Mysia, they 
attempted to go into Bythinia, but the Spirit of Jesus did 
not allow them; so, passing by Mysia, they went to Troas. 
During the night Paul had a vision: there stood a man of 
Macedonia pleading with him, and saying, “Come over 
to Macedonia and help us.” When he had seen the vision, 
we immediately tried to cross over into Macedonia, being 
convinced that God had called us to proclaim the good 
news to them.1 
 
 Ratzinger’s interpretation of this passage bears on the argument of my final two 
chapters concerning the intelligibility of history. “This mysterious text … [is] a first 
attempt at a ‘theology of history,’ intending to underline the crossing of the Gospel … 
‘to the Greeks,’ as a divinely arranged necessity.”2 His reading of this passage implies 
the providential ordering of the Hellenization of the Gospel, a particular facet, that is, 
of the overall meaning of history.  
And what is the meaning of that (overall) history? In one final confirmation that 
by “faith” Ratzinger intends something like the “way of being” of Kierkegaardian 
comportment, he stresses the particularity of Christian faith: particular, however, not 
only because it is my faith, my comportment, my way of being, which is utterly 
unique and distinct from anyone else’s, but also because it is faith in the particular 
man Jesus of Nazareth.3 Surely it is no coincidence that Ratzinger here speaks of faith 
in Jesus as opposed to faith in Christ, for the former is strikingly more particular and 
concrete than the latter. Christ, for example in the thinking of St. Paul, is a reality of 
ecclesial and cosmic dimensions; Christos is universal. Jesus, however, connotes a 
 
1 Acts 16:6–10.  
2 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 78 n. 16.  
3 Ibid., 79–80. 
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Jewish carpenter who spoke Aramaic, “whose … hands were skilled at the plane and 
the lathe,”4 the same Jewish, rabbi-like teacher about whom the older Ratzinger, now 
Roman pontiff, would devote a riveting trilogy which is both historical and 
theological.5 It is this man, this particular Jew, in whom the Christian believer has an 
irreducibly particular faith. Writing in 1968, less than a decade after the publication 
of his Habilitationsschrift, Ratzinger sums up his point: “I believe in you, Jesus of 
Nazareth, as the meaning (logos) of the world and of my life.”6  Could it be that 
Ratzinger regards the logos of history precisely as that concrete particular that is this 
first-century Jew?  
If so, then others would strongly disagree. Channeling the attitude toward history 
which we earlier confronted in Aristotle’s Poetics, Eric Voegelin denies that history 
can be meaningful, that it has an “eidos.” Joseph Ratzinger, following in the footsteps 
of St. Bonaventure, stakes out a different course, one which embraces the possibility 
(if not the actuality) that history does have a definitive sense.  
I. Neither Hegel nor Voegelin: an “in-between” approach 
 In the Preface to his 1821 Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel formulates his bold 
claim that “what is rational is real, and what is real is rational.”7 To quote one 
commentator on this terse text: 
The rational is real: Reason manifests itself in the world, 
and is “realized” in it in both senses of that word: reason 
is made real by fulfilling its own standard of rationality; 
and reason is grasped by reason itself—as in “I realize 
what I am saying”—in the self-consciousness that 
constitutes its freedom. The real is rational: The fulfilled 
reality is fully rational in the two-fold sense of being 
fully transparent to reason, and also in being the product 
of rational forethought.8 
 
 
4 Thomas Kelly, “Lord of All Hopefulness,” Hymn #482 in The Hymnal 1982 (New York: The Church 
Pension Fund, 1985).  
5 See Ratzinger’s “Jesus of Nazareth” series: Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: the Infancy 
Narratives, tr. Adrian J. Walker (New York: Crown Publishing, 2012); Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of 
Nazareth: from the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration, tr. Adrian J. Walker (New York: 
Doubleday, 2007); Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week: from the Entrance into Jerusalem 
to the Resurrection, tr. Adrian J. Walker (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2011); Joseph Ratzinger, 
Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week: from the Entrance into Jerusalem to the Resurrection, part 2, tr. Adrian 
J. Walker (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2010).   
6 Ratzinger, Introduction, 81.  
7 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, tr. Alan White (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 8.  
8 Leo Rauch, “Translator’s Introduction” in G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 
tr. Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), x.  
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As this commentator’s gloss implies, on Hegel’s view the rational and the real 
ultimately are wholly and directly identical without remainder, a view which entails 
another of Hegel’s: that of “subject monism,” which turns the substance of Spinoza’s 
“substance monism” into a subjective consciousness.9  
 In the previous chapters of this essay, I have argued 
 
• that the historical lives of both Bonaventure and Ratzinger amount to really 
good stories (chapter one); 
• that the brute particularity of (Aristotelian) history is connected to “universal” 
knowledge (science) by the mediating discourse of mythos (chapter two); 
• that (stronger still) there is no such thing as history without mythos (chapter 
three); and 
• that one central dimension of reality—human affect—is conditioned and 
formed by mythos (chapter four). 
 
In the above chapters, then, I have been arguing for a claim not unrelated to Hegel’s, 
above. This is true even if, instead of “real” I have used “history,” and instead of 
“rational” I have, in the main, used “mindful” (since I am highlighting the role of 
intellectus or nous). Even in terms of Plato’s Line (rehearsed above in the 
“Introduction and statement of method”), I have presented the matter in terms of a 
trajectory or continuum in which mindfulness and being progress together, from the 
lower end of the line to the upper.  
 And yet, I am not arguing for a complete, mutual collapse of reality into mind or 
vice-versa without remainder, if for no other reason than that such a claim would be 
theologically unorthodox: the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Ascension of Jesus 
Christ imply the permanent presence of the materiality of creation, which will never 
be simply or fully absorbed into the nonmaterial.   
 What, then, am I arguing?  
 Consider a view which is completely opposite to Hegel’s, that of Eric Voegelin, 
expressed in his The New Science of Politics. In his penetrating analysis of Joachim’s 
theory of history, Voegelin raises the possibility of “an eidos of history” and then 
dismisses such a notion as fallacious.  
 
 
9 See Yirmiyahu Yovel, Introduction to Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, by G. W. F. 
Hegel, tr. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005), 16–19. For a view of Hegel which 
denies that his subject monism is “comprehensive of all reality in toto,” but rather simply a matter of 
“structural, interconnected categories,” see Robert E. Wood, “Hegel: From Misunderstanding to the 
Beginning of Understanding,” Epoché 16, no. 62 (Fall, 2012): 337–49. 
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… [T]here is no eidos of history, because the 
eschatological supernature is not a nature in the 
philosophical, immanent sense. The problem of an eidos 
in history, hence, arises only when Christian 
transcendental fulfillment becomes immanentized. Such 
an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a 
theoretical fallacy. Things are not things, nor do they 
have essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course of 
history as a whole is no object of experience; history has 
no eidos, because the course of history extends into the 
unknown future. The meaning of history, then, is an 
illusion; and this illusionary eidos is created by treating 
a symbol of faith as if it were a proposition concerning 
an object of human experience.10  
 
 On the one hand, then, we have Hegel’s view, that history is completely 
transparent to—indeed, reducible to—reason; and on the other, Voegelin’s stance that 
history—at least history as a whole—is opaque to human understanding (seen above 
in his statement that “the meaning of history is an illusion”). 
 Throughout this essay I have argued for a third way. On analogy with divine 
illumination theory, by which objects in the world are recognized by a pre-given eidos 
(Plato’s ἰδέα), history is rendered intelligible by mythos, so that for Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure it becomes the historia salutis of God’s people and God’s creation. 
Indeed, history is this mythos. This stance of mine, then, of history as mythos, is the 
middle way through the impasse of, the position in between,  Hegel and Voegelin.  
 In the remainder of this penultimate chapter of my essay, I apply this model—
embodied in the view of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure (as presented in the 
Habilitationsschrift)—to history in its widest possible scope.  In the introduction to 
this dissertation, I listed several examples of how history and meaning mutually 
interpenetrate one another for both Bonaventure11 and Ratzinger.12 While many of 
 
10 Voegelin, New Science, 120. 
11 These are the step-wise development of the intellect in the six days of creation of Genesis 1; the 
progression inherent in the one-to-one correspondence of the Old Testament to the New Testament; the 
development of the notion of the scriptural semen of day three into a genealogical account of the 
development of doctrine and history more generally; the historicization of the celestial hierarchies of 
Pseudo-Dionysius; the historicization of the Pseudo-Dionysian sapientia nulliformis.  
12 These are the problem of Joachim and Franciscan spiritualism, a crisis over the interpretation of 
history (also covered in my chapter two, above); Bonaventure’s eschatology within the larger medieval 
horizon of meaning which makes it possible, as its condition of possibility; Ratzinger’s embrace and 
elaboration of Bonaventure’s multiformes theoriae as a model for historical genealogy; Ratzinger’s 
articulation of Bonaventurian revelation, also pointing to a genealogical interpretation of history; the 
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these examples will emerge again in this and the following chapter, their main burden 
is to argue for a meaning to history as a whole, to argue that such a meaning is 
possible. Uniquely in the case of eschatology, we posses—we have access to—the 
“imagined double” perceptible by the intellectus fidei, but not the empirical event, the 
res gesta, so to speak. In this sense we are in a position similar to that of the slave boy 
in the Meno, just before the Pythagorean Theorem is deduced.  
 Such an attempt, moreover, will require recourse to eschatology—and hence to 
theology—since the temporal vantage point at which we find ourselves in our present 
cultural moment is situated in medias res, with the temporal unfolding of future 
events yet to succeed us. To that end I will in this chapter summarize Joachim’s 
historical/eschatological views and emphasize where Ratzinger’s Bonaventure agrees 
with the Calabrian abbot, in affirming that history as a whole is intelligible. This will 
set us up nicely for a consideration of two modern responses, those of Ratzinger 
himself and John Milbank, treated in the final chapter. 
II. The content of Joachim’s logos of history or eschatology 
 Before considering Joachim’s views, one must appreciate their extreme novelty: 
against the backdrop of what was by his day the traditional approach to eschatology—
that is, that of Augustine—Joachim’s views are so innovative that they can be 
regarded as a historical rupture, or a rupture in the tradition of Christian thought. As 
Patrick Gardner points out, Joachim  
was more preoccupied with studying scripture in the 
remote monastery of San Giovanni than he was with 
attending to the theological opinions of his day. As a 
result many of his most important theological claims lack 
any precedent in the writings of his immediate 
predecessors or contemporaries. It is rather from his 
personal spiritual experience that much of his insight 
derives.13 
  
 What, then, was the Augustinian picture? In broad strokes, we can here rely upon 
Eric Voegelin, who summarizes the Augustinian stance as we find it near the end of 
The City of God.14 On Augustine’s view there are two historical dimensions which 
Scripture allows us to distinguish: the mundane, secular one on the one hand, and the 
 
pinpointing of the nature of time as the ultimate ground of Bonaventure’s anti-Aristotelianism (treated 
in chapter three, above).  
13 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 73.  
14 Augustine, City of God, XX.6–17 (975–1005).   
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transcendent, spiritual one on the other. Somewhat counterintuitively for the modern 
mind, the church as the Body of Christ, including in her temporal pilgrimage, is 
aligned by Augustine with the latter. While there may be some transcendent historical 
patterns that can be discerned, the immanent, historical trajectory of this world or the 
saeculum is de facto unintelligible and chaotic: it is viewed as the saeculum 
senescens, and is simply growing old and decrepit.15 Furthermore, for Augustine, with 
the advent of Christ, history in terms of its intelligible shape has ended and should be 
regarded as essentially complete in the sense that it has, in the period after the earthly 
life of Christ, no structure, pattern, shape, or intelligibility which we are in the 
position to be able to discern.   
 In order to present a clear picture of Joachim’s theology of history, I offer four 
general planks which the Calabrian affirms. Since in this chapter I am interacting with 
various thinkers—Bonaventure, Ratzinger, de Lubac, Voegelin, Löwith, Milbank—all 
of whom critically engage with Joachim’s thought, I list these planks in order from 
most objectionable to least objectionable, in an imagined “vote” among these 
representative thinkers:  
• the third “week” of history (modeled on the third person of the Trinity, the 
Holy Spirit); 
• the eclipse of the church as the (institutional) body of Christ; 
• the immanentization of the eschaton;  
• the “letter-to-letter” correspondence (i.e., the concordiae) between the age of 
the Old Testament and the age of the new covenant church  
 The items closer to the beginning of the list, then, are those which come closest to 
unanimous rejection by the thinkers named. The items near the end of the list generate 
more debate and disagreement among them. Moreover, we can rank the thinkers listed 
above in order from most hostile to Joachim to most amenable: Milbank, de Lubac 
and Voegelin (all three sharing an equal degree of vehemence); Löwith; Ratzinger; 
Bonaventure.16 
 
15 Voegelin, New Science, 118. 
16 With one major exception, articulated below, I can discern no departure from Bonaventure’s 
reception of Joachim, as contained in the Hexaëmeron, on the part of Ratzinger. My interpretation is 
shared by Rudolf Voderholzer: “Die kirchenpolitische Leistung Bonaventuras, aufgrund der 
transformierenden Aneignung joachitischen Gedankenguts die Einheit des Ordens gerettet zu haben, 
findet Ratzingers ungeteilte Anerkennung.” Rudolf Voderholzer, “Offenbarung und Kirche: Ein 
Grundgedanke von Joseph Ratzingers Habilitationsprojekt (1955/2009) und seine theologische 
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A. The “third week” of history 
 Corresponding to each person of the Godhead Joachim claims to identify a 
definite status of history: the period of the Old Testament—what theologians have 
historically called “the Old Covenant”—is the status of the Father; that in which 
Joachim himself was living serves as the status of the Son; the state about which he 
prophesies, purportedly to begin in the near future (the year 1260), is regarded by the 
Calabrian as the status of the Holy Spirit.17   
 Building on the thought of Rupert of Deutz, who in his work on the creation 
narrative of Genesis adds a “third layer” (that of the Holy Spirit) to the Augustinian 
heritage of the first two (the “literal” work of the Father in creation and the Son’s 
work of redemption18), Joachim takes this new emphasis on threeness one step 
further.19 Suddenly a major thinker affirms three distinct ages of world history, 
excluding the nonhistorical work of creation narrated in Genesis one. (Of course, 
while scholars usually emphasize the threeness of Joachim’s Trinitarian historical 
schema, one should acknowledge that he also stressed its oneness of unity, rooted in 
the same triune nature of God.) 
 Furthermore, “whereas most early Christians locate the focal point of history in 
the events of Christ’s Incarnation, Joachim … [locates] it in the future action of the 
Holy Spirit.”20  This supplanting of Christ’s focal role results from both the new 
periodization of history into a threefold pattern and the emphasis on the third period.  
 More novel still,  
[Joachim] even interprets the earthly life of Christ as an 
anticipation of the Spirit, describing it as a type or figure 
(“typum gerit”) in the same sense that John the Baptist 
serves as a type of Christ.21 
 
 
Tragweite,” in Gegenwart und Offenbarung: Zu den Bonaventura Forschungen Joseph Ratzingers, ed. 
Franz-Xaver Heible and Marianne Schlosser (Regensburg: Pustet, 2011), 63. In this sense one can say 
that Ratzinger in this work “speaks in the voice” of Bonaventure, such that one cannot easily discern 
the difference between the two voices.  
17 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 212; Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 75.  
18 Note that, while Augustine has a single “week” of history beginning with Adam and culminating 
with Christ, this “week” is for Augustine nevertheless patterned on the “week” of creation in Genesis 1, 
which he regards as nonhistorical in the sense that it is not included in the history of the world. Note, 
further, that, based on the preceding paragraph, it is clear that Joachim’s view is consistent with 
Augustine’s here. 
19 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 97. 
20 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 76.  
21 Ibid. 
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Suddenly, in a radical departure from tradition, Christ is not the end; nor, moreover, is 
he even—as for Bonaventure—the Center or Medium. He is now regarded merely as 
the prelude to the historical climax of the Holy Spirit. 
 Does Joachim take himself to have any biblical basis for this injection of a new 
and uniquely spiritual epoch into the timeframe of the world, anticipated to occur 
before the final Parousia? Reviving the older stance of chiliasm—vehemently rejected 
by Origen and Augustine alike—Joachim roots his view in chapter 20 of the canonical 
Christian apocalypse, the Book of Revelation.22 This passage provides the primary 
jumping off point for chiliasms both ancient and medieval. Here, “the seer John 
envisions the binding of Satan and the reigning of the martyrs with Christ for a 
thousand years.”23 Further,  
What most distinguishes the chiliasts is their literal 
interpretation of the millennial period: they view this 
earthly Kingdom as a central part of the Christian hope, 
preceding the Parousia and the general resurrection.24  
 
 In broad agreement with chiliasts generally, Joachim’s contribution to the 
chiliastic position  in particular is to identify this literal thousand-year period 
precisely as the third age of human history, that of the Holy Spirit. During this age the 
Spirit’s presence is expected to be fully poured out on earth, and (as we will see 
below) a spiritual understanding will emerge which will “surpass the literal senses of 
both the Old and New Testaments” and a “new church of the religious” will succeed 
the rule of clerics and the mediation of the sacraments.25 
 A crucial correlate to this Joachite addition of a third segment of history should 
not be overlooked: the entailed displacement of Christ’s role as the embodiment of the 
end of history. This view of Augustine’s was consistent with the conviction that 
“Christ is the end of the ages, his birth coincides with the ‘end of times.’”26 
 
 
22 “[An angel coming down from heaven] seized the dragon, that ancient serpent, who is the devil and 
Satan, and bound him for a thousand years, and threw him in the pit, and locked and sealed it over him, 
so that he would deceive the nations no more, until the thousand years were ended. After that, he must 
be let out for a little while…. When the thousand years are ended, Satan will be released from his 
prison and will come out to deceive the nations at the four corners of the earth….” Rev. 20:2–3:7. For 
Augustine’s argument against chiliasm, see Augustine, City of God, XX.9 (987–93). 
23 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 29.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.    
26 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 96.  
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B. The eclipse of the Body of Christ 
 It would be an exaggeration to claim that Joachim intends to say that the church is 
so completely and simply superseded by the advent of the third status of the Spirit 
that, as a community of the people of God, it ceases to exist. More accurate would be 
that he sees certain features of the New Testament church as pointing toward a future 
fulfillment and hence is expecting them to give way to the new realities of the third 
age. Water baptism will cede place to a baptism of fire, and the clerical hierarchy will 
be replaced by a democratic arrangement of religious brothers in the nova ecclesia 
religiosorum, “a monastic community of saints in the succession of St. Benedict.”27  
 For many thinkers such as Henri de Lubac, such discontinuity between this church 
of the third age and that of the second (i.e., that of de Lubac’s time) is unacceptable: it 
is so different or discontinuous that it eviscerates the church of its very essence and 
for all intents and purposes renders it a distinct thing entirely. 
C. The immanentization of (some elements of) the eschaton 
 Although Joachim includes dimensions of freedom and peace in his portrayal of 
the third age of the Spirit, for the purposes of my project a particularly important 
aspect is the beatific vision, which is directly related to (though perhaps not simply 
reducible to) the journey of the mind I have been describing in my essay. Indeed, 
while for Bonaventure some stage beyond sapientia is never countenanced, the latter 
being regarded as absolutely ultimate, Joachim sees the ultimate phase in human 
mindfulness as something greater than either scientia or sapientia, namely, what he 
terms plenitudo intellectualis.28  
 Yet Joachim precipitously injects this highest stage of the human mind into the 
temporal trajectory of this present world, “a prolongation of our terrestrial 
condition.”29 Hence for de Lubac this historiography amounts to a “millenarian 
utopia,” a striking departure from the likes of Origen and Augustine.30  
 This injection of what was previously regarded as the transcendent, meta-temporal 
end of human life, furthermore, renders Joachim vulnerable to a classic de Lubacian 
criticism more broadly: that of the two-end teleology of the human person.31 Suddenly 
 
27 Gardner, 81–2; Löwith, Meaning in History, 145–6.  
28 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 84.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 On this de Lubacian criticism of many strands of modern thought (which for him enshrine the heresy 
of the natura pura of Francisco Suarez, which the latter takes himself to have derived from Thomas 
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the final purpose of man seems to be bifurcated, since that final purpose is now seen 
not just as the meta-temporal eschaton, but also as the final (but still immanent) 
historical age of the Holy Spirit. Such a “two-fold eschatological expectation” 
involves not only the traditional eschatological hope of theology (the return of Christ, 
the consummation of time, the renovation of the world—all rightly situated by 
Joachim beyond history), but, in addition, now adds a second object of hope, as well, 
“an optimism for a more tangible historical state.”32 In the historical genealogy of 
Western thought which de Lubac performs, this added element ends up supplanting 
the first, resulting in a future hope for the world which is utterly immanent (and 
utterly secular) without remainder.  
 With this new tendency to imagine the eschaton as immanent comes yet another: 
the sense that the human race is the agent which accomplishes cosmic salvation, 
ushering it in by our own planning, our own management, our own efforts. Such a 
conviction, derided by Ratzinger and Voegelin alike, amounts to heresy, given the 
Augustinian position summarized above, and can be detected, according to those 
thinkers, in various modern ideologies including Marxism and liberation theology.33 
 As important as these now immanentized eschatological realities are, however, 
there is yet one more which is even more crucial to my task: the prominence of St. 
Francis in the eschatological vision which Joachim promulgates, a prominence which 
also characterizes the Joachimism of Bonaventure’s day. In a watershed study 
Marjorie Reeves addresses this Joachite distinctive, this identification of St. Francis 
with the angel of Rev. 7:2,34 an identification which had also been affirmed by Garard 
of Borgo San Donnino and John of Parma.35 Moreover, even though (as Ratzinger 
states and as is discussed above and below), Bonaventure stops short of identifying 
the actual order of his day as with the final eschatological, “seraphic” order, yet the 
Minister General does affirm this Joachimite insistence that Francis is the all-
 
Aquinas) are nevertheless also applicable to Joachim, see Simon Oliver, “Henri de Lubac and Radical 
Orthodoxy,” in The T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed. Jordan Hillebert (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2017), 409–10.   
32 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 86. 
33 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 13–15, 212; Voegelin, New Science, 111–12.  
34 This angel is identified both as that of the (sixth) “seal of the living God” and that of the “rising of 
the Sun.” Rev. 7:2.  
35 Marjorie Reeves, The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: a Study in Joachimism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 36–7. 
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important angel of Rev. 7:2, a momentous turning point of eschatological and 
historical uniqueness, as we will see below.  
D. The “letter-to-letter” correspondence (i.e., the concordiae) between the 
Old and the New 
 According to de Lubac what Joachim seeks in the biblical text is “the 
intelligibility of salvation history.”36 What he needs and thinks that he has found for 
this intelligible picture of history is a relationship between two terms (the Old 
Testament period and the New Testament period, the latter of which includes the age 
of the church during which Joachim is living) which then generates a third term (the 
age of the Spirit).37 In other words, the Trinitarian schema we considered above is not 
simply a sequence of three serial elements: instead, what Joachim thinks is that the 
first two—the Father and the Son—are so related that they dynamically produce a 
third, the Holy Spirit.  
 Yet it is not simply that Joachim places the Old and New in a dynamic 
relationship of dialectic. Rather, he gets very specific, delving into the minutiae of the 
two testaments (or testamental periods), setting up an intricate series of one-to-one 
correspondences between the two.   
These are exact historical parallels between the events 
of the Old and New Testaments: “letter-to-letter” 
correspondences, entirely distinct from the parallels 
evoked by the allegorical senses. [Joachim] is not 
dealing here with vague similarities, but with 
meticulously aligning characters, places, wars, etc. 
between the histories of Israel and the church.38 
 
 Now, although this is indeed a departure from the view that was traditional in 
Joachim’s day, it is important to articulate the precise nature of the innovation. Not 
only does Joachim never suggest anything like a “third testament” or a yet-to-be-
expected addition to the canon of Holy Scripture, he does not even extend the one-to-
one correspondence into his posited third age. Rather, he simply affirms the third age, 
on the basis of these double relationships, or the concordiae between the Old and the 
New.39 The entire series of binaries is put in service of locating the point of Joachim’s 
 
36 Gardner, “Modern Pentecost,” 77. See McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, 130–1. 
37 Ibid., 78.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.  
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present day historically. A particularly important one-to-one correspondence, for 
example, is that of Elijah/Elisha in the first status and St. Benedict in the second.40 In 
this manner the Calabrian is able, he thinks, to extrapolate a trajectory which locates 
him near the end of the second status. The upshot of the concordiae, then, is that they 
“spill over” into the time of Joachim’s contemporary culture, thus allowing him 
(purportedly) to mark the (predicted) transition from the second age to the third or 
final one.  
*    *   *   * 
 To conclude this section on Joachim’s views, why did he believe his own time to 
be the transition between the second and third epoch of the historia salutis? Löwith 
supplies us with an additional and decisive answer. Joachim perceived the events of 
his own day as a period of “radical deformation,” exemplified most profoundly by the 
secular or “worldly” concerns of the clerical church: the abuse of power and the 
accoutrements of wealth. For Joachim desperate times called for desperate measures, 
even if such measures were for the Calabrian mystic hermeneutical and hortatory, and 
not explicitly politically revolutionary.   
The signs as described in the gospel show clearly the 
dismay and ruin of the century which is now running 
down and must perish. Hence I believe that it will not be 
in vain to submit to the vigilance of the believers, through 
this work, those matters which divine economy has made 
known to my unworthy person in order to awaken the 
torpid hearts from their slumber by a violent noise and to 
induce them, if possible, by a new kind of exegesis to the 
contempt of the world.41 
 
 On the basis of this quotation, we can say that Joachim intended to shock his 
audience into a new way of living by means of a powerful and direct kind of rupture. 
This rupture is a shaking up of tradition: he explicitly describes it as “a new kind of 
exegesis,” one which departs from the standard approaches which preceded him. 
 Joachim clearly anticipated that this rupture would eventually result in the 
inauguration of the third age of the Spirit, when the newly configured church—
organized no longer in terms of episcopal polity but now as an assembly of spiritual 
brothers in monastic community—would achieve the “perfection” of which St. Paul 
 
40 Marjorie Reeves, “The Originality and Influence of Joachim of Fiore,” 289. 
41 From Joachim’s preface to his Concordance, quoted in Löwith, 147–8. 
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speaks in 1 Cor. 13:9–10,42 a perfection which is largely the equivalent of St. 
Bonaventure’s vision of the eschatological sapientia nulliformis, adapted from the 
thought of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.43   
III. Responding to Joachim: the position of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure 
 Ratzinger shows that Bonaventure’s logos of history is forged out of his 
engagement with Joachimite thought, mostly purging it of error, but also perpetuating 
its progressive ethos. Ratzinger points to Bonaventure’s dismissal of John of Parma 
(narrated in chapter 1, above) as evidence for his rejection of (at least some major 
planks of) the theological movement which Joachim spawned. On my reading we can 
locate three areas where Ratzinger’s Bonaventure disagrees with Joachim. He rejects 
Joachim’s insertion of the third epoch of world history; he does not affirm chiliasm;44 
and he cannot follow Joachim in the latter’s full eclipse of the Body of Christ (for 
example it would be unimaginable for him to regard baptism as obsolete at any future 
point of the church’s this-worldly pilgrimage).45 
 And yet, in this section I want to highlight not where Ratzinger disagrees with the 
theological innovations of Joachim, but where he agrees with them. For these planks 
of the Franciscan’s thought are far more germane to the argument of my essay, that, 
thanks to mythos, a discernable meaning to history—including history at the largest 
possible scale—is possible. Ratzinger’s Bonaventure, I claim, agrees with Joachim in 
the following areas. 
A. The immanentization of (some elements of) the eschaton (in particular St. 
Francis)  
Bonaventure adopts Joachim’s insistence that the inbreaking, into the “here and 
now,” of various eschatological realities, previously in the tradition assumed to be 
meta-temporal, is a legitimate object of Christian hope.  
 
 
42 “For we know only in part … but when the complete [to telion] comes, the partial will come to an 
end.” See Löwith, Meaning in History, 147–8. 
43 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 86–91.  
44 That Bonaventure does not predict a literal thousand-year period before the return of Christ is seen in 
the fact that he places himself at the end (the sixth day) of the final age of history. Indeed, he sides with 
Augustine against Joachim here. Bonaventure, Six Days, XVI.11–31 (236–50); Ratzinger, Theology of 
History, 21.  
45 Indeed, as Ratzinger points out, Bonaventure expressly states this: “… no sacrament of the new law 
can be done away with, because this is already the eternal covenant.” Ratzinger, Theology of History, 
23, citing Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron XVI.2 (403). 
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… Bonaventure raises a new, inner-worldly, inner-
historical messianic hope. He rejects the view that with 
Christ the highest degree of inner-historical fulfillment is 
already realized so that there is nothing left but an 
eschatological hope which lies beyond all history. 
Bonaventure believes in a new salvation in history, 
within the limits of this time.46 
 
Yet for Bonaventure there is an even stronger sense of realized eschatology than that 
of Joachim, for from his perspective such realities are not simply immanent, precisely 
because they are not simply imminent. They are not, that is, simply imputed, as for 
Joachim, into the near-future course of this world; rather from Bonaventure’s 
perspective they have already occurred. Indeed Bonaventure sees Francis, eighteen 
years old at the time of Joachim’s death but already for Bonaventure (as we describe 
in chapter one, above) a figure of historical consequence, as uniquely important in the 
history of redemption. On the basis of the stigmata and his use of the tau-sign when 
signing his personal letters, Bonaventure regards him as the recapitulation of both 
Elias (Elijah) and John the Baptist, as well as the referent of the angelus ascendens ab 
ortu solis of Rev. 7:2.47 Here we come to the only discernable disagreement on 
Ratzinger’s part with Bonaventure, although even here he reads Bonaventure here 
with a great deal of charity:  
In view of the amazing coincidence of the particular 
factors, it is no longer surprising that the identification of 
St. Francis with the angel of the Apocalypse should have 
become a historico-theological axiom of practically 
unimpeachable certitude. Even Bonaventure could not 
close himself to the suggestive power of this fact. As a 
result, the apocalyptic prophecy [of Joachim] and the 
actualized reality in the life of St. Francis are woven 
together for Bonaventure … into an insoluble unity.”48  
 
 And yet it is not just St. Francis whom Bonaventure imbued with eschatological 
import, having from his perspective already occurred, but also the multitude of 
Franciscan brothers, already by his day distributed all across the world, whom the 
 
46 As I will elaborate below, this passage is a conspicuous one in Ratzinger’s text, for here, uniquely, 
his voice deviates from the voice of Bonaventure. Ratzinger, Theology of History, 13–14. 
47 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 34–5. Many Christians today regard the destruction of the Temple in 
AD 70 as the referent of certain biblical prophecies, for example those contained in the “Olivet 
discourses” in the synoptic Gospels. In fact Ratzinger himself holds this view. Ratzinger, Eschatology, 
38. Is Bonaventure’s treatment of Francis as a past fulfillment of biblical prophecy significantly 
different theologically from this widespread view?  
48 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 35.  
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Povorello (or his successors) commissioned. Bonaventure identifies this development 
as the historical occurrence predicted by the sealing of the 144,000 in Revelation 7.49  
 In addition, further, to the mere commissioning of the members of the order, 
Ratzinger also emphasizes the importance to Bonaventure of Francis’ “eschatological 
mood.”50 The Minister General deeply valorized the Poverello’s insistence on treating 
his Rule for the Order sine glossa.51 The point was not to interpret the Rule, but to 
live it, thereby re-enacting, nonidentically repeating in contemporary monastic 
culture, the apostolic lifestyle of simplicity. Bonaventure truly saw in this Franciscan 
ethos something of an eschatological fulfillment (even if he was not yet fully able to 
implement the aspirational ideal, as we will see below). 
 In order fully and accurately to characterize this point of continuity between 
Joachim and Bonaventure, however, one must at the same time appreciate its 
qualification, in the form of a subpoint of discontinuity between the two monastics. 
We must see the discontinuity here within an overarching continuity. On the basis of 
two data, one must admit that Bonaventure resists the instinct of Joachim fully to 
enclose certain eschatological realities within the immanent frame of history (much 
less having already occurred historically from Bonaventure’s vantage point). As 
Ratzinger points out, Bonaventure ascribes to the “sixth age” of the epoch of Christ—
still, that is, within the second and final “week” of the (second great epoch of the) 
world—something of an “Augustinian” quality. Not only does he not view this period 
simply as a time of progressive improvement, but, in an anti-Joachite pivot, he sees it 
as following a pattern of “light–darkness–light”52 and hence oscillating between 
growth and decay.  
 Secondly, however, Bonaventure refuses fully to identify the actual order of 
Franciscans which he is at work overseeing with the truly eschatological order of 
Francis. He admits that Francis was truly the recipient of a supernatural manifestation 
of the eschatological reality, and he respects the Poverello’s desire for his Rule to be 
practiced directly and radically.53 Yet Bonaventure also saw the practical 
impossibility of implementing such a vision in his precise historical moment. He 
 
49 Ibid., 35–38. 
50 Ibid., 40.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid., 26–8.  
53 Ibid., 50–1.  
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respected Francis’ desire, prayed for it to be realized in the future, and trusted God to 
bring about His will in His time. For Bonaventure’s part, he had an institution to care 
for.  
 Ratzinger’s respect for Bonaventure’s historical reading of the situation which 
confronted him is as profound as it is evident: 
In carrying out his office as General and in living his own 
personal life, [Bonaventure] could set aside the sine 
glossa which he knew from the Testament of Francis to 
be the real will of the founder. He could do this because 
the proper historical hour for such a form of life had not 
yet struck. As long as it is still the sixth day, the time is 
not yet ripe for that radically Christian form of existence 
which Francis was able to realize in his own person at the 
divine command. Without feeling any infidelity toward 
the holy founder, Bonaventure could and had to create 
institutional structures for his Order, realizing all the 
while that Francis had not wanted them. It is too facile 
and, in the final analysis, an unlikely method to see this 
as a falsification of true Franciscanism. In reality, it was 
precisely the historical accomplishment of Bonaventure 
that he discerned the true historical situation of the 
controversy between the visionaries and the laxists and 
that he submitted himself in humble recognition of the 
limits demanded by reality. Bonaventure recognized that 
Francis’ own eschatological form of life could not exist 
as an institution in this world; it could be realized only as 
a breakthrough of grace in the individual until such time 
as the God-given hour would arrive at which the world 
would be transformed into its final form of existence.54  
 
This long quotation makes it clear that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure does indeed adopt a 
eschatological stance which is radically “realized,” both continuous with and subtly 
distinct from the position of his Calabrian predecessor. Not only does Bonaventure 
embrace the prudential necessities of providence for the sake of his particular 
community (thus muting some of Joachim’s eschatological aggressiveness), but he 
also admits that the widespread embodiment of the eschatological spirit of St. Francis 
might not occur in this world at all. Ratzinger, in defense of his 13th-century 
predecessor, insists that this reticence is in no way a betrayal of “true Franciscanism.” 
And yet, as we have seen, Ratzinger cannot fully applaud Bonaventure’s 
identification of the Poverello himself as an eschatological figure of such seemingly 
 
54 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 50–51. 
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paramount significance. Such an identification, it turns out, is for Ratzinger less than 
fully orthodox.55  
B. History as progressive.  
 Having registered that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure envisions a new, utterly 
immanent salvation history or eschatological hope within the limits of this world 
(even if that hope, at the end of the day, is not full and final, not absolute), let us now 
turn to an examination of the Franciscan’s expectation of redemptive-historical 
development. Ratzinger’s references to Bonaventure’s historical progressivism are 
scattered throughout the Habiliationsschrift. At first blush it might seem that he is 
simply describing what John Henry Newman calls the development of Christian 
doctrine,56 yet it soon becomes evident that more is going on. This has to do, at 
multiple levels, with the correlations which Ratzinger emphasizes between the 
exegesis of Scripture and the logos of history. I now examine four such levels, 
contained primarily in chapter one of the Habilitationsschrift, entitled “An attempt to 
find the structure of the Bonaventurian theology of history on the basis of the 
Hexaëmeron.”57   
 In the first place consider Ratzinger’s initial statement of the overall correlation of 
mind and moment which I have been referencing (frequently by recourse to Plato’s 
Line).  
The unique relationship between any form of knowledge 
and the historical situation to which it is related is seen 
already in the general outline of the work: it distinguishes 
six levels of knowledge which are interpreted 
allegorically in relation to the six days of the creation 
account. At the same time, the six periods of salvation 
history are related to the six days of creation. For 
Bonaventure this double relationship is not chance nor is 
it arbitrary. Rather, it is a fitting reflection of reality 
which is characterized by an historical, step-wise growth 
in knowledge. 
 
55 This assessment of mine is shared by Remi Brague, who approves of Ratzinger’s appraisal of 
Bonaventure, who does reject key planks of Joachim, but also retains his spirit in the idea of 
eschatology. Rémi Brague, “La théologie de l’histoire de Saint Bonaventure, Préface,” in Gegenwart 
und Offenbarung: Zu den Bonaventura Forschungen Joseph Ratzingers, ed. Franz-Xaver Heible and 
Marianne Schlosser (Regensburg: Pustet, 2011), 479–82. (My thanks are due to Hannah Venable and 
Jane Neal for helping me with the French text of Brague’s article.) 
56 Though “Scripture is closed objectively,” its meaning is not: it is growing historically. Hence “we 
are able to interpret many things which the Fathers could not….” Ratzinger, Theology of History, 9. 
57 German: “Versuch eines Aufbaus der bonaventurianischen Geschichtstheologie auf Grund der 
“Collationes in Hexaëmeron.’” Ratzinger, Offenbarungsverständis und Geschichtstheologie, 20. 
 197 
 
In this programmatic statement of Bonaventure’s progressivism (“reality which is 
characterized by an historical step-wise growth”), Ratzinger is saying that, for 
Bonaventure, mind conditions history. What does it mean to say that history has 
grown or developed? It means that knowledge has grown or developed. Further, why 
has history grown or developed? The answer is that growth in knowledge has caused 
it to grow or to progress. Deferring my response to Voegelin, I point out that this is a 
far cry from Aristotle’s appraisal of history as tyche.58 Yet, it is an equally far cry 
from Hegel’s identity between the rational and the real. Not yet, perhaps, amounting 
to a strong claim of philosophical historicism, it nevertheless sees a strong connection 
between history and human Geist.  
 Second, Ratzinger emphasizes that this growth in knowledge is not, for 
Bonaventure, disconnected from Scripture or its interpretation. Bonaventure does not 
have in view knowledge in general, but (as we saw in chapter 4, above) the kind of 
knowledge he resolutely wants to emphasize is the interpretation of Scripture. Indeed, 
as Ratzinger points out, a primary way that Bonaventure justifies his move of parting 
ways with the historiography of Augustine is his claim that Augustine’s limited 
repertoire of interpretive modes prevents him from seeing Scripture’s ongoing 
applicability to history (that is, the history after Christ) in the first place. 
[Bonaventure] says: “All the mysteries of Scripture treat 
of Christ with his Body and of the Anti-Christ and the 
Devil with his cohorts. This is the meaning of Augustine 
in his book on the City of God….” However 
Bonaventure relates this understanding of Scripture not 
to the theoriae, and therefore not to the theology of 
history, but to the figurae sacramentales which we might 
see as a “typology”….59 
 
These multiformes theoriae—“nothing less than the transfer of the rationes seminales 
to Scripture”60—serve for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure as a kind of “engine” which 
drives history forward, a kind of stimulant or catalyst for future development. Hence, 
while the “step-wise growth” in knowledge is not disconnected from Scripture (or it 
interpretation), neither is it limited to it in terms of applicability. What happens in the 
 
58 See chapter two, above.  
59 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 10. For the quotation Ratzinger cites Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron 
XIV.17 (405–6). 
60 Ibid., 9. 
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interpreter’s mind drives and determines the history of the church61 and indeed the 
world.  
… Scripture contains seeds, that is, seeds of meaning. 
And this meaning develops in a constant process of 
growth in time. Consequently we are able to interpret 
many things which the Fathers could not have known…. 
And so, new knowledge arises constantly from Scripture. 
Something is taking place; and this new and this 
happening, this history, continues onward, for as long as 
there is history at all. This … makes clear that the 
theologian cannot abstract from history in his 
explanation of Scripture; neither from the past nor from 
the future. In this way the exegesis of Scripture becomes 
a theology of history; the clarification of the past leads to 
a prophecy concerning the future.62  
 
 Third, in addition to Ratzinger’s programmatic statement above and his 
presentation of the theoriae, he gives an account of Bonaventure’s (sets of) binary, 
paired terms. He argues that the medieval doctor sees each binary term as 
participating in a relationship which is not just dynamic (as for Joachim, above), but 
also dialectical. Ratzinger makes it clear that Bonaventure adopts these schemata, 
presented above as Joachim’s concordiae or “letter-to-letter correspondences,” 
directly from the Calabrian.63  
 The foundational binary pair which serves as the basis for every other is that of 
the Old Testament and the New Testament.  
The Old and New Testaments are related to each other 
“as tree to  tree; as letter to letter; as seed to seed. And as 
a tree comes from a tree, a seed from a seed, and a letter 
from a letter, so one Testament comes from the other 
Testament.”64 
 
In and of itself, this dynamic does not conclusively demonstrate the presence of 
progression. After all, the “old” could in principle be better than the “new.” Let us 
pause, however, to register that it is difficult to imagine any Christian thinker denying 
all advance or improvement or development from the Old Covenant (typically 
associated with Moses, but also seen to include figures from at least Noah and 
 
61 Ibid., 12.  
62 Ibid., 9. 
63 Ibid., 11.  
64 Ibid., 12.  
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Abraham through David, and on to the Exile) to the New Covenant of Christ. For 
example, the letter to the Hebrews emphases that the new administration brought 
about in Christ is “a new and better covenant.”65 It is difficult, in fact, to overestimate 
the importance of this basic insight to the whole of the New Testament. Even 
Augustine recognizes a progression within the (for him, sole) historical epoch leading 
from Adam to Christ.66 Indeed Bonaventure’s towering Dominican counterpart, St. 
Thomas himself, also explicitly states that the new covenant is an advance over the 
old, the latter being “more perfect” than the former.67 So it is that, at this basic level, 
such progression—historical progression, even—is completely uncontroversial. Karl 
Löwith grasps the fundamental dynamic going on here: 
what matters for the understanding of history is 
Joachim’s revolutionary attempt to delineate a new 
scheme of epochs and dispensations by which the 
traditional scheme of the religious progress from the Old 
Testament to the New Testament became extended….68 
 
Following Joachim, Ratzinger’s Bonaventure identifies what for any theologian is 
uncontroversial—the progression which takes place between the Old Covenant and 
the New Covenant in Christ—and extends and applies this principle more broadly. 
 From here, however, Bonaventure does go on to make two subsequent 
innovations, both contrary to the mind of Augustine. First he extends the binary 
relationship to pairs of two-to-two (for example, servitus to libertas, timor to amor, 
and figura to veritas), three-to-three, etc. (up through seven-to-seven).69 He then 
(building on the seven-to-seven pattern) applies the schema to the entire epoch of the 
Old Testament (complete with characters such as Samuel and Ezekiel), in relation to 
the New (including such figures as Clement, St. Gregory, Hadrian, and 
Charlemagne),70 extending the logic of the correspondence not just to the whole but 
also to the details, to various individual parts.71  
 
65 Hebrews 8:5–7.  
66 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 17.  
67 “Successit … status novae legis statui veteris legis tamquam perfectior imperfectiori.” Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae 71–114,  ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, tr. 
Fr. Lawrence Shapcote, O.P. (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 
2012), Q. 106 A. 4 resp. (413). 
68 Löwith, Meaning, 145. Italics mine.  
69 Ibid., 13. One would be hard pressed to deny the progression inherent in these pairs.  
70 Ibid., 21.  
71 Ibid., 21.  
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 These last two Bonaventurian moves which Ratzinger lays out—the theoriae and 
the binary correspondences—lead to a fourth and final one: the novel periodization of 
history into two great epochs, the latter seen as an organic development out of the 
former, in the same manner as we have seen above. As already stressed, the six days 
of creation of Genesis one, God the Father’s “literal work,” are included in neither 
historical “week.” The other salient feature to point out is the way in which, for the 
Seraphic Doctor, Christ serves as the actual mediating element or “hinge” which links 
together the two epochs: he culminates the Old on day seven (with its rebuilding of 
the temple, its restoration of the city, and its newly given peace), and also re-launches 
the New on day one (with its formation of Christ, the Ebionite heresy, and the 
expulsion of the Jews). With Christ, then, history ends (in agreement with Augustine), 
yet then begins again in a non-identical repetition.72  Here we see the vivid application 
of Bonaventure’s theme of Christus Medium to the realistically temporal landscape of 
history.  
C. History as having an eidos.  
 Having sifted through these theological details, let us now draw out a 
philosophical implication. That Ratzinger’s Bonaventure lays out a historical 
schema—the “double division into seven periods within the two-fold division of the 
Testaments”73—in which his current moment is located demonstrates that he regards 
history as intelligible, as having an eidos. One might rejoin that Augustine also puts 
forth a historical schema—his single week of seven sub-epochs. True, and yet the 
question emerges: given the centuries which had elapsed between Christ’s day and 
Augustine’s own, is this really sufficient? Or should we admit, following Voegelin, 
that such an omission—the omission of any specific treatment of his own historical 
moment within the context of an overall, definite conception of history as a whole—
does amount to the denial of a true historical eidos? The latter conclusion seems 
plausible; to this issue we will return, below.   
 What we see in Ratzinger’s reworking of Bonaventure’s logos of history, indeed, 
is aptly articulated by Löwith, whose definition of the “philosophy of history” is “a 
systematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by which 
 
72 One can see this “completing-relaunching” role of Christ as the hinge between the two covenants in 
the chart on Ratzinger, Theology of History, 21.  
73 Ibid., 17.  
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historical events and successions are unified and directed toward an ultimate 
meaning.”74 For Löwith, moreover, the  philosophy of history is “entirely dependent 
upon theology of history, in particular on the theological concept of history as a 
history of fulfillment and salvation,”75 in particular the fulfillment and salvation 
inaugurated uniquely by the thought forms contained in the Hebrew Bible, or what 
Christians call the Old Testament.  For the student of Heidegger, the philosophy of 
history originates with the Hebrew and Christian faith in a fulfillment of an 
eschatological pattern.  
 This eschatological pattern is revealed in Scripture (keeping in mind Ratzinger’s 
pointed qualification that for Bonaventure all revelation involves interpretation), and 
functions as the imagined double which allows one to recognize the identity, or to 
apprehend the eidos, in the otherwise chaotic ebb and flow of the course of human 
events. This eschatological pattern, in other words, takes on the form of a mythos.  
Conclusion 
 On the basis of these considerations, it seems that, given the vantage point of the 
contemporary world (and church) in the twenty-first century, that in order to maintain 
that history as a whole does have an eidos, one must also affirm some version of 
historical progressivism toward a final telos. Such progressivism is in fact, the main 
element of continuity which Bonaventure picks up and perpetuates from Joachim. On 
this view, the creation which is ongoingly sustained by a providential God is not 
merely a mundus senescens, simply unraveling into oblivion.  
 From the perspective of eight centuries of hindsight, how should modern thinkers 
regard this contribution of Bonaventure? To this question, in our final chapter, we 
now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Löwth, Meaning in History, 1.  
75 Ibid.  
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Chapter 6 
The eschatological whole (II): Ratzinger and Milbank 
Introduction 
 In the last chapter, after contrasting my approach with that of Hegel on the one 
hand and Voegelin on the other, I summarized two premodern eschatological 
positions, those of Joachim and Bonaventure (the latter, admittedly, through the lens 
of Ratzinger). In this final chapter I turn to a contemporary criticism: that of John 
Milbank, in opposition to Ratzinger’s embrace of Bonaventure’s logos of history. 
Before responding to Milbank, however, with my own rejoinder, I attempt a deep 
reading of Ratzinger’s approach to history, but not before gleaning certain key 
insights in support of the validity of an eidos of history from German philosopher 
Josef Pieper. Pieper, I claim, keeps the whole of history within our purview, showing 
that such a grasp is compatible with the complex details of a logos of history that is 
both genealogical and progressive.   
I. Confirmation & supplementation from Josef Pieper 
 In his The End of Time, Josef Pieper provides a powerful argument in opposition 
to the stance of Voegelin; yet Pieper freely admits, in resonance with the overall 
thesis of this essay, that, in order to display the eidos of history, philosophy must 
paradoxically rely on that which is pre-philosophical. Pieper argues against the 
possibility of any authentic philosophy of history which refuses to acknowledge its 
“other” which is theology.1 As he puts it, “a philosophy of history that is severed from 
theology does not perceive its subject matter.”2 For Pieper, then, philosophy stands in 
a “contrapuntal” relationship with theology. 
It happens in all vital philosophizing that the sphere of 
the “purely philosophical” has perforce to be 
overstepped into the sphere of pronouncements whose 
nature it is to be, not the result of human cognitive 
endeavor, but brought to view prior to all intellectual 
activity as something received or to be received.3  
 
Hence Pieper is making the same point that we have seen above in this essay: that 
authentic philosophy does not deny the pre-philosophical. For some 
 
1 Pieper thinks that, while every area of philosophy—cognition or philosophical ontology are the two 
examples he gives—can be regarded as in some sense dependent upon theology, this is most explicitly 
the case in the area of the philosophy of history. Pieper, End of Time, 24–5. 
2 Ibid., 24. 
3 Ibid., 16.  
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phenomenologists this latter amounts to the structure of everyday experience; for 
other thinkers such as Plato and Habermas (as we have seen above) it is constituted by 
mythos.  
 This “return to theology” involves for Pieper a salutary acknowledgement of that 
upon which theologians themselves, in turn, found their discourse: the givens of 
revelation. Among this company of theologians Pieper locates Plato himself: 
The primary thing, which is presupposed by theology, is 
a body of traditional pronouncements which are believed 
to have been revealed … as Plato puts it, “to have come 
down from a divine source.”4  
 
 For Pieper, a philosopher of history will either consciously rely on such revealed 
givens, or his “philosophy” will turn out to be a version of nihilism, which by the 
nature of the case is rationally impenetrable (as we will see below in our discussion of 
the inanis et vacua of Gen 1:2).5 
 Pieper lays out two components which must be regarded as central to any 
philosophy of history and which are accounted for not by “cognitive endeavor” but 
rather by the mythos of theology: the “whence and whither” and “salvation and 
disaster.” On this first point Pieper argues that any conception of history is 
conditioned by “some sort of conception of beginning and end.”6 In this way history 
shares the same logic as mythos or narrative (for no story can continue ad infinitum). 
This point applies, thinks Pieper, to Nietzsche’s rejection of such beginning or end in 
his “doctrine of the eternal recurrence” as much as to any other view. But a rational 
investigation of the beginning or end of time or history is off-limits to the isolated 
philosopher, hermetically sealed off from all other discourses, by the nature of the 
case:7  
 
4 Ibid., 29. Examination of the context of this quotation—from Plato’s Philebus—confirms our instinct 
to expect that, when such revelation is in view, mythos can be found somewhere close by. Indeed, in 
this context Plato alludes to Prometheus: “There is a gift from the gods—or so it seems evident to 
me—which they let fall from their abode, and it was through Prometheus, or one like him, that it 
reached mankind….” Plato, Philebus, tr. R. Hackforth, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), 16c (1092).  
5 We could summarize the point in the following manner: when philosophy examines its undergirding, 
it discovers theology. Theology, in turn, relies upon revelation, which turns out to be inextricably 
mythical or mythological in character.  
6 Pieper, End of Time, 19.  
7 How then is that philosopher Nietzsche able to arrive at the conclusion that the commencement and 
termination of historical time are to be rejected? Here one could argue that Nietzsche, it turns out, was 
no mere philosopher, but rather, relied not just on myth—for example in The Birth of Tragedy his 
whole point is to extol the character of mythological productions and experiences—but also on all 
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The beginning and end of history are conceivable only 
on acceptance of a pre-philosophically traditional 
interpretation of reality; they are either ‘revealed’ or are 
inconceivable.8 
 
 Next Pieper discusses salvation and disaster. For Pieper, not only does the logos 
of history not concern itself with the falling of rocks or the flooding of rivers (that is, 
purely natural occurrences), but it does not even concern itself with the “disintegration 
of culture” or “the rise of a world empire” or “economic development” or “class 
conflict.” Instead, “what really and in the deepest analysis happens in history,” and 
hence is the concern of the logos of history, is  
“salvation and disaster.” And, Pieper reminds us, “these … are concepts which can 
only be apprehended on the basis of revelation.”9 While not disagreeing with Pieper’s 
point here, for the purposes of this study I want to emphasize that the concepts of 
salvation and disaster pertain not only to revealed theology, but also to the nature of 
mythos, including in that more narrow sense of mythos by which Aristotle, as we saw 
above in chapter two, specifies plot. What good story, after all, does not contain a plot 
line, does not spin a dramatic tale, of near disaster and heroic salvation? 
 Further, which area of theology, Pieper asks, is it which is presupposed by the 
philosophy of history? Not angelology; not sacramentology. Rather Pieper stresses 
that same object which Ratzinger emphasizes: the historia salutis, the history of 
redemption.  For when it examines the pre-philosophical “other” applicable to itself, 
the philosophy of history encounters “the exact center of theological pronouncement, 
which is a pronouncement concerning the historical process of the salvation of 
man.”10  
 I want to point out that the situation Pieper is describing here is deeply Platonic. 
First, it conforms to the parameters of Meno’s Paradox: if one truly is to search for an 
object, one must neither completely grasp the object, nor be completely at a loss as to 
the identity or nature of the object. Such is precisely the case with the end of time or 
 
manner of theological assumptions. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and other Writings, tr. 
Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999); Giles Fraser, 
Redeeming Nietzsche (New York: Routledge, 2002); Bruce Ellis Benson, Pious Nietzsche 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008).  
8 Pieper, End of Time, 19.  
9 Ibid., 20.  
10 Ibid., 23.  
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history as Pieper has it: he who “believingly accepts,”11 for example, the theological 
interpretation of the end of time as prophesied in St. John’s Apocalypse, has just the 
kind of hazy apprehension, just the kind of “certain shape,”12 of the sought-after 
object which Plato’s Socrates envisions in the Meno. Here, that is, the apocalyptic 
mythos of Scripture serves as the imagined double on the basis of which we can grasp 
the meaning of history, in the spirit of Pickstock’s account of Neoplatonism, as 
articulated in chapter two above. 
 Yet another, albeit related, Platonic philosophical category through which one can 
view Pieper’s point, in addition to that of Meno’s Paradox, is that of divine 
illumination. Pieper argues that, in order to have an “experience in the historical 
reality before our eyes that has some connection to the end of time,”13 one must first 
“receive” a kind of illumination from “a pre-philosophical tradition.”14 After all, 
Pieper reasons, “the reality of things is in their light,” as St. Thomas says in his 
commentary on the Liber de Causis.15 In principle, this claim is no different from the 
claim that in order to recognize a leaf as a leaf,16 one must first receive—to reiterate 
the point—a kind of illumination from a pre-philosophical tradition. In the spirit of 
Platonic thought, this amounts to a theory of divine illumination,17 without which the 
world is simply a “blooming, buzzing confusion”18—the formlessness and void of 
Gen 1:219 (occurring prior to the intellectual light of creation day one)—and nihilism 
is the case.   
 
11 Ibid., 75.  
12 Ibid., 49.  
13 Ibid., 48 
14 Ibid., 48 
15 Ibid., 55.  
16 I am thinking here of the kind of nominalism expressed in Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying 
in a Non-Moral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, tr. Raymond Guess and Ronald 
Speirs (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 139–53.  
17 On divine illumination, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/illumination/. See also the introduction 
and statement of method, above.  
18 This phrase was coined by William James. See William James, The Principles of Psychology 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 462.  
19 Robert Altar translates the Hebrew והבו והת  , on which these English terms are based, as “welter and 
waste,” thus preserving the onomatopoetic and alliterative character of the original phrase. Further: 
“the second word of the pair looks like a nonce term coined to rhyme with the first word to reinforce it. 
Hence we can say that the writer essentially employs, in his attempt to name this mysterious ‘stuff’ of 
Gen 1:2, three different terms of art with the use of this phrase: onomonopoeia, alliteration, and the use 
of a nonce term.” Robert Altar, The Five Books of Moses: a Translation with Commentary (New York: 
Norton, 2004), 17 n. 2. The LXX renders this phrase aÓo/ratoß kai« aÓkataskeu/astoß and the 
Vulgate inanis et vacua.  
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 As Pieper the philosopher surveys the content of the “exact center of … 
pronouncement” of the 
 theologians, what does he find? What, in other words, is the content of the history 
which is revealed to humankind, upon which the philosophy of history relies? While 
Pieper lists and discusses several elements, I want to focus on two: creation and what 
he calls “transposition.”  
 Pieper’s notion of creation is fully in line with traditional Augustinian (and 
Thomistic) thought. Far from being reducible to that which takes place at a moment or 
instant of time or during any interval of time, creation is the operation of God which 
continually sustains or maintains the world in existence. This view flies in the face of 
the Enlightenment’s notion of a Deus extramundus, “with which is contrasted a finite 
world which is equally self-enclosed.”20 Put differently, human history “continually 
borders” upon “the realm of the untemporal-eternal,”21 which inwardly sustains, 
saturates, and pervades the former. This sustaining, saturating, and pervading, simply 
but mysteriously, is what Christian theology means by “creation.”22 
 Pieper’s second notion to which we should attend is what he terms the 
“transposition,” or the theological pronouncement upon which the “man who 
philosophizes” about time and history must depend, that the end of time by no means 
will consist in annihilation or the reversal of creation, but rather in the transposition 
of the historical/temporal world into the realm of the eternal or non-chronotic. Hence 
the two primary concerns of the philosopher of history are “the theological 
pronouncement that such a transposition will take place” and “the preparation [for] 
the transposition within history.”23 After all, Pieper argues, this latter theological 
pronouncement includes the affirmation that the End “is not unconnected with 
historical events,”24 and this claim is consistent with his view that the end of the 
world is not merely a terminus, but also a telos.25 Progress toward this telos—for what 
is a telos without progress culminating in it?—is not, Pieper is at pains to clarify, 
 
20 Pieper, End of Time, 68. 
21 Ibid.  
22 My stance is that while it would be a mistake to attribute to Bonaventure the view of Deus 
extramundus, he (rightly) insists that human history has a beginning point and a terminus. Reading the 
Seraphic Doctore through the lens of mythos, one may then say that this is because all good narratives 
contain a beginning and an end.  
23 Ibid., 71. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 80.  
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reducible to the realm of immanent human efforts and endeavors without remainder. 
This progress, that is, is characterized by something akin to Hegel’s “cunning of 
reason” or a certain “heterogeneity of ends,” a notion to which we will return below.26 
This progress is no straight line to success or victory over which human beings or 
human civilization exercise intentional control. In this sense it is far removed from 
Marxism, revolutionary politics, liberation theology or any number of other modern 
utopias. And yet, history will, for Pieper, progress toward its telos. This, for him, is a 
given of divine revelation.27  
  History, then, for Pieper, has an eidos, albeit it in a Platonic way, one which 
comes from elsewhere, from a transcendent realm, and not one—as in Aristotle’s τί 
ἦν εἶναι28—which is utterly immanent to the concrete particular itself and graspable 
by man’s mental ability which is calibrated to the particular in all its immanence. In 
short, then, on Pieper’s account, history as intelligible. 
II. Vindicating Bonaventure: heresy and tradition in Ratzinger 
 A. Joachimism as heresy 
 We have seen, in chapter five above, that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure builds upon 
Joachim’s thought in such a way as to vindicate the reality of history’s eidos. Yet, 
surely we are here confronted by a massive objection: it is not the case, as was 
glimpsed in the previous chapter, that Joachim’s theology ought to regarded as 
heresy?   
 Before confirming and elaborating Joachim’s heresy (and its relation to 
Bonaventure), let us attempt to rule out as many candidates (or possible heresies) as 
possible. Bernard McGinn elaborates one possible sense in which this claim—that 
Joachim’s thought is heretical—can be held as true. In the Fourth Lateran Council of 
 
26 For this latter phrase I am relying on John Milbank, The Word Made Strange (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1997), 124–7. 
27 Although Pieper does not in this context cite biblical justification, two passages come to my mind: 
Hab 2:14 (“But the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the LORD, as the waters 
cover the sea.”) and Rev 11:15–16 (“Then the seventh angel blew his trumpet, and there were loud 
voices in heaven saying, “The kingdom of this world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of his 
Messiah….”). Both may be plausibly interpreted as referring to a kind of development which will take 
place—is taking place—within history in a kind of lead-up to Peiper’s telos. Even Thomas cites 
Augustine, who, in his epistle to Hesychius, writes (according to Thomas) that “the Gospel is not 
preached to the whole world yet, but when it is, the consummation of the world will come.” Aquinas, 
Summa theologiae, Q. 104, A. 4, Ad 4 (414).  
28 Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002), Z4 (120–3). 
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1215, Joachim was condemned for his opposition to the doctrine of the Trinity as held 
by Peter Lombard. 
We condemn therefore and we disapprove of the treatise 
or tract which Abbot Joachim published against Master 
Peter Lombard on the unity or essence of the Trinity, 
calling him heretical and senseless because in the 
Sentences he said, “Since it is a most excellent reality—
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and it is not 
generating, nor generated, nor proceeding.”29 
 
The ground of the condemnation, then, is Joachim’s own charge of heresy against 
another, the venerable Master of Paris Peter Lombard. As McGinn goes on to narrate, 
however, the ecclesially authoritative charges of heresy are not to be taken too 
seriously, at least for our purposes, first because they are almost certainly based on a 
misunderstanding on Joachim’s part of the Lombard, but also because it sheds little 
light on the relation which Joachim sees as holding between the Trinity and history. 
On this latter point, McGinn convincingly shows that, while many scholars over the 
centuries have derided Joachim for his supposed view that the immanent Trinity is 
affected by the history of the world (thus negating the doctrine of divine simplicity), 
these accusations are unfounded. On the contrary, according to McGinn, who is “in 
substantial if not total agreement” with Ratzinger’s appraisal of Joachim,30 the 
direction of influence runs in the opposite direction: history is tripartite for Joachim 
because it reflects, imitates, and participates in the Triune God.31  
 In comparison with the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, a more plausible 
reason, it turns out, for regarding Joachim as heretical is his rejection by St. Thomas 
Aquinas, the Doctor Communis Ecclesiae. McGinn demonstrates that Thomas’ 
opposition to the Joachite position developed over several stages, including his 
response to the controversies surrounding Gerardo di Borgo San Donino’s 
Introductorius in Evangelium Aeternum (and its official ecclesial condemnation, 
documented in the Protocol of Anagni32), as well as the equal and opposite invective 
 
29 McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, 167. C.f. Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, tr. Roy J. 
Deferrari (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publishers, 2002), #431 (170). 
30 McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, 214.  
31 Ibid., 161–204. 
32 The Commission of Anagni, and its resulting protocol, condemned both William’s Introductorius as 
well as the theological system, in toto, of Joachim. On the latter point, the alleged Joachite foundation 
to which they reacted is two-fold: his notions of the eclipse of the institutional church and various other 
matters all relating to his espousal of the third status. Bonaventure, however, follows the Calabrian 
down neither of these paths.  Anderson, “St. Bonaventure’s Collations,” 92–3. C.f. Heinrich Denifle, 
 209 
put forth by the no less bombastic anti-mendicant secular doctor, William of St. 
Amour.33 Against these two foes (one radically innovative in eschatology; the other 
condemning the evangelical poverty movement, discussed above in chapter one) 
Thomas fought, on both fronts, with his anti-Joachimite view finally settling into a 
final form in the Summa Theologiae.34 In an effort to clarify Thomas’ opposition to 
Joachimism (embodied in certain ways in Bonaventure), as found in particular in that 
section of the Prima Secundae of the Summa sometimes called “the treatise on the 
law,”35 I offer the following three points. 
 First, Thomas follows Pseudo-Dionysius to the effect that one can hold that “there 
are three statuses,” that of the Old Law, that of the New Law, and “that which comes 
afterwards … in heaven (in patria).”36 Here we find Thomas affirming a historical 
periodization which is tantamount, not to Augustine’s one-week, historical schema, 
but, indeed, to Bonaventure’s two-week, historical schema. On this basis we see that, 
whatever Thomas’ opposition to Joachim, it cannot be simply a matter of deviating 
from Augustine’s single historical “week.”  
 Second, in the third objection of this article and its reply, Thomas once again 
argues a position—yet again in rejection of the third status within historical time—
which indicts Joachim but not Bonaventure. Just as the Old Law involved not just the 
Father but also the Son (here Thomas appeals to John 5:4637), so also the second age 
“belongs not only to Christ but also the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 
8:2….”38 Thomas, then, employs Trinitarian theology—that the ad extra work(s) of 
the Persons are undivided—to undermine a third “week,” again, however, writing in 
such a way as to suggest openness to an appraisal of history as twofold.   
 Third, however, consider the more problematic issue of biblical interpretation. 
McGinn is correct to see this issue as the real source of intractable disagreement 
between Thomas and Bonaventure, with the former insisting that all Old Testament 
 
"Das Evangelium aeternum und die Commision zu Anagni." Archiv fur Literatur und 
Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 1 (1885): 49-98. 
33 Ibid., 210–11. 
34 Ibid., 209–213. 
35 This nomenclature is employed, for example, by Alfred Fredosso. See Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on 
Law: the Complete Text Summa Theologiae I–II, Questions 90–108, tr. Alfred J. Freddoso (South 
Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009).   
36 Aquinas, Treatise on Law, Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1 (257).  
37 “If you believed Moses, you would have believed me, for he wrote of me.”  
38  Aquinas, Treatise on Law, Q. 106, A. 4, ad 3 (258). Rom 8:2: “For the law of the Spirit of life in 
Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death.”  
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figures be interpreted allegorically in Christ, and hence following Augustine in 
disallowing any one-to-one correspondence of concordiae from old to new.39 (“New” 
here includes what Thomas above calls the New Law, which he regards as including 
the post-apostolic history of the church.) Although Bonaventure’s multiformes 
theoriae do not necessarily involve any such one-to-one correspondence,40 and 
although Ratzinger does argue that they apply to the totus Christus,41 there can be 
little doubt that for Thomas these theories are one example of the tendency of 
Joachim and  Bonaventure (from Thomas’ perspective) to undermine the allegorical 
sense in which Christ fulfills the details of the Old Testament. Indeed it is here that 
we hit upon a rock bottom disagreement between the two thirteenth-century 
mendicant intellectuals, a disagreement involving the history of exegesis (which is 
beyond the scope of this essay to settle).  
 Yet one should appreciate the connection between this exegetical matter of the 
concordiae on the one hand and the third historical status on the other, for the latter is 
logically prior to the former. That is, if there is a third status of the Holy Spirit, then 
(assuming that the scriptural historia salutis applies the entirety of temporal history), 
it seems necessarily to follow that the referents of some biblical images are realities 
other than Christ, resulting in a heretical position (according to Thomistic standards). 
Surely this is the real “rub”. Yet it is a “rub” between Thomas and Joachim, not 
between Thomas and Bonaventure: since Bonaventure expressly rejects the third 
status, then it is possible for him cogently to maintain that all biblical signs find their 
fulfillment in the totus Christus (as I argue in Section III, below), in the outworking of 
Christ (or the Christ event) within the age of the church.  
 On this view of things, Thomas regards Joachim’s third status as heretical, but 
Bonaventure, once again, remains unscathed. Yet we must draw the reader’s attention 
to one additional dimension in particular of Bonaventure’s thought which is indeed 
problematic, even for Joseph Ratzinger. In chapter five above I outlined four area of 
the Calabrian’s thought which are pertinent to the task of this essay: the third “week” 
 
39 McGinn, Calabrian Abbot, 210. Thomas relies on Augustine’s rejection of such one-to-one 
correspondence. See Augustine, City of God, XVIII.52, where the Bishop of Hippo denies that the ten 
plagues of Egypt can be “understood as a sign of” the ten persecutions (which Augustine’s 
interlocutors take themselves to identify) of the church.  
40 One should of course remember, as shown above, that in loci other than the theoriae Bonaventure 
does affirm such concordiae. Ratzinger, Theology of History, 21.  
41 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 28. This point will be developed further below.  
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of Joachite history; the eclipse of the (institutional) body of Christ; the 
immanentization of (some elements of) the eschaton (notably the figure of St. 
Francis); and the hermeneutic device of the concordiae. According to the cadre of 
commentators attended to in these final two chapters of this essay, the first, second, 
and final planks are clearly to be  rejected. What I find interesting, however, is the 
paucity of attention to, much less criticism of, the Joachite and Bonaventurian 
adulation of St. Francis to a stature of redemptive-historical import which rivals that 
of Christ himself. It is here, in others words, with the redemptive-historical role which 
Bonaventure accords to Francis, building upon the thought of both Joachim himself 
and the Spiritual Franciscans working immediately in his wake, that proves to be the 
only real heresy which, for our purposes, matters. Every other Joachite plank, it turns 
out, is either rejected by Bonaventure or is recognized by him (and others whose 
orthodoxy is unquestioned) as unproblematic.  
 Again, if Bonaventure does actually perpetuate any element of Joachite thought 
which is clearly heretical, it seems me to reside here, with his view of St. Francis as 
eschatological paragon. As stated and quoted above, Ratzinger admits as much, in a 
haunting passage in which, uniquely in the Habilitationsschrift, his voice deviates 
strikingly from the voice of the Seraphic Doctor. Ratzinger refers to the Franciscan 
identification of Poverello as the angel of the Apocalypse, calling this stance “a 
historical-theological axiom of … unimpeachable certitude” which even Bonaventure 
could not resist.42 It is clear that, at this one point, Ratzinger cannot go “all the way 
down” with Bonaventure. His reading is charitable, to be sure, and for him this view 
of Bonaventure’s does not undermine the legitimacy of “true Franciscanism.”43 Yet, if 
pressed, surely Ratzinger would admit that this view of St. Francis is tainted by the 
specter of heresy.44 After all, it falls prey to that temptation which the Seraphic 
Doctor himself otherwise strenuously resisted: the relativization of Christ, the 
 
42 See n. 48 above, ch. 5, III A. 
43 That Ratzinger has great appreciation for “true Franciscanism” is seen in the quotation in ch. 5, cited 
in n. 54 above. 
44 I hasten to admit the problematic nature of the identification of heresy. After all, as an Anglican, I 
myself might well find it difficult to agree even with Denzinger, himself relying on councils, 
convocations, and decrees, regarded as authoritative by the Roman Catholic Church, on every point of 
alleged heresy.  
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undermining of the absolute preeminence of Christ, with respect to some other 
historical reality.45  
 B. Ratzinger’s view of heresy as genealogically fecund 
 Let us assume, then, that Bonaventure’s Joachite view of Francis is rightly 
regarded as heretical. It is here that things get interesting, for we find in Ratzinger a 
rather conspicuous posture with respect to heresy in the Christian intellectual 
tradition: for him it has (or can have) a constructive role in terms of historical 
genealogy. In a critique of “present day manual[s] of theology,” Ratzinger indicates 
his view that heresies contain a valid truth that must be preserved. For him “every 
heresy in the history of … dogma”46 is a  
cipher for an abiding truth, a cipher we must now 
preserve with other simultaneously valid statements, 
separated from which it produces a false impression.47  
 
With this statement about heresy, which resonates with other similar statements 
throughout Ratzinger’s corpus,48 Ratzinger thus provides a theoretical justification for 
Bonaventure’s appropriation of Joachim, and his own, in turn, of Bonaventure. In 
other words, from a Ratzingerian perspective one can appreciate how heresies—and 
Joachim’s heresy in particular—can generate further historical developments that are 
fruitful, even if the heresies themselves are formally and technically false (in and of 
themselves). What matters here is the claim that Bonaventure’s assimilation of 
Joachite thought—both the “orthodox” components such as historical progressivism 
and the “heretical” features such as the extreme eminence of St. Francis—is itself an 
instance of what is meant by the multiformes theoriae.49 This is the case due to the 
 
45 Octavian Schmucki, O.F.M.Cap. writes that “the Bonaventurian redemptive-historical designation 
borders on a mythologized Christologization of Francis.” (“… grenzt die bonaventurianische 
heilsgeschichtliche Kennzeichnung an eine mythisierte Christologisierung [von] Franciskus.”) 
Octavian Schmucki, O.F.M.Cap, “Joseph Ratzingers Die Geschichtstheologie des hl. Bonaventura: 
Nachwirken in der Forschung und der Folgezeit,” in Gegenwart und Offenbarung: Zu den Bonaventura 
Forschungen Joseph Ratzingers, ed. Franz-Xaver Heible and Marianne Schlosser (Regensburg: Pustet, 
2011), 359. 
46 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 172. 
47 Ibid.  
48 For example, Ratzinger makes a similar point about the constructive value of another (from his 
perspective) heresy, this time in the thought of Karl Barth (and his 20th century Catholic followers), 
who presented an account of the resurrection which in his view is less than orthodox, yet which 
nevertheless is useful for developing a full articularion of that doctrine. Ratzinger, Eschatology, 254. 
49 Actually, we have seen not one but two instances of heresy serving as a cipher for truth. In addition 
to Ratzinger’s embrace of Bonaventurian eschatology despite his refusal of the imputation of a near-
Christic status of the Poverello, we have also seen the appropriation of Bonaventure himself of 
Joachim’s progressivism in spite of the reasons for the progressivism (the third epoch of the Holy 
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historical nature of Bonaventure’s assimilation: the content of the doctrinal 
assimilation, that is, consists of statements and theories which unfold historically, as 
part and parcel with historical development.  In the context of a discussion of 
Bonaventure’s appropriation of Joachim(ism), Ratzinger writes: 
What does Bonaventure mean by these so-called 
theories?... [T]he theories are implied when Scripture 
speaks of the fruits and the trees which carry seeds within 
themselves. It is apparent that amounts to nothing less 
than a transfer of the theory of rationes seminales to 
Scripture. Certainly Scripture is closed objectively. But 
its meaning is advancing in a steady growth through 
history; and this growth is not yet closed. As the physical 
world contains seeds, so also Scripture contains “seeds”; 
that is, seeds of meaning. And this meaning develops in 
a constant process of growth in time. Consequently we 
are able to interpret many things which the Fathers could 
not have known because for them these things still lay in 
the dark future while for us they are accessible as past 
history…. And so, new knowledge constantly arises 
from Scripture.50 
 
Recalling that for Bonaventure there is no Scripture apart from (communal) 
interpretation one can indeed infer from this passage that Ratzinger considers 
Bonaventure’s assimilation of Joachim an example of a multiformis theoria. As a seed 
develops from a fruit, so also Bonaventure’s logos of history sprouts forth from 
Joachim’s interpretation of Scripture, as does Ratzinger’s from Bonaventure’s, heresy 
and all.  
 The case before us, Joachism’s affirmation of the eschatological eminence of 
Francis as the angelus ab ortu of Revelation 7:2, stands in opposition to Augustine’s 
hermeneutical posture. There can be little doubt that the position here of Joachite 
thought is so deeply problematic that it can be regarded as heresy. This position, then, 
serves as a historical condition for the possibility of Bonaventure’s eschatology. By 
assimilating and perpetuating this innovative error, which at the same time serves as a 
“cipher for … truth,” Bonaventure, by way of his own nonidentical repetition, is able 
 
Spirit as well as the inappropriate formulation of the concordiae). In this latter case, it is as if 
Bonaventure accepts the conclusion of an argument for which the premises are false. And yet, this 
procedure is legitimated by Ratzinger’s historical method, as well as that of Milbank. On the latter see 
subsection D below. I am saying that Milbank’s language of the “heterogeneity of ends” and its related 
connotations can be argued to legitimate Bonaventure’s move of assimilating some aspects of previous 
heresy, as well as that of Ratzinger, albeit in different ways. 
50 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 8–9.  
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to construct an eidos of history which benefits from Joachim’s conceptual “seed-
bearing fruit,” while at the same time rejecting the most egregious dimensions of 
Joachim’s thought (such as chiliasm and the third “week” of history).51  
 What, then, for Ratzinger, is the particular truth for which Joachim’s heresy is a 
cipher? What, indeed, is its particular fruitfulness? It is nothing other than the need 
for the tradition to be refreshed and revised, to be updated according the exigencies of 
the cultural moment. Simply put, by the time of Joachim’s day, it was no longer 
acceptable simply to hold that history had ended twelve centuries prior, and that there 
was nothing significant more to say about God’s providential ordering of the events of 
human history, that it is a waste of time to strive to discern the eidos of history in the 
ages after Christ.52 After all, even if Francis is dethroned from his stature of 
redemptive-historical uniqueness, it remains that case that the movement which 
followed in his wake (as well as that of St. Dominic) can be regarded as 
eschatologically significant, a historical-conceptual ingredient for recognizing the 
eidos of history, even in its entirety.  
 To vindicate this move of Ratzinger’s—his ratification of Bonaventure’s logos of 
history in spite of the its assimilation of Joachite heresy—I want to appeal to two 
 
51 In addition to the redemptive-historical prominence which Bonaventure, following the Spiritual 
Franciscans, accords to Francis, one could also note that Bonaventure incorporates Joachim’s deviation 
from Augustine’s single week. It is important here to be clear: as we have seen above, even St. Thomas 
allows for a double-week schema of history. And yet, Joachim’s deviation from the single week is part 
and parcel with his innovation of the third week! Bonaventure clearly assimilates this conceptual 
development, and it, too, serves as a “cipher for … truth.”  
52 This intermittent need radically to refresh and revise the tradition, in response to the historical 
moment, itself has a venerable tradition in Judeo-Christianity, including the following two examples: 1) 
the post-70 CE struggle narrated in 2 Esdras, in the face of the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple 
(hitherto “the focal point of world Jewry”), thus giving rise to halakhic Judaism (or, in broad strokes, 
rabbinic Judaism), in which Temple observance recedes and gives way to a novel emphasis on 
“walking” (the Hebrew halak means “to walk”) according to the Torah; 2) the revisions prompted in 
the earliest communities of Jesus followers in light of the disappointingly delayed Parousia; the 
devastating delay of the anticipated Parousia of Christ in the earliest communities of Jesus followers, 
which led to the (now canonical) revision of earlier (also canonical) predictions of the return of Christ. 
For more on the first instance, which is also an example of midrash, which “expand[s] the relevance” 
of a particular text, updating its sense in light of a historical shift or novel cultural context, see David 
de Silva, Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2002), 323–51; Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity, 2nd ed. (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 462–509; as well as the introductory material to 2 Esdras in The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 320–21 (of the section treating the 
Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books). On the latter example, while the Bavarian theologian 
undermines the historical-critical assumption, exemplified by Albert Schweizer, that “the greater the 
stress on expectation of an imminent end, the older the text must be,” while “the more mitigated such 
an eschatological expectation appears, the more recent the text,” he nevertheless also does concede we 
do find in the New Testament texts revised articulations of such expectations in response to delay. See 
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 35–45. 
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contemporary narrations of similar re-workings of tradition—one from Ratzinger 
himself and another from John Milbank—both of which help us to appreciate the 
genealogical character of Bonaventure’s appropriation of Joachim, and Ratzinger’s 
support of it. Both examples present an account of tradition by which thinkers form 
concepts and accounts of truth which build upon those of their predecessors, the latter 
serving as historical conditions of possibility for subsequent developments. Each 
example, that is, presents a genealogical account. Not only do these examples shed 
light on what Bonaventure is doing in the wake of the (albeit heretical) view of 
Joachim, but they also explain why Ratzinger is able justifiably to defend his 
thirteenth-century predecessor. The first approach is that of Ratzinger himself, taken 
from a later stage of his intellectual career. 
C. Ratzinger’s rendition of the genealogical development of the orthodox 
concept of God.   
 In his Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger rehearses his version of the historical 
process by which Christians came historically to understand the term “God.” 
Furthermore, he explicitly states that this process is one of historical contingency, or a 
matter of responding to historical events. Our understanding of God “did not arise out 
of speculation about God, out of an attempt by philosophical thinking to figure out 
what the fount of all being was like; it arose out of the effort to digest historical 
experiences.”53  
 His rendition of this conceptual development through history passes through the 
following stages:  
• the choice of El and jah as opposed to Moloch and Baal54 
• the subsequent expansion of these former terms into Elohim and Yahweh (with 
particular focus, in the latter case, on the burning bush story in Ex 3);55 
• the anti-idoltary critique put forth by Deutero-Isaiah (and the Wisdom 
literature);56 
 
53 Ratzinger, Introduction, 31.  
54 Ibid., 126. 
55 Ibid., 126–7.  
56 Ibid., 129.  
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• the idea of God as Being (put forward by the translators of the LXX), in a 
move which assimilates the fruits of the Greek legacy (Plato and Aristotle) of 
theologia;57  
• the New Testament (and especially Johannine) affirmation of a God who is 
“one of us,” concomitant with the move of the apostolic authors of the New 
Testament, nevertheless “boldly and resolutely”  to clarify the meaning of the 
divine “by deciding for the God of the philosophers and against the gods of 
the various religions.”58  
While one of the riveting moves Ratzinger makes in this historical genealogy is to 
uphold important elements of both a dymythologized logos59 and an equally ultimate 
mythos—thematics treated above—for our purposes here the main point is how each 
stage builds upon the previous, extending the conceptual content, in all its historical 
contingency, into yet a further development of (what will ultimately become) the 
nature of the Christian God.  
Consider a further example. Ratzinger thinks that the process articulated above 
can be seen to extend to the patristic construction of the doctrine of the Trinity (a 
phase subsequent to the final bullet point on the list above). In discussing the patristic 
assimilation of the Greek notion of prosopon, a key conceptual ingredient in the 
doctrine of the Trinity,60 Ratzinger makes his genealogical convictions clear. 
That the word prosopon … could not at once express 
the whole scope of what there is to express here was 
not, after all, their fault. The enlargement of the bounds 
of human thinking necessary to absorb intellectually the 
Christian experience of God did not come of its own 
accord. It demanded struggle, in which even error was 
fruitful; here it followed the basic law that everywhere 
governs the human mind in its advances.61 
 
Ratzinger’s articulation here of this “struggle” for an adequate conception of theos 
indicates that for him Christian thinking about God develops through time, that it 
builds upon prior intellectual achievements, again, in all their historical contingency. 
 
57 Ibid., 118–20. 
58 Ibid., 137.  
59 In its project of demythologization, for example, Ratzinger thinks that the early church relied upon 
Xenophanes. Ibid., 138.  
60 On the patristic use of prosopon, see also John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), 27–48. 
61 Ratzinger, Introduction, 167. 
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What is more, it indicates that heresy for Ratzinger is providentially one crucial 
ingredient in this dynamic process, for the view being described above, it turns out, is 
that of the ancient Monarchians and Modalists, both communities held by Catholic 
orthodoxy to be heretical.62  
This exemplary account above (dealing with prosopon) suggests, further, an 
important implication: that such development is not simply a matter of brute, 
“revelatory” deliverances from God to the mind of man, but instead is also constituted 
by the full range of human creative activity, at each stage (both here, with prosopon, 
but also in the stages above from El and jah through the Johannine conception) 
involving the human attempt to develop an idea of God which is sufficient to and 
requisite for each respective cultural moment. Against a merely dogmatic statement of 
brute divine deliverance from on high (of the kind countenanced by the older manual 
theologies which preceded him), Ratzinger’s imputed role for active human 
contribution in the achievement of Christian truth finds its justification in his 
understanding of revelation which he developed in his Habiliationsschrift research. If 
all revelation involves human interpretation—the view which Processor Schmaus 
found unacceptable, since it seemed to him to approach a dangerously modernist 
position—then the human person—mind, reason, imagination, memory, will, and 
heart—are all involved the grasp, the formulation, and the communication of 
revelation, all at an essential level. This is not far from Pickstock’s statement 
(channeling the thought of Charles Péguy) that “in order for an event to happen it all, 
it must happen twice.”63 Without human interpretation and imaginative conjecture, 
there is no revelation. The occurrence and meaning of the burning bush in Exodus 3, 
to take one above example of many, simply does not exist without the human attempt 
to understand and articulate these realities. And this process does not find its 
completion in the mind of the solitary individual, but rather redounds from generation 
to generation. It is this human attempt, for all its contingency, which for Ratzinger 
issues forth into a full and (in some ways) final conception of truth. Here, history is 
 
62 Ibid.  
63 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 73 (cited above in chapter two). As Pickstock makes clear, 
Péguy’s stock example of the historical event is storming of the Bastille during the French Revolution. 
John Milbank, again relying on Péguy, makes the same point: “Péguy … insists that there is no pure 
isolated original moment prior to repetition.” John Milbank, “Foreward: Charles Péguy and the 
Betrayal of Time,” in Charles Péguy, Notes on Bergson and Descartes: Philosophy, Christianity, and 
Modernity in Contestation, tr. Bruce K. Ward, (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019, xvi.  
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rational, history has an eidos, and thus Ratzinger is able to vindicate Bonaventure’s 
assimilation of Joachim, heretical though the latter’s view, indeed, was.   
D. Complementary to Ratzinger: John Milbank’s “Christological poetics” 
 In this above approach to tradition which claims to recognize something like a 
providentially ordered “cunning of reason” which proceeds on the basis of conceptual 
genealogy, Ratzinger finds common cause with a contemporary thinker, theologian 
John Milbank. This section of the present chapter will summarize Milbank’s “poetic” 
approach to (the) history (of Christian concepts), and then connect it to Ratzinger’s 
thought.  
 In his essay “A Christological Poetics” Milbank sees the transmission of Christian 
tradition in terms of “non-identical repetition,” or “repetition with variety” (borrowed 
from the eighteenth-century Bishop Lowth, who, against that other bishop Warburton, 
argued for the primacy of speech over writing in the origins of language) on the 
model of a poet who repeats the same poetic lines he received, learned, and 
memorized from his predecessor bards … but with a “twist,” with a difference.64 Even 
as the same lines are repeated, the poet adds a different emphasis, pairs a phrase with 
a novel facial expression, or even stresses different syllables of particular words 
differently than did his antecedent poet. 
 In this way the original poem, and mutatis mutandis the poem at every subsequent 
stage in the catena, is “pleonastic”: it contains within it the potential for an infinite 
variety of performances.65 Milbank goes on to speak of Christ as not only the sum 
total of the signifying chain or web of Hebrew theology poetically imagined in the 
Old Testament, but also as occupying a certain place, indeed an “originating place” or 
an “inaugurating rupture,”66 in this historical chain of meaning.  
 Yet even if Christ serves as “the sum total of the entire chain,” equally he is just 
one point or moment in the larger catena, in which each moment builds upon its 
preceding counterpart, and is in turn built upon by its successor. We see here a kind of 
forward-developing process which Milbank thinks characterizes human cultural 
 
64 John Milbank, “Pleonasm, Speech, and Writing,” in The Word Made Strange, (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1997), 55–83 at 64. 
65 As such Milbank’s pleonasm resonates with the rhetorical question of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure, 
asked in the context of the multiformes theoriae, “Who knows the unlimited seeds which exist?” 
Ratzinger, Theology of History, 8–9.  
66 This term comes from Michel de Certeau, “How is Christianity Thinkable Today?” tr. Frederick 
Christian Bauerschmidt, in The Postmodern God: a Theological Reader, ed. Graham Ward, 142–55 
(Malden, MA: 1997), 143.  
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activity in history. Man, that is, is always trying to “catch up” with his own proper 
destiny. Hegel, Milbank remarks, calls this “heterogeneity of ends” the “cunning of 
reason.”67  
These expressions refer to the way in which human 
historical formulations in their development escape 
their original conscious purposes and yet serve an 
intelligible function. Hegel detected in this 
circumstance a process of immanent determinism….68 
And again:  
… to act at all is to be dispossessed, always 
continuously to apprehend ‘more’ in our own deed 
once it occurs to us, than our first hazy probings 
towards the formulation of a performance could have 
ever expected.69 
 Far from being a “tragic dispossession,” however, for Christian theology this 
situation is potentially redemptive:  
in every human act we are both entirely responsible and 
entirely not responsible…. To maintain … full 
responsibility requires … faith that if we attend to God, 
he will graciously provide us, out of ourselves, with 
appropriate good performances. The moral actor, since 
he is an artist, is as much at the mercy of ‘the muse’ (or 
the Holy Spirit) as the artist.70 
 
As Hegel saw, Milbank points out, this situation is made more complex by 
intersubjectivity: for my performance (even if in response to the Holy Spirit) is 
“preformed by a cultural inheritance.”71 Instead of being ultimately tragic, however, 
we see here “a risky openness both to grace and to the possibility of sinful 
distortion….”72 Milbank uses terms and phrases in this context—“tragic 
dispossession” and “sinful distortion,” for example—which, surely, are not far from 
Ratzinger’s notion of (the danger of) heresy, and the potentially redemptive role it can 
play in the larger purposes of divine providence.  
 
67 This statement comports with the later one in the essay that “there is no activity which remains 
purely within the actor and does not already begin to be an ‘alientated’ project.” Milbank, 
“Christological Poetics,” 129. Here Milbank is arguing that this historical chain of development obtains 
not just in the realm of poiêsis but also of praxis.  
68 Ibid., 125.  
69 Ibid., 126. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
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 In all the above ways, Milbank shows that human activity is “poetic”—or 
“poiêtic”—and that this dimension of human activity equally applies to history and to 
its logos.  
 Next the English thinker applies this notion of the poetic to the workings of the 
human mind, attempting to establish a “taxis” of metaphor. In Aristotle’s Poetics the 
Stagirite considers that “poetry … is mimesis … and that it also inaugurates a world” 
by “setting up an ethos through the employment of a mythos.”73 So for Aristotle there 
is no tension between “ethics” and “myth,” between praxis and poiêsis. The main 
point here is that myth can be imitated; it can be repeated (with variations) and 
therefore passed down as tradition. In this way the meaning of the myth develops and 
builds. Milbank endorses a “metaphorical logic” (put forth, he says, by Paul Ricœur) 
in which thought begins with metaphor as the foundational unit.74 Christian 
eschatology then “saves” the chain—one might say the syntax—of risky transmission. 
In a striking statement of some aspects of the eschaton, Milbank argues that at the end 
of human history, “all the actors taken collectively in their diachronic series [will] 
constitute humanity as at last free and responsible.”75 Though he does not state this 
explicitly, one could regard Milbank’s diachronism here as equally dianoietic, for in 
this chain of developing meaning, it is as if the human race (note that the title of this 
section of his essay is “the poetics of humanity,” not “the poetics of the church”) is 
performing a kind of corporate interpretation, participating in a kind of corporate 
reading project, precisely the kind of “project” Bonaventure has in mind with his idea 
of a historical, eschatological unfolding of the multiformes theoriae.76  
What, the reader might ask, does this account of Milbank’s of the historical 
development of tradition have to do with God? After, all, is it not the case that, central 
to Ratzinger’s vindication of Bonaventure’s assimilation of Joachim, is the notion of 
divine revelation? Precisely so, for Milbank’s argument does not proceed on the basis 
of human cultural construction isolated from the action and speech of the divine, but 
rather deeply includes it: this imaginative account of tradition, indeed, comprises “the 
 
73 Ibid., 127. Presumably by ethos here Milbank means “ethics,” since ethos in Greek means “habit.”  
74 This flies in the face of Aristotle’s On Interpretation, and so the thought of Milbank (and Ricœur) 
dovetails with Derrida’s critique of On Interpretation as articulated in chapter 1 (“The End of the Book 
and the Beginning of Writing”) of On Grammatology. Derrida, On Grammatology, 6–26. 
75 Milbank, “Christological Poetics,” 127.  
76 For this connection I thank Philipp Rosemann.  
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poetic encounter with God.”77 Milbank, indeed, embraces the traditional 
understanding that nature itself is revelatory. Yet, for him, so is culture:   
The created natural order shows God to us, to be sure, 
but there is only a conscious awareness of God if he 
stands ‘ahead of us’ in the realm of ‘objective spirit’ 
that is human culture.78 
 
Further, “… because our cultural products confront us and are not ‘in our control’ … 
somewhere among them God of his own free will finds the space to confront us also.” 
Over and against modern liberal positivistic notions of religion, this implies that 
revelation is always bound up with “the normal processes of history.” Always 
mediated by the material, “the event of revelation is … the intersection of the divine 
and human creations.” In a kind of “dialectic of the human and divine spirit,”79 God 
“overtakes” the creative act to reveal himself to us “without in any way violating the 
range of natural human intent.”80  
 In answering the question, “What difference does Christ make to this picture?” 
Milbank next argues that this developing “intersection of the divine … and human” in 
the cultural life of the old covenant people of God climaxes dramatically in the 
“absolute identity” of Jesus Christ. The “cunning of poetic reason doubled by the 
divine command of our intent” intensifies to the point of absolute identity in Jesus 
Christ: “Jesus Christ realizes is his own person the Father’s work because he is the 
Father’s proper work, the radiance of glory which is not dissociable from the radiance 
of the Father’s very being.”81  
Again:  
 
 
 
 
77 Ibid., 130.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid., 131. 
80 Ibid, 130. This claim is consistent with Kathryn Tanner’s notion of “noncompetitive transcendence,” 
in which divine and human agency, each in its respective freedom, are seen as working together 
harmoniously. See Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 79ff. 
Two examples from the Bible to illustrate this point come to mind: the institution of kingship in the 
Old Testament, commenced with an unfaithful intent, but later redeemed by God in a way free of any 
violation of human freedom; and the Gospel’s portrayal of the “betrayal” of Judas, which turns out to 
play a key role in the redemption wrought in Christ.  
81 Milbank, “Christological Poetics,” 135. 
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Nothing can prove … the perfection of Jesus’ human 
work, for if it is perfect, then the work itself must define 
the character of perfection. Yet once we are convinced 
that we are glimpsing such perfection, are we also not 
glimpsing the perfection of God? The entire problematic 
of the divine overtaking of human purpose in the OT 
points to the coincidence of the divine presence within 
the human telos.82 
 
There is no external standard. If this figura (that is, the poetic “production” of Jesus 
Christ83) is privileged with regard to God, then it is privileged with regard to the 
human race. Christ, then, is the fulfillment of the human telos.84  
 By identifying himself with the Eucharistic bread of ritual enactment, Christ, in an 
unprecedented way, “placed himself in the order of signs.”85 So Christ becomes a 
cultural production, an artifact of poesis, in a uniquely intense way. As is the case 
with all other signs of poesis, Christ is subject to subsequent development in ways 
that are “risky”:  
The words of Maundy Thursday and the acts of Good 
Friday … compose a poetic act characterized by an 
‘overtaking,’ such that the intention of the sign is only 
fully realized in the full outcome of its explication…. For 
a sign does not have the restricted material potency of an 
unfinished living being, but the more universally open, 
active potency of a finished, definable, artifact.86  
 
In summary of his overall point about the role of revelation in the development of 
history by means of tradition, Milbank writes that “… Christ is the unexpected 
fulfillment of human intent, the proper word for God, and the true fulfillment of 
Creation in the realm of human works.”87 
 As riveting as Milbank’s account is, however, it would be fruitless for the 
purposes of this chapter, which is an argument for the eidos of history, if it did not 
take this conceptually developmental unfolding of the narrative of Scripture and the 
mythos of Christ, and extend it into the period of subsequent history, the centuries 
after Christ, the epoch which Bonaventure regards as the second week of history. 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Christ is “produced” both by his own practice, and by the non-identical repetition of his identity, 
both in the Gospels / New Testament, and also in oral tradition in the church.  
84 Ibid., 137. 
85  The phrase is that of Maurice de Taille. Ibid., 138.  
86 Ibid., 138.  
87 Ibid., 139. 
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Indeed, this is precisely what Milbank does in the final movement of his essay, for 
according to him, the role of the church is to continue the poetic activity begun (or at 
least “inaugurated as rupture”) in the Old Testament and fulfilled in Christ. But … 
how? We recognize that “our lives are nothing but an interpretation of Christ as 
presented to us in the Scripture and in the Sacraments.”88  
 In the words of Meister Eckhart, “Christ the Logos is conceived in us again,”89 in 
our own very words.  Just as Mary’s assent, her “fiat,” is a response to the reception, 
her reception, of the history of Israel, a response which grows and develops beyond 
her conscious attempt, so also for us: it is the same for us every time we assent to 
God’s will. “Because Christ’s person is present only in and through his work, this 
means that it is present in the relations that he enters into with other people and the 
things of this world.”90 
 Christ appeals to us in a totally non-violent, unconstraining way. We see this in 
that “he … established his work in what humankind made of him, namely a crucified 
body.” In the death of Christ, the worst tragedy imaginable has been brought into the 
catena of human poetics, and has been “overtaken” on the far side of death, in the 
resurrection. Because this is an unrepeatable origin, violence is now exhausted and 
has no subsequent role in the nonidentical repetition of the christic myth. From now 
until the eschaton, Milbank thinks, we are called to “look to the day when all flesh 
shall see him together,” but we do this “only as makers.”91  
 In closing, we can see how Milbank’s “Christological poetics” complements and 
confirms Ratzinger’s genealogical approach. Both envision a kind of historical 
process in which a real development takes place, but also in which no single human 
mind has a total grasp—much less control—of how the development will unfold or 
what its ultimate telos will be, for each “maker” acts and makes in the throws, in the 
Geworfenheit, of historical contingency. And yet it remains the case, however, that 
one can discern—so it is claimed—a providential, “telic” ordering in which the 
pattern or eidos of history is manifest.  
 
 
88 Ibid., 139. Note that this is closely connected to the medieval “tropological” meaning of Scripture, in 
which our lives become a “trope” of the text.  
89 Ibid., 140 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 142.  
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III. A Rejoinder to Milbank’s critique of Ratzinger 
  Twenty years after his “Christological poetics,” John Milbank revisited this 
theme of the historical unfolding and development of tradition, in the context of a 
meditation on the history-based thought of Charles Péguy.92 Within that context, 
moreover, Milbank mounts a critique—somewhat surprisingly, given the 
confirmation and confluence we just witnessed—of Ratzinger’s alignment with 
Bonaventure in terms of the logos of history. While admitting the validity of some of 
Milbank’s criticisms of the Bavarian theologian, at the same time it is the aim of this 
final section to respond to Milbank’s criticisms and defend Ratzinger, to the end of 
showing that Ratzinger’s approach—to detract not at all from Peguy’s—remains a 
successful articulation of the meaning of history, not least in its Neoplatonically 
resonant reliance upon mythos as the imagined double of history.  
 I want to focus my response to two overarching moves Milbank makes in his 
criticism of what he takes to be an anti-Augustinian eschatology supported by 
Ratzinger. Milbank first identifies two of Joachim’s errors purportedly adopted by 
Bonaventure: the Calabrian’s affirmation of “specific parallels [of ‘events occurring 
since Christ’] to Old Testament events” and of “a new era post-Christ [which would 
give] way to a new era of the Spirit.”93 Then, secondly, he puts forth five criticisms of 
Bonaventure himself, completely independently of Joachim, which I will list and 
respond to below.  
 First, however, to the twin Joachite errors of the one-to-one correspondences and 
the third period of history. While Milbank rightly reports Bonaventure’s rejection of 
the third week (thus eliminating our need to discuss it further), he flatly states that the 
Minister General upheld the Calabrian’s notion of the one-to-one concordiae. 
However, there is a reason I omitted this position from my list above in summary of 
Bonaventure’s position according to Ratzinger,94 in the wake of the Joachite 
revolution. The reason I do not agree that one can simply maintain that Bonaventure 
took over Joachim’s element-to-element correspondence is that, simply put, each 
 
92 John Milbank, “There’s always one day which isn’t the same as the day before: Christianity and 
History after Charles Péguy,” in Theologies of Retrieval: and Exploration and Appraisal, ed. Darren 
Sarisky, (New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 9–36. 
93 Milbank, “Always one day,” 18. I do not know know why Milbank isolates these particular Joachite 
errors as opposed to others, for example the Calabrian’s embrace of chiliasm, which Ratzinger says 
was “declared heretical … and excluded from the universal church….” Ratzinger, Theology of History, 
96.  
94 See above, ch. 5, section III.  
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binary relationship, for Bonaventure, passes through Christ the Medium. At the very 
least, one must admit, on the basis of Bonaventure’s insistence that Christ is the hinge 
or joint between the two weeks of history, that his position is not tantamount here to a 
simple repetition of Joachim, for whom Christ is decentered as one of two joints, 
connecting the first and second segments of a three-fold historical division.  
 And yet, for all his appreciation of the Calabrian, Bonaventure’s departure from 
and discontinuity with Joachim, precisely in this hermeneutical matter of the 
concordiae, runs deeper than simply assigning to Christ the middle position as 
historical center. Beyond just this, it is also clear that, into the web of relationships 
between Old Testament elements and those of the New, Bonaventure injects his own 
version (admittedly) of the Augustinian totus Christus. Bonaventure’s position, that 
is, is a hybrid between Joachite concordiae and the Augustinian totus Christus.  
By means of typological explanation, the Passion of 
Jesus is extended from the “Head” to the “Body.” In the 
case of Jesus’ own sufferings, there was first light, then 
darkness, then light again. Similarly, the Mystical Body 
must go this way of suffering….95 
 
In this context Ratzinger argues that Bonaventure employs totus Christus to 
extrapolate what must be the case for the mystical body. I do not deny that Milbank, 
in good Augustinian form, might still, with just reason, find this particular version of 
the totus Christus problematic. Yet this quotation above should suffice to make it 
clear that Bonaventure’s way of connecting the elements of the Old with those of the 
New is not as crude—not as dismissive of the hermeneutic centrality of Christ—as 
Joachim’s.  
 And yet, I find yet another way of redeeming Bonaventure’s set of 
correspondences, a feature of his thought which, this time, Ratzinger does not make 
explicit. It has to do with the precise way in which he develops the sets of 
correspondences, generating them out of the basic dynamic of “one-to-one,” that is, 
out of the basic dynamic of “letter” to “spirit,” a correspondence which St. Paul 
himself makes explicit in 2 Cor 3:4–6.96 What seems to be going on here is that 
Bonaventure is performing a rational exercise on the basis of his predilection for 
 
95 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 28.  
96 Interestingly, in the relevant passage of the Hexaëmeron, Bonaventure seems to have Gal 4:24ff in 
mind. Bonaventure, Six Days, XV.23 (227); Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XV.23 (401). 
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number as such. In this way, if the basic binary correspondence of letter to law is 
sound, then surely one can extrapolate from a relationship of “unit to unit” to a 
relationship of “compound to compound.” Indeed, Bonaventure’s cogency here is 
seen upon inspection of his “double compound”-to-“double compound” relationship. 
If letter is meaningfully coordinated with spirit, then why should the relationship of 
ante legum97 to sub legum 98 not be coordinated with the relationship of the vocatio 
Gentium to the vocatio Iudeorum? The point is that Bonaventure is not simply 
establishing a corresponding of the first element of the first pair above (ante legum) 
with the first pair of the second pair above (vocatio Gentium). Rather, he is comparing 
a relationship which obtained under the “Old”—the “letter”—to a relationship which 
obtains under the “New”—the “Spirit.” If the basic correspondence of letter to spirit 
(established by the Apostle) holds, then why not a further correspondence which 
simply elaborates the internal structures of the letter and the spirit? Seen in this light, I 
believe that one could see each set-to-set correspondence (two-to-two; three-to-three; 
four-to-four; etc.) as merely an elaboration on the original one-to-one correspondence 
of letter to spirit.99  
 I now turn to Milbank’s second objection above, which can be stated as concern 
that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure envisions an eschatological period—granted, not seen 
as a “third week”—in which, with all-consuming zeal in the Holy Spirit, the finality 
of Christ is eclipsed. On the basis of the Habilitationsschrift itself, however, this is 
simply not the case. Yes, Ratzinger applauds Bonaventure’s expectation of a 
Dionysian sapientia nulliformis which finally transcends all rational knowing, all 
discursive reason. Yet, Ratzinger makes clear, in no way does this eschatological 
mysticism surpass or eclipse Christ: 
When this time arrives, it will be a time of contemplatio, 
a time of the full understanding of Scripture, and in this 
respect, a time of the Holy Spirit who leads us into the 
fullness of the truth of Jesus Christ.100 
 
 
97 That is, the Old Testament period prior to Abraham’s calling, before the law was delivered through 
Moses. 
98 That is, the Old Testament period which took place under the administration of the Mosaic Law.  
99 Ratzinger treats Bonaventure’s generation of the multiple sets of correspondences in section three of 
the first chapter of the book: see Ratzinger, Theology of History, 10–15. For the underlying material in 
Bonaventure upon which Ratzinger is here commenting, see Bonaventure, Hexaëmeron, XV (217–30). 
100 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 55.  
 227 
 But the key to Bonaventure’s thought, as Ratzinger makes clear, is the Seraphic 
Doctor’s ever-present schema of exitus et reditus, conceived in historical terms. For 
this expected eschatological, sapiential mysticism—imagined in Diosysian terms—
amounts to a return to the past, in particular to the historical experience of the 
apostles themselves, as it is alluded to in that all-important text for Bonaventure, 1 
Cor 2:6–7.101 Even as this historical emergence of a democratized sapientia 
nulliformis (no longer limited to the elite “circle of the [apostolic] perfecti”102) 
radically expands the circle of the wise, so also does it achieve a historical repetition, 
a return to the experience of the apostles. Since it is the experience of the apostles of 
the evangelium to which Bonaventurian eschatological history is returning, this in no 
way amounts to an eclipse of Christ, as Ratzinger summarizes near the end of his 
second chapter: 
With this [“the stage of revelation of the final church 
which is to be a church of the perfect”] it becomes 
decisively clear that the revelation of the final age will 
involve neither the abolition of the revelation of Christ 
nor a transcendence of the New Testament. Rather, it 
involves that form of knowledge that the apostles had; 
and thus it will be the true fulfillment of the New 
Testament revelation which has been understood only 
imperfectly up til now.103 
 
Perhaps one can still find reasons to scruple with this eschatological formulation; the 
purported eclipse of Christ is surely not one of them.  
 Beyond these two Joachite distinctives which Milbank thinks Bonaventure 
upholds, however, the founder of the theological movement known as Radical 
Orthodoxy goes on to discuss no less than five additional weaknesses which 
characterize Bonaventure, quite independently of Joachim.104 Milbank takes 
 
101 “Yet among the mature, we do impart wisdom, although it is not a wisdom of this age or of the 
rulers of this age, who are doomed to pass away. But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of 
God….” This wisdom, quam nec oculos vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor humanis ascendit, is what 
Paul imparted to Timothy and Dioysius, according to Bonaventure. See Ratzinger, Theology of History, 
62–3.  
102 Ibid., 44.  
103 Ibid., 93.  
104 One of Milbank’s criticisms (that is, a sixth), that of Bonaventure’s acceptance of the Avicennian 
account of the multiplicity of Platonic forms, is beyond the scope of this essay to address. Milbank 
makes this accusation in the context of a larger diatribe against the Franciscan mentality in general, 
diatribe with which I am largely sympathetic. Milbank, “Always one day,” 20 n. 22. 
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Ratzinger to task for apparently upholding these as well, and so I address them in the 
following points: 
• Bonaventure’s acceptance of Joachim’s stance that Christ is not the end of 
history.105  As Milbank later admits, Ratzinger also regards Christ as the 
end.106 I would add that, if Christ is truly an “event” with all of the 
corresponding mythic endowments, as Milbank confesses both in 
“Christological Poetics” but also in “Always one day,” then he could be both 
center and end, for example, just as the end of a story can be foreshadowed in 
the middle of the narrative. In addition, consider that if Christ is not only the 
end (of the first half of something), but also the origin (of the second half of 
that same thing, as Milbank says that he is in “Always one day”), then this, ipso 
facto, makes Christ the Center. Hence not only can Christ be both the end and 
the center; he can even be the end, the center, and the beginning. One suspects 
that Bonaventure would agree with my assessment here, for elsewhere in his 
corpus he similarly employs a geometric analogy in order to show how God 
defies ordinary rational assumptions or even canons of logic. God, he says, is 
“sphaera intelligibis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam.”107 
If God is both center and circumference, then why deny that Christ is both center 
and end? In a similar vein, Ratzinger’s treatment of Bonaventure’s cosmic-historical 
pattern of exit and return also makes it clear that, since Christ is the center of the 
world’s journey out of, and back into, God, then one could also say that Christ is the 
end (finis) of the world’s journey out of God. Hence, in this sense, Bonaventure is 
clearly saying that Christ is not just the center, but also the end. 
• Bonaventure’s embrace of the characteristic, Franciscan, bifurcated 
telos.108 On this point I fully agree that subsequent developments in the history 
of Western thought do bifurcate the human telos between immanent ends and 
transcendent ends. This interpretation is consistent, for example, with Löwith’s 
“secularization thesis” in which modern secular historiographies of progress 
turn out to be secularized versions of Christian eschatologies.109 I also admit, 
 
105 Ibid., 18.  
106 Ibid., 21–2. 
107 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 144. 
108 Ibid., 19.   
109 For an apt summary of Löwith’s secularization thesis, see Robert M. Wallace, “Secularization and 
Modernity,” 64–8. 
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per my material above, that before Bonaventure Joachim tended to “take 
matters into his own hands” and bring about apocalyptic ruptures and 
“inbreakings” by way of various tactics and “managerial” strategies. However, 
with regard to Bonaventure himself, I see no evidence from the Hexaëmeron or 
from Ratzinger’s research that he is guilty of such bifurcation, any more than 
other forms of affirming the inbreaking of the eschaton—such as St. Paul 
himself affirms—do. See, e.g., St. Paul’s use of the “first fruits” (Gk. 
ἀρραβων)—2 Cor 1:22; 2 Cor 5:5; Eph 1:4. In this context Milbank points out the 
emerging research into Franciscan christologies which might prove problematic.110  
I am open to such conclusions, even as I keep in mind the verdict of scholars such as 
van Steenberghen who regard much of the problematic character of Franciscanism 
as arising after Bonaventure, with the emergence of medieval, neo-Augustinianism, 
seen, for example, in the thought of John Peckham.111 
• Bonaventure’s privileging of emotion and will over the intellect.112 A 
hugely complex issue, I deal with the role of affect—the “middle portion of the 
soul” for both Plato and Aristotle—in my chapter four above. Again I balk at 
the temptation to address this issue in terms of Franciscanism in general. When 
it comes to Bonaventure, however, it is important to see that his all-important 
desire—as in “no man can enter into mystical contemplation unless, like 
Daniel, he be a man of desires”—is never unhinged from the presence of a 
rational telos (i.e., the beatific vision) as it is for moderns (such as Hume). 
Rather for Bonaventure desire is always desire for God, and as such, it does not 
seem to be privileged over the intellect. When one remembers the point of my 
chapter four—that it is the mythos of Scripture which forms our desires 
“dianoetically”, or as a function of our reading of Scripture—this point is 
underlined. 
• Bonaventure’s endorsement of “spiritual contemplation” at the expense of 
faith’s communal dimension.113 Given the intensity of Bonaventure’s opening 
three collationes which are addressed to his fellow confreres and stress the 
issue of audience, I do not see how this is the case. Plus, Ratzinger’s emphasis 
 
110 Milbank, “Always one day,” 19–20 n. 21. 
111 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 128. 
112 Milbank, “Always one day,” 19.  
113 Ibid., 19 and especially 19 n. 21.  
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that it is the interpretation of the church as a community which for 
Bonaventure is all important casts doubt on this position of Milbank’s. To wit:  
… the deep meaning of Scripture in which we truly find 
the ‘revelation’ and the content of faith is not left up to 
the individual. It has already been objectified in part in 
the teachings of the Fathers and in theology so that the 
basic lines are accessible simply by the acceptance of the 
Catholic faith, which — as it summarized in the 
Symbolum— is a principle of exegesis. Here we find a 
new insight into the identification of sacra scriptura and 
theologia.114  
 
• Bonaventure’s anti-institutionalism.115  The way in which Bonaventure 
privileges the prudential needs of his order during his tenure as Minister 
General, guiding him in his decision to oppose the Spiritual Franciscans (and 
acquiesce to the banishment of John of Parma) and to refuse the identification 
with his de facto order with that eschatological order of the Poverello—all 
narrated in chapter one, above—undermines this claim of Milbank’s. 
*  *  *  *  * 
 In the end Milbank’s essay amounts to confirmation of my overall reading of 
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure: that, as in chapter two, scientia is not to be privileged over 
historia/mythos and that, as chapter three seeks to show, history requires and 
presupposes mythos. Even the argument of chapter four—that human affect is 
absolutely central to the historical pilgrimage of man—resonates with Péguy’s 
emphasis of mystique, for surely this phenomenon engages not just sterile reason but, 
more profoundly, those emotions (patriotism, pride, thumos, etc.) located in the 
“middle portion” of the soul, that is to say, human affect.  
 As noted above, Milbank nestles this critique of certain Franciscan tendencies 
within a rendition of Péguy’s approach to history, undergirded by Milbank’s 
conviction that Péguy’s logos of history116 is profoundly non-Joachite (a claim with 
which I do not disagree). And since the bulk of my larger project is to present the 
logos of history of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure in terms that resonate precisely with the 
approach of Péguy, allow me to comment on this material. I do so under three 
headings—all themes of Péguy’s—of mystique (as opposed to politique), origin (in 
 
114 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 66-7. 
115 Ibid., 23.  
116 This is my phase, as it does not appear in Milbank’s essay.  
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opposition to “lay positivist historicism”), tradition (as opposed to “exhaustive,” 
documented history).  
 First, with regard to mystique,117 recall the founding, constitutive importance of 
St. Francis to that polity that was (and is) the Order of Friars Minor. The whole aura 
of the Poverello saturated the ethos of the Order in ways so profound that they are 
difficult to fathom. This is true in terms of the collective memory of the stigmata, of 
the repeated injunction to interpret his regula sine glossa,118 and of the attempt on the 
part of the mendicants, over the decades from his death to the time of Bonaventure, to 
emulate his poverty. Nothing could be more important to the vision of Bonaventure—
and hence, for my purposes, for Ratzinger—than mystique, in particular the mystique 
of St. Francis.  
 Second, Milbank rehearses Péguy’s creative emphasis on the origin. Far from an 
absolute datum which takes place independently of any human perception or 
cognizance, the origin is always already interpreted in the light of some kind of pre-
given memory. Hence,  
The event is already the second as well as the first item 
in a series. It is its own memorial and must have 
occurred twice in order to have occurred once.119 
 
In short, such a notion accords well with my larger point, rooted in the example of 
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure, for whom the historia salutis is all-important, that there is 
no history, no historical event, without mythos, and this in a way which is structurally 
in accord with the role of the forms in Christian Neoplatonist thought.  
 Third and last, Péguy’s conception of tradition, as Milbank presents it, comports 
nicely with my own approach to Ratzinger’s Bonaventure. Writes Milbank:  
 
 
 
 
 
117 Milbank’s definition of mystique: “… an interpersonally shared” set of ritual practices (and one 
could add “stories and myths” precisely like those about St. Francis) which “link together the material 
and the symbolic and whose logic remains ineffable, and, for just that reason, vital and inspiring.” 
Milbank, “Always one day,” 12–13. As mentioned in chapter three above in the context of Pickstock’s 
discussion, Péguy’s stock example here is the storming of the Bastille. Ibid., 10–11.  
118 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 40. 
119 Milbank, “Always one day,” 14.  
 232 
… since an event only exists as repeated can one really 
detach oneself from the past to produce only objective 
history, while even subjective history is problematic, 
since the same historical indeterminacy attends the 
questions of who one really is and what one’s notions 
really amount to in the present. The only possible history 
would then consist in a mediation between the objective 
and the subjective which would demand a submissive 
fidelity to some past horizon of significance and at the 
same time a commitment further to explore that horizon 
in the future.120 
 
The way in which Ratzinger’s Bonaventure approaches tradition fully accords with 
this description, in ways we have seen in my overall essay above. Ratzinger’s notion 
of revelation as communally interpreted deconstructs the difference between the 
subjective and the objective. Bonaventure’s theoriae multiformes embody the 
“commitment” which Bonaventure sees as belonging to the church in its future 
interpretations of Scripture. And the non-identical repetition of the rule, life, and 
values, and spirit of St. Francis align perfectly with the above notion of “fidelity to 
some past horizon” (even if Bonaventure was wrong to exalt the Poverello to such a 
lofty redemptive-historical status).  
 Conclusion  
 If one is cogently to regard history as having an eidos, then one must achieve 
some kind of grasp of the whole, of the entirety of history. In order to achieve this 
grasp, however, one must somehow account for that portion of history which, from 
our vantage point, lies in the future. In this chapter I have tried to argue that such a 
grasp of the historical whole—including future history—is what Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure succeeds in achieving, or at least pointing the way for us to achieve. 
Prior to this chapter, I had focused more on the formal (or eidetic) dimensions of 
Bonaventurian history—on its mythological basis, its pattern of exit and return, its 
progressive structure from first intellect, through dianoia (including the dianoetic 
formation of human affect), and finally culminating in final intellect. In this chapter, 
though, I have presented major elements of the content of Bonaventurian 
(eschatological) history, which by necessity involves a discussion of his reception of 
Joachim.  
 
120 Ibid., 15.  
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 Instead of abdicating such an effort to see the whole by relegating any meaningful 
sense of history as an illusion, Bonaventure modifies Joachim’s content and charts a 
course such that history is building toward a meaningful telos, one which is 
simultaneously a return to the apostolic experience. Is this telos the absolute full and 
final end of history? For Bonaventure, not quite: he preserves the salutary ambiguity 
and humility of any faithful eschatology. Yet he does succeed in his attempt to paint a 
picture of history as a whole, imagined as mythos, which is utterly meaningful.  
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Conclusion 
 The history of intellectual thought in the West can be viewed as an ongoing 
dialogue between logos and mythos. In this essay I have attempted to bring 
Ratzinger’s Bonaventure into that dialectic.  
 It is well known that Bonaventure’s Hexaëmeron contains an anti-Aristotelian 
polemic, in which the Minister General is reacting to the rise of a kind of scientific 
revolution taking place in intellectual culture, including the University of Paris. There 
various of Bonaventure’s colleagues, notably certain members of the Arts Faculty, are 
becoming enamored with a new toolkit of conceptual apparata, apparata found in the 
“rediscovered” works of the Stagirite, finally gaining official entry into curriculum of 
the Arts Faculty in 1255, already on the heels of several decades of deep influence.  
 It is this anti-Aristotelian polemic which Joseph Ratzinger begins to introduce, 
when, near the beginning of his 1959 Habilitationsschrift entitled Die 
Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura, he states that, when Bonaventure 
returned from his Mt. Alverna retreat to the University of Paris, he returned “as an 
outsider to point out the limits of science from the perspective of faith.”1 
 What is the nature of the anti-Aristotelian polemic which Bonaventure levies 
against the Aristotelianism of his day? It is not simply an anti-scientific argument. 
Rather, for Ratzinger, it has to do with history, or what one might call a logos of 
history. For there is no logos of history in Aristotle, and for Ratzinger’s Bonaventure, 
this is a serious problem.  
 One could summarize Ratzinger’s point with the dictum that there is no such thing 
as metaphysics without history. Hence the import of Ratzinger’s claim that 
Bonaventure’s Hexaemeron is a new “high-point” in the theology of history, 
following Augustine’s City of God.”2 That there is no metaphysics without history is 
the nature of the anti-Aristotelian polemic. 
 Why is Aristotle so averse to history? He lays out his answer to this question in 
his Poetics. The bottom line is that for him the historian—he cites Herodotus by 
name—deals only with particulars such as Alcibiades, or Callias, or Isaac, who was 
begotten of Abraham. Dealing only with particulars like these, history for Aristotle is 
 
1 Ratzinger, Theology of History, 3.  
2 Ibid., v. 
 235 
a matter of mere tyche. That is, it is radically unlike epistêmê, which proceeds on the 
basis of universals, and hence with necessity.  
 It turns out, then, that Ratzinger’s Bonaventure is correct: for Aristotle history is 
irrelevant to man’s search for truth. Whatever the historia salutis is, for Aristotle, it 
has absolutely no import.  
 What is interesting about Aristotle’s rendition in the Poetics, however, is that, 
while he sets up an opposition (not a potentially fruitful dialectic) between these two 
kinds of discourse (epistêmê and historia) he also discusses a third form of discourse, 
what he calls mythos, narrative, story. What does he like about mythos? Unlike 
historia, it bears a certain distinct resemblance to epistêmê in that it is quasi-universal. 
Admittedly, it does not traffic in abstract universals, but it does proceed on the basis 
of typoi, or types: types of people, types of situations, types of personality. These 
types, I claim, are for Aristotle quasi-universal. 
 What Aristotle fails to see about mythos, however, is that not only is it quasi-
universal, but it is also quasi-particular, as I show in chapter two above. C. S. Lewis 
makes this point in his article “Myth become Fact,” but others also make the point, 
including Roger Fowler. It turns out that mythos—quasi-universal and quasi-
particular—is a discourse “in-between.” It is a metaxological discourse which marries 
science and history, mediating the difference between them, allowing them to kiss.  
 Aristotle’s reference to mythos directed me to read Bonaventure with the notion of 
mythos or story in mind. The argument of my dissertation is that, while Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure argues that there is no metaphysics without history, we should also take 
the further step and say that there is no history without mythos. It turns out that, when 
one reads the Hexaëmeron (and Ratzinger’s treatment of it) through this lens, it 
generates wonderful clarity and fecundity. 
 Privileging the ordo scientiae over the ordo historiae, the good Scholastic St. 
Thomas clearly privileges logos over mythos. Not so for Bonaventure, it seems clear 
to me, and not so for Ratzinger. For them, mythos is (at least) equally ultimate with 
logos, and in this they are in good company, a company consisting of many important 
thinkers, not least Plato himself.  
 In the remainder of this conclusion I want to provide some implications of each 
respective chapter, showing that together they form a larger argument. Then, before 
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giving a final conclusion, I will admit to a couple of themes which are still in need of 
further development.   
 First, however, I need to provide a clarification.  
I. A hermeneutic clarification 
This essay does not aspire to be a work of historical theology. That is, its aim has 
not been to attend to the latest research into the doctrinal distinctiveness of St. 
Bonaventure, for example paying close attention to the precise ways in which he 
assimilates or deviates from the positions of his predecessors such as the Victorines 
(who were relatively underappreciated in Ratzinger’s day).  Rather, this dissertation is 
an exercise in philosophical hermeneutics, attempting to perform a systematic, 
synchronic analysis of Ratzinger’s Bonaventure, selecting various tools appropriate to 
that task—for example Greek conceptual terms (dianoia, mythos) whose provenance 
is far removed from Bonaventure’s culture. Rather than engage in deep historical 
research into the conceptual ingredients of Bonaventure’s doctrine of God (for 
example), it has tried to bring a structural analysis to bear upon Ratzinger’s 
Bonaventure for the purposes of shedding light upon the philosophy of history. No 
historical theologian in her right mind, for example, would read Bonaventure’s days 
of creation through the hermeneutical lens of Plato’s Divided Line. Yet this is 
precisely what I have done, insisting that it lays bare a phenomenology of mind which 
both Plato and Bonaventure share, even as Bonaventure imports into the Line 
additional rich theological categories and resources developed over centuries of 
Christian tradition. Moreover, this structural analysis finds fertile dialogue partners in 
twentieth-century hermeneutic philosophers such as Gadamer and Ricœur, and it is 
confirmed by Ratzinger. 
II. Chapter implications 
In chapter one we noticed that, in their respective biographies, both Bonaventure 
and Ratzinger deal centrally with the issues of science and history/eschatology. While 
Bonaventure reacts to the rise of Aristotelian scientia on the one hand and Joachite 
eschatology on the other, for Ratzinger the presenting issues are the historical-critical 
method (as a variant of modern science more generally) as well as the emerging threat 
of liberation theology and the eschatological underpinnings of HCM. The similarities 
here, together with the difficulties each experienced in completing their respective 
texts dealing with the logos of history, are striking. In a work attending to the 
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meaning of history, it makes sense to pay close attention to the history of each 
thinker’s actual life. In the case of Bonaventure in particular, one can see his careful 
prudence (phônêsis) in the way he cared for the well-being of his Franciscan order, 
allowing such practical considerations to affect his eventual articulation of 
eschatology. Such a prudential way-of-being in the world is not without philosophical 
implication.  
After verifying Ratzinger’s claim, implicit in his Bonaventure book, that his 
historical predecessor has sound reason to oppose Aristotle on the basis of the latter’s 
stance with respect to history, chapter two amounts to a non-positivistic 
historiography. How is one to put into words the truth about the past? Appealing to 
mythos as the “imagined double” of res gesta, Catherine Pickstock employs 
Kierkegaard and Péguy (as well as Origen and Irenaeus) to the end that non-identical 
repetition gives us access to the past in ways that are deeply resonant with the logic of 
Platonic form. And since mythos is the discourse in-between science and history—a 
claim amounting to an incipient ontology of fiction—we have a language and a 
grammar for this putting the past into words.  
If chapter two puts forth a historiography rooted in an ontology of fiction, then 
chapter three applies and contributes to critical theory. After a close reading of 
Plato’s Divided Line which then becomes a hermeneutic key for Bonaventure’s days 
of creation, I employ Paul Ricoœur to show how narrative actually structures human 
thought. Among the dynamics shared by mind and narrative is the movement from 
parts to whole, as we see in Confessions XI. While Ricœur relies on ancient 
Augustine and postmodern Heidegger to argue his case, I show that medieval 
Bonaventure, too, serves as an effective case study to make the same point, including 
when read through the lens of Ratzinger.  
In chapter two mythos structures history, while in chapter three it structures 
thought. What is the relationship, then, between history and thought? Refusing the 
Hegelian move to identify them, I have tried to show that they are both constituted by 
mythos.  
And yet, for Bonaventure this account, as I have summarized it thus far, suffers 
from a gaping lack, for it has up to now said virtually nothing about desire (and its 
formation), without which one will not reach the final fulfillment of beatitude. So it is 
that in chapter four I supplement the above “eidetic” structural reading with an 
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emphasis that is more holistic, one which the existentialism of Kierkegaard shares. 
Bonaventure thinks that desire is formed and shaped on day three, part and parcel 
with the mythos of Scripture.  
An important implication of this feature of Bonaventure’s account—that desire is 
formed by the reading of Scripture on “day three”—is that it clarifies the nature of 
faith. What is faith? In addition to the intellectus fidei of day two, it is also a way of 
being, a style of faithful, emotional comportment, over the course of day three, in and 
through the vicissitudes of temporal existence. On day three, Scripture provides us 
with a “narrative therapy” (Ricœur) which spurs us toward our final destination in the 
patria.  Superior to Aristotelian scientia, Bonaventurian dianoia is holistically 
inclusive of the entire human person. 
Hence, in this chapter we further see that the equal ultimacy of mythos with logos 
mirrors the equal ultimacy of affectus with mind.  
If history takes the form of a mythos, then one ought—following the above logic 
involving “the whole,” a persistent theme of Ratzinger’s—to be able to speak about it 
as a whole. It is the whole, after all, to which the parts lead, and which it is the special 
role of the intellect to grasp. Yet how can one speak of the whole of history, when we 
have not yet reached its end? Chapters four and five, in essence, make an 
eschatological point, that we are in a position tantamount, as it were, to that of the 
slave boy in the Meno before he deduces the Pythagorean theorem: while we lack the 
complete res gesta, we are already in possession of the “imagined double” in the form 
of the apocalyptically and eschatologically saturated biblical story. The interpretation 
of this story is an admittedly mammoth task, and yet, it does provide an entire plot, a 
complete movement (of exit and return), a comprehensive narrative arc. Otherwise, it 
is not a mythos. It is in this sense that history, as a whole, is characterized by what 
Voegelin calls an eidos.  
Thirteen centuries after the Ascension of Christ, Joachim and Bonaventure rightly 
see that, in their cultural moment, a more complete historical picture can be painted 
than that of Augustine. Even if Ratzinger stops short of exalting Francis to the degree 
that Bonaventure does, he still agrees that the momentous events centered on the 
Poverello suggest that the “history has ended with Christ” model, while valid in 
important ways, is insufficient. Bonaventure’s assimilation of the Calabrian, his sic et 
non to Joachim, preserves his sense of telic historical progression which is a specific 
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form of intelligibility. He does this, even as he looks into the eyes of his beloved 
confreres, full of “spiritually Franciscan” zeal and hope. Not all questions are 
answered or issues resolved, but Bonaventure’s picture does, I hold, consistently 
follow from the constitutive nature of mythos. This hermeneutic key of mine, then, 
vindicates Ratzinger’s vindication of Bonaventure.  
III. Further implications yet to be developed 
 I can think of two major issues entailed by this study which I hope to work on in 
the future. The first is the straightforward matter of establishing a more rigorous 
theological account of the eschaton.  I have come to the conclusion that time is, in 
fact, without terminus or beginning, but that this cannot be said simpliciter of 
chronotic time. When Bonaventure says that tempus is one of four fundamental 
elements of creation, he is not simply referring to chronos. The presence of these 
alternate modes of time in Bonaventure’s account allows him an approach to 
eschatology which does full justice to the Origenist point about the eternality of 
creation, a point which is not rationally incoherent. However, one must also say with 
Bonaventure that our human history is constituted by a real beginning and a real end, 
it seems to me. Of course, this human history itself could in theory be a single 
installment of a larger, potentially never-ending story involving other kinds of time 
(as we glimpse in Bonaventure). However, even here I must say that if non-
chronological time is unlimited (without beginning point or terminus), then it seems 
that it must somehow pass into and out of God and God’s absolute non-temporality. I 
hope to build on my dissertation research in an attempt to answer some of these 
questions and to develop some of these instincts. Sadly I was not able to make more 
progress on them in the current essay.  
 Another theme which I was unable to develop, but which is pointed to by this 
study, is the relationship between philosophy and theology. It does seem to follow 
from this study that philosophy depends upon theology in a straightforwardly 
conceptual way, and also in a more historicist way. First, Pieper’s account in chapter 
five above is apt: the necessary condition for any philosophy of history is some kind 
of underlying mythos, what one might call the “other” of philosophy, just as Hegel 
appeals to God the Son (a mythological element, or at least an element connected to a 
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mythos) in his Philosophy of Spirit.3 This is straightforward enough, it seems: either 
there is no such thing as a philosophy of history, or it is dependent upon theology, the 
latter relying as it does upon the biblical mythos.  
 But the more interesting dependence of philosophy upon theology is a historical 
one, or a historicist one. As Emanuel Falque argues in his work on Bonaventure,4 the 
concept of God has entered into the historical consciousness of philosophy, and 
cannot be “unremembered.” One sees this historical consciousness of (the concept of) 
God, revealed during the course of history, not just in Hegel, but in contemporary 
thinkers such Deleuze and Agamben. The theological nature of these thinkers 
suggests that the historical condition for the possibility of at least some philosophies 
is theological in nature, a suggestion related to my dissertation. Sadly, for now it will 
have to go unexplored.  
*   *  *  *  * 
 I began this last unit of my essay with some final remarks on the myth’s first 
“other,” scientia. I close by addressing its other “other,” history.  
 Like Josef Pieper’s The End of Time, Catherine Pickstock’s Repetition and 
Identity compellingly suggests that, in a unique way, Christian Neoplatonism is 
hospitable to history. That is, there is something about Christian Neoplatonism which 
unlike other philosophical approaches does not exclude history from philosophical 
consideration. 
 In chapter four (“The Repeated Sign”) of the book, Pickstock seamlessly 
transitions, with no apparent difficulty, from a discussion of ontology to a discussion 
of history (or the logos of history). In fact, on the basis of this chapter, we can say 
that, for Christian Neoplatonism, unlike most other philosophical approaches 
(inimical to history), the logos of history is no more problematic than the logos of 
entities in the world, or ontology. How can this be? 
 It has to do with the Forms, which Pickstock also describes as (closely related to) 
the “imagined double” of any given thing, including the universe or world as a whole. 
If any given apple is, at the same time, not-another-apple and also not-a-tomato 
(entities which are wholly imagined or remembered), its intelligibility hinges on this 
 
3 G.W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, tr. W. Wallace & A. V. Miller, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2010), §383 (18).  
4 Falque, Entrance of God.  
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imagined double, and this kind of reasoning is no less applicable to the world as a 
whole. 
 And since the world, or nature, is a meta-indexical whole (that is, it does not point 
to some other item in the world; it is “beyond indicating”), the question emerges: does 
its meaning reside in or rely on some higher, or other, reality? That is, if the world is 
beautiful, then it must rely on some notion or idea or reality of beauty which is not 
itself contained in or constrained by the world. So, either it is not beautiful, or its 
beauty depends on some higher reality (in which case its meaning does rely on a 
“higher” reality).  
 But what Pickstock implies—and here is the point—is that the apple and the 
world are no different than, say, the history of the French Revolution, and in 
particular the storming of the Bastille. Just as the apple is intelligible only because of 
the alternative apple or the non-apple, so also the set of “real” space-time, physical 
events which led to the overthrow of the Ancien Régime in France near the end of the 
eighteenth century are only intelligible on the basis of an imagined history, that is, an 
imagined narrative.5  
 As for the apple, so also for the storming of the Bastille (or any other historical 
event or development). This is the case for Christian Neoplatonism, but not for 
modern, secular, alternative philosophical approaches. Christian Neoplatonism 
confidently embraces a philosophy of history, but other approaches (from 
Aristotelianism to Kantianism) cannot.  
 Hence, history is no longer off limits to the philosophical quest for truth.  
 Hence, we can once again remain open to history, willing to consider attentively 
whatever it has to say to us. 
 When we do that, we are confronted by certain parameter-shifting considerations, 
having to do with creation, fall, incarnation, resurrection, and new creation (or 
apokatastasis, the redemption of all things).  
 The paradox which all of this implies is astonishingly simple, though as of yet 
unstated. Signaling the God-Man, it is this: the logos of history is mythos.  
  
 
5 The same applies to the history of the individual self, as Kierkegaard suggests in Repetition by appeal 
to the “shadow-existences” which one plays in the theater of one’s own self-imaginings. See 
Kierkegaard, Repetition, 154–5. 
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